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PROFESSIONAL READING

On Reorganizing the Pentagon

Rear Admiral S. A. Swarztrauber, US Navy (Retired)

What's wrong with the Pentagon? The enormity and complexity of the problem are bewildering and it was not much comfort to find similar frustrations reflected in each of the three books listed below. No one expert can give satisfying diagnoses and remedies. The three authors differ considerably on "What's wrong" and "What to do?" But on comparing and contrasting their points of view—frequently 180 degrees apart—some of the reasons behind the problem start coming into focus.

Every examination of the problem eventually has to focus on the Pentagon's organization. One quickly learns that in the case of "our" Pentagon, the word "organization" is little more than a euphemism for "power struggle." The struggle is by no means one involving only the armed services, the office of the SecDef, and the defense agencies. The larger battle goes on outside the Pentagon among those who compete for its domination—the White House, the Congress, and industry, to mention the most important. Indeed, the struggle is as big as the Constitution itself, and today the Pentagon is the prime example of the separation of powers contest that was born with our Republic, and flourishes unabated today.

Pentagon organization has been either a simmering issue or a boiling issue—but never dormant—since 1944. Late in 1983, it came to a boil again when the JCS openly split with the SecDef and endorsed a proposal to give

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the JCS Chairman a seat on the National Security Council. At the same time the press carried accounts of "guerrilla warfare" being waged by the SecNav on Capitol Hill to save his 600-ship Navy in open conflict with an enraged DepSecDef.

The three new books which shed so much light on this boiling pot were all published in 1983. They offer us the expert opinion of individuals who have served in the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the armed forces. Unfortunately, we are missing the view of the defense industry, the fourth major protagonist. But the three we have give us more than a generous plateful. Each, in his own way, declares that the present DoD organization is deficient, but that is where the similarity ends. The books:

Barrett, Archie D. *Reappraising Defense Organization: An Analysis Based on the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980*. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983. 325pp. $6

Krulak, Victor H. *Organization for National Security: A Study*. Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1983. 160pp. $8

Yarmolinsky, Adam and Gregory D. Foster. *Paradoxes of Power: The Military Establishment in the Eighties*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. 154pp. $15

The Author and His Approach

Krulak. Retired Marine Lieut. Gen. Krulak fought in three wars, served in the Pentagon, and was actively involved in the discussions preceding the National Security Act of 1947 and its subsequent amendments. He is currently a Vice Chairman of the US Strategic Institute. Krulak's focus is on the damage being done to national security by the mushrooming bureaucracy. He characterizes the OSD as an 88,000-man gargantua which produces a sort of institutional bloat that saps our soldierly strength.

There is no mincing of words in this book. He harshly criticizes the executive department's invasion of the congressional sphere and the substitution of amateur civilian opinion for professional military advice. On one occasion his words remind us of the biblical prophets: "Without [Congress'] vigorous action there is little hope and less likelihood that we will mend our ways before the brutality of war forces change upon us, and that may well be too late."

Krulak's approach is historical. He starts by reviewing the constitutional, nineteenth century, and legislative antecedents of our military establishment. He establishes clearly that the Founding Fathers intended that the Separation of Powers Doctrine apply to the armed forces—most especially to the armed

forces. George Mason is quoted, "The purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands."

Then, from personal experience and research, Krulak articulates the political struggle that took place between 1944 and 1947. One of the most contentious issues was whether or not to establish two new positions: a defense secretary and an armed forces chief of staff. The Army said "yes" and the Navy said "no." Eventually a compromise was worked out and the 1947 Act established a weak SecDef with no armed forces chief of staff.

Krulak offers fascinating insights into the events of the Truman and Eisenhower years. Both gentlemen desired a very strong SecDef with extensive budget control. Not satisfied with the 1947 Act, Truman called for another round of studies in 1948. Referring to what followed as the "Process of Erosion," Krulak accuses Congress of yielding to executive department pressure in the enactment of the amendments of 1949, 1953, and 1958. The service secretaries lost their cabinet status. They and the JCS were eclipsed by one powerful defense secretary and the newly created, but weak, JCS chairman. In the separation of powers contest, the scale had taken a decided tilt toward the White House.

From 1958, Krulak leads us through the growth of the gargantua. What had been envisioned in 1947 as a staff of fifteen to twenty-five $10,000-a-year civilians and officers ballooned into an 88,000-strong OSD that led to the disastrous results in the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam War, and the Desert I hostage rescue attempt in Iran. The system doesn't work, says Krulak, so it is time for change.

This book is easy to read, crisp, colorful, and straight to the point.

Yarmolinsky. Adam Yarmolinsky offers us the viewpoint of a high-level OSD civilian official. He was Special Assistant to Secretary McNamara during the Kennedy administration and a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary during the Johnson administration. He now practices law in Washington. He was assisted in writing this book by co-author Gregory Foster of ABT Associates, who is also a contributing editor to *Orbis*. Their approach is a broad-brush survey course on the military establishment and arms control. It appears to be a collection of individual papers fleshed out and edited into book form. It contains a great many useful facts, figures, and events interspersed with personal philosophy.

Yarmolinsky's experience at the highest levels of the defense bureaucracy peeps through with his use of that familiar Pentagon style: "Some observers say . . . . Others argue . . . . Still others believe . . . . "

Yarmolinsky, who is referred to as the senior author, acknowledges the assistance of Gregory Foster, who provided essential facts and ideas, on an extraordinarily tight timetable. This timetable may account for some errors concerning the JCS which went uncorrected, as well as a few apparent

contradictions that probably could have heen explained had there been more time.*

Without douht, the author knows the Pentagon and what makes it tick. But his views run counter to those of the military who work there. The Pentagon years under Kennedy and Johnson are seen by military leaders as the most dismal. Yarmolinsky, conversely, defends the OSD leadership of that period most vigorously and enthusiastically. He points to the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) and Systems Analysis, inaugurated during the Kennedy administration, as OSD's finest hour.

One of his "Paradoxes of Power" (from the title) declares that the larger a military establishment, the harder to control its hureaucracy. He does not attack the Pentagon organization, per se, but rather its inertia, its unmanageability, and the attitude of its military members. Yarmolinsky considers it dangerous that "the country is not able to preside over the military." He sees it imperative to achieve more and better civilian control over the armed services. He views military spending as bad for the economy and the military-industrial complex as inconsistent with the good of the Republic.

Another of his paradoxes states that we must deter because we cannot defend. As a co-sponsor of the Senate Nuclear Freeze Resolution he joins those who believe we already have all the nuclear deterrent we need. He asks paradoxically, "How can we live peacefully with such a large military establishment? But on the other hand, how can we live without it?" He closes the book with a chapter on arms control which clearly reflects his conviction that arms control—more than reorganization—is the answer to the problem of the Pentagon.

The entire book flows with a smooth, conversational style. It has the air of authority that comes with personal experience. The approach is as liberal as Krulak's is conservative and will probably do well in campus book stores.

Barrett. Dr. Barrett is a member of the professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee. Although never a member of Congress himself, he is ex-Air Force, his approach will be well received by Congressmen. Congress is constitutionally responsible for maintaining the armed forces and better than half of this book is dedicated to the maintenance of functions; more specifically, to getting a better handle on

*For example, on page 28 he refers to the "weekly JCS session"—they meet much more frequently—and inaccurately describes the sequence in staffing JCS decisions. One of the contradictions concerns arms control. On page 40 he laments that "ACDA has not exerted a significant impact on the defense establishment in its 20 years of existence." Yet on page 8 he acknowledges that "nowadays the military takes it for granted that it cannot discuss new weapon systems . . . without considering the arms control implications . . . " On page 134 he credits the ABM Treaty of 1972 as preventing serious destabilization. Under that Treaty, the military cancelled and dismantled a multibillion dollar program and complex.

such items as procurement, R&D, logistic support, maintenance, and certain Congressional pet projects like health care.

According to Barrett, the Act of 1947 as amended provided a legislative model—or functional wiring diagram—which has been short-circuited. Despite the language of the law, the uniformed services and the SecDef have emerged with positions of strength and influence out of proportion to their legal mandates. As a result of these distortions we suffer from inadequate military advice for the President and an ineffectively managed armed services.

Of the three books, Barrett's follows the most subdued or pragmatic approach. There are no charged quotations or warnings here. He uses as his framework for analysis the Defense Organization Study (DOS 77-80) conducted between 1977 and 1980—thrust on an unwilling Pentagon by the Carter White House. DOS 77-80 is a package of five studies, one each dealing with the DoD headquarters, the National Military Command Structure, defense resources, defense agencies, and combat effective training. The author served as an executive secretary for one of them. Toward the end of the Carter term, attention became riveted to the hostages in Iran and interest in DOS 77-80 waned. No formal integrated report was ever submitted. Barrett hopes his book will resurrect the project.

Given the complexity of the issue, and faced with reams of documents, Barrett's task was enormous. To make his research product more digestible, he split the work and followed parallel tracks to two sets of conclusions and recommendations. One track deals with the "employing arm" of DoD—SecDef-JCS-CinCs. The other deals with the "maintaining arm"—SecDef-Services-Component Commanders.

After analyzing and synthesizing the five studies, Barrett adds his personal assessment. There are four choices, he concludes: maintain the status quo, fine-tune the present system, limited reorganization, and major reorganization. He selects the option that would steer DoD's organization back toward the model intended by Congress.

Former JCS Chairman, General David C. Jones, in the book's introduction, praises Barrett's scholarship and his work with the Congress. But Jones hopes that bolder changes will be attempted, noting that Barrett's "recommendations are very modest. Politics, after all, is the art of the possible and perhaps Arch [Barrett] is right in his assessment of what is possible. Nevertheless, I dare to hope that our actions may yet match our rhetoric when we proclaim that national security must be above politics . . . . " In 1982, the year before he left office, General Jones publicly indicted the Joint System. This fanned the flames under the simmering pot and by late 1983, things were moving again in Congress.

Barrett's book is scholarly; it is organized and reads like a text. It would be most valuable to anyone seriously trying to understand the Pentagon.

The Problem

Krulak. The central issue, according to Krulak, is that the "warmaking competence of the military professional is blanketed by a suffocating institutional hierarchy." This indictment can be broken down into three components.

Presidents do not receive the military advice they need. Presidents have taken the easy—but dangerous—path in seeking an increasingly powerful SecDef. Krulak quotes Maxwell Taylor: "Often Presidents and Defense Secretaries have not wanted the military around during policymaking." The author adds that "sometimes military advice was not sought because of an advance conviction that it would not be palatable." A former JCS member complained that "what they are looking for is a unanimous point of view. They don't want disagreement." Presidents hope that a strong SecDef will settle the disagreements and shield the White House from controversy. The result, Krulak says, is that we have not won militarily since WWII, at which time the JCS were in constant personal contact with the President.

Excesses and abuses of civilian control cause failures. The American fighting man is perfectly contented with and committed to the principle of civilian control of the military. But a dangerous distortion of that principle occurs when a president becomes insulated from his military advisors and when four or five echelons of OSD officials, with little or no military knowledge, become involved in "micro-management" of purely military matters. Krulak cites a number of examples. There was one OSD official who ordered that a specific photo-reconnaissance mission in Vietnam be flown at 100-feet altitude, ignoring the objections of the field commander, with disastrous results. Krulak also blames costly procurement debacles, such as the TFX, on an OSD staff that tried to force its unprofessional decisions on unwilling services. Most SecDefs, he points out, are trained on the job. Few passed the primer stage before they were replaced—some 2.4 years on the average.

Our military professionalism is endangered. This problem is perhaps the most sinister, as it affects the character of the US fighting man. Since 1958, the admirals and generals have had to learn a new trade, mastering the "self-nourishing civilian bureaucracy," at the expense of their traditional role, the mastery of warfare. "By the sheer weight of bureaucratic pressure, the nation's military leadership has been encouraged to minimize its broad and basic commitment to 'support and defend the Constitution.' In place of that commitment there is implicit in the system encouragement for them to dedicate themselves to support and defend the Secretary of Defense—and all of his Under and Assistant Secretaries as well—whose views they are adjured to endorse in unison before a Congress depicted more and more as the enemy."

Yarmolinsky. Yarmolinsky identifies a wide range of problems created by the military establishment. Most fall into one of the four summaries below.

By its sheer mass and momentum, the military establishment is wasteful, inefficient, and out of control. It is the largest organization in the United States and touches every facet of American life. Yet it is not a monolithic structure. Yarmolinsky sees it as a "modern structure of prestressed concrete, held together by the tensions between opposing forces." No one has yet figured out a way to get their arms around the problem.

The establishment represents an elaborate ritualistic process, the net effect of which is to fudge accountability and to make speedy and clear decisions extremely difficult. This leads to wasteful duplication of effort, e.g., four individual "air forces"; cost overruns, 2900 Trident design change orders within three months; inflation and unemployment; and dislocation of capital and skilled manpower.

The Pentagon organization employs two percent of the American work force and yet its products offer no consumer satisfaction other than the pleasure members of the armed forces may take in flying planes or firing weapons. And despite this huge investment, Americans are discovering more and more things that their military cannot do.

Alliances and coalitions make the establishment immune to supervision and change. Its broad reach and long tentacles into Congress, the public, private, and foreign sectors, have forged an armor of "floating coalitions" that cut across organizational lines. Yarmolinsky depicts the armed services as being in league with industry and Congress so as to undercut OSD efforts to control the Department. With thousands of retired officers in industry, the combined lobbying abilities of industry and services are greatly superior to those of OSD.

On the other side of the coin, Yarmolinsky believes that OSD officials are denied access to needed information and expert military advice. This puts them on the spot. They are reluctant "to make adverse judgments on complex issues of military research and development; a wrong decision against a weapon system could, just possibly, mean defeat for the United States in a future conflict, while a wrong favorable decision would only mean unnecessary dollars for defense."

The Congress is no help in bringing the services under control, regrets Yarmolinsky. That body has "sought to perpetuate interservice competition . . . a situation in which one service could be played off against the others." Yarmolinsky is most annoyed at Congress' attempts to micromanage the affairs of OSD. He compares GAO's activities vis-à-vis the DoD as very similar to OSD's program analysis activities vis-à-vis the armed services.

