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## Caribbean Coast Guard: A Regional Approach

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Commander Robert E. Fenton, US Coast Guard

**F**or many Americans, pre-1980 thoughts of the Caribbean Basin\* were focused exclusively on tourism in an idyllic tropical paradise. While reality never matched that naive simplification, the US action in Grenada in October 1983 capped a series of events that graphically demonstrated the strategic importance of the Caribbean. Before that involvement, revolutionary upheavals in Nicaragua and Surinam; guerrilla movements in El Salvador, Guatemala and Colombia; the massive immigrations of Cubans and Haitians in 1980; the debt crisis of the Basin, and the persistent drumbeat of Cuban adverturism and propaganda already had focused US policy-level attention to a region long regarded as secure for American interests. Cynics will argue that Grenada represents a return to gunboat diplomacy, characteristic of past US policy that has alternated between “benign neglect” and periodic, fitful unilateral interventions. More realistically, others assert that it manifests a renewed American commitment to its neighbors, backed up by military strength. That commitment is embodied in a mature Caribbean policy that has three major, continuing components:

- Support for free elections and broadly based democratic institutions, consistent with American ideology, beliefs in self-determination, and hope for evolutionary progress toward representative government.
- The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), an integrated program of trade, aid and investment to overcome structural under-development in the Basin countries and so to stimulate the internal economic growth necessary to reduce socio-political pressures for radical change.
- Collective security efforts and security assistance to help democratically oriented governments resist externally supported insurgents who would impose totalitarian regimes inimical to US interests.<sup>1</sup>

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\*While not defined precisely, United States policy considers that the Basin includes Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean Islands, Venezuela, Colombia, and Guyana. The term connotes a commonality of purposes and problems that occur throughout the region, rather than a discrete geographical area.

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Given the continuing validity of these objectives, it remains the responsibility of policy-makers to fashion specific programs and institutional arrangements that will ensure their attainment.

**The Concept.** This essay treats one possible manifestation of the last two policy components. It supports the creation of permanent regional or, more likely, sub-regional Coast Guards to buttress maritime security and to protect the internal economic health of the Basin countries.

Responding to the common interests and common problems of the participants, such regional Coast Guards would be formed from existing Coast Guards, police forces, and/or navies acting in "dual-hatted" capacities, both as national maritime forces and as naval components in broader regional collective security arrangements. While ultimately a single monolithic "Caribbean Coast Guard" acting in a coherent multilateral fashion might be practical, a less ambitious sub-regional approach seems much more realistic. Depending on the degree of political integration and the mutual compatibility among the neighboring states, a variety of organizational forms are suggested. Those would range from simple liaison mechanisms between adjacent states—much along the lines of present coordinating arrangements for maritime Search and Rescue (SAR)—to sub-regional Confederations designed specifically for a limited set of naval/Coast Guard functions, to stronger general-purpose, multi-mission regional forces, and finally to the fully evolved multinational force in the future. As will be seen later, US-Jamaica-Barbados action in concert with the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was a temporary prototype of this last organizational form. This discussion will deal only with the second stage of evolutionary growth, the confederated Coast Guard. As states grow comfortable with the status quo, they could proceed to a next higher stage of integration. In any event, the US role could be tailored to match its own needs and interests, the capabilities and interests of its potential partners, and the current political climate.

At the very least, the US Coast Guard (USCG) could serve as a "role model" and a training resource for newly emergent national Coast Guards. As Table 1 indicates, there is a remarkable similarity between USCG missions and those of two important island nations, which are probably typical of most Caribbean nations. In the long run, it could function as the US member and nucleus of the region-wide "Caribbean Coast Guard," since its relative size, mission profile, and existing ties to Caribbean nations offer some benefits. Paradoxically, even though it is at all times a US armed force, its image is basically humanitarian and nonthreatening to Caribbean nations that are often highly suspicious of US military dominance. Thus, for example, Coast Guard cutters operated routinely without incident off Mariel, Cuba, during the 1980 "Freedom Flotilla," and maintained routine

