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The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan, Makers of the Postwar World

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This is not only incorrect, but unfair and harmful to the Attaches. The AFL/CIO, to which the Attaches must be fully acceptable, is well aware of the damage that could be done to their effectiveness by any identification with intelligence activities. Accordingly, although as Mr. Mayer relates, the AFL/CIO is militantly anti-Communist, it is also militantly opposed to countenancing any association of "its Attaches" with an intelligence agency. One hopes that any future edition of this otherwise well conceived and well executed treatment of the diplomatic profession will correct this unfortunate misunderstanding.

Finally, from time to time Mr. Mayer feels called upon to pronounce on a number of current political and diplomatic controversies in ways that will not be applauded by all of his readers. At times his eagerness to let a breath of fresh air into stale arguments reveals perceptive insights into current realities. At other times, however, even a very felicitous style cannot conceal a less than complete understanding of the nature of the world's problems and the difficulties facing any serious efforts to resolve them.

Mr. Mayer's essays into more complicated policy dilemmas are no less open to critical analysis. The book remains, therefore, a curious mixture of perceptive insights and somewhat unrealistic suggestions for improvement. This is regrettable because his obvious lapses on some points tend to undermine his credibility on other, more limited matters,

where his off-beat advice is often well founded. The lively style in which the book is written contributes to this result, moreover, because Mr. Mayer—in his understandable desire to be readable—occasionally slides over from an engaging irreverence into the kind of snide remark that could make the serious reader take his views less seriously than they should be.

EDWARD L. KILLHAM
Naval War College

Barnet, Richard J. *The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan, Makers of the Postwar World*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 511pp. \$19.95

A brilliant analysis of global international relationships from the mid-1940s to the early 1980s, *The Alliance* is narrative political-economic history at its best, showing how the victorious United States shaped the postwar world by making defeated Germany and Japan into "protectorates" and exhausted Britain and France into virtual dependencies through the Nato system. Though the author is a master at weaving together the multifaceted story of this "alliance," he cannot decide whether it was preconceived, "surely one of the most ingenious political inventions of our century," or merely opportunistic, "a compromise between the liberal vision of a world economic order and . . . 'the gospel of national security.'"

His narrative tends to support the latter conclusion that, indeed, compromise became the (reluctant) *modus operandi* of the succession of US

presidents from Truman to Reagan, with each compromise further diluting the actual inventions. Barnett offers no historian's judgment of how the United States might have done better over these four decades nor how it might have shaped the future of its allies from the late 1940s. He shows America's intentions at several stages, how and why things went wrong, and how particular problems might have been handled differently.

"Creation," one of three divisions in the book, reveals how the revolutionary attempt in the late 1940s to deindustrialize Germany and Japan gave way to the reconcentration of economic wealth in both countries. This provided stable buffers against the Soviet Union, a process greatly stimulated by the Korean War.

"A Time of Wrenching" of the Alliance followed, due in no small part to the policies of Dwight Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, described as "a rumpiled bear of a man with a drooping look, serious, suspicious, and self-righteous, the perfect foil for the popular general who hated war." With new emphasis on massive retaliation, Dulles tried to invent a Communist threat in the Middle East and weaken Britain's traditional role there, which prompted the Suez war of 1956 and did great harm to the Nato partnership. And when the French suspected Dulles of trying to create an American security system in the Far East, they pulled out of the European Defense Community. This led to West German rearmament.

Nato had no credible military strategy in the 1950s as the generals were looking to refight World War II using nuclear weapons, an impossibility demonstrated by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The Kennedy-Johnson years only accelerated the decline of American prestige within the alliance, with the strong European economy undercutting the American challenge of US based multinational corporations, the Japanese keeping out US companies altogether.

The "unraveling" of the Alliance accompanied the Russo-American *détente*, which Dean Acheson had foreseen as imperiling the unity of the West and diluting US influence in Europe, based as it was on its anti-Soviet military presence. But Henry Kissinger of the Nixon administration wanted *détente* in order to achieve stability and order inside America and throughout the world. Domination of the world market was shifting to Europe and Japan by 1971, requiring aggressive US economic policies such as promoting relations with China to offset the spectacular Japanese gains. The October 1973 war, the oil embargo and the 1974 crisis in Cyprus all further undermined American influence, which reeled even more so under the undisciplined foreign policy of the Carter regime—battered in general by the energy crisis and in particular by the 1979-80 upheavals in Iran and Afghanistan. Into the breach has stepped Ronald Reagan, whose tough words and exaggerated fears of the Russian threat have only served to frighten

Europe further, bury *détente* and lead to a new round of peace movements.

Whither The Alliance? Barnet does not guess at this. He has merely told the tale as *he sees* it. At the very least, his account should help to educate American leaders to past US folly and make them more sensitive to global realities. As a historian, Barnet is neither a traditionalist (the United States is never wrong) nor a revisionist (the United States is never right). What he really seems to be saying is that in fact the postwar era has come to an end and, thus, also should any policy assumptions based on the initial postwar political arrangements. A new American world view is badly needed, perhaps to restore the Alliance with a fresh set of assumptions. First, however, we must brush away the cobwebs of rhetoric and bad history. Mr. Barnet has contributed materially to this end in his meaty book.

CLARK G. REYNOLDS
Charleston, S.C.

Beckwith, Charlie A., and Knox, Donald. *Delta Force*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983. 300pp. \$14.95

Big dumb grunt.

Open-faced honesty, simplicity. What you see is what you get. One of the modern day adventurers who show up in long-range reconnaissance units or special forces outfits—long on guts and bravado. A man with the single-mindedness of St. Bernard, the rescuing cleric.

Only Beckwith's cloth is camouflage, his missionary endeavor: to design, build and train a unique Army

unit for saving hostage souls. A chivalrous knight of nobility, sophistication and Machiavellian plots he is not. More like an NFL fullback of the fifties with a pair of brass knucks and alum on his jersey sleeves, alternatively cussing and spitting at the opposing line, the officials, the coaches, his own teammates as he plows his body into the stack on the next play. No O.J. Simpson here, no gliding to the outside or cutting back across the grain when the hole crashes shut or never appears.

Beckwith's *forté* is blood, sweat, tears, cheers, and a lot of wishful thinking. He exhibits a child-like fascination for the British SAS, a special operations unit he served with early in his Army career. Beckwith then spends more than the next decade of straight-ahead hammering on the Army for the need of a unique Army unit, fashioned in the British mold—at times he sounds like a teenager in his emulation—to be used in terrorist hostage situations.

There is good news: Beckwith succeeds, Delta Force will be formed. Immediately, however, there are internal Army squabbles, jealousies, plots and counter-plots to thwart Delta Force, or to have other Army units take on the new mission assigned to Delta Force. There is yet more good news: Beckwith succeeds again, Delta Force is intact, potent, and has access to the requisite-caliber soldiers to man and train the elite hostage rescue unit.

The timing is well-nigh providential as Beckwith is finishing almost 2 years of training Delta Force, when