Attitudes of military men are hard to change. Traditional values of military men have been conditioned by years of intense training to fight for the objective at

any cost and by fierce competition within their own service structures. Accordingly, says Yarmolinsky, they are somewhat less responsive to judgments of outside observers. Thus, there occurred a tragic disconnect between senior military commanders and their civilian superiors during the war in Vietnam, and even more effective civilian control of the military could not have redeemed it. But there are signs of change, in Yarmolinsky's opinion. Since the advent of the AVF, our soldiers no longer serve because of a patriotic calling but because of their need for an occupation. Exit hero image; enter the bureaucrat. Although this is a painful—even controversial—process, thinking men of this dangerous nuclear age will learn to bear "the pains of transition from the heroic to the bureaucratic model—realizing that bureaucrats can be heroes too, but it's harder . . . . "

Efforts to curb the military establishment by arms control have been ineffective. The very existence of the military establishment constitutes a danger of nuclear war—a war that might be the end of civilization. Still, comments Yarmolinsky, we seem committed to an all-out arms race, while giving lip service to arms control. He believes arms control could provide a practical constraint on the "uncontrolled expansion of the U.S. and Soviet military establishments." But, he qualifies, arms control runs counter to the short-term parochial interests of the military bureaucracy and therefore, it cannot succeed without Presidential commitment, which it lacks.

Barrett. Barrett logically presents two versions of the problem. First he examines in detail the criticisms of the Pentagon that emerged from DOS 77-80, as follows:

- JCS is unable to give military advice from national perspective due to service bias.
- National Military Command Structure is inadequate during crises.
- JCS avoids giving advice when division of their budget shares is at issue.
- JCS, as a committee, is an inappropriate institution for directing operations.
- Joint Staff is too dependent on services' input.
- CinCs are too weak and component commanders are too strong.
- Too much micro-management by OSD; OSD should stick to broad policy issues.
- Decision making is overly concentrated at SecDef level and Service Secretaries are underemployed.
- Excessive layering of management levels.
- Imprecise lines of authority.
- Difference of opinions are submerged, depriving the President of needed important information and advice.

Barrett also gives his own assessment of where the problems lie and they can be broken down into four areas.

The legislated channels of responsibility are being ignored. We have drifted away from the Constitution and the National Security Act which provide one channel for employing the armed services and another for maintaining them. A situation has evolved wherein SecDef, working directly with the uniformed services, is performing both the employing and maintaining functions simultaneously by means of a *de facto*, unofficial chain of command through the services to the component commanders and fighting forces. The *de jure*, or legislated chains of command are mostly bypassed, leaving the CinCs fairly well out of the picture and relegating the service secretaries to a window dressing role.

The SecDef is doing the service secretaries' jobs and is neglecting his own. Just as Krulak criticizes the SecDef for doing the JCS' job, Barrett criticizes the SecDef and OSD for having usurped the maintaining functions of the service secretaries. Clearly the law assigns a very wide range of maintaining functions, including R&D, to the service secretaries. But just as clearly, the OSD, under its broad coordination authority, has taken over in the maintenance area. The service secretaries have practically become ministers without portfolio. Meanwhile, the SecDef has become so extensively involved in the details of managing the services, that he has precious little time left to concentrate on the broad national defense policy issues—which the law requires him to do. Virtually all participants in DOS 77-80 agreed that DoD had become overly centralized except the OSD participants themselves.

The defense structure is rigidly resistant to change. The natural human tendency is to protect one's turf. Nowhere is this more true than in the Pentagon. Every one of its components can be expected to defend against any threat by any other component that would reduce its influence, invade its domain, or challenge its essential role, its independence, its budget, or its morale. Barrett documents resistance by SecDef/OSD to any and all DOS 77-80 recommendations for organizational changes which would strengthen the joint structure or service secretaries. The services, too, have a long history of resistance when it comes to sacred parochial cows. They will even oppose change when it may appear on the surface that they may be getting something for nothing, especially if that change may interfere with what they perceive to be their traditional missions or roles. For instance, the Navy did not want polaris SSBNs at first. They resisted getting involved in riverine warfare and opposed the idea of floating warehouses for the RDF. The Army was so skeptical about air power they gave up the Army Air Corps. They wanted nothing to do with Green Berets nor ABMs.

Inter-service rivalry is a problem, but a manageable one. Barrett does a first-rate job with the phenomenon of bureaucratic conflict. He reminds us that the Founding Fathers deliberately institutionalized conflict. Conflict is an instinctively human trait that will inevitably surface when people or

organizations interact, particularly on matters of distribution of property. Barrett draws on James Madison and *The Federalist* to point out that conflict, even with its potentially disastrous results, is legitimate. (Krulak emphasizes this point, too.) Barrett argues that cooperation and conflict can coexist beneficially and that a wise manager can manipulate, design, tailor, or structure conflict to serve as an effective management tool, even, ironically, in the resolution of conflicts themselves.

Recommendations

Krulak. His recommendations are brief and unambiguous, and there are two of them.

First, "get the OSD out of the professional area of warmaking, which is the proper province of the JCS." Krulak would limit the role of the SecDef to the logistic, fiscal, budgetary, and administrative aspects of our national security structure. Most important: the military chain of command must pass directly from the President to the fighting forces via the JCS.

Second, "guarantee to the Commander-in-Chief and the Congress the unfiltered counsel of the nation's military leaders, as represented in the corporate body of the JCS." But this body, says Krulak, should not include a JCS Chairman. The concept of a JCS has proven its case, but the concept of a JCS Chairman has not. It is time to acknowledge that reality and to eliminate the office. Krulak holds that no one man, civilian or military, can give the President proper advice on the broad spectrum of land, sea, and air warfare that is required.

Yarmolinsky. Yarmolinsky does not conclude with recommendations like the other two authors. But his recommendations, which appear throughout the book are yet clear, and some fairly leap at the reader.

The President should take a vigorous personal lead in arms control. Otherwise, the military bureaucracy will dominate the scene.

"Increase civilian control of (1) overall budgets; (2) research and development; (3) force structure; (4) contingency planning; and (5) actual military operations." Yarmolinsky opposes further increases in defense spending. In fact, he speculates, the recent Reagan increases may, paradoxically, reduce the overall effectiveness of the military establishment. The present system, dominated by the military-industrial-labor-congressional complex is totally inadequate. "To maintain effective civilian control over the military budget . . . the civilian authorities must involve themselves deeply in . . . control of R&D and control of force structure . . . . " The principal device available to the civilian leadership for controlling actual military operations, advises Yarmolinsky, is through the development and promulgation of rules of engagement.

Convert the US military from a warfighting to a constabulary force. Such a force would consider war as an interruption of its normal duties. "In this situation, military attitudes are as important as military functions . . . . If the military is to evolve, even over a long stretch of time, into an essentially constabulary force, great changes in the symbolic values of the military within American society must be achieved." Which leads to another recommendation.

Reshape attitudes of career military officers. "Senior military commanders need to understand and share the objectives of their civilian superiors . . . . Enhancing civilian control . . . is to some extent a matter of education, and the educational process is a life long one." He suggests more ROTC and fewer service academy officers, in the mix, plus more in-service education at civilian universities. There should be created satisfactory career lines for officers specializing in politico-military relations and even the possibility of lateral entry for civilian specialists into the officer ranks.

Barrett. After considering four broad alternatives suggested by DOS 77-80, Barrett selects "Limited Reorganization." He admits that maintaining status quo is a perfectly viable alternative under the premise that the cure may be worse than the malady. Fine-tuning the present system would solve little, and lacking legislative backbone, may not even survive a change of administrations. A major reorganization is simply not politically feasible, Barrett reckons. Thus, he opts for modest congressional action, which by the fall, 1983, seemed to be gathering momentum on Capitol Hill, despite OSD opposition. Barrett's limited reorganization proposal would attempt to restore separation between the employment arm function and the maintenance arm function as envisioned in the language of the 1947 Act as amended. Two parallel legislative actions would be involved.

Streamline the maintenance arm. Barrett recommends integration of the departmental headquarters of the services. The service secretariats would cease to exist and the service staffs would thenceforth serve both secretary and service chief. The secretary would be restored as the bona fide manager of his service. Service chiefs would serve as chief of staff in the real and traditional sense of the term. The chiefs would handle joint matters in the JCS arena, having a personal staff to assist them, and the vice chiefs would deal with purely service matters—pretty much as is the case at present. Barrett makes a strong and convincing case for this, but it presupposes that the SecDef can be persuaded to release the reins. Decentralization in this manner could free the SecDef to spend more time in dealing with external entities and in executing his legal responsibilities to define high-level national security objectives.

Strengthen the employing arm. Several actions recommended by Barrett would, using his words, "institutionalize a joint perspective."

- Strengthen the JCS Chairman. Formally give him an independent voice, and memberships on senior advisory bodies such as Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council. Assign him a dedicated staff. Establish him as principal link between SecDef and CinCs, eliminating JCS from chain. Assign him responsibility to review service and agency budget proposals and to submit his recommendations to SecDef.
- Strengthen the CinCs. Designate the CJCS as their single uniformed superior. Give them increased responsibilities in readiness evaluation. Assign responsibility for joint training and doctrine to RedCom.
- Increase independence of Joint Staff. Terminate services' coordination of joint papers. Insure Joint Staff receives guidance from White House and SecDef. Revise personnel procedures to insure assignment of best qualified officers.

Reviewer's Critique and Assessment

After having studied the considered opinions of three expert Pentagon observers, we are still left hanging up in the air. Obviously, they cannot all be right, and just as obviously, we cannot implement all their mutually exclusive recommendations.

Why has the Pentagon turned in such an unenviable performance? Krulak says there has been too much civilian control. Yarmolinsky claims there has been too little. Barrett believes that it has been a failure to maintain a tidy separation between civilian control of the maintaining and employing arms.

Who is to blame? Krulak blames successive power-grabbing administrations and submissive congresses for the fix we are in. Yarmolinsky blames the unholy Congressional-Service-Industry alliance. Barrett blames human nature—man's instinct to protect and expand his turf.

What to do? Krulak advises we get rid of the JCS Chairman and get the SecDef out of the JCS' business. Barrett recommends we strengthen the JCS Chairman and get the SecDef out of the service secretaries' business. Yarmolinsky recommends more SecDef control of both the JCS' and service secretaries' business.

Krulak. Krulak warns that we must take dramatic remedial action to restore sound military advice to the President before it is too late. I do not believe the problem is quite as urgent and dangerous as he suggests.

Krulak himself acknowledges that presidents do not want heavy doses of military advice in peacetime. The squeaky peacetime wheels will get the grease, even when the president is a military man like Eisenhower. So, are we to force military advice down an unwilling president's throat?

The real reason we lost at the Bay of Pigs, in Vietnam, and at Desert I in Iran was far more fundamental than lack of military advice. It was available. But none of the presidents involved—for reasons right or wrong—saw those situations as vital to the nation. Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter viewed their social, economic, and domestic political problems as more important to the nation's interests than dealing with a secnrity problem. They never shifted mental gears to a military mode as did Roosevelt during World War II.* So it was business as usual, and we muddled through with our existing defense organization machinery.

Americans have an organizational bent. We create great organizations which we hope will function under all circumstances. But when a really major emergency arises, which might put that organization to the test, our nature is to improvise—to do it *ad hoc*—and to circumvent existing wiring diagrams. At the outset of World War II, we did just that, creating new organizations, such as JCS and OPA, changed names and missions of others, and totally mobilized the national resources.

In the event of another bona fide national emergency, we would do likewise. No commander in chief in his right mind would try to fight a major war with our present defense organization. The first thing he would do would be to summon his service chiefs to the Oval Office. There would suddenly be a huge OSD staff of program analysts, comptrollers, net assessors, R&Ders, and other miscellaneous bureaucrats idle and available for duties related to the war effort.

As much as I agree with Krulak—especially on the problem of micromanagement by OSD—I do not believe his recommendation on JCS advice will be acted upon in peacetime. And even if Congress were to enact a Roosevelt-JCS type of relationship, the president would be too absorbed in social, economic, and political issues to listen. What we need and must have, then, are a few, less sweeping changes that will guarantee us a military structure of professional fighting men—equipped, trained, and ready—whose leaders can make a rapid move across the river to the White House when the President calls.

Yarmolinsky. Yarmolinsky says that the most important mission of our military establishment is no longer to fight war but to deter it. In order for the military establishment best to carry out this mission, we must bring it under control through increased civilian control, arms control, and reshaping the way military men think.

While I agree wholeheartedly with the importance of deterring nuclear

*I feel quite certain that Krulak would have better words for the Grenada operation. That one enjoyed the personal commitment of the President and the military was not overwhelmed by micro-management of the operation. Grenada proved that even our present system can be made to work—given those right conditions.

war, I do not see how Yarmolinsky's formula will do it. He says our military establishment must be structured to deter because it cannot adequately defend. He calls this a paradox, but to me, it is more a case of flawed reasoning. It confuses *means* with *end*. He says we must deter (means) in order to avoid nuclear destruction (end). He fails to acknowledge that deterrence is a worthy end in itself—that we must defend in order to deter. The USSR will be deterred by significant warfighting potential. The USSE will not be deterred by a military establishment run by a bureaucracy of nonprofessionals, debating arms control proposals, and restructuring itself as a constabulary force.

Yarmolinsky strongly emphasizes arms-control. Arms control and disarmament schemes are as old as recorded history. Isaiah wrote of beating swords into plowshares. None—neither the simplest nor the most elaborate attempts—have ever prevented war among the signatories.

Historically, arms control enthusiasts have relied on both dreams and fears to promote their cause. Great dreans of peace produced the short-lived Concert of Europe, League of Nations, and Pact of Paris. The framers of the United Nations said to themselves, "This time it will be different." Similarly history tells us of the great fears of mass annihilation generated by a series of "ultimate weapons," the crossbow, gun powder, and aerial bombardment. Yarmolinsky now repeats old arguments, "This time, with nuclear weapons, it's different." We live in the midst of a recurring cycle wherein man's belligerent nature overcomes his noble thoughts. If we are to rely on arms control to prevent a nuclear holocaust, then we are in serious trouble, indeed.

Yarmolinsky is also of the school that equates general war with nuclear war and, consequently, as one which might end civilization. Many of this school then reason that general war is obsolete. The logic that follows is a very slippery slope. Warfighting forces are judged obsolete and forms of unilateral disarmament gain respectability. According to this logic we can get by with a constabulary force and silo-sitters.

But this reasoning is wrong on three counts. First, there is no compelling reason for a country at war to use nuclear weapons, especially if it might eliminate the possibility of achieving its wartime objectives. Even Hitler, with back to the wall, did not employ biological or chemical weapons, presumably deterred by the consequences of retaliation.

Second, nuclear war would not end civilization. That theatrical horrow scenario is used as a dramatic closing argument to "rest the case" against war, and for disarmament. No one but an insensitive barbarian would challenge it. But reality is not so simple. The *real* horrow of nuclear war is that man *would* survive. The survivors would endure incalculable heartache and adversity. But man, with his proven ability to survive famine, flood, and plague—nuclear winters notwithstanding—would be left to pick up the pieces and start the next cycle.

Third, war has not become obsolete. To believe so is to deny all history and human nature. There will be wars, minor wars and major wars: perhaps nuclear, perhaps not, perhaps worse. For these reasons we should do everything in our power to deter war, to delay it, or to minimize its effects on us. We Americans will be challenged as long as we are "King of the Mountain." If we are unwilling or unprepared to think the unthinkable, we may be condemned to enduring it.