**TABLE 1: Comparison of Coast Guard Missions—United States, Jamaica and Trinidad/Tobago Coast Guards**

United States	Jamaica <sup>2</sup>	Trinidad-Tobago <sup>3</sup>
a. Search and Rescue	a. Search and Rescue	a. Naval Defense
b. Aids to Navigation	b. Surveillance of the coast line and territorial seas.	b. Search and Rescue
c. Law enforcement (customs, drugs, fisheries, immigration, etc.)	c. Fisheries Protection	c. Narcotics drug enforcement
d. Marine environmental protection	d. Narcotics Drug Enforcement	d. Anti-Smuggling of goods and emigrants
f. Military preparedness	e. Anti-Smuggling in accordance with the Customs Laws	e. Fisheries protection
g. Marine Safety	f. Assistance to Government agencies	f. Marine environmental protection
h. Marine Science	g. Aid to civil powers	g. Disaster assistance
i. Port Safety and Security	h. Assistance in times of national disaster	h. Marine safety
j. Assistance to Government Agencies.	i. Training and exercises with other Commonwealth Forces	
	j. During National Emergencies, operates as the Naval Unit, Jamaica Defense Force.	

patrols in the Windward Passage and Yucatan channels during the Grenadian incursion. Given improved naval capability in its newest cutters (the 270-foot-long “Famous Cutters” class) and a deliberate decision to concentrate those and other Coast Guard resources (i.e., the 378’ *Hamilton*-class cutters) in the Caribbean area, the Coast Guard could take up the slack of an otherwise diminished US naval presence, particularly in an antisubmarine warfare role. The *Hamilton*-class ships will begin a FRAM program in 1985 that will extend their service lives and add new capabilities, specifically Lamps I, TacTas, secure voice/satellite communications, and a MK75 Oto-Melara gun with MK92 Fire Control System. While the Famous class now has only space and weight provisions for AN/SQR-19 TacTas sonar, Harpoon, Lamps and Phalanx, there are some indications that these systems may be installed relatively early in their operational lives.<sup>4</sup> Without those systems, the cutters could serve as effective Command and Control platforms, but would lack essential offensive/defensive capability to function in a multithreat environment. With them, collectively, the Coast Guard can truly serve as the low-mix US naval option for the Caribbean postulated in a recent *Review* article by Capt. John Trainor.<sup>5</sup> Of course, this concentration of US resources could be done only at the expense of domestic missions throughout the continental United States, Alaska and Hawaii.

Thus, the concept of a “Caribbean Coast Guard” is fairly fluid. Its exact nature, shape and functioning will vary in time and by sub-region. Its development will be evolutionary and its mix of roles and missions a product of political agreement. Nonetheless, its one constant is a progressive integration of naval/Coast Guard forces in a cooperative regional framework. Through that mechanism, enhanced collective security and internal economic benefits will accrue.

**Factors Arguing For and Against a Coordinated Approach.** US policy toward the Caribbean is not motivated by altruism, but rather by the hard realities of its strategic importance and of its growing interdependence. The Basin forms our "third border," with its Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) carrying half of US foreign trade, over two-thirds of our imported oil, and a wealth of strategic minerals. In the event of a Nato war in Europe, 50 percent of US force supplies would transit through the Straits of Florida.<sup>6</sup> Economic interdependencies are strong and the Basin collectively is our third largest trading partner, providing a net favorable balance of \$1 billion on a \$60 billion two-way annual flow. US imports (\$30 billion) include oil, sugar, coffee, bauxite and meat, while exports (\$31 billion) are concentrated in manufactured goods, machinery, chemicals, grain and transportation equipment. US direct investment aggregates to \$13 billion, and US and Western banks collectively carry nearly all the area's debt obligations.<sup>7</sup> People are equally important, as the Basin is the source of 80-90 percent of all annual US immigrants (legal and illegal), with the US mainland now home to nearly one out of every eight persons born on the Caribbean Islands.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, the strategic importance of the Caribbean is well established for both the United States and the other Basin states, which themselves are even more dependent on SLOC protection (95 percent of their trade moves through the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico and Panama Canal).<sup>9</sup> This mission has been foremost in the minds of US naval planners, with ASW being a principal concern, a concern shared by the two larger navies in the area—Colombia and Venezuela. Also, the added threat of a Cuban Navy being used as an ancillary to communist-supported guerrillas in their own countries has prompted parallel interest in internal antisubversion as a naval mission.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, protection of 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) will bring all naval forces further offshore for an enforcement presence.

