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"Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad," and "Beyond the "Vietnam Syndrome": U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s"

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Crisis with another confrontation during the Arab-Israeli conflict exactly eleven years later. If the stakes were much less in October 1973, Caldwell also demonstrates the vastly improved system of operative norms and procedures between the superpowers that were developed in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. Finally, his treatment of US-Soviet economic relations during the cold war and détente periods reveals an extreme polarity of perspectives. In light of current official interest over technology transfer to the Soviet Union and its allies, Caldwell offers excellent historical background on reaching a meaningful balance between achieving mutually profitable East-West trade and the assured security of militarily critical technologies and strategic materials.

The third and final section of the work examines the major differences and similarities in US and Soviet foreign policy behavior as derived from the author's application of the regimes concept. Caldwell points out that because the grave risk of nuclear war required immediate results, the crisis management regime developed much more rapidly than its arms control and economic counterparts. He also observes that domestic, regional and alliance considerations have served as occasional retardants in the regimes' developmental process. With the prospects of renewed US-Soviet negotiations on the horizon, this volume has much to offer area specialists and general readers alike. Its analytical

application of the regimes concept to this key international issue is quite successful and the author's substantive coverage of the pattern of competition and cooperation implied to US-Soviet relations since 1945 further adds to its value as an authoritative topical work.

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Klare, Michael T. and Arnson, Cynthia. *Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981. 165pp. \$9.95 paper \$4.95

Klare, Michael T. *Beyond the "Vietnam Syndrome": U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981. 137pp. \$4.95

The Institute for Policy Studies has published two books about US politico-military involvement in the Third World. One discusses how the US government and American corporations supply Third World dictatorships with the means to carry out internal repression, and the other book deals with the possibility of US military intervention in the Third World. While both books are well written, each also contains a number of flaws.

Supplying Repression is a well-documented work detailing both the types and quantities of instruments of repression which are exported from

the United States. The study also points out that many of these exports are justified as being necessary for a Third World nation's external defense, but are often suited only for the suppression of internal opposition.

The major flaw in this book is that the author gives only slight attention to the fact that other nations, particularly the Soviet Union, are also engaged in this type of trade. Predictably, the authors' only policy recommendations are for the United States to cease exporting the means of repression to its allies. They say nothing about the difficulties of getting the USSR to exercise similar restraint, or what the consequences would be if the United States adopted such a policy and the USSR did not. One gets the impression that the authors are less interested in seeking the means to reduce and eliminate repression everywhere in the world than in merely ending the US contribution to it. The latter goal is desirable, but surely the former is even more so.

Much less convincing is *Beyond the "Vietnam Syndrome"* in which the US government is portrayed as the main danger to world peace. Klare describes the "Brown Doctrine" (to suppress global turbulence arising from poverty and economic decline), the "Carter Doctrine" (to protect energy sources in the Middle East), the "Haig Doctrine" (to guard strategic minerals), and the Rapid Deployment Force. He sees all discussion of these contingencies as evidence of US plans to launch a war.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is portrayed as having neither the means nor the desire to intervene abroad militarily (except Afghanistan which Klare justifies through noting that that country is on the Soviet border).

Klare makes a number of statements about Soviet military doctrine without quoting a single Soviet source either in Russian or in English translation. Klare states that "any East-West clash will automatically escalate to a full-scale war," according to the Soviets. While this is true concerning what the Soviets say about conflict in Europe, he overlooks the fact that since the early 1970s Soviet military thinkers have said that the USSR is now strong enough to keep conflicts that occur in the Third World localized. Further, Klare specifically excludes arms transfers and military advisers from his comparison of American and Soviet intervention capabilities, and thus ignores the fact that Soviet military thinking regards arms transfers, the use of Soviet military advisers, and even Cuban combat troops, as effective means of Soviet involvement in Third World conflicts.

Further, in comparing US and Soviet intervention capabilities, Klare only compares those forces on each side which he considers to be dedicated to Third World contingencies. Thus, regarding manpower, he says that the United States has 215,000 troops for Third World interventions as opposed to only 72,000 for the Soviets. Since the

Soviets have over 100,000 troops in Afghanistan now, it is obvious that forces which Klare considers dedicated to Third World contingencies alone are not the only ones that the Soviets can use to intervene in the Third World. This unnecessary qualification in Klare's comparison of Soviet and American forces make his conclusions unconvincing.

This book sees the ideal of American foreign policy as being one of nonintervention, but does not examine the question of how Soviet interventionism can be either prevented or contained. This is a major shortcoming in Klare's work. As with the other book, if it is morally desirable for the United States not to intervene abroad militarily, surely it is more desirable for all other countries, including the USSR, not to do so either. Again, however, Klare provides no recommendations on how to bring about this more desirable state of affairs.

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Murphy, John F. *The United Nations and the Control of International Violence: a Legal and Political Analysis*. Totowa, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun, 1982. 212pp. \$32.50

This volume by a former occupant of the Stockton Chair of International Law at the Naval War College, with a foreword by Professor Robert S. Wood, the Chairman of the Department of Strategy at that institution, is concerned with the part that the United Nations has

played in the control of international violence. It is divided into two parts, the first dealing with what formerly was known as "war" and now is known by the more euphemistic term "armed conflict"; and the second dealing with such forms of violence as revolutions, wars of assassination, and international terrorism, the latter two being designated by the author as "unconventional violence."

After a brief history of earlier attempts of international organizations to control international violence, Professor Murphy analyzes the United Nations system of maintaining international peace and the manner in which that system has fared in the activities of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretary General, and the International Court of Justice. He examines numerous episodes dealt with by each of these organs, and concludes that in the control of interstate violence the Secretary General is the organ of the United Nations which "has come closest to fulfilling the ideal expectations of the organization's founders"; that the Security Council and the International Court of Justice have performed below expectations; and that the record of the General Assembly is mixed. (In the chapter in which the activities of the General Assembly are discussed at length, he portrays vividly the rise, as well as the decline and fall, of the importance of that body as an institution for the control of interstate violence, which resulted because it became a forum incapable