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### Donovan, America's Master Spy

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of the larger mounts proved difficult tasks which were not compensated for by the desired greater hitting power. The Germans also took the world lead in going to extremely high pressure steam propulsion—up to 1,600 psi. This reduced machinery weight but resulted in endless grief in terms of system reliability and maintenance.

The earliest of these destroyers were commissioned just before the war started in 1939 so the inexperienced German Navy had little operational experience with them before the fighting began. They were employed initially for minelaying in the shallow waters of the North Sea off the English east coast rather than with the German fleet. Ten destroyers were lost—almost the entire Type 36A class—at Narvik in the 1940 invasion of Norway during several desperate actions. The book covers the destroyers' and torpedo boats' actions against British destroyers and cruisers ranging from the coast of France to the frigid waters of the Norwegian Sea. Rough seas in the operating areas seem to have been a given condition. For this reason their efforts around the Norwegian North Cape to intercept Allied convoys moving in and out of Murmansk were unsuccessful. The author also covers the final efforts in the Baltic, where all available craft were employed to move large numbers of German troops and civilians out from under the rapidly advancing Russians.

The German destroyers did not live up to their designers' expecta-

tions and in many instances were frustratingly ineffective. In their defense, one must say that they operated in almost universally poor weather, that their fire control systems and radars were not the best and that they were up against an increasingly powerful enemy whose unending air raids made repair difficult. In action against surface ships, the German destroyers and torpedo boats relied heavily on torpedoes with almost no success (less than one percent of those fired, hit). One wonders what similar engagements would be like today with gun and ammunition handling automated and fire control systems.

*Destroyers!* covers a navy which, at destroyer level, never fought the US Navy, and yet the final German steam-driven designs, the Types 41/36C were generally comparable to the US *Gearings*. The Germans did, however, operate in areas where we intend to go. This book makes good reading both for the history it conveys and its lessons for the future.

R.F. CROSS III  
Alexandria, Virginia

Dunlop, Richard. *Donovan, America's Master Spy*. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1982. 562pp. \$19.95

Richard Dunlop is particularly qualified to write the Donovan biography. He not only worked for the OSS in the Burma and Greek theaters during World War II, but he also examined a multitude of recently declassified documents and interviewed many of Donovan's asso-

ciates. Dunlop's personal association with Donovan in the OSS coupled with the author's experience in the intelligence community has enabled him to portray accurately the men, history, and politics that shaped the Central Intelligence Agency. This book should be particularly interesting to intelligence buffs for four reasons.

Bill Donovan was a brilliant, dynamic anti-trust lawyer who, anticipating the United States involvement in World War II, launched an aggressive campaign to establish a United States "central intelligence agency." Facing intense opposition from the military intelligence chiefs, government departments, and agencies, Donovan persisted in his efforts by hounding his old law school classmate, President Roosevelt, through the White House back door. FDR weighed the political implications of establishing a new intelligence agency and finally bowed to Donovan's pressure by appointing him as the Coordinator of Information in July 1941. Donovan expanded this office into strategic services in 1942, and launched a new effort to retain the OSS after the war as a permanent intelligence service.

*America's Master Spy* illustrates the political arena that enabled Donovan to establish the OSS. President Roosevelt felt that Ambassador to Britain Joseph P. Kennedy sympathized with the cadre of English noblemen who preferred accommodation with Hitler rather than war. Roosevelt did not think this was Churchill's view so he dispatched

Bill Donovan as a secret presidential emissary to determine Britain's survivability. Happy with reports from his "secret legs" that the British were "strong and determined," FDR became increasingly receptive to Donovan's views on national intelligence.

Dunlop outlines the contentious relationship between the OSS and the FBI and Donovan and Hoover, that is remembered by the intelligence community to this day. Donovan, head of the criminal division, tried to fire the "young upstart" acting FBI director for wire tapping. Hoover was retained as the FBI director when he notified Attorney General Stone that the FBI had enough damaging information in the files to sink the Republican candidates in the upcoming presidential election. In 1952 Hoover may have given Donovan the final blow in their longstanding personality clash. As William R. Corson suggests in *The Armies of Ignorance* (New York: Dial Press, 1977), Hoover leaked damaging personal information on Donovan to President Eisenhower as Donovan was being considered for the position of Director of Central Intelligence. Donovan was never appointed to the organization he developed.

The volume provides the reader an insight into the OSS organization and operations. He hired scholars and college professors on every subject. The OSS established a worldwide information network complete with field offices and agents. Research and development was charged with

creating everything from improved communications to special explosives. Every walk of life was considered at Donovan's desk to support covert operations. Not only was intelligence collection and analysis important but Donovan sensed a need to conduct guerrilla warfare in the face of the technologically advanced and trained militaries of Japan and Germany. He explained to FDR, ". . . the United States is still a bush league club. We must play a bush league game, stealing the ball and killing the umpire." Not only was the OSS an intelligence unit, but it was a premiere fighting force during World War II.

While the author covers the life of Bill Donovan more thoroughly than Ford's *Donovan of the OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), Dunlop is somewhat sketchy in the OSS historical and organizational details. Furthermore, Dunlop treats Donovan as a hero throughout the biography without significant mention of faults. Donovan's womanizing may have contributed to his lifetime of largely unsuccessful political campaigns. Yet today's national intelligence structure can probably be attributed to FDR's successful harnessing of Donovan's ambitious and aggressive personality.

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Hoffman, Fritz and Hoffman, Olga Mingo. *Sovereignty in Dispute, The Falklands/Malvinas 1493-1982*.

Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. 194pp. \$20

This work is one of a series of Westview special studies on Latin America. The preface gives notice of an Argentine perspective both in source material and inclination of authors who are historians by profession.

The authors do a good job with the questions of national pride and deep-rooted precedents of international law which precipitated the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. From the start they come down on the Argentine side, but bias does not ruin the book—other flaws nearly do. The book founders badly in dealing with the geopolitical and maritime significance of the islands. This flaw weakens the analysis of the present situation and clouds aspects of policy which would otherwise interest readers.

The authors do not adequately deal with the Falklands/Malvinas issue in terms of political geography. They acknowledge the historic utility of British south seas presence in the Falklands, as when it served as an English foot in the door to the Pacific, but virtually ignore the potential utility of the Malvinas Islands for Argentina. Accordingly, there is no discussion of how an Argentine presence in the islands might figure in British-Argentine competition and antagonisms over territorial claims just to the south, in the Antarctic Peninsula. Only one sentence is devoted to the nearby Argentine-Chilean dispute over the Beagle Channel. Nothing at all is said