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The Outstanding Naval Strategic Writers of the Century

Barry D. Hunt

Any retrospective covering a century of historical writing faces irksome questions, not the least of which are, what works or authors should be highlighted and on what grounds? Whatever the rationale, selection involves some element of intellectual *apartheid*. In naval history, these questions are made more acute by the fact that, depending on one's criteria, there are either too few or too many good examples to consider. From one point of view, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan predominates as the only historian-philosopher worth consideration. His popularity and influence have varied greatly over the decades; yet, in many graduate schools and service academies, he is virtually the only theorist of sea power studied. Popular misgivings about history's relevance in the nuclear age may have debased and tarnished his image, but many nonetheless await the day of his next coming for salvation from our current lack of consensus in naval doctrine.

Others see in more recent years a significant outpouring in the amount and quality of naval historical writing—including studies of service politics, logistics, leadership, technology, and of biographies and memoirs—which offers hope that some new Messiah will emerge to lead the way. But these are extremes, and in attempting to set a balance between them, this paper will focus on the efforts of those historians who in company with Mahan have been mainly concerned with higher policy, strategic theory, and general naval doctrine. Its intention is to suggest that the traditions of serious historical scholarship in these areas have been more broadly developed and soundly grounded than many do seem to appreciate; and that the achievements of the early pioneers in this field have been progressively extended.

Naval history itself has changed. More rigorous standards of evidence, method, and argument have altered its form and substance as an intellectual discipline. An important side effect, however, of such increasingly specialized

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approaches to past experience has been a noticeable reluctance of professional historians to apply their findings to present needs. Policy prescription and doctrinal advocacy have more recently been left to the political and other social scientists. Whether this divorce of history and strategic thought can or indeed should be reconciled is a fundamental question every student of modern maritime-naval affairs encounters. The founding fathers of this field faced the same dilemma.

The Mahan-Corbett Tradition

One consequence of recent research is that Mahan himself, warts and all, has finally been given some full-blown human dimensions. His reputation as the leading “Prophet” of sea power has had its ups and downs; but now it is possible to view him as a pioneering historical phenomenon in his own right, a product of his times, the preoccupations of his profession and of a wider American—even international—environment. What then remains to be said about him? That his ideas continue to dominate the field, most especially in North America, is undoubted. But as the military historian, Max Jalms observed about Clausewitz’s influence in late nineteenth-century Germany: “it is almost mystical; his writings have actually been read far less widely than one might suppose . . . !”¹

Mahan, too, continues to be regarded with mystical reverence; some would suggest that the historians who followed him merely refined notions he was first to formulate. Rear Admiral John Hayes noted in 1953 that, for all his faults, Mahan is about all we have; until someone better comes along, “none of us can go wrong if we study Mahan’s great historical works.”² The trouble with such sentiments is that they may reinforce an important shortcoming of current discussion, for they bar the doors to any wider understanding of the work of Mahan’s contemporaries and those who did go on to expand or challenge his first tentative steps.

The point to be emphasized is that however much Mahan’s success and influence did overshadow the efforts of others, he was but one of a generation of pre-World War I writers who together contributed to the late nineteenth century outpouring of public interest labeled by W.L. Langer as the “new navalism.” Even amongst fellow reform-minded Americans of his time, social class and service, as Peter Karsten and others have shown, Mahan was more a synthesizer of ideas than a truly innovative loner.³ Like-minded individuals and groups were at work in other naval nations. The French *Jeune École*, led by Baron Richard Grivel and Admiral Theophile Aubé, were certainly amongst the more innovative writers; their “heresies” after all called forth counterresponses from more orthodox naval thinkers all over Europe, and even Japan.⁵ In Great Britain, the efforts of Captain Sir John and Vice Admiral Philip Colomb, Sir John Knox Laughton, and Sir Julian Corbett along with other writers and journalists whose contributions have been

reexamined and brought to our attention by Professor Donald Schurman in *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914* (1965), add weight to the point that Mahan worked in anything but a vacuum. Julian Corbett was undoubtedly the most important of these Europeans. He and Mahan were the twin founding fathers of the historical school of naval strategists.

Both men sought to educate their countrymen on the importance of sea power in international affairs. They also attempted to circumvent the disinterest of naval officers towards the theoretical side of their profession. They searched for the secrets of naval strategy as practiced in the age of sail, that “living tradition” which had gone largely unspoken and unrecorded to the grave with the last of Nelson’s generation, and worked to derive from them general concepts that could serve their contemporaries faced with all the perplexities which rapid technological change induced. For their efforts to unearth the permanent and unchanging features of maritime warfare that transcended operational and technical innovations, both came to be accused—not without justification—of actually underrating, or failing to foresee, the implications of such new departures as submarines or the importance of convoys as a response to World War I variations on the *guerre de course* theme.

Of course, Mahan’s books enjoyed much greater popularity and success than Corbett’s did, in the short run. Timing and other circumstantial factors may have contributed to this important distinction between the two men’s work. Still, the fact remains, that Mahan’s impact was instantaneously greater. With the publication of his *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783* (1890), as Professor Schurman noted, “The big-navy prophets now had a bible.” Unfortunately, like other bibles, this version’s foundations were never designed to bear the load of theological interpretation that Mahan’s later, and often overzealous, disciples applied to it. This is not to denigrate in any way the full measure of Mahan’s pioneering achievement, but rather to suggest that an important part of his enduring legacy was his establishment of the ideas and reasoning processes that continue to define the disciples of “Blue Water” navalism, extreme or otherwise.

Mahan’s role as a conscious theorist can and has been exaggerated, especially by those who have read only *about* his work. He was a profoundly gifted descriptive, narrative historian, but never a systematic analyst. His theoretical strategic ideas must therefore be culled from his narrative expositions. Herbert Rosinski felt that Mahan was really an “epigrammatic” thinker: “Even his famous lectures at the Naval War College were nothing more than a series of case studies, strung together in a hardly perceptible general scheme; and when finally, towards the end of his life, he was induced to revise and publish them in 1911 under the title of *Naval Strategy* that task was so uncongenial to him that the result proved, in his own words, ‘the most perfunctory job I have ever done.’”⁶

At no point did Mahan offer a sustained and coherent exposition of his “theory” of sea power or precise definitions of important terms such as “command of the sea.” Very rarely did he probe causation. More frequently he intermingled historical issues with current debates. His famous introductory discussion of the six principal elements or conditions of sea power seems, by modern standards of analysis, crude. His determinism must of course be judged against contemporary scales which placed Mahan more or less in step with academic fashion of his time;⁷ still it had the effect of overplaying environmental effects at the expense of understanding the role of conscious choice by individuals and governments. This may help to explain Mahan’s failure to emphasize the intimate connections between foreign policy and naval strategy.