It is fashionable these days to speak about there being no winners, only losers, in war. This is not exactly new. In retrospect, did the United States really win World War II? Or would it be more accurate to say we lost the least? As unsettling as this reasoning is, it is, unfortunately, all relative.

To get a handle on the military establishment, Yarmolinsky would change its "mentality" in two ways. First, he would increase civilian control—vertically and horizontally—of every facet of Pentagon endeavors. Second, he would reeducate the military to think more like, and share the objectives of, the civilian leadership. Unless Yarmolinsky seriously has it in mind to amputate America's warfighting arm, his logic escapes me. At this time in our history, when we have the most to lose, we need the most skillful and dedicated warriors we have ever had. The President and the Congress need sound military advice more than ever. The time-honored principle of civilian control of the military should not be subverted for purposes of civilianizing the military. In effect, Yarmolinsky's proposals would do just that, and would lead to the demise of the Republic.

Military and naval science—warfighting—is a profession which, like any other, requires decades to master. We seek financial experts to run the Treasury Department. Just as the President selects men who have tilled the soil and who have engaged in collective bargaining to lead the Agriculture and Labor Departments, respectively, he should seek men who have studied, practiced, and tasted combat as his Pentagon managers. We do not need more civilian control of the Pentagon; the President, the Secretaries, and the Congress are certainly adequate, and clearly what the Founding Fathers envisioned. What we need at the Pentagon is more professional control, not on-the-job trainees from business and academe. There is a seldomly considered source of this type of professional military leadership and expertise: the retired officer community. Why not seek and appoint the best available experts for *all* of our executive departments?

Barrett. Barrett is concerned with OSD's encroachment into the maintenance function. This has been an incremental process over a period of decades. The cumulative effect of the process is not what the Congress originally had in mind. Barrett proposes to return, incrementally, towards an organizational arrangement that properly accounts for congressional constitutional and legislated preeminence in the maintenance function.

Congressional acquiescence in the step-by-step accretion of power by OSD must now be recognized by Congress as a series of mistakes. One of the biggest mistakes was stripping the service secretaries of their cabinet status. For, thereafter, they no longer possessed the necessary clout to perform the tasks that Congress left on the law books for them to perform. Barrett's proposal to streamline the maintenance function might give the service secretaries the wherewithal to reclaim their lost authority. This would be "half a loaf" which we should not reject out of hand as insufficient.

There is one untidy detail. Barrett speaks of integrating the three service headquarters staffs. While there are three service secretaries, there are four service staffs. Under Barrett's proposal, the SecNav would find himself with two chiefs of staff—the CNO and the Marine Commandant. It might require some fancy foot work to tidy this up.

Under Barrett's recommendation to beef up the joint structure, the strengthened JCS Chairman would be responsible for delivering military advice to the President in two forms. First, he would offer his own independent view, representing the CinCs. Second, as JCS spokesman, it would be his duty to report to the President whenever the JCS were not in agreement with his own assessment, and why.

This proposal would amount to a "quarter of a loaf," provided HR 3718 is approved, assigning the JCS Chairman a seat on the National Security Council as a co-equal with the SecDef. At least one man in uniform—representing the expertise and capabilities of one of the four services—would be a regular in the White House. Even though the JCS Chairman would be "filtering" the advice of his JCS colleagues, he would be better equipped for this role than a civilian official. This quarter loaf would be another step in the right direction.

Assessment. America has traditionally pushed its military establishment to the back burner in peacetime. This time, the military was also buried, file cabinet by file cabinet, beneath an enormous, entangling bureaucracy.

That bureaucracy has not optimized the combat readiness and warfighting ability of our armed forces. It is certainly too cumbersome and inefficient to be useful in time of war. It exists primarily because of a fundamental flaw in the organization of DoD—the unprecedented centralization of authority in one executive. It contradicts the principle of separation of powers; it violates the sound management principle of span of control; and it attempts to homogenize heterogeneous entities.

Constitutional separation of powers. When successive presidents sought to delegate their defense budget headache, Congress acquiesced. When SecDef instituted an elaborate PPBS to accommodate the President's wishes, Congress acquiesced again. Congress accepted this incremental invasion into

its domain because it still had an ace up the sleeve—its direct relationship with the services.

In 1949, when the service secretaries lost their direct access to the President, a century-and-a-half-old delicate balance was upset, they did retain their special relationship with Congress. The services' power base, quite naturally, shifted toward Capitol Hill. Now, when a service's pet project is pruned by SecDef and fails to make it into the Administration's budget, the service resents it. When that service then presses its own budget version before the Congress, OSD cries "insubordination." Depending on where you sit, the SecDef/OSD, the Congress, or service(s) become the "enemy." Major resources—time, funds, and manpower—are committed to protecting one's "turf" against the "enemy."

Remarks made by Yarmolinsky, Krulak, and Barrett confirm this. Moreover, their remarks also make it clear that the Executive Branch is out in front in this separation of powers contest. Barrett and Krulak—in the losers' corner—recommend turning the clock back. Yarmolinsky, on the other hand, matter-of-factly declares that the constitutional checks and balances are now irrelevant.*

Congress, probably regretting having yielded so much, is now fighting its way back. The GAO audits, annoying to OSD, and the War Powers Act, annoying to presidents, are examples of Congress' attempt to reassert its waning control over national defense issues.

If push came to shove, neither the elaborate OSD system of military procurement and budget controls nor the War Powers Act would stand up to a constitutionality challenge before the Supreme Court. (One needs only to reread the first few pages of the Constitution.) The Court has already spoken once on this issue. In 1850 it held that the duties and powers of the President as Commander in Chief were purely military. Yet today, post-World War II events have produced this Executive-Legislative "Mexican stand-off."

The uniformed leaders are caught in between, which paradoxically, is sometimes bad and sometimes good, depending on who is judging. They sorely resent the progressive diminution of their role as advisors to the President. A few years ago the CNO, in his capacity as Senior Naval Advisor, wrote to the President in utter frustration, complaining that his advice was not reaching the White House. He was sharply rebuked by the SecDef.

It is true that the amendments to the Act of 1947 have force-fed some inter-service cooperation that had not existed before. But ironically, much of the cooperation that has emerged has come about because of the services' common-adversary relationship with the OSD, and not because of common

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*Yarmolinsky, p. 96. "The three checks on the power of the military provided in the Constitution . . . have proved largely irrelevant to the central dilemmas of civilian control in the second half of the twentieth century."

philosophy, purpose or mission. The services, sensing the power struggle between the Branches, actually find themselves able to play one side against the other. From a privileged position on the E Ring, I have observed some remarkable about-faces and some surprising truces among strange bedfellows, agreeing to support one another's programs. The OSD fights back, trying to divide and conquer. The Congress audits the OSD.

The bureaucracy, the entangling coalitions, and the tension between opposing forces depicted so graphically by Yarmolinsky, grow and grow on. They will continue to do so, inevitably, around the super magnet known as SecDef.

Span of Control. The Constitution declares there to be two principal functions of the federal government: first, the defense and second, the general welfare of its citizens. At the end of the 1700s there were five executive departments—State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Justice—reflecting those constitutional functions demanding the most personal attention of the Chief Executive. Said another way, those were the functions least prudent for delegating to someone else, or so one would think. In fact, War and Navy have lost their cabinet status, delegated to someone else. Many other functions, not mentioned in the Constitution—Agriculture, Education and Labor, to mention a few—have been elevated to cabinet status.

In effect, the presidential function of Commander in Chief has been delegated. The SecDef has been formally inserted into the chain of command between the Oval Office and the fighting forces. The fact that there exists this delegation is cause enough for concern, but the manner in which it has been delegated is far more disturbing. It is widely accepted as a principle of sound management that the effective span of control of a good leader is between seven and nine, maybe ten subordinates. Our defense bureaucracy is organized so as to place over 30 high-level officers and bureaucrats under the SecDef's formal, line supervision. These are deputy, under, and assistant secretaries, service secretaries, agency directors, members of JCS, CinCs and aides. The SecDef cannot possibly devote sufficient personal attention to those with solid-line wiring diagram relationships with him. Without manageable-span-of-control supervision, waste, inefficiency, unaccountability, and bureaucracy grow.

We seem compelled to put all of our eggs in one basket. The military establishment is the largest organization in the United States. It employs more people—4,700,000—than any other. It accounts for over 70 percent of federal procurement. Its mission is the most important of any assigned to the federal government. All other executive agencies and departments are dwarfed by comparison. Even if divided into its three services—Army, Navy, Air Force—the smallest among them would still dwarf the other

departments. Should we really divide executive responsibility so unevenly and then expect there to exist one man wise and strong enough to control it?

Homogeneity vs. Heterogeneity. The Founding Fathers did not see the Army and Navy as similar or homogeneous organizations. In the language of the Constitution, the Army and Navy were treated in distinct terms, in different sub-paragraphs, and with separate funding procedures.

Nothing has changed. The missions of the Army and Navy—and now, the Air Force—are still different, as different, for example, as the missions of the Commerce and Agriculture Departments. Moreover, the philosophies of professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are pronouncedly different. They see themselves very differently—raison d'être, approach to problem solving, attitudes, and every-day procedures. During my 14 years in joint and combined assignments, I frequently found I had more in common with foreign naval officers than I did with American officers of the other services.

It must be presumed that the 1949 decision to consolidate the three service departments into one was conditioned by the prevailing but faulty reasoning that the missions of the services had been superseded by that of deterrence. But deterrence is not a mission, it is an objective, and the real missions of the services did not go away. If consolidation of related missions were the driving criterion, then combining Navy and State would make just as much sense. The Air Force would go quite nicely with NASA, and so forth.

Consider an analogy. Another US Administration, concerned with streamlining government operations, might conceivably decide to consolidate all government entities concerned with the national economy. The Departments of Commerce, Labor, and Treasury with selected agencies would be logical and prime candidates for inclusion in the new Department of the Economy. It is likely that these components would quickly oblige the Administration with a consensus on how best to structure and manage the economy? Would it serve the national interest if a powerful Economy Secretary submerged dissent and achieved a consensus by coercion?

The architects of the amendments to the 1947 Act somehow saw a homogeneity among the armed services that simply does not exist. They are heterogeneous in more ways than they are homogeneous. To homogenize them would be to destroy them.

It is a very difficult task to try to homogenize heterogeneous units, especially if the units do not wish to be homogenized. This task employs scores of thousands of OSD bureaucrats. It will require hiring some more before either (1) they are able to succeed as Yarmolinsky urges, or (2) a President and a Congress decide it was a bad idea in the first place.

Irony of ironies, an ex-military man, President Eisenhower, was a major participant in the creation of the defense bureaucracy. In his earnest attempt

not to appear partial to the military, he helped sire a monster far more menacing than the military-industrial complex he seemed to dread. Could he comment today, I believe he would agree.

The only sure solution would involve painful dislocations for a lot of well-meaning and patriotic folks. But sooner or later the SecDef must be separated from the services, and the service secretaries restored to cabinet status with access to the President. Let them manage the maintenance arm on behalf of the Chief Executive for the Congress.

This is not to say we couldn't use a SecDef. On the contrary, let him manage the employing arm for the Commander in Chief. His functions might include: oversight—not command, but oversight—of the joint structure; management of those defense agencies determined to be truly joint; and coordination of all international military affairs. He should also assume the duties of the White House National Security Assistant. This would be a very important office, with a very important man, performing a formidable task—but one far more manageable than the one that exists today.

Should the Congress wish to adopt its own form of PPBS and FYDP, it would certainly be within its prerogative to do so. It is that body's Constitutional responsibility to determine the size, composition, and armament of the armed forces.

Whereas Barrett proposed "half a loaf," the foregoing must be considered a full loaf, and one that is probably too large for appetites either in the White House or on Capitol Hill—at least at this point in time. It may be we have not suffered enough—in Krulak's words—to demand change. Barrett would say this recommendation is not within the realm of the politically possible. Yarmolinsky would not see this as a problem, much less the proposed as a solution.

By the oath we pledge, we are sworn to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . . . " It is very uncomfortable to stand by and observe distortion of the checks and balances of the Constitution we are to defend. We suspect that unless our Executive and Legislative Masters are both contented with their working relationships nnder the Constitution, we are courting disaster.

If you want a single fundamental reference on the subject of naval weapons, classified or unclassified, *U.S. Naval Weapons* is it—it is meaty and filled with information without being the least bit dull or opaque.

William D. O'Neil

Friedman, Norman. *U.S. Naval Weapons: Every Gun, Missile, Mine and Torpedo Used by the U.S. Navy from 1883 to the Present Day.* Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1983. 287pp. $24.95

Once again, Norman Friedman has produced a fine and useful book of reference. Anyone with a professional or personal involvement in naval weapons will find much of interest and value in it. As is usual with Dr. Friedman's books, this one is meaty and filled with information without being the least bit dull or opague.

Its title notwithstanding, the book's coverage is not restricted to weapons, but also includes weapons control systems and most detection and tracking systems (the chief exception being shipboard radar systems, the subject of another of Dr. Friedman's books). The bulk of this effort is narrative in form, divided into six topically oriented parts: Guns (Surface Fire); Fleet Air Defense Before 1945; Underwater Ordnance; Fleet Air Defense After 1945; Air-to-Surface Weapons; and Surface-to-Surface Missiles. Each part has an introduction giving a general overview, followed by chapters devoted to specific systems or categories of systems—"Gun Design and Development, 1883-1983," "Sonar Systems," "Fighters in Fleet Air Defense," "Harpoon," etc. There is also a general chapter on "Antisubmarine Strategy and Tactics." The story starts with the dawn of the "New Navy" in the 1880s; there is no coverage of earlier systems.

The organization of these chapters is fundamentally historical; they tell the story of each system's development and how one system led to another. In most cases there is considerable description of the decision process and of the positions taken by the bureaus, OpNav, SecNav, and other players. The systems are described in terms of rheir gross physical characteristics, basic principles of operation, general performance, and relationship to other systems. At least one good black-and-white photo or diagram is provided to illustrate nearly every system.

The narrative sections are followed by 45 pages of densely packed appendixes, which provide additional discrete data. Together, the narrative and appendixes furnish information on virtually every system the Navy has so

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much as considered over the past century. The comprehensiveness and precision of the information inevitably falls off somewhat as the most recent systems are reached and security becomes a significant consideration. For the most part, however, Dr. Friedman has avoided the kinds of gross inaccuracies that books on weapon systems commonly fall prey to (thus depriving professionals of a good deal of innocent merriment which they are accustomed to derive from such works), largely by being very careful about his sources and refusing to accept ill-informed speculation when hard information is lacking.

