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Naval War College Review

Volume 37
Number 3 *May-June*

Article 10

1984

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Recommended Citation

Swarztrauber, S.A (1984) "On Reorganizing the Pentagon," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 37 : No. 3 , Article 10.
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PROFESSIONAL READING

On Reorganizing the Pentagon

Rear Admiral S. A. Swarztrauber, US Navy (Retired)

What's wrong with the Pentagon? The enormity and complexity of the problem are bewildering and it was not much comfort to find similar frustrations reflected in each of the three books listed below. No one expert can give satisfying diagnoses and remedies. The three authors differ considerably on "What's wrong" and "What to do?" But on comparing and contrasting their points of view—frequently 180 degrees apart—some of the reasons behind the problem start coming into focus.

Every examination of the problem eventually has to focus on the Pentagon's organization. One quickly learns that in the case of "our" Pentagon, the word "organization" is little more than a euphemism for "power struggle." The struggle is by no means one involving only the armed services, the office of the SecDef, and the defense agencies. The larger battle goes on outside the Pentagon among those who compete for its domination—the White House, the Congress, and industry, to mention the most important. Indeed, the struggle is as big as the Constitution itself, and today the Pentagon is the prime example of the separation of powers contest that was born with our Republic, and flourishes unabated today.

Pentagon organization has been either a simmering issue or a boiling issue—but never dormant—since 1944. Late in 1983, it came to a boil again when the JCS openly split with the SecDef and endorsed a proposal to give

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the JCS Chairman a seat on the National Security Council. At the same time the press carried accounts of "guerrilla warfare" being waged by the SecNav on Capitol Hill to save his 600-ship Navy in open conflict with an enraged DepSecDef.

The three new books which shed so much light on this boiling pot were all published in 1983. They offer us the expert opinion of individuals who have served in the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the armed forces. Unfortunately, we are missing the view of the defense industry, the fourth major protagonist. But the three we have give us more than a generous plateful. Each, in his own way, declares that the present DoD organization is deficient, but that is where the similarity ends. The books:

Barrett, Archie D. *Reappraising Defense Organization: An Analysis Based on the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980*. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983. 325pp. $6

Krulak, Victor H. *Organization for National Security: A Study*. Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1983. 160pp. $8

Yarmolinsky, Adam and Gregory D. Foster. *Paradoxes of Power: The Military Establishment in the Eighties*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. 154pp. $15

The Author and His Approach

Krulak. Retired Marine Lieut. Gen. Krulak fought in three wars, served in the Pentagon, and was actively involved in the discussions preceding the National Security Act of 1947 and its subsequent amendments. He is currently a Vice Chairman of the US Strategic Institute. Krulak's focus is on the damage being done to national security by the mushrooming bureaucracy. He characterizes the OSD as an 88,000-man gargantua which produces a sort of institutional bloat that saps our soldierly strength.

There is no mincing of words in this book. He harshly criticizes the executive department's invasion of the congressional sphere and the substitution of amateur civilian opinion for professional military advice. On one occasion his words remind us of the biblical prophets: "Without [Congress'] vigorous action there is little hope and less likelihood that we will mend our ways before the brutality of war forces change upon us, and that may well be too late."

Krulak's approach is historical. He starts by reviewing the constitutional, nineteenth century, and legislative antecedents of our military establishment. He establishes clearly that the Founding Fathers intended that the Separation of Powers Doctrine apply to the armed forces—most especially to the armed

forces. George Mason is quoted, "The purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands."

Then, from personal experience and research, Krulak articulates the political struggle that took place between 1944 and 1947. One of the most contentious issues was whether or not to establish two new positions: a defense secretary and an armed forces chief of staff. The Army said "yes" and the Navy said "no." Eventually a compromise was worked out and the 1947 Act established a weak SecDef with no armed forces chief of staff.

Krulak offers fascinating insights into the events of the Truman and Eisenhower years. Both gentlemen desired a very strong SecDef with extensive budget control. Not satisfied with the 1947 Act, Truman called for another round of studies in 1948. Referring to what followed as the "Process of Erosion," Krulak accuses Congress of yielding to executive department pressure in the enactment of the amendments of 1949, 1953, and 1958. The service secretaries lost their cabinet status. They and the JCS were eclipsed by one powerful defense secretary and the newly created, but weak, JCS chairman. In the separation of powers contest, the scale had taken a decided tilt toward the White House.

From 1958, Krulak leads us through the growth of the gargantua. What had been envisioned in 1947 as a staff of fifteen to twenty-five $10,000-a-year civilians and officers ballooned into an 88,000-strong OSD that led to the disastrous results in the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam War, and the Desert I hostage rescue attempt in Iran. The system doesn't work, says Krulak, so it is time for change.

This book is easy to read, crisp, colorful, and straight to the point.

Yarmolinsky. Adam Yarmolinsky offers us the viewpoint of a high-level OSD civilian official. He was Special Assistant to Secretary McNamara during the Kennedy administration and a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary during the Johnson administration. He now practices law in Washington. He was assisted in writing this book by co-author Gregory Foster of ABT Associates, who is also a contributing editor to *Orbis*. Their approach is a broad-brush survey course on the military establishment and arms control. It appears to be a collection of individual papers fleshed out and edited into book form. It contains a great many useful facts, figures, and events interspersed with personal philosophy.

