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The Story of Anzac

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the Kanto Force or the Manchurian Army? More importantly, the historical underpinning of the text leaves very much to be desired. A particularly vexing example is Stanley's confused handling of the crucial Mukden affair of September 1931, where even his times are out of kilter. One also wonders about the feeble characterization of the modern Japanese officer corps as springing from aristocratic or *samurai* stock.

It is true that remarkably little of moment has ever appeared in English on the subject of the so-called China Incident; e.g., Frank Dorn's retrospective *Sino-Japanese War* (1974), Dick Wilson's journalistic *When Tigers Fight: The Story of the Sino-Japanese War* (1982), and Hsi-cheng Chi's illuminating *Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse* (1982). Stanley's photographic survey can best be used with the other works in precisely the category selected for it by the publisher: as a reference album.

ALVIN D. COOX
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Bean, C.E.W. *The Story of Anzac*. Lawrence, Mass.: Queensland University Press, 1981. v. I, 662pp. \$36, v. II, 975pp. \$36. Volume I was first printed in 1921 and Volume II in 1924 in Sydney, Australia.

The Australian official history of World War I is justly renowned for its accuracy, clarity, and forthright judgments. There was no official censorship, and authors were able to express their opinions freely often to

the discomforture of their British military and academic counterparts. Thus, while British official historians concealed casualty figures to preserve Haig's reputation, the Australians wrote forthrightly and without fear of retribution.

C.E.W. Bean was the general editor of *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918* and personally wrote the first two volumes which cover the creation of the Australian Imperial Force, its operations in Egypt in 1914 and 1915, and the Gallipoli campaign of 1915-1916. Bean in fact accompanied the Australians to Egypt as a war correspondent and in this capacity went with the Anzac Corps to Gallipoli. He was therefore able to supplement his research and extensive postwar interviews with participants with his own frontline experience.

The Story of Anzac is painstakingly detailed comprising about 1,400 pages of text plus maps, notes, and appendixes. Bean describes not only the operations of the Anzac Corps but also the activities of the British and Turkish forces. For anybody interested in examining the actions of the Anzac Corps right down to the company, platoon and even squad level there is no better source than Bean's volumes.

Bean's study is also a first-rate description of the problems inherent in amphibious operations. Gallipoli was, of course, the first major sea-borne assault under conditions of modern war. The author carefully describes all of the shortcomings of the expedition. He notes, for exam-

ple, that the Royal Navy's bombardment of the Turkish defenses though impressive was in fact inadequate and that once the troops were ashore the absence of effective communications rendered close gunfire support almost impossible. Moreover the lack of communications equipment made it difficult for unit commanders to direct effectively their subordinates. The terrain made it impossible for commanders to see much of what was happening; there were no accurate maps, and there were no observation aircraft. The Australians, therefore, usually had to rely on runners to relay critical messages. Runners often got lost or were shot by the Turks thus compounding command and control problems. Lack of proper beach control techniques delayed the flow of supplies and reinforcements ashore and hindered the efficient evacuation of the wounded.

During the interwar years the US Marines studied the Gallipoli campaign in order to learn from Allied problems and devise an effective amphibious assault doctrine. A reader interested in understanding the problems involved in mounting an attack from the sea will find Bean's study very rewarding.

Bean's work also shows why the Australians ultimately became the shock troops of the British Army on the Western front. The military historian Alfred Vagts drew a distinction between militarism and the military way. Militarism is a way of life based on caste, cult, authority, and belief in tradition for its own sake.

The military way emphasizes loyal-

ty, efficiency, and a focus on achieving objectives.

In the First World War the British Army was wedded to the first concept. For officers social connections were vital and criticism of superiors avoided at all costs. Textbook methods were gospel and as late as 1918 senior officers were still trying to launch cavalry attacks. The Australians by contrast were dedicated to the military way. Officers, for example, were chosen for their ability not because of their social status. The fact that the Jew, Sir John Monash, could become a general is indicative of this attitude. In the British Army he would never have received a commission as a junior officer. In the field the Australians quickly learned to do their jobs in the most efficient manner whether or not their methods were sanctioned by tradition. It was in the crucible of Gallipoli that the Australians learned their methods of waging war, and it is this process that Bean describes with painstaking care.

STEVEN ROSS
Naval War College

Pack, James. *Nelson's Blood: The Story of Naval Rum*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 200pp. \$14.95

Despite the legend that gave rise to this book's title, Nelson's body was not returned from Trafalgar in a barrel of rum—and had he lived in 1970, Nelson would have applauded the termination of the daily ration of grog. However illustrious and venerable a service tradition must support a service need, Nelson would have been the first to recog-