Books such as this are not without their dangers, which are perhaps magnified here by the solid virtues of this one. There is a fine air of completeness and certitude that clings to the book's accounts of weapons and their development, lent not by any immodest claims on Dr. Friedman's part but by his careful and precise accumulation of detail. "Surely," one is likely to say to oneself, "here at last is the true and veritable story." And to be sure, in most cases it is the nearest thing to the true and veritable story that has been seen in print, or ever will be seen. But it is by no means the full truth, and indeed the full truth would in most cases lie beyond the reach of this or any other book.

Naval weapon systems have always represented substantial feats of engineering and organization, all the way back to Tyre, and our century has seen their complexity growing exponentially. The decisions on major systems are bound up with power, money, pride, and diverging alternate futures for great institutions—and men (and nowadays women) contest them with all their passion. The truly important moves in the development histories often are not recorded, and often the records that do exist were written with an eye more to advantage than to accuracy. Naturally it is impossible to deal with all the labyrinthine details in such a book as this, even if the necessary information were available.

Even "hard facts" about weapon design and performance can be treacherous. The design of a major weapon system may involve many hundreds of interlocked critical choices. Dr. Friedman has sought (with varying degrees of success) to select and illuminate a few of the most important design issues for some systems, but for the most part confines himself to straightforward descriptions of system characteristics. As a result it is often difficult to form any very precise idea of the physical principles which underlie a system's operation, or to understand the constraints and tradeoffs which shaped it. Nor are the descriptions sufficient, in many cases, to provide a clear picture of the system's operating sequence or performance. Finally, there is very little data on effectiveness in service. In all of these matters, of course, the author is handicapped by the outright absence of much of the vital data, and to some extent by his own lack of any extensive experience in weapon system design, development and testing.

Limitations it has, yes, but make no mistake: this is an excellent book. No more solid, reliable, comprehensive compendium on US naval weapons will be found anywhere. If you want a single fundamental reference on the subject, *U.S. Naval Weapons* is it.

Russett, Bruce. *The Prisoners of Insecurity—Nuclear Deterrence, The Arms Race, and Arms Control.* San Francisco: Freeman, 1983. 192pp.

The thesis of this book is that the most fundamental questions about national security and arms control are political rather than technological, and there exists an elite that perpetuates a myth that arms control and security questions should be left to the experts. The purpose of the book, then, is to consider some of the basic questions that should be addressed by the "conscientious" citizen and to provide some of the technical information necessary to an informed discussion.

The author, a professor of political science at Yale University, views the arms race and war as an acute problem and makes no apparent attempt to present his arguments dispassionately. Intended to provide data to support the basic arguments of the nuclear arms activist, the book is an excellent primer on the subject.

The centerpiece of the book is the prisoners' dilemma. This is a game where two people are arrested for a crime and held incommunicado. The prosecutor does not have enough evidence to convict them; but each is told that, if he confesses first, he will be set free—if his accomplice confesses first, he will receive maximum sentence. If both confess on the same day, they will receive stiff sentences. If neither confesses, they will be convicted of some lesser crime for which the prosecution has sufficient evidence. On reviewing the choices in this game, each player is better off if he does not trust his accomplice and confesses, even though they are both likely to end up worse off than if they could trust each other to cooperate. The author draws the analogy to the security dilemma where both sides arguably would be better off if they devoted their resources to social programs rather than to defense but where the consequences of misplaced trust are indeed dire.

The author prepares the reader to enter into arguments on how to reduce the stakes of the prisoners' dilemma by tracing the history of the Soviet-American arms race and analyzing stable deterrence. All of the arguments as to why arms races are bad—guns vs. butter, increasing the destructiveness of war, and arms races as a cause of war—are trooped out. But he then makes it apparent that most of these arguments miss the mark. The key is an element of trust that requires some degree of communication between the superpowers. This communication can be open, including exchange of technical data

and on-site inspection of weapons systems; or it can be sanctioned, permitting surveillance and other means of information collection. The more open the communication, the more confidence each side can have in the intentions and capabilities of the other. From the discussions of crisis stability and the history of arms control in the remainder of the book, one can make a strong case for why communications with the Soviet Union are unlikely to improve and why confidence-building measures are so fragile as to have no lasting effect.

The author conveys the fear and frustration of the nuclear protest group and argues for a nuclear freeze, no first use, and so on down the agenda. But the arguments are unconvincing precisely because the author admittedly falls back on faith and does not offer solutions to the principal dilemma; opening up the Soviet Union and bringing it into the community of nations. I was pleasantly surprised to find the author stating, "If there were easy solutions, we would have taken them by now." Though the author sees the problem of nuclear arms as acute, he offers no short-term solution—only a first step and hope.

I could not help but conclude that the author was incorrect in his primary thesis. This is indeed a subject for experts. The book skips along the surface of a wide range of issues and convinces the reader that serious study is required to have a truly informed opinion. Anyone who could reasonably argue all of the facets of the nuclear policy would be considered fairly expert. However, the author reserves the term "expert" for one who knows how to calculate the cost effectiveness of nuclear weapons and in doing so reflects a peculiarly Yale judgment that one who understands nuclear weapons effects must not understand the social, political, and economic aspects of current nuclear policy. Overall, the author does succeed in making the case that democracy demands an informed public, and he has contributed a very readable introduction to the complex issues of nuclear arms.

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Freedman, Lawrence. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 473pp. $10.95

Kaplan, Fred. *The Wizards of Armageddon*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 452pp. $18.95

Lefever, Ernest W. and Hunt, E. Stephen, eds. *The Apocalyptic Premise: Nuclear Arms Debated*, Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1982. 429pp. $14 paper $9

The ground swell of public interest in nuclear weapons, their use, control or elimination, stimulated a flood of activity in rhe bookstalls, with at least three dozen new volumes coming off the presses this year. These are three of the best. Lawrence Freedman, professor of war studies at the University of London, and Fred Kaplan, an American journalist,

are less concerned about where nuclear arms are taking us than about how we got where we are. Ernest Lefever and Stephen Hunt, both prominent in the field of ethics and public policy, offer thirty-one selections reflecting a wide range of views on nuclear arms policy by political activists, religious leaders, government authorities, scholars, and policy experts. The three books together offer an excellent guide for strategy making.

Freedman and Kaplan both look back to the origins of nuclear war, and both give credit to Bernard Brodie for pioneering concepts of nuclear strategy around the principle that the purpose of the military establishment is no longer to win wars but to avert them. Theorizing on how best to avoid nuclear war soon produced the alternative of how to fight, and perhaps win, one. The debate between the deterrers and the warfighters has been with us ever since. Perhaps the most original contribution by either side came from the polemicists who sort out the debaters as the MAD men (for mutual assured destruction) and the NUTS (for nuclear use theorists).

When Bernard Brodie joined the Air Force planning staff as a consultant in 1948, he embodied the intellectual split between the deterrers and the warfighters. Earlier Brodie had supported, as a means of keeping nuclear war limited, the idea of both sides targeting only military facilities, deliberately avoiding cities. When he determined that up to two million civilians would still be killed in a "counterforce" war, he abandoned this idea, then joined the Rand think tank where other scholars were investigating similar alternatives to Armageddon. The development of the hydrogen bomb shocked Brodie and other scholars. A purely counterforce strike was then defined as one killing *only* two million civilians and Brodie thought that strategy had reached a dead end. His interests shifted to attempts to keep nuclear war limited, which seemed hardly likely; he left Rand in 1966 to return to teaching and further study the psychological causes of war.

Both Freedman and Kaplan develop the intellectual history of nuclear war through the eyes of the strategists themselves. Freedman's thesis is that nuclear strategy is cyclical and repetitive. "Much of what is offered today as a profound and new insight was said yesterday; and usually in a more concise and literate manner." Kaplan sees their world as excessively narrow, operationally naive, dominated by military hardware where capability equates to intent. The warfighters and deterrers, arms controllers and first strikers, the counterforce, countervalue, or conventional responders are carefully analyzed to show strengths and weaknesses and the overall fragility of the body of theory itself.

What differences have the nuclear strategists really made? Secretaries of Defense other than James Schlesinger have read few books about nuclear strategy before taking office, their decisions in office more often

than not followed political or technological imperatives of the moment. Think tank advice from organizations such as Rand supports service dogmas. Offered on a paid and privileged basis, is it or can it be compatible with the integrity of decent scholarship? Brodie had serious reservations about the whole concept of nuclear war. Because officials "will not pay for unfriendly advice (twice)," he was never popular with Air Force officers with whom he had to work. It is at this point that the apocalyptic debate of Lefever and Hunt may be of greatest utility in suggesting alternatives.

Lefever and Hunt believe that quality of the current debate on nuclear arms on both sides of the Atlantic is marred by simplistic slogans, doubletalk, misplaced fears and distorted statistics; it has hardly served the long term objective of "peace with freedom and justice." The 31 essays represent a wide variety of sources and diverse views, and are never far from the moral and ethical aspects of atomic warfare. Part One offers an excellent discussion of arms control issues, US-Europe oriented, with sound views from both sides of the Atlantic. The peace movement is developed in Part Two, including several fine selections on Soviet manipulation of peace sentiments in the West and the "Active Measures" by the KGB seeking to separate the United States from its European allies. Part Three, "The Apocalyptic Premise," offers a platform for the prophets of doom like Jonathan Schell, and after doom like Herman Kahn, Michael Kinsley, and Jack Greene. Part Four, "The Churches and Modern Arms," covers succinctly the current issues raised by both Catholic and Protestant clergy and the burden on government officials to choose between their consciences as illuminated by church teachings, and their professional careers and commitments. Pundit George Will claims that the technology of modern arms "has driven us to a deterrence policy based on a practice that was once universally condemned, holding enemy civilian populations as hostages." But even before Hiroshima, he adds, injuries inflicted on noncombatants were not just collateral effects of war; they were "deliberate results, on a vast scale, of tactics tailored to conventional weapons." Part Five offers the official views, United States, Soviet and British, for control of armaments. A highly useful "focus" precedes each of the essays and an excellent bibliography corresponding to the five sections of the text offers an excellent guide for further study.

The professional officer, whatever his particular bent, will find in these books a splendid study guide, first in reviewing the limitations on nuclear strategies developed by past experts in the field, and second, the limitations on future strategies placed by moral and ethical constraints on public policy. From both, far better concepts of nuclear strategy should certainly emerge.

DR. PAUL R. SCHRATZ
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Peri, Yoram. *Between Ballots and Battles: Israeli Military in Politics.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 344pp. $39.50.

The course of events in Lebanon over the past two years has significantly sharpened Israeli internal opposition towards their own military policy. For the first time in five wars, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) did not have the public's total unswerving support. The Kahane Commission was an example of this divided opinion and, even though it gave almost complete exoneration to the army involvement in the Sabra and Shatilah massacres, it was clear that the divisive effects of Lebanon exposed the inherent controversy within the Israeli civil-military relationship.

Yoram Peri's timely book on the growing conflict between the political establishment and the military has been made even more useful because of the recent "strategic consensus" agreement between Washington and Tel Aviv. Peri, who is presently teaching political science at Tel Aviv University, was a political advisor to Yitzhak Rabin in 1974 and 1977.

He skillfully details the political involvement of the IDF from its early days to the present and shows how the centrality of the security issue dominates every Israeli political decision. Moyshe Dayan once described their fixation on security by saying that small nations don't have foreign policy; they have defense policy. Also, the protracted conflict against the Arabs has developed a concept of the citizen soldier once described by an IDF general as "a citizen on eleven months of annual leave." However, the debacles of the early days of the Yom Kippur War began to cause Israeli public opinion to waver in its absolute trust of the military leadership and question if security matters should really be sacrosanct and shielded from public scrutiny.

Traditionally, the IDF has been considered to have strong central civilian control. It is here where Peri shows remarkable chutzpah by directly challenging the theory of such noteworthy authorities on the IDF as J.C. Hurewitz, Amos Perlmutter and Nadaf Safran. *Between Battles and Ballots* is well researched and factually detailed. Much of the book is based on Peri's Ph.D. thesis, and he provides much evidence to support his theory that the IDF is now a strong, almost independent force taking part in top decisions of the Israeli government. He makes his case by first showing how the military has become a crucial avenue to top political jobs. His detailed analysis discusses the former officers who have moved directly to the posts of prime minister, deputy prime minister, defense minister and many other key posts. He points out that many of these officers devote considerable active-duty time and energy to obtaining these political posts. For example, nearly 20 percent of the local political parties in a recent municipal election were headed by officers. Peri also outlines the essential weakness of the political

system which is supposed to control the military. His accounts of the relationships between prime ministers, defense ministers and chiefs of staff are very revealing and they provide insight into some of Israel's crucial political-military decisions through the years. Another bit of evidence put forth by Peri is that the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza since 1967 has given the IDF an expanded civilian policy-making role at the cabinet level as they deal with the administration of those areas.

This is a useful book for readers interested in Israel's role in the contemporary Middle East. Well organized with impressive footnotes and bibliography, it manifests the fears of a segment of Israeli society who see the growth of the military's political power as dangerous. In fact, Peri's closing statement does not rule out an eventual military takeover of Israel. Perhaps David will become Goliath.

E.V. BADOLATO
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Naval War College

Buck, James H. and Korb, Lawrence J. *Military Leadership.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1981. 270pp. $22.50 paper $9.95

The premise of this collection of articles on military leadership is that there are no well defined set of concepts that describe what a military leader is or should be, and that attempting to define such a set may be futile because leadership is so situationally dependent. A postscript by Professor Sarkesian pessimistically concludes that:

"It is the human, moral, and ethical dimension of leadership that are least susceptible to quantification and precise empirical design. Having noted this, it is appropriate to close with the observation that it is unlikely that researchers and practitioners will find precise answers to the concept and exercise of leadership."

So we are told that leadership is too hard to figure out, but here are what some learned people think about it anyway. The learned range from among others: a historian, a psychologist, a philosopher, and a battalion commander. Distinctions between management and leadership are referred to in about half of the articles. Some conclude managers require different skills than leaders; some conclude that one can't be a leader unless he is a manager; and some conclude that the values of management are inconsistent with those of leadership.

The collection of articles are organized around three main topics: theory, special contemporary issues, and leadership in the field. This group of articles would make a good set of readings for students and teachers in an executive course at a senior service school. Especially the theoretical articles which discuss ideas from the viewpoint of several disciplines: organization theory, psychology, and philosophy. Students in senior service schools could test the concepts derived from this set of articles against their experience both as leaders and followers. Students could

then either accept, reject, or modify some of the ideas derived from those disciplines as they apply to military leadership.

I disagree that uncovering basic laws of characteristics of good military leadership is too hard. If the subject is worth writing about, it is worth rigorous and scientific inquiry that attempts to objectively identify these characteristics. Nowhere in the book is a discussion of what such a research design might look like, except that Dr. Korb poses some important questions that might be the frontispiece of such an inquiry. These are:

- How can the system provide for the effective assignment and promotion of military professionals?
- Is it possible to determine what abilities a potential leader should possess?
- Is leadership a subject that can be taught? If so, how?
- How can unit leaders be perceived as such when military command is centralized to such a high degree?
- Can the military maintain its community basis; units their social cohesion?