Yarmolinsky's experience at the highest levels of the defense bureaucracy peeps through with his use of that familiar Pentagon style: "Some observers say . . . . Others argue . . . . Still others believe . . . . "

Yarmolinsky, who is referred to as the senior author, acknowledges the assistance of Gregory Foster, who provided essential facts and ideas, on an extraordinarily tight timetable. This timetable may account for some errors concerning the JCS which went uncorrected, as well as a few apparent

contradictions that probably could have heen explained had there been more time.*

Without douht, the author knows the Pentagon and what makes it tick. But his views run counter to those of the military who work there. The Pentagon years under Kennedy and Johnson are seen by military leaders as the most dismal. Yarmolinsky, conversely, defends the OSD leadership of that period most vigorously and enthusiastically. He points to the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) and Systems Analysis, inaugurated during the Kennedy administration, as OSD's finest hour.

One of his "Paradoxes of Power" (from the title) declares that the larger a military establishment, the harder to control its hureaucracy. He does not attack the Pentagon organization, per se, but rather its inertia, its unmanageability, and the attitude of its military members. Yarmolinsky considers it dangerous that "the country is not able to preside over the military." He sees it imperative to achieve more and better civilian control over the armed services. He views military spending as bad for the economy and the military-industrial complex as inconsistent with the good of the Republic.

Another of his paradoxes states that we must deter because we cannot defend. As a co-sponsor of the Senate Nuclear Freeze Resolution he joins those who believe we already have all the nuclear deterrent we need. He asks paradoxically, "How can we live peacefully with such a large military establishment? But on the other hand, how can we live without it?" He closes the book with a chapter on arms control which clearly reflects his conviction that arms control—more than reorganization—is the answer to the problem of the Pentagon.

The entire book flows with a smooth, conversational style. It has the air of authority that comes with personal experience. The approach is as liberal as Krulak's is conservative and will probably do well in campus book stores.

Barrett. Dr. Barrett is a member of the professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee. Although never a member of Congress himself, he is ex-Air Force, his approach will be well received by Congressmen. Congress is constitutionally responsible for maintaining the armed forces and better than half of this book is dedicated to the maintenance of functions; more specifically, to getting a better handle on

*For example, on page 28 he refers to the "weekly JCS session"—they meet much more frequently—and inaccurately describes the sequence in staffing JCS decisions. One of the contradictions concerns arms control. On page 40 he laments that "ACDA has not exerted a significant impact on the defense establishment in its 20 years of existence." Yet on page 8 he acknowledges that "nowadays the military takes it for granted that it cannot discuss new weapon systems . . . withont considering the arms control implications . . . " On page 134 he credits the ABM Treaty of 1972 as preventing serious destabilization. Under that Treaty, the military cancelled and dismantled a multibillion dollar program and complex.

such items as procurement, R&D, logistic support, maintenance, and certain Congressional pet projects like health care.

According to Barrett, the Act of 1947 as amended provided a legislative model—or functional wiring diagram—which has been short-circuited. Despite the language of the law, the uniformed services and the SecDef have emerged with positions of strength and influence out of proportion to their legal mandates. As a result of these distortions we suffer from inadequate military advice for the President and an ineffectively managed armed services.

Of the three books, Barrett's follows the most subdued or pragmatic approach. There are no charged quotations or warnings here. He uses as his framework for analysis the Defense Organization Study (DOS 77-80) conducted between 1977 and 1980—thrust on an unwilling Pentagon by the Carter White House. DOS 77-80 is a package of five studies, one each dealing with the DoD headquarters, the National Military Command Structure, defense resources, defense agencies, and combat effective training. The author served as an executive secretary for one of them. Toward the end of the Carter term, attention became riveted to the hostages in Iran and interest in DOS 77-80 waned. No formal integrated report was ever submitted. Barrett hopes his book will resurrect the project.

Given the complexity of the issue, and faced with reams of documents, Barrett's task was enormous. To make his research product more digestible, he split the work and followed parallel tracks to two sets of conclusions and recommendations. One track deals with the "employing arm" of DoD—SecDef-JCS-CinCs. The other deals with the "maintaining arm"—SecDef-Services-Component Commanders.

After analyzing and synthesizing the five studies, Barrett adds his personal assessment. There are four choices, he concludes: maintain the status quo, fine-tune the present system, limited reorganization, and major reorganization. He selects the option that would steer DoD's organization back toward the model intended by Congress.

Former JCS Chairman, General David C. Jones, in the book's introduction, praises Barrett's scholarship and his work with the Congress. But Jones hopes that bolder changes will be attempted, noting that Barrett's "recommendations are very modest. Politics, after all, is the art of the possible and perhaps Arch [Barrett] is right in his assessment of what is possible. Nevertheless, I dare to hope that our actions may yet match our rhetoric when we proclaim that national security must be above politics . . . . " In 1982, the year before he left office, General Jones publicly indicted the Joint System. This fanned the flames under the simmering pot and by late 1983, things were moving again in Congress.

Barrett's book is scholarly; it is organized and reads like a text. It would be most valuable to anyone seriously trying to understand the Pentagon.

The Problem

Krulak. The central issue, according to Krulak, is that the "warmaking competence of the military professional is blanketed by a suffocating institutional hierarchy." This indictment can be broken down into three components.