Professor Gerald S. Graham, as will be discussed later, felt that Mahan—as have many of his descendants—treated naval strategy almost as a thing apart. Also, the largely inductive character of his overall approach, which suggested that the conclusions drawn from one historical model—the British success story from the 17th to 19th centuries—should apply to other time frames and situations, is a proposition that few professional historians accept with ease. Finally, Mahan was a historian with purpose in the sense that his assignment under Luce at the Naval War College was to demonstrate history’s utility; to show how “scientific history” could be made to serve the needs of the US Navy. His use of the Jominian model as a means of transmitting his findings into his students’ discussions was a conventional, though even by 1880s European standards, dated technique. Applied to his own research, the model produced some interesting results; how well they accorded with reality was another question.

By these criteria, Julian Stafford Corbett had a clear edge on Mahan. He, too, when invited in 1900 to lecture at the Naval War Course at Greenwich, faced the problems of first disarming and then enthusing his audiences; of teaching strategy concurrently with the history on which it was based and of offering it in a form that could be digested, as he said, by the “unused organs of naval officers’ minds.” The challenge of convincing his audiences had an undoubted impact on his own later research interests, as it had Mahan’s, but Corbett arrived at Greenwich as a fully matured historian with his grasp of British political-strategic practice firmly established in his mind.

The book for which Corbett is now best remembered was a response to his students’ needs and a deliberate counter to Mahan’s influence. This is not to imply that British officers’ formal education entailed very much more than a superficial reading of Mahan; but in tandem with their instinctive adulation of “Nelsonic” ideals, his books did reinforce their folk history approaches to strategy. Corbett’s *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911)—originally conceived simply as a “glossary” of naval terms around which syndicate

discussions could be focused, and then later developed into a book—was tailored to that British audience. It was not intended as a universally applicable theory and it still reads like an expanded set of lecture notes. It is, however, much more self-consciously systematic, analytical and structured than anything else he wrote, especially in the way he drew from examples in his major books⁸ to drive his points home. In it, he was less preoccupied with a search for “principles” as guides to sound conduct—in the Jominian sense—than he was, as Clausewitz had been, with understanding the nature of the phenomenon of war itself.

At the heart of Corbett’s analysis lay the notion that Britain’s influence as a first-rate imperial and European power derived from the combined use of her naval, military, commercial and diplomatic resources. The symbiotic interplay of these instruments applied to her continental and maritime policy options, not as distinct or competing but complementing strategies, was the real source of British “power” in his view. The enduring requirement of this form of warfare dictated that statesmen and businessmen, no less than admirals and generals, understood what it could and could not do. Within this framework, Corbett made his case for the idea that there was therefore a good deal more to naval strategy and warfare than the seeking out and destruction of an enemy’s fleet in some glorious, culminating battle of decision on the Trafalgar model. Such events had been rare—aberrations—that even when achieved, as at Trafalgar, rarely brought about the results expected of them. In Corbett’s view, the purpose of naval forces was to work in the service of the government’s wider goals, to pressure the enemy in a variety of ways, to assist the army and the diplomats.

Like Mahan, Corbett believed in the existence of enduring features and concepts of maritime strategy. He never claimed, however, that history’s “lessons” could produce detailed prescriptions for the conduct of operations. In company with Clausewitz, he understood that historical study and reflection was important as a learning *process* in the nurturing of a cultivated mind, of instinctive mental reflexes that could distinguish from past patterns what had worked or not. Using an analogy his students would appreciate, he explained the role of theory this way: “Navigation and the parts of seamanship that belong to it have to deal with phenomena as varied and unreliable as those of the conduct of war. Together they form an art which depends quite as much as generalship on the judgment of individuals. The law of storms and tides, of winds and currents, and the whole of meteorology are subject to infinite and incalculable deflections, and yet who will deny nowadays that by the theoretical study of such things the seaman’s art has gained in coherence and strength? Such study will not by itself make a seaman or a navigator, but without it no seaman or navigator can nowadays pretend to the name. Because storms do not always behave in the same way, because currents are erratic, will the most practical seaman

deny that the study of the normal conditions are useless to him in his practical decisions?"⁹

Corbett also borrowed from Clausewitz's unfinished discussion on the subject of limited war. He developed this concept into his own "Theory of War" (*Some Principles*, Part I) that reflected Britain's unique circumstances. He argued that Britain had acquired her great empire and exercised her influence in continental European affairs because of her ability to wage wars that were limited in their objectives. Maritime power had given her the ability to isolate and retain overseas possessions, to protect the home islands from invasion while constricting her opponents' use of the seas and, through several forms of diplomatic, financial and military assistance, fostered and preserved the continental coalitions that constituted the real cutting edge of her influence in such instances as the Seven Years War and Napoleonic Wars. From this general analysis, Corbett then went on to examine more particularly his "Theory of Naval War" (Part II) and "Conduct of Naval War" (Part III), in which with carefully developed historical illustrations he systematically set out his case.

At the heart of his thinking here was the notion of "command of the sea," which by his definition: "means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory."¹⁰

In his discussion of the various degrees and kinds of "command," he insisted that the historical norm was in fact an uncommanded sea, and that it was this condition, "this state of dispute" that is the focus of naval strategy. The leading or preponderant navy undoubtedly would prefer to end this dispute as quickly as possible, whereas, the weaker would prefer to prolong it as much as possible. From this point, Corbett's divergence from Mahan became most pronounced as he then tackled the convention that the navy's principal function was to fight fleet actions and must therefore be kept physically united until the enemy was destroyed. What Corbett sought to make clear was that naval forces' inherent characteristics of mobility and flexibility meant that they could be assigned multiple functions while still retaining their ability to concentrate in terms of time. At no point did he reject the idea that command could be won, or indeed only be fully assured, by the destruction of the opposing fleet.