Perhaps a research design that starts with those military persons who, by the standards of the services, are good leaders might lead to the discovery of important characteristics of military leadership. Once identified, these "leaders" could be further investigated by asking those who were their followers if and why these individuals were perceived to be good leaders. Response bias aside, I believe that followers know who they would like to go to war with and who they wouldn't, and they probably can identify why they feel that way.

FRANCIS G. SATTERTHWAITE
Naval War College

Sims, Robert B. *The Pentagon Reporters.* Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983. 177pp. $5.50

At last! A scholarly work about the Pentagon press corps, and its ways of doing business, that is entertaining, informative and does not read like a textbook.

Bob Sims is a descriptive writer of quality. His considerable E-Ring experience, as the public affairs assistant to secretaries of the Navy from both political persuasions, gives him a valuable insight into both the workings of the Pentagon bureaucracy and the men and *woman* (yes, just one) who constituted the Pentagon press corps in 1982. Captain Sims wrote his book while serving as a senior research fellow at the National Defense University. He was able to weave his historical research, interviews and insights into a highly readable manuscript that brings to life the people, and their motivations, who report defense news.

The Pentagon press corps is more mature, and more geographically stable, than their news media colleagues at other Washington institutions. For instance, the Associated Press' Fred Hoffman has toiled at the Pentagon for 22 years, and is not loath to sharply correct transient newsmakers and spokespersons who are

less than precise in their statements about past defense policies and programs. Ike Pappas of CBS News, until he was reassigned to other duties recently, had been a regular in the Pentagon newsroom for seven years. However, Sims has detected a trend by senior news editors to rotate their reporters more frequently than before, to keep them being watchdogs, rather than lapdogs, of the "beats" to which they are assigned.

Sims traces the relationship between the military and the news media, which has always been adversarial, but only rarely hostile. He explores the motivations, thought processes, attitudes, deadline pressures ("Speed.Accuracy.Speed.") and professional competitiveness of the reporters who collect, interpret, and disseminate military news. That news contributes to the public's opinion and understanding of DoD policies, programs, and personnel. Some of these correspondents also exert significant influence over Congress' understanding of military matters. For instance, George Wilson of the *Washington Post* only slightly overstated what Capitol Hill insiders have known for at least 25 years. "The only thing politicians *read* are the newspapers. They don't have time to read briefings. They don't have time to read reports that the Pentagon sends them. So when you go to a Congressional hearing, you'll see that about half the questions are provoked by what the guy reads over his coffee in the newspaper—which is usually the *Washington Post.*"

The Pentagon Reporters covers all elements of the Pentagon press corps; the wire services, daily newspapers, news services (Scripps-Howard, etc.), news magazines, technical and policy publications, broadcasting, foreign news agencies (Reuters), and US government outlets such as the US Information Agency and the Voice of America. Sims interviewed the newsperson representing each medium to ascertain his personal background and the inspiration that brought him into journalism, and the twists and turns of fate that placed them in the newsroom of the Pentagon. In this book the people he interviewed discuss journalism ethics, attitudes, leakers, show-offs, and whistle-blowers. They explain why they are uncomfortable when their patriotism or loyalty or honesty is questioned. In general, according to Sims, the reporters' ultimate national defense goal is the same as the goal of those in the defense establishment they report about—they want a strong and safe America. Sometimes, Sims continues, their profession calls on them to pursue that goal in ways that seem inconsistent, often wrong, to those who are not journalists. They *report* defense news, not *manufacture* it. But they are not infallible. And they, correctly, have their pointed critics. Caspar Weinberger was quoted as saying, "I have . . . the greatest respect for the profession, and it is only that respect that leads me occasionally to point out things that are in error."

What is most notably missing in Sims' book is a skeptical appraisal, or ranking, of the best and worst of the

news media representatives who cover the Pentagon, and why. But perhaps that omission is an inevitable consequence of an active-duty officer writing about influential persons with whom he continues to have frequent contact. Nevertheless, this is a first-class piece of research and writing and should be read by every military officer who wants to better understand and appreciate the influence of military reporting, and military reporters, on their professions.

JAMES E. WENTZ
Captain, US Navy
Naval War College

Hosmer, Tephen T. and Wolfe, Thomas W. *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983. 318pp. $23.95

In assessing the behavior of the Soviet Union in the developing world, several generally discernible patterns can be analyzed. In *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts*, Hosmer and Wolfe have outlined some of the overall strategy that seems to be at the heart of Soviet expansionism since the Second World War. Given the current Soviet/Cuban involvement in the Caribbean and Central American regions, the book is a particularly timely study of the USSR's policy and attitude toward the Third World.

The work is very tersely and concisely written, and probably originated as a Rand Corporation study, as both the authors have worked in that organization. It contains a number of simple maps, an excellent bibliography, and extensive notation. As such, it functions well as a basic outline of Soviet adventurism since WWII, and could be quite useful as a guide to more in-depth research. It was obviously written to provide the reader with an overview of major trends, and it succeeds admirably in that capacity. In the first part of the text, the overall Soviet involvement in the developing world is traced from an economic, political, and military standpoint. The second section is concerned with more specific analysis of military action in the Third World, including particular emphasis on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a possible paradigm-shift to an even more adventurous policy. The book concludes by offering some thoughts on future trends in Soviet involvement as well as possible US responses to such maneuvers. It is well-organized and cleanly written throughout, setting out factually and impartially the Soviet record in the developing countries. The authors refrain from discussing US response along the complicated road from 1945 to the present, as that would have been beyond the scope of their work.

The most convincing section of the book is contained in the final two chapters, where Hosmer and Wolfe discuss possible future trends in the Third World and propose several US responses. The authors convincingly point out factors that suggest increased Soviet adventurism (improvements in Soviet power projec-

tion capabilities, changes in the balance of power, experience and infrastructure, cooperative intervention with surrogates, rising radicalism and instability in the Third World, and the validation of Soviet Great-Power credentials). The factors that might tend to diminish Soviet Third World involvement are also covered well, including economic constraints, US policies and actions, and diverging interests, among others. Overall, the aurhors believe that Soviet policy will continue to be aggressively opportunistic—willing to take advantage of situations that arise, but not part of some master plan for world domination. This is a thesis supported both by historical fact and current information.

In terms of US response, the authors offer a four-point prescription:

- Demonstrate US interests early and convincingly.
- Maintain credibility of possible US escalation.
- Recognize limitations of linkage.
- Emphasize crisis management and anticipatory involvement.

Clearly, these are all sound judgments. The more interesting and difficult question, however, is one upon which Hosmer and Wolfe do not touch: How does a government *convince the public* to endorse such demanding and possibly dangerous policies, particularly in the post-Vietnam period? This is at the heart of the current controversy surrounding US responses to external force involvement in Central America. The answer, of course, is informing the public of the seriousness of the threat and the need for strong response by the United States. *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts* is one such effort to bring such information before the public. By illustrating the complexities of Soviet policy and attitudes, Hosmer and Wolfe have made a significant contribution to the continuing debate over the meaning and response to Soviet adventurism in the developing world.

JAMES STAVRIDIS
Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Markey, Edward J. *Nuclear Peril.* Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983. 183pp. $14.95

In *Nuclear Peril*, Congressman Edward J. Markey (D., Mass.), an opponent of both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, inadvertently reveals a remarkable degree of political opportunism. A critic of nuclear energy during the late 1970s when the Three Mile Island incident made such criticism fashionable, an advocate of non-proliferation in the early 1980s when India's Tarapur and Iraq's Osirak made that an attractive issue once again, and a promoter of a nuclear freeze when public interest was mounting, Markey has always focused on the particular nuclear issue receiving public attention and appears to have the most political potency.

Perhaps to demonstrate consistency, but more likely to demonstrate leadership in the nuclear area,

Markey has sought to connect all of these issues. He sees a direct connection between nuclear energy and nuclear weaponry: "The ultimate problem with nuclear power is nuclear bombs." Even though there are obvious connections between civil and military uses of nuclear energy, Markey clearly distorts those connections. For him, nuclear reactors are bomb factories, and for him the presence in a country of nuclear fuel or uranium oxide is dangerous.

In *Nuclear Peril*, Markey gives primary attention to non-proliferation issues, especially to the 1980 controversy over US supply of nuclear fuel to India's Tarapur reactors. However, he seems chiefly interested in opposing nuclear power. Indeed, he defines the proliferation issue in technical terms (i.e., as the spread of nuclear power plants and associated facilities, and the consequent technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons). From this perspective, which was embodied in the Carter policy, the proliferation issue cannot genuinely be resolved in a world in which nuclear energy is used to provide electrical power.

The solution to the proliferation problem, then, as Markey sees it, is to end nuclear power production and exports. And he advocates both the "dismantlement" of nuclear power plants in the United States and getting the United States out of the "nuclear export business." He argues this simple solution to a complex problem cautiously. For apparently he has discovered that you cannot seriously advocate an immediate termination of nuclear power production either in this country or abroad, or an immediate termination of nuclear exports (particularly to countries with which the United States has agreements or contracts, and that accept full-scope safeguards), in the existing political atmosphere in the United States. Regardless, the effects of such proposals, even if they never become national policy, could harm US efforts to reestablish ourselves as a reliable supplier and to reassert leadership in non-proliferation policy.

Unless one believes Markey to misunderstand the issues totally or, more likely, to be first and foremost a critic of nuclear energy, it is difficult to understand why he takes the positions he has. He desires that the United States reassume global leadership on non-proliferation policy, and he believes that if the United States phases out nuclear energy and exports, its example will have the desired worldwide effect of terminating nuclear power production and commerce. He does not seem to understand that his recommendations would lead to an effective renunciation by the United States of its non-proliferation leadership, and to the "Pontius Pilate" approach to non-proliferation that has been so appealing to some members of Congress.

That Markey does not fully accept the logical consequences of his arguent is evident in his decision concerning the use of leverage. Of course his policies would not allow leverage over the nuclear programs of other states. He argues that not only has

such leverage not been used, but that it should not be used: "Nuclear power is simply too dangerous a commodity to be a bargaining chip in world diplomacy." How, then, is the United States to exert leverage? With the full panoply of US political, economic and military power and influence—these, according to Markey, can and should be brought to bear in the struggle to prevent further proliferation. This argument assumes that non-proliferation is the most important problem in the world, and that it should shape US foreign and trade policies. Such is a dangerous and absurd argument.

If the United States followed Markey's advice, it would indeed cut the use of nuclear energy worldwide, but it would not change the tendencies for states to proliferate. Rather, both "problem states" and those seeking energy security would develop their own facilities for enrichment and reprocessing. These are both more difficult to safeguard and pose graver proliferation risks than the existing commercial facilities do under international safeguards.

Markey argues for the union of the antinuclear (energy) and the nuclear freeze (weapons) movements in this volume, as he has since in congressional and other public fora. He appears to understand the problems involved with fusing two disparate movements with divergent interests, but he seems to believe that public interest lobbyists and a grass roots movement can achieve success within Congress. He understands correctly that the great majority of Congressmen are neither strongly committed for nor against nuclear energy, and that actions of the administration and of lobbyists, as well as expressions of public opinion can definitely influence their behavior. And this is what he proposes be done.

DONALD M. KERR
Los Alamos National Laboratory

Perl, Raphael. *The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A Documentary Sourcebook*. New York: Oceana, 1983. 722pp. $45

For those of us eager to see an in-depth analysis of the international law implications of the 1982 Falklands War, this book is disappointing. The reasons for disappointment are attributable not so much to the content as to the volume's title, combined with the timing of its publication and the layout of its cover.

The book appeared early in 1983, with the Falklands War still fresh in mind. The first nine words of the title are emblazoned in large type across its cover and on its spine. The subtitle, "A Documentary Sourcebook," appears on the cover in letters one-fifth the size of those in the main title. They do not appear at all on the spine. The first sight of the book invariably draws an incredulous comment or question on how the author could possibly have written such a lengthy analysis of a just-concluded war.

Unfortunately, the book is not really about the 1982 war over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, and what analysis it contains is a mere 55 pages

long. Those 55 pages are devoted to the century-and-a-half argument between Argentina and Britain over the islands' sovereignty. The vast bulk of the book consists of photocopied reproductions of documents relevant to the sovereignty dispute and—beginning with page 419—the 1982 war.

True, an analysis of the sovereignty dispute is worthwhile, and yes, a collection of documents on the Falkland Islands "dispute" is useful, and so is the 27-page historical chronology by Everette E. Larson. Nevertheless, one begins reading the book with hopes somewhat dashed.

There are, moreover, other disappointments. Some are not so significant—for example, it is cheaply printed and bound, as if done in haste. A bit more significantly, some of the reproduced documents—including Pope Alexander VI's famous Bull of 1493, which appears not in Latin but in Spanish—are not translated into English.

The analysis of the sovereignty dispute that begins the volume is a well-researched account that focuses on the legal position of the two antagonists. The geographical and historical facts are marshaled and shifted through the international law doctrines concerning modes of territory acquisition and self-determination. The author concludes that it "is impossible to arrive at a definitive answer as to who has the right of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands." However, he does suggest that original sovereignty rested with Spain until Spanish abandonment in 1811 and that this dereliction was followed by Argentine occupation in the 1820s, but that this occupation gave rise only to "an inchoate title to the Islands, based on expectancy." Then, after the 1833 ouster of the Argentinians by Great Britain (with US assistance), the British began a 150-year occupation that began in "bad faith," but which arguably perfected eventual title in Britain. This conclusion is certainly defensible, but the background analysis by the author could have been stronger.

Mr Perl's analysis is followed by Everette E. Larson's chronology of events bearing on the sovereignty dispute, beginning with the Papal Bull and ending with the 20 June 1982 surrender by Argentine personnel on Thule Island, South Sandwich Islands, to the British.

The book then presents its reproductions of 52 relevant documents. This section of the volume covers 603 pages and includes several United Nations documents arising out of the 1982 conflict. This should be of value to anyone interested in researching either the sovereignty dispute or certain of the events surrounding the war. It is not particularly useful to those who wish to investigate the international law issues arising from the use of force by both sides or the conduct of the hostilities.

The book ends with a 31-page bibliography, also the work of Everette E. Larson. There is no index.

JON L. JACOBSON
University of Oregon
School of Law

Kellett, Anthony. *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle.* Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982. 362pp. $38

At one time or another during their careers, most military commanders speculate about what motivates their men to fight. George Washington, for example, wrote to the Congress that, "Three things prompt men to a regular discharge of their duty in time of action: natural bravery, hope of reward, and fear of punishment." Trotsky had the last of those three factors in mind when he wrote about the Red army that, "The command will always be obliged to place the soldiers between the possible death in the front and the inevitable one in the rear." Other military writers such as Ardant du Picq and S.L.A. Marshall have maintained that soldiers are motivated primarily by feelings of comradeship.