Presidents do not receive the military advice they need. Presidents have taken the easy—but dangerous—path in seeking an increasingly powerful SecDef. Krulak quotes Maxwell Taylor: "Often Presidents and Defense Secretaries have not wanted the military around during policymaking." The author adds that "sometimes military advice was not sought because of an advance conviction that it would not be palatable." A former JCS member complained that "what they are looking for is a unanimous point of view. They don't want disagreement." Presidents hope that a strong SecDef will settle the disagreements and shield the White House from controversy. The result, Krulak says, is that we have not won militarily since WWII, at which time the JCS were in constant personal contact with the President.

Excesses and abuses of civilian control cause failures. The American fighting man is perfectly contented with and committed to the principle of civilian control of the military. But a dangerous distortion of that principle occurs when a president becomes insulated from his military advisors and when four or five echelons of OSD officials, with little or no military knowledge, become involved in "micro-management" of purely military matters. Krulak cites a number of examples. There was one OSD official who ordered that a specific photo-reconnaissance mission in Vietnam be flown at 100-feet altitude, ignoring the objections of the field commander, with disastrous results. Krulak also blames costly procurement debacles, such as the TFX, on an OSD staff that tried to force its unprofessional decisions on unwilling services. Most SecDefs, he points out, are trained on the job. Few passed the primer stage before they were replaced—some 2.4 years on the average.

Our military professionalism is endangered. This problem is perhaps the most sinister, as it affects the character of the US fighting man. Since 1958, the admirals and generals have had to learn a new trade, mastering the "self-nourishing civilian bureaucracy," at the expense of their traditional role, the mastery of warfare. "By the sheer weight of bureaucratic pressure, the nation's military leadership has been encouraged to minimize its broad and basic commitment to 'support and defend the Constitution.' In place of that commitment there is implicit in the system encouragement for them to dedicate themselves to support and defend the Secretary of Defense—and all of his Under and Assistant Secretaries as well—whose views they are adjured to endorse in unison before a Congress depicted more and more as the enemy."

Yarmolinsky. Yarmolinsky identifies a wide range of problems created by the military establishment. Most fall into one of the four summaries below.

By its sheer mass and momentum, the military establishment is wasteful, inefficient, and out of control. It is the largest organization in the United States and touches every facet of American life. Yet it is not a monolithic structure. Yarmolinsky sees it as a "modern structure of prestressed concrete, held together by the tensions between opposing forces." No one has yet figured out a way to get their arms around the problem.

The establishment represents an elaborate ritualistic process, the net effect of which is to fudge accountability and to make speedy and clear decisions extremely difficult. This leads to wasteful duplication of effort, e.g., four individual "air forces"; cost overruns, 2900 Trident design change orders within three months; inflation and unemployment; and dislocation of capital and skilled manpower.

The Pentagon organization employs two percent of the American work force and yet its products offer no consumer satisfaction other than the pleasure members of the armed forces may take in flying planes or firing weapons. And despite this huge investment, Americans are discovering more and more things that their military cannot do.

Alliances and coalitions make the establishment immune to supervision and change. Its broad reach and long tentacles into Congress, the public, private, and foreign sectors, have forged an armor of "floating coalitions" that cut across organizational lines. Yarmolinsky depicts the armed services as being in league with industry and Congress so as to undercut OSD efforts to control the Department. With thousands of retired officers in industry, the combined lobbying abilities of industry and services are greatly superior to those of OSD.

On the other side of the coin, Yarmolinsky believes that OSD officials are denied access to needed information and expert military advice. This puts them on the spot. They are reluctant "to make adverse judgments on complex issues of military research and development; a wrong decision against a weapon system could, just possibly, mean defeat for the United States in a future conflict, while a wrong favorable decision would only mean unnecessary dollars for defense."

The Congress is no help in bringing the services under control, regrets Yarmolinsky. That body has "sought to perpetuate interservice competition . . . a situation in which one service could be played off against the others." Yarmolinsky is most annoyed at Congress' attempts to micromanage the affairs of OSD. He compares GAO's activities vis-à-vis the DoD as very similar to OSD's program analysis activities vis-à-vis the armed services.

Attitudes of military men are hard to change. Traditional values of military men have been conditioned by years of intense training to fight for the objective at

any cost and by fierce competition within their own service structures. Accordingly, says Yarmolinsky, they are somewhat less responsive to judgments of outside observers. Thus, there occurred a tragic disconnect between senior military commanders and their civilian superiors during the war in Vietnam, and even more effective civilian control of the military could not have redeemed it. But there are signs of change, in Yarmolinsky's opinion. Since the advent of the AVF, our soldiers no longer serve because of a patriotic calling but because of their need for an occupation. Exit hero image; enter the bureaucrat. Although this is a painful—even controversial—process, thinking men of this dangerous nuclear age will learn to bear "the pains of transition from the heroic to the bureaucratic model—realizing that bureaucrats can be heroes too, but it's harder . . . . "

Efforts to curb the military establishment by arms control have been ineffective. The very existence of the military establishment constitutes a danger of nuclear war—a war that might be the end of civilization. Still, comments Yarmolinsky, we seem committed to an all-out arms race, while giving lip service to arms control. He believes arms control could provide a practical constraint on the "uncontrolled expansion of the U.S. and Soviet military establishments." But, he qualifies, arms control runs counter to the short-term parochial interests of the military bureaucracy and therefore, it cannot succeed without Presidential commitment, which it lacks.