As Trainor and Robert Scheina both suggest, the Cuban-Nicaraguan naval threats are not sufficiently grave to warrant a continuing and overt US Navy response, but naval forces nonetheless would have to be diverted from other tasks to deal with these challenges. The indigenous military forces are not large enough for the task. Collectively, the Basin countries have the world's smallest military establishments relative to their size. Cuba is the exception; with a population less than one-eighth as large, it has more armed forces members (227,000) than all of the rest of the Basin countries (less Mexico) combined (216,900).<sup>11</sup> Today, the US Navy is severely stretched to meet its forward deployment strategy commitments. This situation holds little promise for improvement as the effects of a personnel end-strength freeze through 1985, combined with the acquisition of thirty new ships, will further squeeze the support base.<sup>12</sup> Giving the realities of naval commitments to Nato, the Middle East, the Far East, and new demands for a Fifth Fleet in the

Indian Ocean, the US Navy will be hard pressed to divert added resources to a vulnerable Caribbean. Where once the Royal Navy and American Navy held undisputed sway, only Guantanamo Bay and Roosevelt Roads are left as US operating bases, with no permanent forces afloat. The US Coast Guard is also severely strapped and is maintaining a strong Caribbean presence for antidrug smuggling only by depleting its assets throughout the East and Gulf coasts. The small French and Dutch naval presence is insufficient to provide credible security.

Thus it becomes apparent that pure self-interest of the Caribbean states and US naval realities argue for a coordinated approach. But for a number of reasons, such a collective arrangement may be difficult to achieve. First, the intense nationalism of the Basin countries has frustrated numerous previous attempts at political alliances; in fact, recent history has witnessed the area splintering into an array of "mini-states." Just since 1975, nine new independent countries have been created from former British and Dutch colonies. Establishment of any joint or coordinated armed force-Coast Guard presupposes some level of joint foreign policy and cohesion.

Second, notwithstanding the common threat, Basin countries harbor a lingering fear of US intervention in their internal affairs. Clearly, some will see Grenada as a confirmation of this anxiety. Soviet propagandists always have played on this concern, arguing that an "inter-American Armed Force" would be used inevitably as the vehicle for advancing US imperialism and suppressing progressive elements in decadent societies.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, the impetus and direction for such forces will have to be primarily from the countries themselves.

Third, in conjunction with the fierce nationalism, there is a heady potpourri of cultural, social and political pluralism in the Caribbean. The "Caribbean Basin" is more a geographic entity than a political or social reality. For example, Spanish-speaking Central America lacks the same level of parliamentary democracy and stable political institutions that generally prevail in the insular Caribbean and in Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. The British and Dutch retain some influence in their former colonies, but not sufficient to ensure any viable move toward political-economic unity in the Caribbean Basin. Although probably overstated, the fact remains that some polarization continues to exist between the Anglo and Hispanic cultures that, by habit, does carry over into the political arena.

Fourth, the Caribbean countries differ markedly in economic power and naval strength. Except for Venezuela, Cuba, and Colombia, none has a navy of even modest size or modern equipment. Economically, most countries are small and underdeveloped. They are caught in the grip of a worldwide recession that has drastically harmed their commodity-based economy and blunted their hopes for economic growth. Lastly, traditional US political dominance is increasingly being challenged not just by Cuba, but also by

Venezuela and Mexico, which seek to influence regional events from a perspective not always congruent with US views.

Overall, nonetheless, the factors and pressures are in place for a coordinated regional approach, but for one which must account for the unique regional environment. From the foregoing factors, it is obvious that:

- National sovereignty must be preserved scrupulously in coordinated arrangements;
- Subregional groupings built around common heritage, culture, language or political institutions are perhaps most feasible;
- The US role ought to be low-key and nondirective while simultaneously warmly encouraging;
- The sub-regional makeup of the forces will have to develop a "critical mass" from relatively small national contributions; and
- The attitudes of Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico will be critical to the success of any initiative.

