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Trident

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Trends"; Rana Pennington provides an interesting chapter on "Pilot Initiative in the Soviet Air Forces"; Dr. Norman Friedman provides a perceptive chapter "The Soviet Bomber Force," which is mostly pre-1945 history and there is overlap with John Baker's "The Long-Range Bomber in Soviet Military Planning"; John Bessette follows with his comprehensive "Soviet Military Transport Aviation"; Ralph Ostrich writes on "Aeroflot" and Lynn Hansen covers "Soviet Helicopters."

This is followed by an interesting chapter on "Reorganization Trends" by Philip Petersen. But this chapter not only seems out of order (as do many chapters in the book), but points up the lack of an early chapter on Soviet military-aviation organization. Nowhere is the reader provided a description of how the Soviet air forces are organized, or a description of the air defense interceptor organization (part of the National Troops of Air Defense) or how naval aviation relates to Soviet air forces. Next, Paul Murphy provides a chapter on "Political Missions" which is interesting and contains much useful data on the activities of Soviet military aviation in peacetime. The last chapter, which is also very useful, is James Hanson's "MiG-Sukhoi Diplomacy: The Patterns of Soviet Exports of Combat Aircraft."

One is left with the feeling that some authors may have tried too hard to make their case for Soviet military aviation, and in doing so have reduced the book's value. Statements as "... the fact that the USSR

employs aircraft sales as its principal military means for expanding influence in the Third World," and that the MiG-21 aircraft is not far behind the AK-47 as a worldwide symbol of Soviet global power, would be argued in many quarters. The book also suffers in not providing the reader with basic data on Soviet aviation strength and basic air unit organization. And, although the book was published in 1984 and "signed to press" in the summer of 1983, there are several significant 1981 and 1982 developments that are not mentioned.

The Soviet Air Forces is a very useful book, but falls short of its goal and short of what one should expect for the price.

NORMAN POLMAR
Alexandria, Virginia

Dalgleish, D. Douglas and Larry Schweikart. *Trident*. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984. 502pp. \$32.50

Authors Dalgleish, a professor of political science, and Schweikart, the recipient of a Ph.D. in history, have produced a tome that goes well beyond a description of the Trident submarine, although the bulk of the text concerns the *Ohio*-class SSBN. Not only does it cover the entire Trident project including the missile and submarine-basing facilities, but it also explores in considerable detail such peripheral issues as the problems of procuring major weapons systems under a democratic system of government, the political and strategic aspects of the

US nuclear deterrent Triad, possible alternatives to the Trident as a weapons system, and the potential interrelationships between Trident and global politico-military developments. If this appears to be a big order, *Trident* is a big book.

Naval readers will soon sense that the authors are on the side of Trident, for they do not hesitate to interpose their comments and conclusions within the descriptive narration of facts and figures. These range from awe at the size and complexity of the SSBN to the assertion that the *Ohio* has "far surpassed its original goals" in terms of attaining its design objectives. Further, Dalgleish and Schweikart reject most of the arguments against Trident as proxies for the real reasons for opposing it, namely competition for the same share of the budget or misguided trust in the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union.

This is not to say that the authors fail to recognize valid criticisms of the Trident program; indeed, they fault both the Navy and the shipbuilder, Electric Boat, for errors in the contract negotiation, design, and construction phases of the program. However, they dismiss the overattention to so-called cost overruns as "meaningless in historical perspective" and "a semantic distraction to . . . objective analysis." Similarly, they view much of the well-publicized delay in completing the *Ohio* as due either to widely unrealistic expectations, difficulties to be expected in a radical new design, or

factors such as strikes and labor problems that could not have been anticipated.

Although the book's detailed coverage is a strength, it is also one of its major faults. There is hardly a single fact or observation in the public record that is not referred to at least once in the book. Unfortunately, the authors sometimes are not able to distinguish the wheat from the chaff, especially in details of naval organization or shipbuilding procedures. Their description of the submarine and its construction facilities tends to accept as revolutionary or unique, features that a submarine designer would consider standard practice or evolutionary improvements. The authors were obviously greatly impressed by a good public relations job on the part of Electric Boat and an interview with P. Takis Veliotis while he was still in charge of the shipyard. In contrast, they were denied access to material from the Naval Sea Systems Command, and their direct contact with the Navy seems to have been mainly with public information types in Washington and a few submarine-operating personnel. Thus the book is noticeably one-sided in its treatment of the controversies between the Navy and Electric Boat as well as lacking input from an essential source.

The authors' lack of personal experience in naval shipbuilding and submarine construction has weakened their presentation in a number of places. For instance, a sketch that is intended to illustrate the difference

between a real welded seam and "popularly imagined" welds shows an impossible configuration. In another place they misinterpret Admiral Hyman G. Rickover's complaint about "absentee management" as applying to Veliotis and officials at the Electric Boat yard; rather, it relates to the takeover of Electric Boat by General Dynamics and the similar absorption of other shipyards by conglomerates in which shipbuilding is only one of many interests.

The authors seem to have missed the real significance of Electric Boat's claims for reimbursement under the builder's risk insurance provisions of the contract. The issue was not the payment of premiums to Lloyds of London, but the fact that Since World War II the Navy itself has assumed the liability for losses beyond the shipbuilder's control. That the Navy should pay a contractor for his own defective work is, on the face of it, absurd; however, it appears that a literal reading of the insurance provision could be interpreted that way. The Navy's violent reaction including the cancellation of Electric Boat's option for the eighth Trident and the award of three attack submarines to Newport News, as well as the hollow public threats by administration officials

to seek other US or foreign sources for Trident submarines, can only be explained by a real fear that the claims would be upheld.

Dagleish and Schweikart correctly cite the political maneuverings leading to the initial "fixed-price" contract and Electric Boat's propagandistic "guarantee" of an impossible delivery date for the first Trident as guaranteeing only future claims, charges, and countercharges. They also detect the influence of Admiral Rickover and certain members of Congress in causing this fiasco. On the other hand, they tend to give Mr. Veliotis undue credit for the ultimate success of the project. Only the first intimations of the kickback scandal that has led to Veliotis' indictment by a Federal court and his flight to Greece were known to the authors when the book went to press, but the case has now reopened the entire issue of possibly fraudulent claims against the Navy. Only when that issue has been resolved, and all of the Navy's records are declassified and released, will it be possible for someone to write the definitive history of the Trident project. Dagleish and Schweikart's *Trident* is not such a book.

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