Barrett. Barrett logically presents two versions of the problem. First he examines in detail the criticisms of the Pentagon that emerged from DOS 77-80, as follows:

- JCS is unable to give military advice from national perspective due to service bias.
- National Military Command Structure is inadequate during crises.
- JCS avoids giving advice when division of their budget shares is at issue.
- JCS, as a committee, is an inappropriate institution for directing operations.
- Joint Staff is too dependent on services' input.
- CinCs are too weak and component commanders are too strong.
- Too much micro-management by OSD; OSD should stick to broad policy issues.
- Decision making is overly concentrated at SecDef level and Service Secretaries are underemployed.
- Excessive layering of management levels.
- Imprecise lines of authority.
- Difference of opinions are submerged, depriving the President of needed important information and advice.

Barrett also gives his own assessment of where the problems lie and they can be broken down into four areas.

The legislated channels of responsibility are being ignored. We have drifted away from the Constitution and the National Security Act which provide one channel for employing the armed services and another for maintaining them. A situation has evolved wherein SecDef, working directly with the uniformed services, is performing both the employing and maintaining functions simultaneously by means of a *de facto*, unofficial chain of command through the services to the component commanders and fighting forces. The *de jure*, or legislated chains of command are mostly bypassed, leaving the CinCs fairly well out of the picture and relegating the service secretaries to a window dressing role.

The SecDef is doing the service secretaries' jobs and is neglecting his own. Just as Krulak criticizes the SecDef for doing the JCS' job, Barrett criticizes the SecDef and OSD for having usurped the maintaining functions of the service secretaries. Clearly the law assigns a very wide range of maintaining functions, including R&D, to the service secretaries. But just as clearly, the OSD, under its broad coordination authority, has taken over in the maintenance area. The service secretaries have practically become ministers without portfolio. Meanwhile, the SecDef has become so extensively involved in the details of managing the services, that he has precious little time left to concentrate on the broad national defense policy issues—which the law requires him to do. Virtually all participants in DOS 77-80 agreed that DoD had become overly centralized except the OSD participants themselves.

The defense structure is rigidly resistant to change. The natural human tendency is to protect one's turf. Nowhere is this more true than in the Pentagon. Every one of its components can be expected to defend against any threat by any other component that would reduce its influence, invade its domain, or challenge its essential role, its independence, its budget, or its morale. Barrett documents resistance by SecDef/OSD to any and all DOS 77-80 recommendations for organizational changes which would strengthen the joint structure or service secretaries. The services, too, have a long history of resistance when it comes to sacred parochial cows. They will even oppose change when it may appear on the surface that they may be getting something for nothing, especially if that change may interfere with what they perceive to be their traditional missions or roles. For instance, the Navy did not want polaris SSBNs at first. They resisted getting involved in riverine warfare and opposed the idea of floating warehouses for the RDF. The Army was so skeptical about air power they gave up the Army Air Corps. They wanted nothing to do with Green Berets nor ABMs.

Inter-service rivalry is a problem, but a manageable one. Barrett does a first-rate job with the phenomenon of bureaucratic conflict. He reminds us that the Founding Fathers deliberately institutionalized conflict. Conflict is an instinctively human trait that will inevitably surface when people or

organizations interact, particularly on matters of distribution of property. Barrett draws on James Madison and *The Federalist* to point out that conflict, even with its potentially disastrous results, is legitimate. (Krulak emphasizes this point, too.) Barrett argues that cooperation and conflict can coexist beneficially and that a wise manager can manipulate, design, tailor, or structure conflict to serve as an effective management tool, even, ironically, in the resolution of conflicts themselves.

Recommendations

Krulak. His recommendations are brief and unambiguous, and there are two of them.

First, "get the OSD out of the professional area of warmaking, which is the proper province of the JCS." Krulak would limit the role of the SecDef to the logistic, fiscal, budgetary, and administrative aspects of our national security structure. Most important: the military chain of command must pass directly from the President to the fighting forces via the JCS.

Second, "guarantee to the Commander-in-Chief and the Congress the unfiltered counsel of the nation's military leaders, as represented in the corporate body of the JCS." But this body, says Krulak, should not include a JCS Chairman. The concept of a JCS has proven its case, but the concept of a JCS Chairman has not. It is time to acknowledge that reality and to eliminate the office. Krulak holds that no one man, civilian or military, can give the President proper advice on the broad spectrum of land, sea, and air warfare that is required.

Yarmolinsky. Yarmolinsky does not conclude with recommendations like the other two authors. But his recommendations, which appear throughout the book are yet clear, and some fairly leap at the reader.

The President should take a vigorous personal lead in arms control. Otherwise, the military bureaucracy will dominate the scene.

"Increase civilian control of (1) overall budgets; (2) research and development; (3) force structure; (4) contingency planning; and (5) actual military operations." Yarmolinsky opposes further increases in defense spending. In fact, he speculates, the recent Reagan increases may, paradoxically, reduce the overall effectiveness of the military establishment. The present system, dominated by the military-industrial-labor-congressional complex is totally inadequate. "To maintain effective civilian control over the military budget . . . the civilian authorities must involve themselves deeply in . . . control of R&D and control of force structure . . . . " The principal device available to the civilian leadership for controlling actual military operations, advises Yarmolinsky, is through the development and promulgation of rules of engagement.

Convert the US military from a warfighting to a constabulary force. Such a force would consider war as an interruption of its normal duties. "In this situation, military attitudes are as important as military functions . . . . If the military is to evolve, even over a long stretch of time, into an essentially constabulary force, great changes in the symbolic values of the military within American society must be achieved." Which leads to another recommendation.