Under his summary of "Methods of Securing Command" he listed fleet action ahead of blockade. What he did take pains to demonstrate was that against an unwilling enemy, it would be difficult to force a stand-up fight and that any incautious "seeking out" could even be counterproductive. Battle was one of several options, but to insist beyond that was to deny British historical and operational wisdom. At root, what animated Corbett was his

sense that Jominian interpretations of modern warfare simply could not be transposed directly to the maritime medium. Our teachers incline to insist that there is now only one way of making war and that is Napoleon's way, he wrote: ". . . they brand as heresy the bare suggestion that there may be other ways, and not content with assuming that his system will fit all land wars, however much their natures and objects may differ, they would force naval warfare into the same uniform under the impression apparently that they are thereby making it presentable and giving it some new force."¹¹

Corbett's success in countering this forcing of naval theory into Napoleonic uniform—in his major books, his War Course lectures, or in his role as one of Admiral "Jackie" Fisher's *confidants*¹²—may be judged by the fact that before, during and after World War I he had to face the criticisms of the more aggressive (mostly retired) admirals who regarded Jellicoe's and later Beatty's, refusal to run risks with the Grand Fleet's narrow margin of numerical superiority and, reliance instead on the wearing logic of the distant blockade, as a fundamental error. The controversy and bitterness of the 1917 "Sea Heresy" public debates that followed the disappointment of Jutland were unfairly and inaccurately directed towards Corbett, and certainly overrated his impact as a teacher. The source of the primacy of battle fetish lay more accurately in a widespread popular misreading of sea power's potentials that had been in place well before submarines and mines made the distant blockade stance necessary.

Variations of the "Victory" school's arguments continued to animate naval debate throughout the interwar period, in the Jutland controversy of the 1920s, and the ongoing carrier vs. battleship debates. They reached their most sustained and developed form in the writings of the American naval officer, Commander H.H. Frost, who devoted the last two decades of his life to unraveling the mysteries of Jutland. Failure there to his mind, flowed from a combination of Corbett's influence compounded by Jellicoe's overcautiousness. How much Frost's ideas influenced or even reflected mainstream American naval thinking in the years before World War II, particularly at the Naval War College, cannot be addressed here.¹³ That Frost fully understood neither Corbett's logic nor the influences that actually did dictate British and Allied strategy in World War I seems clear.

Between the World Wars

Why the trauma of World War I did not spawn more general reassessments of basic strategic thought or why, in its aftermath, the naval renaissance that some younger officers had hoped for never did materialize, are intriguing questions to this day. In the face of Jutland-induced doubts about the decisiveness of modern fleet actions, the uncertain portents of aircraft and submarines, a radically altered international environment and pressures everywhere for disarmament and budget cutting, most naval hierarchies

extemporized their responses or instinctively recalled Mahanian orthodoxies that did not always meet these questions head on. Even Corbett's judicious analysis in his official *Naval Operations: History of the Great War* (3 vols., 1920, 1921, 1923) was badly undercut by an Admiralty disavowal that had more to do with protecting reputations than getting at a clearer appreciation of what actually had happened. The small handful of new writers who did take up the challenge did so (much as did Liddell Hart, Fuller and others who pioneered the new field of mechanized-armored land warfare) with little encouragement from officialdom. Until the early 1930s, they also wrote for a public largely disinterested in such issues. By 1940, the centennial of Mahan's birth, Herbert Rosinski sensed that Mahan's influence had all but disappeared. Even within the leading navies, he noted: "his memory is still invoked on all solemn occasions and his teachings continue to be considered the foundation of official doctrine. But the invocation has long since become an empty ritual, and the glory, in the words of a well-known contemporary British writer on naval affairs, 'is the glory of legend rather than knowledge.' In the development of present-day naval thought Mahan is no longer a living influence, and his volumes and treatises gather dust upon the shelves. This is even more the case of the other navies, Italian, German and Russian, where not even pretence at paying him lip service is maintained any longer, and Mahan is either dismissed as an outdated old fossil or roundly accused of having taught naval strategy in favour of the two Anglo-Saxon powers."¹⁴

These latter-day "New Schools" in Russia and Italy linked their reassessments to the language and logic of their political ideologies as well as the potentials of new *matériel* that seemed to favor their defensive needs. They voiced shared feelings that their maritime interests might somehow be secured without directly challenging the major naval powers on the high seas.¹⁵ This quest for alternative theories was pushed furthest in Germany, although there the radical impulse was tempered by internal service politics that for much of the interwar period revolved around the personality of Admiral Tirpitz.

The most influential critique of German wartime planning and performance came from Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener. In 1925 he prepared a memorandum (*Denkschrift*) which formed the basis of his 1929 book *Seestrategie des Weltkrieges* (expanded and reissued in 1941). The burden of his argument was that Tirpitz's defensiveness in the face of Britain's eleventh-hour adoption of the distant blockade had played into her hands, aggravated Germany's numerical and geographic disadvantages, and handed Britain command of the seas virtually by default. Germany's only recourse, in Wegener's judgment, had been to break clear of the strategically dead North Sea; to undermine Britain's controlling hold by a progressive offensive (*die fortschreitende offensive*) through Denmark and the Jutland Peninsula to Norway and the Shetlands beyond. There the long

sought after contest with the Grand Fleet would produce a command which the High Seas Fleet, imbued with an Atlantic mentality (*geist des Atlantiks*), could exploit. But however much developments in World War II—the occupations of Norway and France—appeared to validate Wegener's call for a break out from the “wet triangle” of the Heligoland Bight, his reasoning was badly flawed and throughout the later 1920s to 1935 became the focus of steady criticism from the senior naval hierarchy.

In the *Marine Rundschau*, official historian Admiral Otto von Groos led a counterattack against a string of articles by younger officers inspired by Wegener's ideas. There and in his own book, *Seekriegslehren* (1928), Groos adapted Mahan and Corbett to highlight Wegener's more obvious fallacy; namely, that an engagement fought off the Norwegian coast would not be any easier to control or more decisive than one in the North Sea; where it was fought was unimportant for the strategic effect.

In 1931, French Admiral Raoul Castex, in the third volume of his *Theories Strategiques*, suggested that Wegener's proposals would have simply added the northern neutrals to Germany's list of enemies, a point which Groos publicly endorsed in his 1935 *Marine Rundschau* review of the book. Dr. Herbert Rosinski, at that time pursuing his own study of naval theory at the Marineakademie, argued that Wegener had overemphasized geographical factors without ever coming to grips with the more basic issue of the German fleet's numerical inferiority.¹⁶

The ultimate importance of Wegener's theories however, was that they supplied the younger generation with an acceptable explanation of German failure in World War I along with a prescription for rebuilding something other than a defensive or simply a coastal force (*Küstenmarine*). His suggestion that a war of ocean communications could be translated into a lethal assault on enemy trade was taken up by others in the 1930s, most importantly by Captain von Waldeyer-Harts (“The Naval Warfare of Tomorrow,” in *Wissen und Wehr*, 1936), Dr. Ernst Wilhelm-Kruse (*Neuzeitliche Seekriegsführung*, 1938), and Admiral Kurt Assmann, who despite his position from 1933 as Chief of the Naval War History Service and his personal reverence for Tirpitz, also came down on the side of “tonnage warfare.”¹⁷

The extent to which these arguments mirrored the hopes and the illusions of the earlier *Jeune Ecole* are perhaps their most striking feature. That they were driven in large part by materialist impulses gave them much in common not only with that earlier generation, but also with many others in the interwar years who pushed their cases for and against battleships, aircraft or other weapons systems. What is more difficult to comprehend, especially with the Germans, whose respect for and use of historical analysis was so highly developed, is that these arguments rested on such constricted intellectual perspectives.