*Caribbean Navies/Coast Guards—Capabilities and Limitations.* Whether called a navy, Coast Guard or police force, most small developing nations of the Caribbean seek a quasi-military seagoing service capable of providing limited defense operations, search and rescue services, environmental and economic resource protection, and marine aids to navigation. In the larger countries—Colombia, Cuba, and Venezuela—a separate unit has been established to carry out these coastal functions, while the navy has retained "blue water" roles and missions.

Appendix I is a compilation of the navies and Coast Guards of the Caribbean Basin, excepting a few of the small island states. In reviewing the data, one finds that most navies/Coast Guards are defensive in nature, suited only to near-shore operations in relatively nonhostile climates. While there is a wide variety of "Patrol Craft" employed, most are small, lightly armed, relatively unsophisticated, and incapable of prolonged cruising.

Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic have relatively large navies in terms of personnel and major ships. However, most of their ships are obsolete. In Venezuela and Colombia modernization is ongoing with new frigates being added to the inventory. Meanwhile, to the south, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and Argentina all have larger and better fleets, but none conduct routine operations in Caribbean waters.<sup>14</sup>

Cuba probably has the best indigenous navy in the Caribbean. While having only one major combatant (a Koni-class frigate), her two Foxtrot submarines, 11 OSAs, 14 Komars, 4 Turyas, 18 P4/P6 boats, and 16 Zhuk-class fast attack craft constitute a potent force especially in a coastal defensive role. Cuba has virtually no capability for power projection for lack of amphibious transport.

Maritime patrol aircraft are generally lacking and only Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic have any Navy or Coast Guard air capability. In the latter cases, normal peacetime operation by their air forces suggests an absence of training for these naval missions. Recently, Barbados acquired four aircraft for use with the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System.

Command and Control arrangements appear to be spotty to nonexistent. The US Seventh Coast Guard District in Miami, Florida—which acts as the Maritime SAR Coordinator for the region—does have land-line interconnects with most of the Basin countries via US diplomatic missions, and fairly good HF regional coverage from its radio stations in New Orleans and Miami. However, most of the states themselves have little in-house capability.

***Mission Needs Vs. Available Assets.*** As suggested earlier, the Caribbean states all have a reasonable commonality of maritime mission needs: naval (SLOC protection, coastal defense, chokepoint control, etc.) and Coast Guard (SAR, law enforcement, EEZ policing, environmental protection, etc.). All have very limited resources, and yet all are aware that deferral of investment increasingly prejudices their economic well-being and the preservation of their national sovereignty. The problem they face, then, is setting mission priorities, developing long-term plans, and creating some form of alliance associations that will satisfy their individual needs.

The existing array of national assets does represent their best attempt to balance priorities. All have selected a limited coastal defense-policing capability (i.e., Coast Guard); and the more wealthy have opted for a deep ocean presence, reflecting their concern for SLOC protection and other legitimate defense needs. To the degree a problem exists, its roots are twofold: first, the lack of resources of underdeveloped and small or newly independent states and, secondly, the failure of larger states to modernize their fleets. In neither case are the available assets sufficient to meet the needs and, besides, it is not apparent whether the needs-problems of the smaller or of larger states are of greater consequence to “collective security.” On the one hand, the smaller states are most vulnerable to external subversion and least capable of self-defense. On the other hand, only the larger states have sufficient strength and power to assist the United States in its goal of preserving regional stability. But on balance, reason would favor a greater effort to develop the asset needs of the smaller states for two reasons. First, their needs are more urgent and more modest, with small-scale investment likely to return a large payoff. Second, the Cuban threat is primarily ideological and revolutionary. Should the Cubans seek to project their power through their navy, it is a threat that can be easily contained by the United States and its regional allies. Havana can be more dangerous by



exporting arms and revolutions to small countries, a threat that can be countered by the development of national and sub-regional Coast Guards. In any event, no Caribbean state can go it alone and only sub-regional or regional approaches are likely to be effective.