Reshape attitudes of career military officers. "Senior military commanders need to understand and share the objectives of their civilian superiors . . . . Enhancing civilian control . . . is to some extent a matter of education, and the educational process is a life long one." He suggests more ROTC and fewer service academy officers, in the mix, plus more in-service education at civilian universities. There should be created satisfactory career lines for officers specializing in politico-military relations and even the possibility of lateral entry for civilian specialists into the officer ranks.

Barrett. After considering four broad alternatives suggested by DOS 77-80, Barrett selects "Limited Reorganization." He admits that maintaining status quo is a perfectly viable alternative under the premise that the cure may be worse than the malady. Fine-tuning the present system would solve little, and lacking legislative backbone, may not even survive a change of administrations. A major reorganization is simply not politically feasible, Barrett reckons. Thus, he opts for modest congressional action, which by the fall, 1983, seemed to be gathering momentum on Capitol Hill, despite OSD opposition. Barrett's limited reorganization proposal would attempt to restore separation between the employment arm function and the maintenance arm function as envisioned in the language of the 1947 Act as amended. Two parallel legislative actions would be involved.

Streamline the maintenance arm. Barrett recommends integration of the departmental headquarters of the services. The service secretariats would cease to exist and the service staffs would thenceforth serve both secretary and service chief. The secretary would be restored as the bona fide manager of his service. Service chiefs would serve as chief of staff in the real and traditional sense of the term. The chiefs would handle joint matters in the JCS arena, having a personal staff to assist them, and the vice chiefs would deal with purely service matters—pretty much as is the case at present. Barrett makes a strong and convincing case for this, but it presupposes that the SecDef can be persuaded to release the reins. Decentralization in this manner could free the SecDef to spend more time in dealing with external entities and in executing his legal responsibilities to define high-level national security objectives.

Strengthen the employing arm. Several actions recommended by Barrett would, using his words, "institutionalize a joint perspective."

- Strengthen the JCS Chairman. Formally give him an independent voice, and memberships on senior advisory bodies such as Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council. Assign him a dedicated staff. Establish him as principal link between SecDef and CinCs, eliminating JCS from chain. Assign him responsibility to review service and agency budget proposals and to submit his recommendations to SecDef.
- Strengthen the CinCs. Designate the CJCS as their single uniformed superior. Give them increased responsibilities in readiness evaluation. Assign responsibility for joint training and doctrine to RedCom.
- Increase independence of Joint Staff. Terminate services' coordination of joint papers. Insure Joint Staff receives guidance from White House and SecDef. Revise personnel procedures to insure assignment of best qualified officers.

Reviewer's Critique and Assessment

After having studied the considered opinions of three expert Pentagon observers, we are still left hanging up in the air. Obviously, they cannot all be right, and just as obviously, we cannot implement all their mutually exclusive recommendations.

Why has the Pentagon turned in such an unenviable performance? Krulak says there has been too much civilian control. Yarmolinsky claims there has been too little. Barrett believes that it has been a failure to maintain a tidy separation between civilian control of the maintaining and employing arms.

Who is to blame? Krulak blames successive power-grabbing administrations and submissive congresses for the fix we are in. Yarmolinsky blames the unholy Congressional-Service-Industry alliance. Barrett blames human nature—man's instinct to protect and expand his turf.

What to do? Krulak advises we get rid of the JCS Chairman and get the SecDef out of the JCS' business. Barrett recommends we strengthen the JCS Chairman and get the SecDef out of the service secretaries' business. Yarmolinsky recommends more SecDef control of both the JCS' and service secretaries' business.

Krulak. Krulak warns that we must take dramatic remedial action to restore sound military advice to the President before it is too late. I do not believe the problem is quite as urgent and dangerous as he suggests.

Krulak himself acknowledges that presidents do not want heavy doses of military advice in peacetime. The squeaky peacetime wheels will get the grease, even when the president is a military man like Eisenhower. So, are we to force military advice down an unwilling president's throat?

The real reason we lost at the Bay of Pigs, in Vietnam, and at Desert I in Iran was far more fundamental than lack of military advice. It was available. But none of the presidents involved—for reasons right or wrong—saw those situations as vital to the nation. Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter viewed their social, economic, and domestic political problems as more important to the nation's interests than dealing with a secnrity problem. They never shifted mental gears to a military mode as did Roosevelt during World War II.* So it was business as usual, and we muddled through with our existing defense organization machinery.

Americans have an organizational bent. We create great organizations which we hope will function under all circumstances. But when a really major emergency arises, which might put that organization to the test, our nature is to improvise—to do it *ad hoc*—and to circumvent existing wiring diagrams. At the outset of World War II, we did just that, creating new organizations, such as JCS and OPA, changed names and missions of others, and totally mobilized the national resources.

In the event of another bona fide national emergency, we would do likewise. No commander in chief in his right mind would try to fight a major war with our present defense organization. The first thing he would do would be to summon his service chiefs to the Oval Office. There would suddenly be a huge OSD staff of program analysts, comptrollers, net assessors, R&Ders, and other miscellaneous bureaucrats idle and available for duties related to the war effort.