Two naval experts who did understand these failings were Admirals Raoul Castex and Herbert Richmond of the French and Royal navies. Although they never met until 1933, their careers ran along curiously parallel courses. Both

were successful career officers who began writing serious history as a sideline well before 1914. Both went on to become leading reform activists particularly in the area of officer education where they emphasized history's value as the best means of developing strategic instincts. Of the two, Castex remains the more shadowy figure. His influence, perhaps a function of language, was confined mainly to France and Europe.

In Professor Theodore Ropp's judgment, Castex "represents perhaps the best synthesis of Mahan and the *Jeune Ecole*."¹⁸ His impressive 5-volume *Theories Strategiques* (1929-1935) was the capstone of a life-long publication effort which, in books alone, amounts to some fifteen or more spanning the years 1904 to 1976 (the last *Melanges Strategiques*, posthumously). From his earliest posting in Indo-China, Castex tackled the policy questions that France would face in defending her extended empire and in this he anticipated the dilemmas Great Britain would also have to resolve in striking some acceptable balance between extensive foreign interests and decidedly limited military capacities. His later preoccupations with the interplay of land versus sea-based power, of international systems, and the balance of power led him to wonder if, under modern conditions, sea power's formerly ubiquitous influence might not become more constrained. In this he was anticipating much present-day discussion concerning naval strategy's integration with wider considerations.

Internationally, Castex achieved notoriety during the 1922 Washington naval talks for his sensational endorsement of Germany's U-boat campaign. But in this, as in his other attempts to understand the problems faced by lesser naval powers, he was no extremist. Like Richmond, he encouraged his contemporaries to question the underlying assumptions of such things as capital ship design. He did not doubt the future importance of large surface vessels, provided they could be adapted not only to survive in their new environment but moreover could actually exploit it. His own analysis of World War I was a carefully reasoned reaffirmation of Mahan's and Corbett's views on the continuing importance of command of the sea as the essential precursor to successful initiatives against an enemy's coast or control of his life-lines. And while he entered some caveats regarding the completeness of command under modern conditions, he stood foursquare with conventional wisdom in suggesting that the nexus of any effort to acquire limited command or control of *essential* communications was *la force organisée*. While new technology may have given lesser navies the ability to mount powerful strategic or tactical initiatives aimed at dispersal, destruction in detail or deferment battle should remain the eventual aim of the superior navy.

Much like Castex, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond¹⁹ became well known outside of his own navy's circles because of his public criticism of official policy, in his case, just prior to the 1930 London naval talks. For several years

in fact, Richmond had criticized what he believed to be his superiors' blind faith in the future of big battleships. Prior to the 1921 Washington talks, he had argued that continued building programs that took insufficient account either of the implications of submarines and aircraft, or of the international economic realities on which Britain's maritime ascendancy rested, were premature if not madness. He challenged the notion of maritime security defined mainly in terms of relative battleship strength, of upper tonnage limits of 35,000 tons for capital ships and fixed numerical ratios.

In 1929 he publicly questioned this doctrine of "material parity" and called for more rational approaches that would set individual nations' needs on a qualitative basis that served strategic and tactical needs, and placed size restrictions for individual ships at levels as low as 10,000, even 6,000 tons. Not surprisingly, this was his last foray as a serving officer; he was forced into early retirement and spent the rest of his days at Cambridge. Whatever the merits or otherwise of his detailed arguments they should not obscure the fact that what Richmond, as the leading voice of a small band of "anti-materialist" reformers in the Royal Navy, had worked to show was that strategic considerations must predominate over technological possibilities in the formulation of basic policy. Whether in naval construction or other matters, to do otherwise was he argued: ". . . beginning at the wrong end of the stick. No one says what we want to do and ask for the stuff which will do it. It is *all* started from the material end, not the strategic. I say this is wrong. Our strategists (if we have any) should examine the situation. Where can we do the most harm to the enemy?"²⁰

From his earliest days, Richmond's commitment to reform had caused him to draw in like-minded younger officers who wanted to intellectually regenerate the navy. When, in 1912, they founded the privately circulated *Naval Review* to encourage interest in the study of strategy, tactics and principles, Richmond noted that he hoped to develop the mental habit of reasoning things out, getting at the bottom of things, evolving principles and spreading interest in the higher side of our work. This was a commitment that shaped the rest of his career as an educator, defense critic, strategist and historian who persistently challenged materialist influence in the shaping of naval policy. His impact was weakened by unattractive features of his own prickly personality. Nonetheless, it was his pen that provided the only sustained critical analysis of British naval thought on a wide range of national defense issues.

Richmond was Corbett's direct intellectual heir. It was Corbett who first encouraged the young Captain of HMS *Dreadnought* to begin writing serious history before the war and then, until his own death in 1922, continued to encourage Richmond's involvement in educational and organizational reform. In another sense as well, Richmond inherited Corbett's view of naval strategy

as forming but a part of a grander view of a truly combined operations philosophy. This idea led him to spell out the need for an overall, generally accepted doctrine which recognized the assets and liabilities of a maritime empire, offered a realistic basis for interservice cooperation, and a framework within which to assess the implications of new weapons. Richmond's attempts to define such an overall British doctrine of war never resulted in single, systematically developed document; but his ideas can be extrapolated from his efforts to give them form and substance through his work as commandant of the War Course at Greenwich (1920-23) and the Imperial Defence College (1926-28), his official submissions as CinC East Indies Station (1923-25) when he was more or less directly involved in the then evolving Singapore strategy, and his later writings as a civilian academic at Cambridge University. In common with Colomb and Corbett, he envisioned a system of empire maritime communications linked by a network of bases whose defense was the joint responsibility of all three services. The maritime emphasis of his views raised criticisms that he denigrated the importance of the other services, especially the Royal Air Force.