***A Prospective Sub-Regional Model.*** The US Coast Guard, working with the Departments of State and Defense, has worked closely with many developing countries in training and information exchange activities, particularly in the Caribbean. In October 1981, the first Caribbean Maritime Symposium was hosted in Florida by the Coast Guard. Attended by 41 representatives from 15 countries and two international organizations, the symposium focused on maritime SAR, pollution control and associated equipment. On a bilateral basis, most Caribbean countries have cooperated with the United States in numerous and effective actions to suppress illicit drug smuggling. Also, through a bilateral treaty with Haiti, a joint US-Haitian effort has curtailed widespread illegal immigration from Haiti to southern Florida.

To date there has been only one example of an effective and functioning sub-regional Coast Guard. This is the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS), which itself is an outgrowth of the earlier Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The OECS is a sub-regional body created in June 1981 by treaty—the members are Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Principal aims of the treaty are the promotion of regional cooperation and collective security.

OECS was followed a year later by the RSS. On 29 October 1982, the governments of Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on mutual assistance in disasters, smuggling prevention, search and rescue, immigration control, maritime policing, fisheries, customs, pollution control, and threats to national security.<sup>15</sup> Flowing from that MOU were staffing and financial arrangements worked out over the intervening period. Of recent significance was the finding by OECS that the political situation in a member state (Grenada) warranted collective security action. It obtained concurrence and support from Barbados and Jamaica, and then urged the United States to participate in the support of the regional actions taken in Grenada.

It is too soon to determine whether the RSS will remain effective in the aftermath of Grenada. Nonetheless, in concept and detail, it seems very much an analogue for the sub-regional Coast Guard favored in this approach. There is a sharing of resources and experiences; institutionally, there is a political alliance buttressed by a military collective security arrangement. Success in this limited incursion, however, could ease the way toward future cooperation. Perhaps its major shortcoming is its lack of a capability to project power, a defect which may have led to its decision to seek US assistance.

The United States enthusiastically supports the RSS, and is seeking \$11.5 million in military assistance funds over five years to aid its start-up needs. These funds will provide a secure command and control network, two Sikorsky S-76 helicopters, a 110-foot patrol boat with boat weapons and military training; and three 65-foot patrol boats—one each for Dominica, St. Lucia, and Antigua—already are being purchased in FY '84. The US Coast Guard will provide training assistance teams to each country to facilitate the development of their organizations.

***A Recommended Approach.*** Collective security arrangements are not new to the Caribbean Basin-Western Hemisphere. Before Nato was established, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) of 1947 established the framework for collective self-defense against external attack. The Organization of American States (OAS) was created in 1948 to carry out its purposes. Although attempts to form a permanent hemispheric armed force have failed, an Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) in Washington does coordinate national and regional defense planning.<sup>16</sup> Sub-regional defense groupings have also been formed, such as the 1965 El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras-Nicaragua military bloc, but their success has been marginal.<sup>17</sup>

Figure 1 suggests a hypothetical and much more modest variant of this approach to form sub-regional Coast Guards. Working within the OAS framework and existing sub-regional institutions, four major sectors could be formed. Each would have one large state with a capable navy, grouped with smaller states having limited naval and Coast Guard forces. The larger state would provide an offshore presence (naval role), while the smaller states could provide coastal defense, economic resource protection and civil maritime needs (Coast Guard role). Joint training and operations would seek to enhance interoperability and to build confidence. In peacetime, all states could share some responsibility for EEZ policing; in this sense they would function in a supranational capacity so as to conserve limited enforcement resources. To enhance this role, the sector borders would be drawn to conform to the outer limits of EEZs as they are formalized. Naturally, this aspect would require delicate negotiation, since sovereignty in the EEZ is jealously guarded and policing has been done very rarely on a multilateral basis.

The Eastern Caribbean RSS should be examined carefully as a model. Its experience will provide valuable lessons as to technical, operational, institutional, funding and leadership issues. Sector I is nearly a functioning entity; additions of the French Departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique plus Trinidad/Tobago and Saint Martin are needed, as well as Venezuela. Here political issues are prominent—whether and how France would participate, and the precise role of Venezuela. Venezuela has a capable navy interested in protecting its SLOCs, particularly the Panama Canal and the



Figure 1. Possible Division of Responsibilities for Sub-Regional "Caribbean Coast Guard." Lead State in each Sector shown in braces.