As much as I agree with Krulak—especially on the problem of micro-management by OSD—I do not believe his recommendation on JCS advice will be acted upon in peacetime. And even if Congress were to enact a Roosevelt-JCS type of relationship, the president would be too absorbed in social, economic, and political issues to listen. What we need and must have, then, are a few, less sweeping changes that will guarantee us a military structure of professional fighting men—equipped, trained, and ready—whose leaders can make a rapid move across the river to the White House when the President calls.

Yarmolinsky. Yarmolinsky says that the most important mission of our military establishment is no longer to fight war but to deter it. In order for the military establishment best to carry out this mission, we must bring it under control through increased civilian control, arms control, and reshaping the way military men think.

While I agree wholeheartedly with the importance of deterring nuclear

*I feel quite certain that Krulak would have better words for the Grenada operation. That one enjoyed the personal commitment of the President and the military was not overwhelmed by micro-management of the operation. Grenada proved that even our present system can be made to work—given those right conditions.

war, I do not see how Yarmolinsky's formula will do it. He says our military establishment must be structured to deter because it cannot adequately defend. He calls this a paradox, but to me, it is more a case of flawed reasoning. It confuses *means* with *end*. He says we must deter (means) in order to avoid nuclear destruction (end). He fails to acknowledge that deterrence is a worthy end in itself—that we must defend in order to deter. The USSR will be deterred by significant warfighting potential. The USSE will not be deterred by a military establishment run by a bureaucracy of nonprofessionals, debating arms control proposals, and restructuring itself as a constabulary force.

Yarmolinsky strongly emphasizes arms-control. Arms control and disarmament schemes are as old as recorded history. Isaiah wrote of beating swords into plowshares. None—neither the simplest nor the most elaborate attempts—have ever prevented war among the signatories.

Historically, arms control enthusiasts have relied on both dreams and fears to promote their cause. Great dreans of peace produced the short-lived Concert of Europe, League of Nations, and Pact of Paris. The framers of the United Nations said to themselves, "This time it will be different." Similarly history tells us of the great fears of mass annihilation generated by a series of "ultimate weapons," the crossbow, gun powder, and aerial bombardment. Yarmolinsky now repeats old arguments, "This time, with nuclear weapons, it's different." We live in the midst of a recurring cycle wherein man's belligerent nature overcomes his noble thoughts. If we are to rely on arms control to prevent a nuclear holocaust, then we are in serious trouble, indeed.

Yarmolinsky is also of the school that equates general war with nuclear war and, consequently, as one which might end civilization. Many of this school then reason that general war is obsolete. The logic that follows is a very slippery slope. Warfighting forces are judged obsolete and forms of unilateral disarmament gain respectability. According to this logic we can get by with a constabulary force and silo-sitters.

But this reasoning is wrong on three counts. First, there is no compelling reason for a country at war to use nuclear weapons, especially if it might eliminate the possibility of achieving its wartime objectives. Even Hitler, with back to the wall, did not employ biological or chemical weapons, presumably deterred by the consequences of retaliation.

Second, nuclear war would not end civilization. That theatrical horrow scenario is used as a dramatic closing argument to "rest the case" against war, and for disarmament. No one but an insensitive barbarian would challenge it. But reality is not so simple. The *real* horrow of nuclear war is that man *would* survive. The survivors would endure incalculable heartache and adversity. But man, with his proven ability to survive famine, flood, and plague—nuclear winters notwithstanding—would be left to pick up the pieces and start the next cycle.

Third, war has not become obsolete. To believe so is to deny all history and human nature. There will be wars, minor wars and major wars: perhaps nuclear, perhaps not, perhaps worse. For these reasons we should do everything in our power to deter war, to delay it, or to minimize its effects on us. We Americans will be challenged as long as we are "King of the Mountain." If we are unwilling or unprepared to think the unthinkable, we may be condemned to enduring it.

It is fashionable these days to speak about there being no winners, only losers, in war. This is not exactly new. In retrospect, did the United States really win World War II? Or would it be more accurate to say we lost the least? As unsettling as this reasoning is, it is, unfortunately, all relative.

To get a handle on the military establishment, Yarmolinsky would change its "mentality" in two ways. First, he would increase civilian control—vertically and horizontally—of every facet of Pentagon endeavors. Second, he would reeducate the military to think more like, and share the objectives of, the civilian leadership. Unless Yarmolinsky seriously has it in mind to amputate America's warfighting arm, his logic escapes me. At this time in our history, when we have the most to lose, we need the most skillful and dedicated warriors we have ever had. The President and the Congress need sound military advice more than ever. The time-honored principle of civilian control of the military should not be subverted for purposes of civilianizing the military. In effect, Yarmolinsky's proposals would do just that, and would lead to the demise of the Republic.

Military and naval science—warfighting—is a profession which, like any other, requires decades to master. We seek financial experts to run the Treasury Department. Just as the President selects men who have tilled the soil and who have engaged in collective bargaining to lead the Agriculture and Labor Departments, respectively, he should seek men who have studied, practiced, and tasted combat as his Pentagon managers. We do not need more civilian control of the Pentagon; the President, the Secretaries, and the Congress are certainly adequate, and clearly what the Founding Fathers envisioned. What we need at the Pentagon is more professional control, not on-the-job trainees from business and academe. There is a seldomly considered source of this type of professional military leadership and expertise: the retired officer community. Why not seek and appoint the best available experts for *all* of our executive departments?