All of these aspects of motivation and many others are covered in *Combat Motivation.* Since much of the book goes well beyond what a behavioral scientist would call motivation, the book's subtitle, *The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle*, is actually a more accurate description of the contents than the title itself. There are, for example, sections on training, military discipline, organizational policies such as troop rotation and descriptions of combat in addition to discussions of such standard motivators as patriotism, religious beliefs, punishments and rewards.

The book is based largely on a report prepared for the Canadian Department of National Defence and published in 1980. The purpose of the study was to review the subject of combat motivation for the purpose of improving the leadership, administration and training of the Canadian armed forces. The result is an interesting admixture of behavioral science and military history. The examples are taken largely from 20th century wars and from British, Canadian, and American actions in particular. The readers should not expect to find any startling new theories about combat motivation, but rather a thorough review of the subject.

The biggest surprise perhaps is that, except for a brief comment near the end of the book, *Combat Motivation* contains no discussion of frustration as a combat motivator. This omission is not the result of an oversight. The author explains that the study is concerned with external motivators and that such internal factors as instincts, self-actualization and frustration are not included. Although the subject of frustration has been accounted for, so to speak, its absence is unfortunate nevertheless. Frustration as a cause of aggressive behavior is a subject that has received attention by both behavioral scientists and military men. John Dollard, an authority on the subject of frustration as a producer of aggression and the author of a World War II book on the behavior of men in battle, wrote in one of his works, "This study takes as its point of departure the assumption that aggression is always a consequence of frustration." He goes on to say that the aggression "may be directed at the

object which is perceived as causing the frustration or it may be displaced to some altogether innocent source." Compare that scientific view with that of a former Marine writing of his experiences as a young corporal during the Korean war. "The rest of the day is filled with a wide variety of interesting projects: policing the area (picking up cigarette butts, scraps of paper, etc.), rifle inspection, troop and stomp (drill, marching, etc.), personnel and tent inspections, classes, hikes, training problems, night problems. This is what is called 'harassing the troops.' It is suggested that we take out our resentment on the Chinese later."

The omission of frustration as a combat motivator notwithstanding, *Combat Motivation* is still the best overall review of the subject available. As such it deserves the attention of professional soldiers and others interested in understanding what motivates men in combat.

TED GATCHEL
Colonel, US Marine Corps
Naval War College

Maroon, Fred J. and Beach, Edward L. *Keepers of the Sea*. Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1983. 256 pp. $45.00 ($75.00 in a bonded leather edition)

The advertising for this volume includes quotes by Admirals Arleigh Burke and Thomas B. Hayward which use the words "amazing," "discriminating," "irresistible," "nostalgic," "exciting," "unique," "scintillating," and "action-packed." Not being of a mind to compete with former Chiefs of Naval Operations in a contest of superlatives, I shall resist the temptation to add to their list. This book contains the finest collection of photographs of the operating Navy and Marine Corps ever published. Fred Maroon is not only the finest of technicians with a "lens" but a true artist at capturing naval forces against the vastness of the sea and sky. His portfolio is held in place by the sort of consistent mortar one would expect of Captain Beach.

More than haze gray ships, black submarines and silver aircraft, the US Navy of today is truly reflected in the faces of the officers, crews and trainees as captured by the camera of Fred Maroon. There is the self-choreographed ballet of the carrier's flight deck crew to the accompaniment of screeching jets, slamming catapults and compressing landing gear. There is the concentration and stress in the faces of USS *Richmond K. Turner* crewmen on the manila highline during a personnel transfer at sea. The determination of Naval Academy plebes completing their year-long rite of passage by climbing Herndon Monument to place a cap at the peak. You can feel the bewilderment on the faces of young Marines as "the gunny" explains why they are hunkered in the mud with rain drenched ponchos—the tired concentration of watchstanders in the control station of a submarine, in the CIC of a destroyer or in the ready room of a carrier. And most of all, the pride and necessary cockiness that make men in their teens and early twenties the masters of machines costing hundreds of millions

of dollars—young men who pay the price daily for our nation's need to deploy forward its Navy. All this and more is here.

One of the first things any author or speaker must do is to decide what he is not going to say or write. Some Navy specialists, such as the land-based air antisubmarine warfare community, may feel slighted at there being no photographs of P-3Cs. Some might wish for more shots of underway replenishment, exploding weapons, heavy weather operations, etc., but they will appreciate the book in toto as a beautiful photographic tour de force.

Others might find fault with Ned Beach's tendency toward cliches, but his style makes *Keepers of the Sea* meaningful to a much larger audience. In fact it would be a superb gift to parents and friends from the plains and mountains, who still have difficulty imagining how we spend our time at sea. Some copies will be going from Newport to Vermont for just that reason. (If you're an Institute member it's only $36.00) This book will provide many hours of enjoyment to the old sailor, the modern steamer and to those as yet uninitiated. Any American will be proud of the Navy shown here.

D.G. CLARK
Captain, US Navy

Reilly, John C. Jr. *United States Navy Destroyers of World War II.* New York: Sterling Publishing Company, 1983. 160pp. $16.95

Definitive published material on the US Navy's warships—the objectives behind their designs, the designs themselves and the successes and limitations of those designs—has been all too scarce until very recently. One might have considered this lack almost a national trait since most developed countries, even those suffering defeat and heavy loss, have produced highly specific combatant ship design histories. Perhaps the foremost in all these efforts was Dr. Oscar Parkes' *British Battleships* published in 1956, which still sets a world standard. But there are also the excellent Italian series organized according to ship type, published during the sixties, and, more recently, the German submarine studies by Eberhard Rossler. Not to be ignored are the extraordinary British works on destroyers by Edgar March, and on cruisers and battleships by Alan Raven and John Roberts; the French efforts by Henri Le Masson and the extensive work of the Japanese. All have the common thread of access to official correspondence, plans and photographs.

Until the midseventies, however, similar design studies of US warship types were rare, superficial, and incomplete. One reason for this may have been the reluctance of US publishers to support works which required extensive research for what was perceived as a very limited market. The Naval Institute professional and nonprofit, was more concerned than other publishers with the missing technical histories. As a result, after an extended gestation period, they published Robert O. Dulin and William H. Garzke's *U.S. Battleships in World War II* in 1976, followed four years

later by the same authors' *Allied Battleships in World War II*. Most recently the Institute has produced *U.S. Destroyers* by the prolific Norman Friedman, its most ambitious design history to date. This volume's drawings by A.D. Baker and definitive accounting of each design, based on official records, approach the quality of the best German and British works. Its only major flaw is that it is late by some twenty years. Now in this late flood of technical histories, comes a second definitive US destroyer work which covers much the same subject but over a more limited time span.

United States Navy Destroyers of World War II by John C. Reilly, is an outstanding work. Furthermore, at $16.95 it is an exceptional value. Within its covers is the best collection of photographs of the war years' destroyers yet published; even better, most are dated, greatly increasing their worth. The author pays attention to detail while maintaining a good overview of the Navy's design objectives. He has divided US destroyers into four generations: the 68 pre-World War I "broken deckers"; the mass produced four-stack flushdeckers of World War I; the London Treaty ships of the thirties (DD 348 to 420); and finally, the *Benson, Gleaves, Fletcher, Sumner* and *Gearing* classes. The book deals almost exclusively with the ships of the last two generations.

Each class, starting with the eight ships of the *Farragut* class (DD 348-355) of FY 1932-33, is described in its own chapter. With the aid of referenced official documentation, the developing requirements of each class are outlined, providing a feel for the give and take between Opnav's requirements, normally as represented by the General Board, and the technical bureaus which were called upon to develop the design. As each class is reviewed, including pictures from commissioning to the end of the war, an impression can be gained as to how dynamic destroyer design was, particularly during the immediate prewar period. Unthinkable now, then there was a new destroyer class each year with significant changes from their predecessors.

These ships up through the early *Benson* and *Gleaves*, bore the brunt of the war's demands through 1942 after which the first *Fletchers* began reaching the fleet in the Pacific. The latters' larger size permitted greater flexibility in adjusting their armament and control systems to meet the rapidly increasing Japanese air threat. The *Fletchers*, arguably the best all around destroyer class of World War II (measured in fighting ton miles, say), were followed by the *Sumners* and their near sisters, the longer legged *Gearings*. All are covered by Reilly in detail, there being 16 continuous pages of *Fletcher*-class photographs alone.

The final years of the war saw the operational emphasis for destroyers in the Pacific shift from surface actions to carrier task force escorts. This led to picket duty during the invasion of Okinawa. The kamikazes and Bakas

encountered then and there led to even greater emphasis on antiaircraft armament and warning capability on the destroyers as the invasion of Japan was considered. The resulting increased 40 mm installations as well as the specialized *Gearing*-class radar picket designs are covered adequately.

There is a final chapter covering official ruminations on future destroyer designs based on the lessons of the war. The new ships always, as now, were larger than their predecessors. The book's conclusion provides a thoughtful review of fleet escort thinking on into the postwar years. Finally, there are appendixes on destroyer stability, war damage, basic Navy organization for 1934 and 1944, and lastly, a summary of destroyer characteristics by class. There is no listing of individual destroyer names and numbers. Perhaps there could be some criticism of the chronological detailing of events which occasionally overlap or are repeated. A complete reading is required to ensure capturing all of the detailed design considerations covered.

Destroyers in World War II should be in the library of anyone concerned with destroyers, past or future. Much of the information contained has been unavailable for too long. All we need now is to convince the publishers to print these priceless photographs on better paper.

RICHARD F. CROSS
Alexandria, Va.

Mannix, Daniel P. IV, ed. *The Old Navy: Rear Admiral Daniel P. Mannix III*. New York: Macmillan, 1983. 294pp. $16.95

Compiled from letters, journals, and diaries, an excerpt from this memoir by Rear Admiral Daniel Pratt Mannix III has appeared in *American Heritage*, and the book has been selected as an alternate choice by both the Military Book Club and the Naval Institute Press. This does not, of course, guarantee that *The Old Navy* will necessarily be to everyone's liking. Some people may question the admiral's memory in spots, just as others may wince at his old fashioned anecdotal style. Nonetheless, Daniel Pratt Mannix IV has done a commendable job in editing his father's papers. With assistance from the Naval History Division, he has produced a beguiling memoir of a navy moving from post-Civil War insularity to the threshold of world power.

The memoir opens in 1882 with recollections of Mannix's childhood in China as the son of a Marine captain on loan to the Chinese government as a torpedo expert. It concludes with his final cruise in command of a destroyer squadron in the Levant, a cruise which witnesses the consolidation of Turkey under Kemal Ataturk.

Most intriguing, and highly symbolic, is an early chapter concerning the Spanish-American War. Granted leave from Annapolis in order to take part in the war, Midshipman Mannix hustles aboard the USS *Indiana*. At the Battle of Santiago Bay, he watches a dejected Admiral Cervera being taken into custody, "I never

felt so sorry for anyone in my life," and along with the rest of Sampson's fleet receives prize money (Midshipman, $267) and a tumultuous hero's welcome in New York Harbor. In retrospect, Mannix adds a passage that deserves quoting, as it epitomizes the nostalgia of a number of officers of his transitional generation:

"It is now fashionable to jeer at the Spanish-American War. Even so, it had something. The tropical setting, the background of palms, white surf and blue sky, the chivalry of the enemy, the shortness of range . . . the absence of submarines and the type of warfare they represent, the fact that it was largely a war of movement and things took place out in the open with flags snapping in the breeze, the sea salt in our faces, and our ships speeding through the water as blue as turquoise and white with foam, the staccato sequence of events, the fact that when it was all over we knew who had won."

Graduating from Annapolis, Mannix moves through a variety of duty stations which reflect the Navy's growing commitments. He moves with zest and with a resolve characteristic of his era. If, as an ensign, he cuts a foolish figure leading a shore party into Buffalo on the day of McKinley's assassination, he analyzes the fiasco and later earns promotion to Lt. (jg.) by cooly defusing a red-light district riot in Pensacola. Moreover, whether ashore or afloat, Mannix exudes a puckerish humor all his own. A fine raconteur, his besr yarns are those from his cruises to Edwardian England, Imperial Germany, Russia, and Japan during the Dreadnought Period. In Kiel, for example, he averts a duel between an American midshipman and a German officer by ordering a bowl of brandy "smashes" and then proposing toast after toast until all parties are too tipsy to do anything but sing "Oh Susannah." Bidding the Navy adieu, the Germans go ashore in ignorance of the apples adorning their helmet spikes.

By the time Mannix concludes a tour with the 1918 Yankee Mining Squadron, one can sense his disillusionment with the industrial commercial America which has evolved since his youth as a midshipman aboard sailing vessels. Increasingly, he has little use for civilians. One senses too, his impatience with the drift of post-WWI diplomacy. Assigned as an escort to foreign delegates at the 1921-22 Washington Disarmament Conference, he comes away unquestionably bitter. "It was at the height of the pacifist craze . . . we Navy men were ordered to be present but to keep quiet . . . I don't know what good it did to force us to be present except to humiliate us."

Nonetheless, through his final cruise—a cruise during which he swims the Hellespont—Mannix retains an optimism and vitality characteristic of a generarion. Throughout the book one is reminded that "The Old Navy" is also the Navy which produced Admirals King, Nimitz, Halsey, and Spruance, a breed which would serve its

country well. Although Mannix retired in the 20s he was, in a sense, one of them. However quaint or long ago their Navy may seem, the reader is likely to agree with Daniel Pratt Mannix IV that we are living today on their bounty. In short, this entertaining memoir is highly recommended to The New Navy.

JOHN S. PETERSON
The Military Bookman
New York City

Woodward, David, *Sunk! How the Great Battleships were Lost.* Winchester, Mass: Allen and Unwin, 1982. 153pp. $17.95

It is difficult to say exactly what audience Mr. Woodward had in mind when he wrote this book. Surely not lovers of the history and lore of the famous battleships since the organizing principle of the book, as evident in its title, is how they all were sunk. Battleship buffs, as we know, revel in the glory of the great ships, not in their demise.

Neither is Mr. Woodward apparently interested in writing for historians. Although the subject is obviously a historical one, the fifteen short chapters of the book are decidedly slanted toward the loss of a ship or ships rather than the full story. In short, this is a book about losers, not winners. To this writer it seemed odd indeed to look at Jutland, Tsushima, or Pearl Harbor from this restricted point of view. Admittedly, the reader will find himself leaving Mr. Woodward frequently and referring to his library to get "the rest of the story."