But Richmond's differences with the airmen went much deeper than simple interservice prejudice, for he saw in the "strategic" air power arguments of the interwar years—based on the use of massive terroristic strikes on urban and industrial targets—a horrible distortion, militarily and morally, of Britain's means of waging war. He sensed that strategy was being oversimplified and warped by an excessive reaction to purely technological drives. His efforts to counter this distorting tendency earned him a reputation for short-sightedness towards air power which his record and writings disprove. In World War II, he attacked the priorities emphasized by Winston Churchill and "Bomber Harris" for the strategic bombing effort; he stressed instead the absolute need to secure Allied sea communications first. He correctly feared that victory through the bombing of Germany might well be bought at the price of Britain's ruin as an oceanic-imperial power, a proposition which was an important example of his insistence on drawing distinctions between ends and means.

Richmond is now remembered mainly for his work as a historian. He extended the earlier efforts of the Colombes, Mahan and Corbett by raising the general awareness of naval history's significance both as a distinct field of serious academic endeavor and a vitally important process in officer education. But Richmond's writings also went beyond the form and substance of his forbears to bridge the gap towards postwar and more recent scholarship.

Like Mahan, Richmond did scour history for timeless lessons, but this tendency was most pronounced in his more popular books in which his purpose was to instruct audiences largely untutored in naval matters. They

were didactic in method and purpose, and colored by a determinism that is dated now. Most of these were tracts for their times. His last two books, however, *Statesmen and Seapower* (1946) and his unfinished *The Navy as an Instrument of Policy 1558-1727* (ed. by E.A. Hughes, 1953) stand apart and survive as his best known works. In these broad brush treatments Richmond perfected the Mahan–Corbett tradition by explaining to political and military leaders alike their joint responsibilities for defining national objectives and developing strategies to serve them in peace and war.

But in his major scholarly works, that is those upon which his credentials as a serious historian rest,²¹ Richmond's purpose was not to devise a universal theory of sea power or to consciously systematize on the basis of Jomini or any other model. Here he clearly parted company with Mahan. His intention rather was simply to explain British maritime successes and failures in terms of personalities, circumstances and consciously developed policies. Ever sensitive to political, geographical, technological and military–naval specifics, Richmond challenged the more extreme navalist writers' preoccupation with the operations of the battle fleet. He went further to emphasize that sea power was always more complex and all-inclusive than that in its workings as an instrument of diplomatic, economic and military power. Hence his own emphasis on such fundamental and complementing concepts as lines of communication and trade defense, blockade and belligerents' rights, combined operations and alliance politics. In terms of research, use of primary resources and interpretation, Richmond owed little to Mahan and much more to Corbett. Perhaps his greatest influence in this respect was on the new generation of postwar historians whose careers touched upon his. The ultimate tragedy of course has been that Richmond's work, like Corbett's, did not receive the public and professional naval acclaim given to Mahan's. Mahan was always the exception. And the final irony of Richmond's career, as it ended in 1946, was that it was Mahan once again who scooped the field.

World War II and After

Mahan's reincarnation during the Second World War is one of the more interesting case studies of history's influence upon sea power. How directly his prescriptions did condition planning and operations, or served merely to justify strategic extemporization is still an open question. What does seem clear, for our purposes, is that American naval leaders did view their victory over Japan as a Mahanian triumph of sea power. In saying this, however, Professor Russell Weigley was careful to add; "To be sure it was a triumph against one of the two great powers uniquely vulnerable to sea power; against a continental adversary its strategy would have limited relevance."²² Later generations have come to appreciate this caveat, but at war's end its implications were not so obvious. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's 1947 report to the Secretary of the Navy was an unqualified vindication of Mahan's central argument that Allied victory

had flowed from a series of decisive battles which had conferred a virtually absolute command of the seas. The harnessing of carrier-based aviation's full potential had augmented and extended the Navy's traditional capabilities. Non-American naval experts may have noted, and perhaps understood, Nimitz's failure to give much emphasis to trade defense and submarine warfare. But if in this respect the war had somewhat different lessons to teach British, Canadian, German, Italian or other sailors, they were generally in agreement that the final decisive offensives, and ultimately victory, had been built upon the sure foundation of hard-won maritime control.

Perhaps the most important factor in Mahan's resurrection during the war was Margaret Tuttle Sprout's article, "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power" which was published in 1941 in Edward Mead Earle's important book *Makers of Modern Strategy*. More than any other, this article served to disinter the almost forgotten prophet and reassert his reputation as the premier naval theorist. Timing and circumstance were once more on Mahan's side it seems. Mrs. Sprout's scholarly achievement was impressive both in terms of wartime naval needs and the fact that her reconstruction is the one from which most students derive their perspectives on Mahan. In many college level courses, hers is the introduction they are given to maritime affairs. Too frequently as well, it is their last look. This is not meant to downgrade neither Mahan nor Mrs. Sprout, but rather to lament the fact that this impression of Mahan's exclusive pertinence has constricted naval thought ever since. One has only to peruse the indexes of postwar professional journals or countless student paper titles to sense the influence of his Sprout-induced ghost as attempts were made to show his relevance in the nuclear age, or more dangerously, as his shadowy figure was called upon to bless the proceedings of a navy caught in the middle of postwar budget and unification struggles.

Of course, other serious scholarly attempts were made during the war and afterwards to integrate Mahanian orthodoxy with modern developments.²³ Of these, the most important was Bernard Brodie's *Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* (1942, with several revisions, reissued in 1965 as *Guide to . . .*). It was a comprehensive response to the war then unfolding. In form, it broke new ground inasmuch as its thematic approach was designed to appeal directly to a professional audience. This reflected Brodie's commitment to the idea, later expressed in his book *War and Politics* (1973), that strategy is fundamentally a utilitarian subject: Strategic thinking, or theory if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a "how to do it" study, a guide to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently. In substance, however, both in his *Guide* and *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (1943), he was squarely within the tradition of his intellectual forbears, particularly on the fundamentals of command of the sea and its exercise. His analysis of the 19th-century steam revolution was skillful and innovative suggesting that, had he continued to devote his unusual talents to naval history, he might have gone on to become a second Mahan.

But, far less sanguine than his naval colleagues about how the war had reaffirmed the lessons of history, and more sensitive to the implications of new technology, most especially atomic weapons, Brodie seems to have sensed better than most of his generation the difficulty of applying a history-based theory at a moment when most observers were suggesting that pre-1945 experience was simply irrelevant.