Eastern Caribbean approaches. Its subsidized oil sales to regional neighbors has won friendship and strong political support. Colombia could provide a similar function westward. Mexico has perhaps the most difficult task. Although it wishes to be a regional power and has also provided concessional oil sales, it is hampered by its ambiguous relations with Cuba, the political turmoil of Central America, and the relatively poor quality of its fleet.

The US Coast Guard is suggested as the major player in sector IV, since its peacetime and prospective wartime missions (ASW, Maritime Defense Zone, etc.) concentrate its resources in the northern Caribbean chokepoints. Further, all US bases (less NavFac Antigua and Panama bases) are in Puerto Rico, Florida and Cuba. It has good working-level relations with Haiti, Bahamas, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. The sector itself is of greatest interest to the United States because of the contiguous SLOCs and the Cuban threat.

**T**here seems to be a number of advantages to the collective approach: It is consistent with US policy favoring collective security and the development of indigenous military forces.

It may relieve strain on forward deployed US Navy forces, permitting some relaxation of Caribbean presence for the Atlantic Fleet.

It permits enhancement of US Coast Guard wartime readiness through an emphasis on interoperability with US and Caribbean navies, and through greater US Navy and US Coast Guard regional coordination.

It enhances the roles of regional political and naval powers—Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia—in the interest of promoting regional stability, thus ensuring reasonable burden-sharing in an alliance-type framework.

It permits European/Nato partners (including Canada) to participate in hemispheric defense through coordinated military assistance to their former and existing colonies or existing departments, under the umbrella of a sub-regional organization.

It serves to strengthen sub-regional groups within the mainstream of Inter-American OAS political activity.

It maximizes the return on US military assistance funds (MAP and IMET), providing as well some equipment standardization and economies of scale in procurement.

It provides a modest foundation for later stages of enhanced collective security arrangements.

It may reduce the potential for US-Soviet confrontation by devolving regional responsibility to sub-regional organizations.

It may help the US Coast Guard's peacetime missions through the coordinated assistance provided by the new organizations.

**I**n structuring the program, the Eastern Caribbean RSS will furnish useful guides. Nonetheless, the ideas below merit consideration.

- “High tech,” expensive platforms should be resisted. Most smaller Basin countries lack the personnel and financial resources to own or operate such equipment and, in any case, their needs are much simpler.

- Concessional sales or outright grants, vice commercial sales, will be needed due to the developing countries’ limited finances. While US producers should be encouraged to bid, purchase of US-made equipment should not be a qualifying requirement for aid. In particular, Nato partners should be considered—Italy, France, Germany and Britain produce numerous, reliable fast patrol boats.

- Political consensus of some type must precede formation of regional Coast Guards. The OAS and IADB could serve as a useful forum for regional agreement. Prior bilateral US discussions with Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia should help to resolve contentious issues before the implementation of each regional sector. In any case, sub-regional groups will need to develop their own evolutionary approaches.

- Caribbean states themselves are the best judges of their needs. However, some attempts to establish region-wide priorities and standards in procurement must be made at the outset. Fast patrol boats with simple missile and gun systems are relatively inexpensive, can serve dual roles as ASUW platforms and Coast Guard-type enforcement resources, and would be effective deterrents even against larger, more sophisticated ships. Helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft would be programmed for surveillance and over the horizon (OTH) targeting and SAR needs. Command and control facilities need particular care, to ensure they are compatible with regional or sub-regional decision-making processes and yet serve national needs simultaneously.

**Conclusion.** In terms of its geopolitical situation, the Caribbean Basin may be characterized as a diverse region with a few well established states and numerous mini-states having only recently achieved independence. In the past, their colonial status and their political and social differences reinforced their isolation from each other. Meanwhile, the United States provided an effective, if occasionally heavy-handed, defense. Today their vulnerability is more pronounced and while the United States is disinclined to intervention, notwithstanding the Grenadian incursion, their strategic location remains vital. No single Caribbean state is capable of defending the Basin, nor should any state consider it a unilateral responsibility. Rather, regional groups offer strong possibilities for coordinated security and mutual economic benefits. The “Caribbean Coast Guard” is one such path.

