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The United Nations and the Control of International Violence: a Legal and Political Analysis

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Soviets have over 100,000 troops in Afghanistan now, it is obvious that forces which Klare considers dedicated to Third World contingencies alone are not the only ones that the Soviets can use to intervene in the Third World. This unnecessary qualification in Klare's comparison of Soviet and American forces make his conclusions unconvincing.

This book sees the ideal of American foreign policy as being one of nonintervention, but does not examine the question of how Soviet interventionism can be either prevented or contained. This is a major shortcoming in Klare's work. As with the other book, if it is morally desirable for the United States not to intervene abroad militarily, surely it is more desirable for all other countries, including the USSR, not to do so either. Again, however, Klare provides no recommendations on how to bring about this more desirable state of affairs.

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Murphy, John F. *The United Nations and the Control of International Violence: a Legal and Political Analysis*. Totowa, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun, 1982. 212pp. \$32.50

This volume by a former occupant of the Stockton Chair of International Law at the Naval War College, with a foreword by Professor Robert S. Wood, the Chairman of the Department of Strategy at that institution, is concerned with the part that the United Nations has

played in the control of international violence. It is divided into two parts, the first dealing with what formerly was known as "war" and now is known by the more euphemistic term "armed conflict"; and the second dealing with such forms of violence as revolutions, wars of assassination, and international terrorism, the latter two being designated by the author as "unconventional violence."

After a brief history of earlier attempts of international organizations to control international violence, Professor Murphy analyzes the United Nations system of maintaining international peace and the manner in which that system has fared in the activities of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretary General, and the International Court of Justice. He examines numerous episodes dealt with by each of these organs, and concludes that in the control of interstate violence the Secretary General is the organ of the United Nations which "has come closest to fulfilling the ideal expectations of the organization's founders"; that the Security Council and the International Court of Justice have performed below expectations; and that the record of the General Assembly is mixed. (In the chapter in which the activities of the General Assembly are discussed at length, he portrays vividly the rise, as well as the decline and fall, of the importance of that body as an institution for the control of interstate violence, which resulted because it became a forum incapable

of taking effective and equitable action with respect to most international conflicts.)

The author's description of the General Assembly's action in defining aggression—a process which began long ago in the League of Nations and which ultimately culminated in the adoption of a definition by consensus in 1974—is succinct. He says that it is “a provision that only the most unimaginative would-be aggressor will not be able to cite in support of its actions.” The total validity of that statement was demonstrated by Argentina when it justified its military occupation of the Falkland Islands in April 1982.

Professor Murphy believes revolutionary violence is the most serious challenge the United Nations has had to face, and he concludes that “it has not proved equal to the task,” although in some instances a positive contribution may be said to have been made to the control of this form of violence. He further observes that the “failure to meet this challenge . . . lies in the reluctance of member states to involve the United Nations in situations involving revolutionary violence.” The vast majority of those same states have no such reluctance when their political interests are involved—with the result that, like its fact-finding, the actions of the United Nations in this respect are all too frequently based, not on fact or on law, but on political prejudice and bias.

With respect to “wars of assassination,” the author points out that in recent years there has been “a virtual

explosion” in this form of surrogate warfare, naming Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq as the prime offenders. He notes that for a variety of reasons most of the states in which such state-supported assassinations have occurred have taken no action against the state responsible even when, as in the case of Libya, its involvement was officially admitted. The United Nations has not seen fit even to discuss this particular problem.

In his discussion of international terrorism, Professor Murphy gives us concise narratives of the incidents at Entebbe and Teheran as well as the United Nations activities with respect to each of these two events. He states flatly that Entebbe does not represent one of the finest moments of the United Nations. However, he feels that, ineffective as it was, some good did come out of the activities of the United Nations in the Teheran crisis because he believes that it helped to create the atmosphere which made it possible for the General Assembly to adopt the 1979 *International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages*. While this reviewer has some difficulty with his interpretation of Article 12 of that Convention, any international agreement in this area is a much-needed addition to the meager results heretofore attained—except that the asylum states, those which welcome hostage takers with open arms, such as Libya and Yemen, are never parties to these agreements.

Professor Murphy's slim volume is on a subject which has held center

stage on the international scene at least since the early 1970s. It is an extremely readable book which the layman will readily understand and which the political scientist and lawyer will find extremely instructive. It will prove a valuable tool for anyone interested in a candid evaluation of the operations of the United Nations in the very important field of the control of international violence in all of its forms.

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Moskin, J. Robert. *Among Lions: The Definitive Account of the 1967 Battle for Jerusalem*. New York: Arbor House, 1982. 401 pp. \$16.95

Pollock, David. *The Politics of Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy Since the Six Day War*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. 328pp. \$35.

Israel's capture of East Jerusalem from Jordan and its retention since the 1967 Middle East War has been one of the more important Middle East events of the past twenty years. The Arab nations remain adamant in rejecting any peace settlement with the Jewish state unless the future of East Jerusalem is at least open to discussion. The story of the Israeli seizure of East Jerusalem—which contains some of the holiest shrines of the Jewish, Moslem and Christian religions—would seem to provide the material for a timely and fascinating history basic to an understanding of what is today one of the

world's most sensitive crisis areas. J. Robert Moskin, an experienced American journalist who was the Foreign Editor of *Look* magazine and Senior Editor of *Colliers*, has tackled the job with mixed results in his new book, *Among Lions*.

The problem is not the author's style, he writes well, nor his failure to do adequate research. Neither is it a lack of objectivity, although Moskin has leaned primarily upon Israeli sources and his account is told largely from the Israeli point of view. Rather, the difficulty, for this reviewer at least, is that the book resembles less a traditional history than what might properly be referred to as television journalism. The narrative is almost exclusively a compilation of personal recollections of the participants—some important and others low-placed, interviewed by the author. The anecdotes related are frequently entertaining, sometimes poignant and occasionally embarrassing; as for example the case of Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Chief of Staff and subsequent Prime Minister, who suffered a psychological breakdown on the eve of the war and had his duties taken over by his newly appointed Chief of Operations Haim Barlev, recalled from political exile in Paris.

The difficulty with this style of history is that the big picture, if not omitted entirely, at least receives lesser attention than in more traditional accounts. Rather than researching the admittedly sometimes boring official records and personal memoirs, Moskin appears to have