Brodie's personal metamorphosis into one of the first theorists to grapple with concepts of nuclear deterrence and limited war was undoubtedly naval history's loss. But his pioneering efforts along with a handful of other so-called "First Wave" writers like Jacob Viner, Arnold Wolfers and Liddell Hart, helped to define the central concepts of nuclear age military thought; particularly the insight that traditional preoccupations with offensive strategies of annihilation must give way to those that sought to control and avoid their application. These prophetic notions were barely credited in 1946-47; but twenty years later, as Michael Howard has noted, they were "to be commonplaces of strategic thinking."²⁴ With his own instincts firmly rooted in pre-1945 experience, Brodie has, in his subsequent career as one of the foremost civilian strategists of the nuclear era, brought to bear a much needed sense of perspective.

This is not the place to trace Brodie's impact on these broader developments in American and Western nuclear thought. His personal conversion may have been symptomatic of the fact that the nexus of American strategic thought, thereafter dominated by civilian academic specialists, had shifted to areas and issues that were not purely naval, or single-service oriented. The preoccupations of the new strategic studies community have provided little basis on which to erect a new or even up-dated version of classical maritime thought. Byzantine struggles between and within the services during the late 1940s and 1950s over unification, forces organization and roles did nothing to clarify the theoretical issues. These political struggles called forth all sorts of strategic justifications; but seen in a longer perspective, they were little different from those earlier periods of painful transition—such as the late 19th century when Mahan first wrote, or the 1920-30s. Admiral Richmond's calls then for a commonly understood doctrine, have an echo in Admirals T.H. Moorer's and Alvin Cottrell's lament in 1977 about the continued lack of an American grand strategy: "Military power cannot be understood or defended unless it is harnessed to purpose—and purpose can only be defined in the context of comprehensive strategy."²⁵

These developments and their impact on national consensus and self-confidence have been well documented. Less well observed perhaps is another trend which has also served to undermine our confidence in classical theory.

History and Historians

In *The Education of a Navy*, Donald Schurman observed that when Mahan and his colleagues began their work, history itself—as a serious intellectual discipline distinguishable from the wider fields of letters and the humanities—was then going through its own birth pangs. History's subsequent progress to academic respectability and the proliferation of its increasingly specialized practitioners, particularly those concerned with naval and maritime affairs, has been a steady evolution that makes the "scientific" methods of that earlier generation appear clumsy by comparison. What characterizes more recent scholars, apart from more rigorous professional standards, has been that their studies have been constructed primarily as explanations of past developments in terms which contemporaries would have comprehended. This literature is of course vast and highlighting specific authors invites argument. By way of illustration however, one might mention Vincent Harlow's *The Founding of the Second British Empire* (1952), R. Robinson and J. Gallagher's *Africa and the Victorians* (1961) and C.J. Bartlett's *Great Britain and Sea Power, 1915-1953* (1963) as examples of more innovative analyses which, though not exclusively or even mainly concerned with naval thought, have established the bases for understanding the forces which actually did shape foreign, colonial and defense priorities and which have spawned any number of similar studies of other imperial systems. John Ehrman's *The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697* (1953) a particularly outstanding example of its kind, examined the interplay of personality, organization and administrative factors that complicate policy and strategy formulation.²⁷

Examinations of specific periods canvassed or ignored by earlier writers—Geoffrey Symcox' *The Crisis of French Sea Power, 1688-1697* (1974); John F. Guilmartin's *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the 16th Century* (1974); or Fernand Braudel's *The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1973)—have given fresh perspectives regarding Mahan's universality, raised doubts about his conclusions concerning attritional *guerre de course* doctrine and the relationships between maritime trade and naval activity, and of amphibious operations. Recent explorations of the peacetime influence roles of the navy, such as Kenneth Hagan's *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy* (1973), David Healey's *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era* (1976), and William Braisted's *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909* (1958), have hopefully opened the door to further such probes particularly of the postwar *Pax Americana*.

Studies concerned with internal and domestic politics, bureaucracies and special interest groups, such as Richard Challener's *Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914* (1973); Roger Dingman's *Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitations, 1914-1922* (1976); Ronald Spector's *Professors of War* (1977); Volker Berghahn's *Der Tirpitz Plan* (1972) have broadened our

awareness as to how foreign policy and strategy can be deflected by these forces. The list could go on and on; the point being that, even discounting a steady production of more popular and operational histories, in comparison to the pre-World War II period, specialized naval history has very much ceased to be the poor country cousin to military history that it once was.

Historians bent on broad themes have not become a vanished breed altogether and, amongst the most important contributions to this ancient genre have been those of Gerald S. Graham. A former Canadian, who before the war taught at Queen's University (Canada) and Harvard, and following wartime service with the Royal Canadian Navy, completed his distinguished academic career as Rhodes Professor of Imperial History at King's College, University of London (1947-70), Graham has exerted his powerful influence on several generations of devoted students by his rejection of any narrowly defined theoretical frameworks that treat naval strategy as a specialist or exclusive field of scholarship. Practicing his own preaching to "let the documents lead," Graham has refined Corbett's and Richmond's concerns to reenphasize the multicausal relationships that link naval and foreign policy.

As with Corbett or Richmond, one must turn to Graham's major historical studies²⁸ of Britain's 18th and 19th-century oceanic empire to uncover the bases of his central argument; namely, that the exercise of her influence had always depended on an intelligent balancing of limited means, too many responsibilities and ever changing circumstances. These distinguished studies are models of the historian's art in which compelling narrative, style, and analysis are blended with subtlety and force. These qualities are evident in his better known *The Politics of Naval Supremacy* (1965). In this short overview of British experience in the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, he highlights both the realities and the illusions of the *Pax Britannica* to show that numerical superiority in ships was never *the* deciding factor; that British influence was always a function of a wide variety of political, industrial-commercial and diplomatic considerations that interacted directly with events ashore.