Barrett. Barrett is concerned with OSD's encroachment into the maintenance function. This has been an incremental process over a period of decades. The cumulative effect of the process is not what the Congress originally had in mind. Barrett proposes to return, incrementally, towards an organizational arrangement that properly accounts for congressional constitutional and legislated preeminence in the maintenance function.

Congressional acquiescence in the step-by-step accretion of power by OSD must now be recognized by Congress as a series of mistakes. One of the biggest mistakes was stripping the service secretaries of their cabinet status. For, thereafter, they no longer possessed the necessary clout to perform the tasks that Congress left on the law books for them to perform. Barrett's proposal to streamline the maintenance function might give the service secretaries the wherewithal to reclaim their lost authority. This would be "half a loaf" which we should not reject out of hand as insufficient.

There is one untidy detail. Barrett speaks of integrating the three service headquarters staffs. While there are three service secretaries, there are four service staffs. Under Barrett's proposal, the SecNav would find himself with two chiefs of staff—the CNO and the Marine Commandant. It might require some fancy foot work to tidy this up.

Under Barrett's recommendation to beef up the joint structure, the strengthened JCS Chairman would be responsible for delivering military advice to the President in two forms. First, he would offer his own independent view, representing the CinCs. Second, as JCS spokesman, it would be his duty to report to the President whenever the JCS were not in agreement with his own assessment, and why.

This proposal would amount to a "quarter of a loaf," provided HR 3718 is approved, assigning the JCS Chairman a seat on the National Security Council as a co-equal with the SecDef. At least one man in uniform—representing the expertise and capabilities of one of the four services—would be a regular in the White House. Even though the JCS Chairman would be "filtering" the advice of his JCS colleagues, he would be better equipped for this role than a civilian official. This quarter loaf would be another step in the right direction.

Assessment. America has traditionally pushed its military establishment to the back burner in peacetime. This time, the military was also buried, file cabinet by file cabinet, beneath an enormous, entangling bureaucracy.

That bureaucracy has not optimized the combat readiness and warfighting ability of our armed forces. It is certainly too cumbersome and inefficient to be useful in time of war. It exists primarily because of a fundamental flaw in the organization of DoD—the unprecedented centralization of authority in one executive. It contradicts the principle of separation of powers; it violates the sound management principle of span of control; and it attempts to homogenize heterogeneous entities.

Constitutional separation of powers. When successive presidents sought to delegate their defense budget headache, Congress acquiesced. When SecDef instituted an elaborate PPBS to accommodate the President's wishes, Congress acquiesced again. Congress accepted this incremental invasion into

its domain because it still had an ace up the sleeve—its direct relationship with the services.

In 1949, when the service secretaries lost their direct access to the President, a century-and-a-half-old delicate balance was upset, they did retain their special relationship with Congress. The services' power base, quite naturally, shifted toward Capitol Hill. Now, when a service's pet project is pruned by SecDef and fails to make it into the Administration's budget, the service resents it. When that service then presses its own budget version before the Congress, OSD cries "insubordination." Depending on where you sit, the SecDef/OSD, the Congress, or service(s) become the "enemy." Major resources—time, funds, and manpower—are committed to protecting one's "turf" against the "enemy."

Remarks made by Yarmolinsky, Krulak, and Barrett confirm this. Moreover, their remarks also make it clear that the Executive Branch is out in front in this separation of powers contest. Barrett and Krulak—in the losers' corner—recommend turning the clock back. Yarmolinsky, on the other hand, matter-of-factly declares that the constitutional checks and balances are now irrelevant.*

Congress, probably regretting having yielded so much, is now fighting its way back. The GAO audits, annoying to OSD, and the War Powers Act, annoying to presidents, are examples of Congress' attempt to reassert its waning control over national defense issues.

If push came to shove, neither the elaborate OSD system of military procurement and budget controls nor the War Powers Act would stand up to a constitutionality challenge before the Supreme Court. (One needs only to reread the first few pages of the Constitution.) The Court has already spoken once on this issue. In 1850 it held that the duties and powers of the President as Commander in Chief were purely military. Yet today, post-World War II events have produced this Executive-Legislative "Mexican stand-off."

The uniformed leaders are caught in between, which paradoxically, is sometimes bad and sometimes good, depending on who is judging. They sorely resent the progressive diminution of their role as advisors to the President. A few years ago the CNO, in his capacity as Senior Naval Advisor, wrote to the President in utter frustration, complaining that his advice was not reaching the White House. He was sharply rebuked by the SecDef.

It is true that the amendments to the Act of 1947 have force-fed some inter-service cooperation that had not existed before. But ironically, much of the cooperation that has emerged has come about because of the services' common-adversary relationship with the OSD, and not because of common

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*Yarmolinsky, p. 96. "The three checks on the power of the military provided in the Constitution . . . have proved largely irrelevant to the central dilemmas of civilian control in the second half of the twentieth century."

philosophy, purpose or mission. The services, sensing the power struggle between the Branches, actually find themselves able to play one side against the other. From a privileged position on the E Ring, I have observed some remarkable about-faces and some surprising truces among strange bedfellows, agreeing to support one another's programs. The OSD fights back, trying to divide and conquer. The Congress audits the OSD.

The bureaucracy, the entangling coalitions, and the tension between opposing forces depicted so graphically by Yarmolinsky, grow and grow on. They will continue to do so, inevitably, around the super magnet known as SecDef.