The style of the author is patently anecdotal. Although Mr. Woodward refers to many sources, including correspondence and some personal conversations, there are no footnotes and there is no bibliography. In one instance, for example, in preparing the reader for Pearl Harbor, Mr. Woodward retells of his personal strategic talks, in 1932, with a certain unnamed and retired Soviet vice admiral, a conversation which, to him, clearly foretold of the rise of Imperial Japanese naval power.

All of this is not to say that the book is not interesting reading. Ranging from the Austro-Prussian War in 1866, when the Italian battleship *Re d' Italia* was rammed and sunk by the Austrian *Ferdinand Max*, to the sinking of the *Yamato* in 1945 at the end of World War II, the book is a fascinating collection of sea stories. The author knows his subjects well and has a winning way of retelling each incident. He often quotes unusual sources, such as the diary of the gunnery officer in the *Lützow* in action against the *Lion* at Jutland, or Commander Semenov, who, having no particular appointed duties in the *Suvarov*, watched and took notes at Tsushima, as the great Russian fleet was sunk before his eyes.

Since Mr. Woodward can obviously spin a yarn with the very best, perhaps it is his editor who should be faulted for the book's organizing principle of sunken ships instead of the overall excitement, glory, and

heroism of the actions which are the most important part of all naval history and lore. For every *Hood* there is a *Bismarck*, and for every *Bismarck* a *King George V*, yet to focus on just the demise of a ship or ships seems too narrow a view. Would that we shall not now have a series of books on sunken destroyers, cruisers, submarines and aircraft carriers despite the best efforts of Mr. Woodward or his editor.

MICHAEL B. EDWARDS
Commander, US Navy

Snyder, Louis L. *Louis L. Snyder's Historical Guide to World War II.* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. 838pp. $39.95

The *Historical Guide to World War II* is an encyclopedia of information about the war, arranged alphabetically, with entries ranging from a few sentences to many pages in length. It also includes some data charts on weapons systems ("German Aircraft Data," "Order of Battle of the Waffen—SS"), the original texts of some important documents and statements ("Atlantic Charter"), and a chronology of the war. The information ranges from the very basic ("Nuremberg Trials," "Arleigh Burke," "Battle of Midway") to the exotic ("Moon Planes," "Fort Eben Emael," "Waldteufel").

As a compendium that one might throw on the shelf at home, the *Guide* is too detailed—questions on the "Dam Busters Squadron," for example, seldom come up in general discussion. On the other hand, as a serious reference work for scholarly use, the volume is far too thin and sketchy. It might have some appeal for the *serious* World War II buff, or find a place amidst the reference works in certain libraries. The book is Professor Snyder's latest in a long series of works on a variety of international topics and the war, and one has the feeling that he is using many of the scraps of information and research that have collected over the years. The result is an interesting and cleverly written volume, but the need for such a book is ultimately questionable—virtually all of the important information can be easily found in a general encyclopedia or in any of the countless books (including Professor Snyder's own) already written about the Second World War.

The most interesting aspect of the *Guide* is its information on the cultural, economic, and social aspects of the war. Entries on "Resources, Battle for" or the personality pieces on various leaders are neatly fitted into the overall flow of the war. Also worthy of note is the long and detailed index and the entries dealing with the literature, songs, and newspapers of the war years, subjects not normally contained in such studies.

Overall, the *Historical Guide* is highly readable and useful for quick, general research on the war, roughly at the level of a college undergraduate who needs some quick facts for a paper. For the dedicated World War II buff, it represents a means of putting much information into a convenient form for quick use. One

is left with a sense, however, that Professor Snyder's evident talents of research and writing might be better utilized in more important efforts than this.

JAMES STAVRIDIS
Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Tilford, Earl H. Jr. *Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia.* Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1980. 212pp. $7.50

This is a story of ghosts, of heroic people and dramatic events which increasingly haunt the reader as he moves through the story and relives the history within the covers of Major Earl Tilford's book *Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975.*

Tilford has packed a tremendous amount of information into about 120 or so pages of text in a 212-page work, a tribute to the rigorous standards of scholarship and tight writing so evident in his book. The thoroughness of the research is evident in the bibliography and the ample footnotes and most of his material was derived from primary sources, including interviews with those involved.

This is a story which cannot miss. Of the elites in the Vietnam War, none stood higher than the men in the Air Rescue Service (renamed in 1966 the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service). These men, in their slow and vulnerable craft, routinely had to overcome the deep, skeletal fear which afflicted all of us who felt the enemy's breath as they risked everything to save a man. While this book is primarily about Air Force rescue operations, the roles of the other services are not ignored.

Tilford's brief historical introduction reveals some surprises, such as the fact that a few helicopters were in use in the final weeks of World War II. (Read the book to find out where and why, and be even more supprised.)

Serious thought was given to air rescue during the RAF-Luftwaffe battles in 1940, and the Americans became deeply involved upon their commencing air operations in Europe and the Pacific. The Korean War and the French colonial war in Indochina enhanced the rescue role of the helicopter while revealing its limitations.

As Tilford points out, the American involvement in Indochina in the early sixties found the rescue forces ill-equipped and unprepared to recover downed crewmen or isolated troops, and air rescue always lagged a step behind as combat operations increased in intensity. Their coming of age is well described as the Air Rescue service moved up from the severely limited H-43 through the HH-3 "Jolly Green Giant" to the Buff, or "Super Jolly Green" H-53.

As the author so rightly notes, air rescue is often an afterthought in peace, and when war breaks out too many lives are needlessly lost because the needed equipment and training are generally years "away."

Typical of the dangers faced by the rescue forces was the experience of the HH-43 crew which departed a forward site in Laos to rescue a

downed F-105 pilot. As they moved in the waiting communist troops opened fire at point-blank range, downing the chopper and capturing the crew. The copilot, kept in harsh conditions in Laos, made a heroic attempt at escape after a year, but was recaptured. Tilford reports that the pilot was murdered by a peasant. Those, including this reviewer, who were in Udorn in 1965 remember the details as briefed at the time—he was given away by peasants, then beheaded by the Pathet Lao.

Crews flying over North Vietnam had a rule of thumb on rescue: up to the Black river there was a good chance of rescue; between the Black and Red rivers, one's chances for rescue dropped sharply, but a save was possible; beyond the Red river, log it out (although a few daring saves were made in Route Packs 5 and 6).

If the worst happened, crews were better off being taken in North Vietnam than by Communist Laotian guerrilla forces. To the North Vietnamese, an American flyer was a valuable pawn to be kept alive as political leverage; to the Laotians the prisoner was a bother to be disposed of as quickly as possible—hence it is not surprising to those who flew those missions that so many of the MIAs were lost in Laos. Besides, the jungle covered its scars quickly, so that wreckage rapidly disappeared from view.

There is one slight omission in the book when describing the search and rescue task force in action. This was the role played by an always unsung group, the radar controllers ("Weapons Directors") at the area radar stations ("Brigham" at Udorn, "Invert" at Nakhon Phanom, etc.). While the airborne control ship Crown (later King) ran the show at the scene, the whole thing was organized and tracked by a young lieutenant or captain controlling the fleet at the radar station; Crown depended on him to track the force, mark the spot of a downed plane, effect the air refueling rendezvous for the supporting fighters, provide weather information, and more.

Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia contains several pages of photographs. For many, there can be no such thing as "overkill" when describing the dangers faced by the men of the rescue forces who so often risked so much in living up to their Service's motto "That Others May Live." Earl Tilford's work, valuable for both historian and the interested reader alike, does justice to those brave men.

PETER M. DUNN
Colonel, US Air Force
Defense Intelligence College

Stanley, Roy M. II. *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: War in China, 1937-41: Japan's Rehearsal for World War II.* New York: Scribner, 1982. 213pp. $24.95

War books for American audiences sell better if Pearl Harbor is mentioned in the title. Relevance may also be suggested by claiming that prewar activities under study (such as Japanese operations in China) have an intimate connection

with the main event, in this case the Pacific War. On both counts, the titling and subtitling of Colonel Stanley's monograph are misleading. That the combat in China broke out four and a half years before Pearl Harbor does not make it the prelude to the naval air strike on Hawaii; that the Japanese army and air forces fought extensively in China does not constitute a rehearsal for the global war against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. Masked by these semantics is the fact that Stanley does document an extremely sound point: prewar allied intelligence lacked the scale, structure, and skill to collect and evaluate potentially useful data on the shadowy, underrated Japanese, even after their armed forces came out of the closet in China in 1937.

To Stanley's examples of benign American neglect could be added the unnerving experience of General Victor Krulak who, as a young marine lieutenant stationed in Shanghai in 1937, found his first-hand observations of innovations in Japanese landing craft and amphibious tactics pigeonholed and ignored by US higher headquarters. Krulak had forwarded detailed data and photographs on materials, design, and dimensions in his "Report on Japanese Assault Landing Operations Shanghai Area 1937," identifying such advances as modified hull bottoms and bow ramps. When Krulak later visited Washington in 1939, he traced his report to an obscure cubicle in BuShips, where an unknowing civilian employee commented that the author must have been a crank who did not know the difference between a stern and a bow. If anybody important had taken notice of the document, Krulak was not aware of it. (See Richard H. Hoy, "Victor H. Krulak: A Marine's Biography," M.A. thesis, San Diego State University, 1974.)

But back to Colonel R.M. Stanley: an expert on photo interpretation, he has assembled a folio of more than 250 prewar and wartime photographs from open or declassified sources, and has spun a text around them, complemented by interesting excerpts from musty US training pamphlets and guides. The author is at his best in chronicling the Flying Tigers and his hero Claire Chennault. Knowledgeably captioned, the photos range from informative to picturesque. My favorite in the latter class is a posed photograph (vintage 1926) showing the wizened Old Marshal of Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin, and his surprisingly bookish-looking son Chang Hsueh-liang, towered over by an impeccably uniformed American regimental commander in Tientsin. Many photos, however, will interest only target analysts, devotees of military gear and uniforms, and ordnance buffs.

Stanley's writing style is often chummy, "The Japanese Army had an amazing talent for stepping on itself"; his transliteration of Asian (especially Japanese) names is erratic, inconsistent, and sometimes uninformed. Why, for instance, call the famous Japanese Kwantung Army

the Kanto Force or the Manchurian Army? More importantly, the historical underpinning of the text leaves very much to be desired. A particularly vexing example is Stanley's confused handling of the crucial Mukden affair of September 1931, where even his times are out of kilter. One also wonders about the feeble characterization of the modern Japanese officer corps as springing from aristocratic or *samurai* stock.

It is true that remarkably little of moment has ever appeared in English on the subject of the so-called China Incident; e.g., Frank Dorn's retrospective *Sino-Japanese War* (1974), Dick Wilson's journalistic *When Tigers Fight: The Story of the Sino-Japanese War* (1982), and Hsi-cheng Chi's illuminating *Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse* (1982). Stanley's photographic survey can best be used with the other works in precisely the category selected for it by the publisher: as a reference album.

ALVIN D. COOX
San Diego State University

Bean, C.E.W. *The Story of Anzac.* Lawrence, Mass.: Queensland University Press, 1981. v. I, 662pp. $36, v. II, 975pp. $36. Volume I was first printed in 1921 and Volume II in 1924 in Sydney, Australia.

The Australian official history of World War I is justly renowned for its accuracy, clarity, and forthright judgments. There was no official censorship, and authors were able to express their opinions freely often to the discomforture of their British military and academic counterparts. Thus, while British official historians concealed casualty figures to preserve Haig's reputation, the Australians wrote forthrightly and without fear of retribution.

C.E.W Bean was the general editor of *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918* and personally wrote the first two volumes which cover the creation of the Australian Imperial Force, its operations in Egypt in 1914 and 1915, and the Gallipoli campaign of 1915-1916. Bean in fact accompanied the Australians to Egypt as a war correspondent and in this capacity went with the Anzac Corps to Gallipoli. He was therefore able to supplement his research and extensive postwar interviews with participants with his own frontline experience.

The Story of Anzac is painstakingly detailed comprising about 1,400 pages of text plus maps, notes, and appendixes. Bean describes not only the operations of the Anzac Corps but also the activities of the British and Turkish forces. For anybody interested in examining the actions of the Anzac Corps right down to the company, platoon and even squad level there is no better source than Bean's volumes.

Bean's study is also a first-rate description of the problems inherent in amphibious operations. Gallipoli was, of course, the first major seaborne assault under conditions of modern war. The author carefully describes all of the shortcomings of the expedition. He notes, for exam-

ple, that the Royal Navy's bombardment of the Turkish defenses though impressive was in fact inadequate and that once the troops were ashore the absence of effective communications rendered close gunfire support almost impossible. Moreover the lack of communications equipment made it difficult for unit commanders to direct effectively their subordinates. The terrain made it impossible for commanders to see much of what was happening; there were no accurate maps, and there were no observation aircraft. The Australians, therefore, usually had to rely on runners to relay critical messages. Runners often got lost or were shot by the Turks thus compounding command and control problems. Lack of proper beach control techniques delayed the flow of supplies and reinforcements ashore and hindered the efficient evacuation of the wounded.

During the interwar years the US Marines studied the Gallipoli campaign in order to learn from Allied problems and devise an effective amphibious assault doctrine. A reader interested in understanding the problems involved in mounting an attack from the sea will find Bean's study very rewarding.

Bean's work also shows why the Australians ultimately became the shock troops of the British Army on the Western front. The military historian Alfred Vagts drew a distinction between militarism and the military way. Militarism is a way of life based on caste, cult, authority, and belief in tradition for its own sake. The military way emphasizes loyalty, efficiency, and a focus on achieving objectives.

In the First World War the British Army was wedded to the first concept. For officers social connections were vital and criticism of superiors avoided at all costs. Textbook methods were gospel and as late as 1918 senior officers were still trying to launch cavalry attacks. The Australians by contrast were dedicated to the military way. Officers, for example, were chosen for their ability not because of their social status. The fact that the Jew, Sir John Monash, could become a general is indicative of this attitude. In the British Army he would never have received a commission as a junior officer. In the field the Australians quickly learned to do their jobs in the most efficient manner whether or not their methods were sanctioned by tradition. It was in the crucible of Gallipoli that the Australians learned their methods of waging war, and it is this process that Bean describes with painstaking care.

STEVEN ROSS
Naval War College

Pack, James. *Nelson's Blood: The Story of Naval Rum.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 200pp. $14.95

Despite the legend that gave rise to this book's title, Nelson's body was not returned from Trafalgar in a barrel of rum—and had he lived in 1970, Nelson would have applauded the termination of the daily ration of grog. However illustrious and venerable a service tradition must support a service need, Nelson would have been the first to recog-

nize that the rum ration is out of place in the context of modern naval warfare.

Indeed, as Captain Pack shows in his astute and lavishly illustrated social history, its place in the Royal Navy was always ambiguous. Sailors drank rum in the West Indies for a century before Admiral Vernon, in 1740, sought to curb drunkenness by solemnizing the custom and putting it under official control, cutting the raw spirit with water and issuing this "grog" in limited amounts twice a day.