This symbiosis of power is the central thesis of Professor Paul M. Kennedy's reconsideration of Mahanian convention in light of recent specialist scholarship. In *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (1976), Kennedy lays to rest many of the more extreme assumptions of "Blue Water" enthusiasts by exploring the relationships that did exist between Britain's naval power and the growth and decline of her economic predominance. Highlighting once again, the inherent limitations as well as advantages which they conferred, he expertly traces the conscious exploitation and blending of her maritime and continental options.²⁹

Finally, with respect to these post-World War II developments in historical research, some comment on the writing of official history might be

useful. Both the American and British official series are impressive examples of thoroughly researched, lucidly written and carefully argued narrative histories. The widely acclaimed success of Samuel Eliot Morison's 15-volume *United States Naval Operations in World War Two* (1947-62) may have obscured the fact, unfortunately, that it is primarily an operational history that offers few insights into policy and strategy making, or the impact of wider economic and social considerations. Captain Stephen W. Roskill's 3-volume *The War at Sea, 1939-1945* (1954-1962) is less vulnerable to this charge, though in his case the British decision to publish separate civil and grand strategy series may have better defined his focus.

Morison's personal credentials in naval affairs were his *Marine History of Massachusetts* (1941) and *Life of Columbus* (1942), and his well-known independence of mind which obliged him to set out his own standards. Roskill, on the other hand, was the heir and exemplar of a more fully matured writing tradition. With no formal academic training when he was invalided from the Royal Navy and took over the official history, he was able nonetheless to draw upon the examples of his predecessors. Also, from Richmond, he learned directly of the difficulties which Corbett had had to surmount in writing the First World War account. Morison, of course, had an academic career in which official history was only one part. His later work on John Paul Jones and Matthew Perry, and the early discoverers of America confirmed his status as a leading pioneer in US oceanic history.³⁰ Roskill's pen never wandered very far from his central interest in the problems and politics of British strategy. His later studies of British naval policy in the interwar period, of Maurice Hankey, and of Winston Churchill's leadership in World War II,³¹ will long remain important references for students of these years, their near-Olympian air reinforced by his status as Britain's "official" naval historian until his death in 1982.

Professor Arthur J. Marder was never an official historian, but he was modern naval history's foremost practitioner. From his earliest works on the Victorian-Edwardian Navy, through his classic 5-volume *Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919* (1961-70), to his later works that brought his interests forward in time to the interwar and World War II periods,³² Marder set standards of scholarship and presentation that gave naval history an unprecedented respectability. Few professional historians, though they might challenge some of his judgments, could claim not to have been influenced by him, or aware of his presence. But sadly, as this writer discovered at the time of Marder's recent death, few serving naval officers, in Canada or the United States at least, could make that same admission. This is tragic, for all of his books can be characterized as systematic, well-conceived studies that interweave the intricacies of policy, doctrine, technology and personalities into an elegantly simple narrative.

Marder's voracious appetite for primary documentation, and his faculty for tapping the memories of participants, their contemporaries and even their widows, were never permitted to override his basic purpose which, in his own words, was "to tell a story and to tell it well, and with a liberal infusion of the personal, the human component . . . (to) include a sense of how events appeared to the participants, bereft of the knowledge possessed by historians and others writing long afterwards." Although this purpose did not include a preoccupation with naval thought or strategic theory, nevertheless his tracing of its development and impact on planning and practice is one of the unifying threads in all his works. Students seeking to comprehend the complexities of their own world could do no better than to turn to the conclusion of *Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*.

Strategic Studies and Naval Thought

These postwar advances in naval *history* have not been entirely paralleled by similar progress in naval *thought*. In quantity and quality, the contrast between the literature devoted to maritime theory as compared to the broader central concepts of nuclear age thought—deterrence, limited war and arms controls—is striking, and may account for some of the lack of consensus and cohesion of which many senior naval leaders complain. By their reticence to address more contemporary questions, naval historians have some responsibility for this. Many would argue that policy prescription should not be even an incidental motive in their work; that advocacy has no place in serious scholarship. Yet, by standing aloof from those processes which since 1945 have witnessed a diffusion both of strategic studies' focus, and its intellectual sources, historians have defaulted on the chance of adding their peculiar skills and perspectives to those of the political and social scientists, economists, mathematicians and "hard" scientists who have otherwise predominated. The failings of this largely civilian and American-dominated strategy community have been well delineated by others³³ who suggest that much recent writing has been pretentious and obscure, and overly empiricist and ethnocentric. Historians therefore have a role to play, if only to add a sense of context, depth and realism to assist their colleagues in comprehending just how much our passage into the nuclear age did, and did not, undermine the relevance of experience.

One of the first analysts to tackle such questions was Professor Lawrence Martin. In *The Sea in Modern Strategy* (1967) he suggested that nuclear technology, as well as other important developments have so altered the nature of naval operations as to shift the basic nature and focus of naval strategy away from fleet actions. Other naval specialists—Admirals Sir Peter Gretton of Britain, P. Barjot of France and Edward Wegener of Germany³⁴—while emphasizing the continued, even increasing, importance of the seas in the modern world, attempted to illustrate how far, with what modifications and in what situations the established concepts of maritime thought continue

to apply. Since the 1970s, attention has also been turned to newer roles. In *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (1971), James Cable broke new ground by identifying the more indirect applications of naval force through the exploitation of its implied power. This was followed by Edward Luttwak's *The Political Uses of Seapower* (1975) and Ken Booth's *Navies and Foreign Policy* (1977). Studied in conjunction with D.P. O'Connell's *The Influence of Law on Sea Power* (1975), these important books have increased our understanding not only of what is *new* about such uses of maritime force but also of how central they have been in the past.

By far, the greatest weight of scholarly effort in recent naval analysis has been directed at Soviet naval development and its implications. The most original and sustained writings have come from Robert Herrick, Michael McCwire and James McConnell.³⁵ Their work and that of their many colleagues who have sought to penetrate the mysteries of Admiral Gorshkov's pronouncements has become something of a separate growth industry. Students wishing to gain some measure of the results will find their task eased by first consulting the contributions of Geoffrey Till and Brian Ranft. Their *The Sea in Soviet Strategy* (1983) and *Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age* (1982) place these Soviet advances and the discussions surrounding them in a balanced context. Also, by carefully laying out the main lines of the currently contending schools of interpretation and allowing their readers to draw their own conclusions, they offer a useful example of the contributions which serious historians can make.