**APPENDIX I: CARIBBEAN NAVIES/COAST GUARDS**  
 (Adapted from *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1981-82*)

Country	Personnel	Vessels	Aircraft	Bases
Anguilla (police)		2-26 ft. rescue craft		Located at airport
Bahamas (unit of Royal Bahamas Defense Force)		1-103 ft. patrol craft (PC) 7-60 ft. PC		Nassau
Barbados (Coast Guard)	4 officers 57 enlisted	1-123 ft. PC 1-65 ft. PC 3-40 ft. PC 2-75 ft. PC		Bridgetown
Belize	50	2-40 ft. PC		Belize
Colombia (Navy)	700 officers 6500 enlisted 1500 marines	4 subs 3 destroyers 1 frigate 3 patrol ships 4 gunboats 26 support/misc.	50 helos (Air Force)	Cartagena, Buenaventura
(Coast Guard)		9 patrol craft		
Costa Rica	90 officers/ enlisted	1-105ft. PC 5-65 ft. PC 3-40 ft. PC		Liuon, Puntarenas
Cuba (Navy)	380 officers 5700 enlisted	2 subs (Foxtrot) 1 frigate (koni) 21 attack (missile) 22 attack (torpedo) 16 attack (patrol) 26 PC 36 MCM, misc.	55 helos (Air Force)	Mariel, Havana Cienfuegos Punta Ballentotes Canasi
(Frontier Guard)		14 PC		
Dominican Republic	650 officers/ enlisted	1 frigate 5 corvettes 11 PC 23 misc.	14 misc. (Air Force)	Santo Domingo, Las Calderas
El Salvador	130 officers/ enlisted	7 - PC		Acajutla, La Libertad, La Union
Grenada		1-40 ft. PC		
Guatemala	100 officers/ 500 men	3-105 ft. PC 2-65 ft. PC 10 PC 7 misc.		Santo Tomas, Sipacate
Guyana	150	1-103 ft. PC 3-40 ft. PC 6 misc.		Georgetown
Haiti (Coast Gnard)	40 officers 260 enlisted	1-105 ft. PC 2-95 ft. PC 5 - misc. PC		Port Au Prince
Honduras	50	2-105 ft. PC 4-65 ft. PC 1-50 ft. lanch		Puerto Cortes

Country	Personnel	Vessels	Aircraft	Bases
Jamaica (Coast Guard)	18 officers 115 enlisted	1-105 ft. PC 3-85 ft. PC		Port Royal
Mexico	16,430 officers/ enlisted 3,800 marines	2 destroyers 6 frigates 70 PC 36 misc.	10 helos 50 fixed wing	6 Gulf, 8 Pacific
Nicaragua	200 officers/ enlisted	13 PC 3 misc.		Carinto Puerto Cabezas
Panama (Coast Guard)	300	1-103 ft. PC 2-65 ft. PC 3-40 ft. PC 6 Amphib. 3 misc.		
St.. Kitts (Police)		1-30 ft. PC		Basseterre
St. Lucia (Customs)		1-140 ft. PC		
St. Vincent (Police)		1-75 ft. PC		Kingstown
Trinidad/Tobago (Coast Guard)	38 officers 400 enlisted	2-133 ft. PC 4-103 ft. PC 3-50 ft. PC 3 - Police craft		Stanbles Bay
Venezuela (Navy)	3500 officers/ enlisted 4000 marines	5 subs 2 destroyers 8 frigates 6 attack (missile) 21 PC 30 misc.	6 helos 20 fixed wing	Caracas, Puerto Cabello La Guaira
(National Guard)		43 PC		
British Virgin Islands (Police)		1-40 ft. PC		

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 Notes

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17. *Ibid.*, p. 99.



All was ruled by the harsh and despotic factor, shipping.

Winston Churchill