Span of Control. The Constitution declares there to be two principal functions of the federal government: first, the defense and second, the general welfare of its citizens. At the end of the 1700s there were five executive departments—State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Justice—reflecting those constitutional functions demanding the most personal attention of the Chief Executive. Said another way, those were the functions least prudent for delegating to someone else, or so one would think. In fact, War and Navy have lost their cabinet status, delegated to someone else. Many other functions, not mentioned in the Constitution—Agriculture, Education and Labor, to mention a few—have been elevated to cabinet status.

In effect, the presidential function of Commander in Chief has been delegated. The SecDef has been formally inserted into the chain of command between the Oval Office and the fighting forces. The fact that there exists this delegation is cause enough for concern, but the manner in which it has been delegated is far more disturbing. It is widely accepted as a principle of sound management that the effective span of control of a good leader is between seven and nine, maybe ten subordinates. Our defense bureaucracy is organized so as to place over 30 high-level officers and bureaucrats under the SecDef's formal, line supervision. These are deputy, under, and assistant secretaries, service secretaries, agency directors, members of JCS, CinCs and aides. The SecDef cannot possibly devote sufficient personal attention to those with solid-line wiring diagram relationships with him. Without manageable-span-of-control supervision, waste, inefficiency, unaccountability, and bureaucracy grow.

We seem compelled to put all of our eggs in one basket. The military establishment is the largest organization in the United States. It employs more people—4,700,000—than any other. It accounts for over 70 percent of federal procurement. Its mission is the most important of any assigned to the federal government. All other executive agencies and departments are dwarfed by comparison. Even if divided into its three services—Army, Navy, Air Force—the smallest among them would still dwarf the other

departments. Should we really divide executive responsibility so unevenly and then expect there to exist one man wise and strong enough to control it?

Homogeneity vs. Heterogeneity. The Founding Fathers did not see the Army and Navy as similar or homogeneous organizations. In the language of the Constitution, the Army and Navy were treated in distinct terms, in different sub-paragraphs, and with separate funding procedures.

Nothing has changed. The missions of the Army and Navy—and now, the Air Force—are still different, as different, for example, as the missions of the Commerce and Agriculture Departments. Moreover, the philosophies of professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are pronouncedly different. They see themselves very differently—raison d'être, approach to problem solving, attitudes, and every-day procedures. During my 14 years in joint and combined assignments, I frequently found I had more in common with foreign naval officers than I did with American officers of the other services.

It must be presumed that the 1949 decision to consolidate the three service departments into one was conditioned by the prevailing but faulty reasoning that the missions of the services had been superseded by that of deterrence. But deterrence is not a mission, it is an objective, and the real missions of the services did not go away. If consolidation of related missions were the driving criterion, then combining Navy and State would make just as much sense. The Air Force would go quite nicely with NASA, and so forth.

Consider an analogy. Another US Administration, concerned with streamlining government operations, might conceivably decide to consolidate all government entities concerned with the national economy. The Departments of Commerce, Labor, and Treasury with selected agencies would be logical and prime candidates for inclusion in the new Department of the Economy. It is likely that these components would quickly oblige the Administration with a consensus on how best to structure and manage the economy? Would it serve the national interest if a powerful Economy Secretary submerged dissent and achieved a consensus by coercion?

The architects of the amendments to the 1947 Act somehow saw a homogeneity among the armed services that simply does not exist. They are heterogeneous in more ways than they are homogeneous. To homogenize them would be to destroy them.

It is a very difficult task to try to homogenize heterogeneous units, especially if the units do not wish to be homogenized. This task employs scores of thousands of OSD bureaucrats. It will require hiring some more before either (1) they are able to succeed as Yarmolinsky urges, or (2) a President and a Congress decide it was a bad idea in the first place.

Irony of ironies, an ex-military man, President Eisenhower, was a major participant in the creation of the defense bureaucracy. In his earnest attempt

not to appear partial to the military, he helped sire a monster far more menacing than the military-industrial complex he seemed to dread. Could he comment today, I believe he would agree.

The only sure solution would involve painful dislocations for a lot of well-meaning and patriotic folks. But sooner or later the SecDef must be separated from the services, and the service secretaries restored to cabinet status with access to the President. Let them manage the maintenance arm on behalf of the Chief Executive for the Congress.

This is not to say we couldn't use a SecDef. On the contrary, let him manage the employing arm for the Commander in Chief. His functions might include: oversight—not command, but oversight—of the joint structure; management of those defense agencies determined to be truly joint; and coordination of all international military affairs. He should also assume the duties of the White House National Security Assistant. This would be a very important office, with a very important man, performing a formidable task—but one far more manageable than the one that exists today.

Should the Congress wish to adopt its own form of PPBS and FYDP, it would certainly be within its prerogative to do so. It is that body's Constitutional responsibility to determine the size, composition, and armament of the armed forces.

Whereas Barrett proposed "half a loaf," the foregoing must be considered a full loaf, and one that is probably too large for appetites either in the White House or on Capitol Hill—at least at this point in time. It may be we have not suffered enough—in Krulak's words—to demand change. Barrett would say this recommendation is not within the realm of the politically possible. Yarmolinsky would not see this as a problem, much less the proposed as a solution.

By the oath we pledge, we are sworn to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . . . " It is very uncomfortable to stand by and observe distortion of the checks and balances of the Constitution we are to defend. We suspect that unless our Executive and Legislative Masters are both contented with their working relationships nnder the Constitution, we are courting disaster.