Reflecting over this century, one might finally suggest that if naval history and strategic thought have not become entirely disparate fields of enterprise, they no longer sit in easy union. There have been too few naval professionals who, like Rear Admiral Henry Eccles or Admiral Stansfield Turner,³⁶ have tried to bridge the gap between political-military theory and the actualities of its seaborne applications. Some recent observers, such as James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver in *The Future of United States Naval Power* (1979) take heart from what they term "an emerging consensus in the new literature" which is already leading to a renaissance of sea power. One hopes they are right. Still, those who expectantly await another Messiah's coming may have difficulties recognizing him. A *new* Mahan, naval officer or civilian academic, might resemble his predecessor only to the extent that he is willing to make that bridging attempt. In terms of his scholarly qualifications, his grasp of historical detail and his awareness of the continuing durability of the few critical ideas that do connect them and give shape and meaning to present or future trends, he or she may more closely approximate Castex's or Richmond's examples. That could be an unsettling prospect. Such mavericks are difficult for any profession to accommodate. Yet, without that intellectual encouragement and toleration which Luce and Mahan bequeathed to the Naval War College so long ago, the hope of innovation too frequently turns to frustration or worse, silence. Still,

even in their more extreme manifestations, as Richmond noted in 1933—half way through this century under review—heretics can help to protect any community from mental crystallization. It was one of Richmond's strongest personal convictions: "that it is they that keep a service alive in peace, that every innovator is an innovator because he has given thought to his subject and nourished it with discussion, and that every great captain in war has owed his success to the fact that he was an innovator to whom tradition was a valuable servant, not a tyrannical master."

Notes

1. Max Jahns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften* (1891), vol. III.
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3. E.g., Peter Karsten, *The Navay Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism* (New York: Free Press, 1972); Ronald Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977).
4. See R. Grivel, *De la Guerre Maritime* (Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1869); Theophile Aubé, *A Terre et a Bord, Notes d'un Marin* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1884).
5. E.g., R. Daveluy, *L'Esprit de la Guerre Navale* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1902); *Strategie Navale*, 1905; Gabriel Darrieus, *War in the Sea: Strategy and Tactics* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1907); G. Sechi, *Elementi di Arte Militare Marittima* (2 volumes, 1903-1906); Kurt von Maltzahn, *Naval Warfare* (New York: Longmans Green, 1908); G.J.W. Putnam Cramer, *Indleiding tot de Maritime Strategie en Zeetactiek* (1913). Also M. Peattie, "Akiyama Saneyuki and the Emergence of Modern Japanese Naval Doctrine," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 1977.
6. "Mahan and World War II: A Commentary from the United States," *Brassey's Naval Annual* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), reprinted in B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed., *The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977), pp. 20-40.
7. Clark G. Reynolds, "The Thallasocratic Determinism of Captain Mahan," *1971 Seminar in Maritime and Regional Studies*, C.D. Reynolds and W.J. McAndrew, eds., 1972, pp. 77-85.
8. Notably, *Drake and the Tudor Navy* (New York: Longmans Green, 1898); *The Successors of Drake* (New York: Longmans Green, 1900); *England in the Mediterranean* (New York: Longmans Green, 1904); *England in the Seven Years War* (New York: Longmans Green, 1907); *The Campaign of Trafalgar* (New York: Longmans Green, 1910); Corbett's complete works are discussed in D.M. Schurman, *The Education of a Navy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), and also by the same author, *Julian S. Corbett, 1854-1922: Historian of British Maritime Policy from Drake to Jellicoe* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1981).
9. Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (New York: Longmans Green, 1911), pp. 7-8.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
12. See Schurman's *Julian S. Corbett*; and "Historians and Britain's Imperial Strategic Stance in 1914," in J.E. Flint and G. Williams, *Perspectives of Empire* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973), pp. 172-188.
13. Holloway H. Frost, *The Battle of Jutland* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1936). Frost's influence is discussed in R.F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 292-298.
14. Simpson, pp. 20-21.
15. E.g., R. Bernotti, *La Guerra Marittima, Studio Critico sull' Impiego dei Mezzi Nella Guerra Mondiale* (Florence, Italy: Carpitiani M. Zipoli, 1923); G. Fioravanzo, *La Guerra sul Mare et la Guerra Integrale* (1930-1931); O. Di Giamberardino, *L'Arte della Guerra in Mare* (1937).
16. Simpson, p. 64.
17. Kurt Assmann, *Militarwissenschaftliche Rundschau* (1939), Numbers 2-4.
18. Theodore Ropp, "Continental Doctrines of Sea Power," E. Mead Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 455.
19. Material in this section is based on the author's *Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871-1946* (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1982).
20. A.J. Marder, *Portrait of an Admiral* (London: Cape, 1952), p. 296.
21. Herbert Richmond, *The Navy in the War of 1739-48* (1920); *The Navy in India, 1763-1783* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1931); *Papers Relating to the Loss of Minorca in 1756* (London: Navy Records Society, 1913); *The Spencer Papers* (volumes III and IV, 1924).
22. Weigley, pp. 293-298.

23. M.T. and H.M. Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939); and *Toward a New Order of Sea Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1946); A.F. Sokol, *Sea Power in the Nuclear Age* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961); J.J. Clark and D.H. Barnes, *Sea Power and its Meanings* (New York: Watts, 1966); Clark G. Reynolds, *Command of the Sea* (New York: Morrow, 1974).

24. Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace* (New York: Viking Press, 1970), p. 159.

25. Alvin Cottrell and Thomas Moorer, *U.S. Overseas Bases, Washington Papers, Vol. 5* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977), p. 6.

26. See also W.C.B. Tunstall's "Imperial Defence" chapters in the *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, v. II (1940) and III (1959); C.R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire* (London: Hutchinson, 1969); J.H. Parry, *The Spanish Seaborne Empire* (New York: Knopf, 1966).

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28. Gerald S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950); *Great Britain and the Indian Ocean: A Study in Maritime Enterprise, 1810-1850* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); and *The China Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830-1860* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

29. See also Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment* (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1972), and *The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal* (London: Cape, 1975).

30. Samuel Eliot Morison, *John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959); *The Two-Ocean War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963); *Life of Commodore Matthew C. Perry* (1967); *The European Discovery of America: The Northern Voyages* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), *The Southern Voyages* (1974).

31. Stephen W. Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars, I* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press); *The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929* (1968), II: *The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-1939* (1976); *Hankey: Man of Secrets* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 3 v., 1970, 1972, 1974); *Churchill and the Admirals* (New York: Morrow, 1977); also *The Strategy of Sea Power: Its Development and Application* (London: Collins, 1962).

32. Arthur J. Marder, *Anatomy of British Sea Power, 1880-1905* (New York: Knopf, 1941); *From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace, 1915-1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974) *Operation Menace: The Dakar Expedition and the Dudley North Affair* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); *Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy—Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); also *Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond* (London: Cape, 1952); *Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kiltinstone* (London: Cape, 3 v., 1952-59). Also a festschrift to Marder, Gerald Jordan, ed., *Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945* (New York: Crane Russak, 1977).

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