Grog time, and those occasions when the order to "splice the mainbrace" set out an additional tot, became important moments aboard ship, a time of sociability providing the anodyne to relieve the discomforts of life afloat. The expectations and fond memories of the ceremony, the reluctance of the Board of Admiralty to terminate this special privilege of the Royal Navy, testify to the value it had as a morale booster and reward for the arduous hours at sea. Rum was called a seaman's "built-in stabilizer."

Yet Captain Pack's lively account shows that for all the nostalgia associated with the rum ration there was also, from the beginning, a dark side, the problem of drunkenness. While it was the province of the spirit to impart comfort and courage, its abuse led to disorder and incompetence. Captains over the centuries wrote to the Board warning that drunkenness was the curse of the service.

Most shipboard crimes were intimately associated with drinking. To this problem the Admiralty responded with various palliative measures. Vernon's daily half-pint was gradually reduced. The mix of grog was changed to cut its potency. There was closer administration of the "pusser's rum."

The Admiralty moved very slowly. Abolition did not take place until well after the Second World War. Yet it was clear from the beginning of this century that the days of the tot were numbered. Changing social mores helped dissolve its mystique. Evidence came in on the effects of alcoholism. Alcohol related punishments were a burden on command. There was a reassertion of the popularity of beer, now possible to store in cans. In the mid-1950s only a third of the men took their rum ration. Above all, in the age of high technology, it was evident that the daily issue was not compatible with the necessary standards of safety and efficiency within the fleet.

Captain Pack concludes with a fine account of the intelligent way the Admiralty finally abolished the ration. Projecting its annual cost, they got the Treasury to give a lump sum worth nine years of rum to establish a Sailor's Fund for charitable purposes to naval personnel, and promulgated new rules for the purchase of beer aboard ship. In 1970, without opposition, and with no more than a sentimental look backwards, the long tradition of "Up Spirits" came to an end.

GEORGE W. BAER
Naval War College

Herwig, Holger, and Heyman, Neil M. *Biographical Dictionary of World War I.* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. 424pp. $49.95

This dictionary presents a large number of biographical accounts, quite complete and authoritative, describing personages of importance who directed affairs in the most important belligerent nations during the First World War. The nations covered include Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Rumania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, the United States, and the Vatican.

The two authors, both Europeanists, base their biographical sketches on the works of leading authorities or on memoirs, tracing careers in general but concentrating on activities during 1914-1918. Herwig and Heyman make an effort to avoid the dull flatness often associated with biographical dictionaries, including evaluative comments as well as descriptive information and introducing interesting and even amusing anecdoctes or quotations.

The coverage is most useful for the European participants, reflecting not only the European specialties of the authors but the realities of the Great War. There are twenty-three entries for the United States by comparison with sixty-nine for Germany and fifty for Great Britain. This apportionment seems just and proper. American users are much more in need of biographical information about our allies and enemies than about the United States, the latter information being familiar or easily obtained. This work should help American scholars to introduce enemies and allies more effectively into the American treatment of the First World War than is now the case.

Anything that can be done to strengthen the American understanding of the First World War is a contribution of significant import. Much of our mental baggage concerning international relations and national security has its origins in the catastrophe of 1914-1918. Americans all too often ignore this fundamental truth because we were late into the war. In any event the experience of the Second World War effectively aborted a truly comprehensive American appraisal of the earlier conflict, a circumstance that helps to explain certain shortcomings in our understanding of underlying events for the period 1939 to 1945.

The compilers deserve considerable praise for undertaking a taxing labor that should prove helpful to students of the First World War for many years to come.

DAVID F. TRASK
US Army Center of Military History
Washington, DC

Puryear, Edgar F., Jr. *George S. Brown, General US Air Force. Destined for the Stars.* Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983. 306pp. $16.95.

George S. Brown was a courageous soldier, a fine officer and perhaps even a splendid human being. Despite these qualities it is not certain that ". . . Brown was destined

to become one of the most brilliant air commanders in history." In another day, he might have become that, but by the time he grasped the levers of power it was beyond his reach. Even were Edgar F. Puryear's judgment on Brown's brilliance as an air commander correct, neither *Destined for the Stars* nor any other book published this early could support that conclusion.

Edgar Puryear was once on the faculty of the Air Force Academy and has written two similar books: *Nineteen Stars* and *Stars in Flight*. He claims a Ph.D. in Political Science and History from Princeton University and a law degree from the University of Virginia.

Notwithstanding impressive academic credentials, Puryear's methodology disqualifies the present work as sound biography or history. By an overwhelming margin, his sources are interviews granted by Brown's superiors, colleagues, and subordinates immediately after Brown's tragic death. The source material, therefore, is much more in the character of a eulogy than a suitable foundation for a worthy biography. Other sources are Brown's Officer Effectiveness Reports, interviews from his mother and brother, and his public speeches when he was Chief of Staff of the US Air Force and Chairman of the JCS. All these materials are handled in an uncritical way. Puryear did not do much archival research for *Stars in Flight*, and of course most of that kind of material on Brown is still classified. Yet he ignores most of the published material that does relate to Brown's career. Rather, he covers General Brown's tenure as commander of 7th Air Force in Vietnam by stringing together a host of personal anecdotes without ever addressing the great airpower issues involved in the war. Given that Vietnam was a defeat, the worst in American history, Puryear can hardly take that as support for the notion that his subject was one of the ". . . most brilliant air leaders in history." Later, General Brown was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was in the saddle for one of the saddest days in American military history, the fall of Saigon in 1975. Again, we cannot fault Brown for that humiliation, but neither is it any foundation for the claim of brilliance as an air leader.

Puryear's declared purpose is to tell those who aspire to lead their country the ways in which they might qualify themselves for the task. The method is to use the career of General George Brown as a model. In the final chapter, the characteristics to be cultivated are summarized. There is little doubt in my mind that Brown possessed them. However, the superficiality of the research so undermines the accuracy of the work as to destroy its worth as a credible guide for the younger generation—worse than that, it tends to widen the generation gap in a way detrimental to pride of service—being made up largely of the quotations from senior USAF generals, it is bound to be seen as the voice of the establishment.

Puryear and Presidio Press would

have been well advised to find someone experienced in the military profession to read the final typescript to save them from many of those other elementary mistakes that bring the book's overall worth into question. That would have prevented the Military Air Transport Service from becoming the "Material Air Transport Service," and would also have prevented reporting that in 1967 the USS *Liberty* was sunk, which she was not. There are many other obvious mistakes that careful editing would have prevented. Of these the most important is the failure to recognize in the *Mayaguez* incident that the Cambodian government had decided to release the crew of that captured American freighter before either the Marine landing on Kob Tang Island or the bombing of the Coral Sea had taken place.

This biography of George S. Brown, then, is a last testimonial from his friends—a eulogy and no more. When we do get a history of his stewardship of our national security, we will learn a great deal about crisis leadership, the way that the bureaucracy works, and about survival in Washington in times of political turmoil.

DAVID R. METS
Troy State University
Florida Region

Macdonald, Lyn. *SOMME*. London: Michael Joseph, 1983. 366pp. $19.95

The Battle of the Somme opened with an artillery barrage of unprecedented intensity and duration heralding the "Big Push" on 24 June 1916, and ended without achieving its objective over 300,000 casualties later on 21 November 1916. The end was sadly heroic. A forlorn band of ninety men from the Glasgow Boys Brigade Battalion (officially the 16th Highland Light Infantry) reported as "missing" had actually captured a length of battered German trench and held out six days longer. Reduced to fifteen "starving, filthy, frozen, exhausted" men, they were overwhelmed by unrelenting German counterattacks. The German major interrogating them said, "Is this what held the Brigade up for a week? Who are you and where have you come from?"

Lyn Macdonald's book gives the answer to that question. It is an account of *Kitchener's Army*—shipping clerks, errand boys, stevedores, railway porters, grocer's assistants, postmen—men who were transformed from patriotic, high-spirited groups of "pals" on a lark to cannon fodder, corpses and a few surviving soldiers. This is a superb but overwhelmingly sad piece of historical research and writing. The author establishes an objective, and achieves it. "This book does not set out to draw political conclusions and, although it is the story of a battle, it is more concerned with the experience of war than with the war itself."

The story is told in a remarkable series of eyewitness accounts that bring back to life and, death, the men and the times. The author's complete understanding of the battle and mastery of the terrain is the warp

through which is woven the woof-threads of personal experiences by the participants on her narrative loom, which produces a seamless literary fabric. The resulting tapestry is rich in color and texture: kilted Scots, the Australians and New Zealanders bronzed and blooded from Gallipoli, Canadians, 35 Sonth Africans who paid their own passage to England to enlist in 1914, the Royal Naval Division (steadfastly retaining naval rank) and the "lads" of *Kitcheners Army*—an agglomeration of local groups of pals, buddies, workmates, fellow-townsmen. It is complete work. Nothing is neglected: Chinese labor battalions, the Zeppelin attacks on London (linked to experiences of soldiers evacuated to England because of glutting of the medical system in France), visits of the King and the Prime Minister to the battle, logistical snarls, meticulous staff work in planning broken down by the underlying false tactical assumptions and lack of any real strategy.

The very organization of the Army insured that the more than 300, 000 casualties (over 90,000 dead) would decimate the male population of the communities sponsoring the "lads." The casualties that initially inundated the medical evacuation chain—military hospitals in France and England, civilian hospitals and finally private homes and public buildings—also littered the battlefield with bloated, blackened, rotting men and horses. Casualties also shattered the fighting units of the Army. One example, Corporal Jack Beament of the Church Lads Brigade (Kings Royal Rifle Corps): "It was a horrible, terrible massacre. We'd lost all the officers out of our company. We lost all the sergeants, all the full corporals and all the NCOs right down to Herbert King who was the senior Lance-Corporal. He was my pal and he brought 'A' Company out of the wood. He rallied them and brought them out. There were more than two hundred of us went in. And Herbert brought them out. Sixty seven men. Thar was all."

At Delville Wood, the South African Brigade went into action on Bastille Day, 14 July 1916 three thousand strong; at roll-call when they came out, only seven hundred sixty-eight men answered. Two Australian divisions lost over six thousand officers and men in the month of July 1916.

As the story develops, the author is at pains to provide the reader with precise maps of all actions and annotated photographs both from ground vantage points and the air. She wants the reader to see all and understand everything about the terrain and leaves nothing to the imagination; just as the diaries and testimony of the participants do everything to put into the reader's mind the thoughts and words that allows one to recreate the events of the Somme.

It was a senseless, but historic, battle bridging the ages from a cavalry charge at High Wood on Bastille Day to the first use of modern armor, the tank-led assault on Flers, 12 September 1916. Both affairs were badly managed. The lancers' charge

was 12 hours too late to exploit a gap the infantry had made and should have moved into at once. The tank attack dissipated the shock effect by distributing 42 tanks over 15 kilometers. The Somme was conceived with a series of politically motivated designs rather than the result of sound strategic analysis. The grand tactic was faulty, the six-day artillery barrage did not pulverize the German defenses. It started badly with a disastrous ten minute pause in artillery support, which allowed the Germans to come out of their deep bunkers and man machine guns and inflict 57,000 casualties on that day alone. It ended badly, too.

The author does not judge. She uses the results of her own knowledge and the research support (largely volunteers from the 1981 Sixth Form of the Harvey Grammar School of Folkstone, England) which is diverse and international to let the reader have the ability to judge. Her book is the chronicle of a national tragedy that helped to disfigure Western European Civilization.

But it is really a soldier's tale, told by the fighting officers and men on both sides. Perhaps the worst indictment of the strategy and leadership in this phase of World War I is outside the covers of this book. Basil Liddell Hart writing about Passchendaele (as has Lyn Macdonald in a previous work) records the "remorse of one who was largely responsible for it . . . . Growing increasingly uneasy as the car approached the swamp-like edges of the battle area, he (the general) eventually burst into tears crying, 'Good God, did we really send men to fight in that?'"

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Mack, William P. and Paulsen, Thomas D. *The Naval Officer's Guide.* Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1983. 537pp. $14.95

Bassett, Frank E. and Smith, Richard A. *Farewell's Rules of the Nautical Road*, 6th ed. Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1982. 500pp. $21.95

Two recent editions of classic naval works have been published by the Naval Institute Press, and both are solid additions to any maritime library. *The Naval Officer's Guide* and *Farewell's Rules of the Nautical Road* have been reference works of note for naval officers since their original publication in 1943 and 1941 respectively. Both editions are improvements and refinements of earlier efforts undertaken by highly qualified authors.

The Naval Officer's Guide is clearly aimed at the junior officer who has only recently been commissioned. It contains a wealth of very basic information covering such subjects as "The Importance of Our Navy," "Personal Administration," "Military Courtesy, Honors, and Ceremonies," and so on. It has detailed information on the various branches of the government involved with the Navy, as well as broad coverage of the naval forces themselves. Admiral Mack, a former superindendent of the Naval Academy, manages to

strike the right tone for the *Guide*—knowledgeable, accurate, and friendly. The edition is small and well-bound, a good choice for the ensign's seabag. While there is little in the volume that most officers have not mastered at the 0-3 point, *The Naval Officer's Guide* is still useful as a reference work for any officer's library. For their next edition, the authors might consider an appendix with the officer's recommended seabag, expanding the first chapter on the roles of the Navy, or improving the information for wives and dependents. The recommended reading list should be overhauled and the information on frocking needs to be updated. These are minor criticisms, however. Overall the *Guide* continues as a minor classic for generations of naval officers.

What can be said about *Farewell's Rules of the Nautical Road*?

First of all, this is a superb edition, published at a particularly timely moment. The dust is finally settling from a decade of tinkering with Rules of the Road, and the complete sequence of change, including the COLREGs and the new Inland Rules are all well laid out here. In fact, both sets of rules (International and Inland) are printed side-by-side, allowing for comparison and contrast during study. The illustrations are particularly clear and detailed, and the notes provided by Commanders Bassett and Smith are useful and well-written.

Second, the sections of the book dealing with the interpretations and court rulings resulting from the rules of the road are well collected and intelligently presented. The useful appendixes are likewise well selected. There is precious little a mariner would need to know about the rules and laws of the nautical road that does not fall between the covers of this edition of *Farewell's*.

Together, the authors had a major impact on Navigational instruction in the Navy over the past decade when each served as chairman of the department of navigation at Annapolis. As the authors put it in their preface, "the book is dedicated to the proposition that obedience to the rules is the surest way to avoid collision." Having had the privilege of studying under one of the authors (Commander Dick Smith), I will personally attest that the clearest way to learn the rules (short of taking course work from one of the authors) is to study this sixth and best edition of *Farewell's*. This volume is a mandatory purchase for any marine library or naval officer—don't go down to the sea in ships without a well-thumbed copy firmly in hand.

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