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### Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel

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through cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. The treatment is lucid and objective in discussing the strengths and weaknesses of these techniques which have been widely applied in public sector policy analysis.

Part IV treats a variety of micro-economic tools and issues of concern to national security. There are chapters applying microeconomic theory to the defense labor market, the defense capital market, mobilization planning, and technological change. The labor chapter does a nice job of explaining the economics of raising armed forces through the use of volunteers and how this will become more difficult in the 1980s and 1990s because of a decreasing labor pool. The problems in the weapons acquisition process are addressed in the chapter on defense capital. One topic on which there is an economics literature that is not included is incentive contracting. Mobilization examines the tradeoffs between maintaining larger forces-in-being versus a surge capability. A brief but insightful discussion of the alternatives for dealing with military manpower shortfalls upon mobilization is included. The discussion of technological change highlights the contributions that research and development (R&D) have made both to the productivity and growth of the civilian economy and to military effectiveness. The relative decline in R&D spending in the 1970s has had adverse impacts in both the civil and military sectors.

The last two sections of the book

deal with international and comparative aspects of national security. These are topics which often fail to get sufficient attention in spite of the increasing interdependence of nations. Cases on energy vulnerability and the Nato alliance demonstrate the costs and benefits of the international dimension. The economic and national security relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union are illustrated with analyses of East-West trade and comparative military expenditures. The latter chapter applies oligopoly theory to the phenomenon of the arms race, showing both the value and the limitations that these action-reaction models have in explaining nations' military spending.

*The Economics of National Security* has some problems in trying to cover such a broad range of national security issues and the relevant economic theory in 400 pages. However, overall it is successful in bringing to bear the power of economic analysis to increase the understanding of national security policy.

JOHN A. WALGREEN  
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Green, Stephen. *Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel*. New York: Morrow, 1984. 370pp. \$14.95

This is a terribly upsetting book. In these pages a sober but convincing case is made that until 1964 and the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, the United States had a Middle East

policy of which Israel was a part; but since then the United States has had a policy which deals solely with Israel and permits itself only ad hoc arrangements toward the rest of the Mideast.

This policy has sought military solutions to social and political problems, has been frightfully expensive and has been eminently unsuccessful. It has not only failed to improve Israel's security over some thirty years, it has alienated the rest of the Mideast, occasionally put the United States at odds with its Nato allies, and has mortgaged the national interest to the whims of a client state.

Using previously classified documents, the author makes it clear that until 1965 the United States pursued a policy of balance in the Mideast. Often as not, this was achieved in spite of Israel's territorial ambitions. But everything changed with Lyndon Johnson. Laxities in the Atomic Energy Commission permitted some 200 kilograms of enriched uranium to become "lost"; and within 18 months Israel's leadership was talking about "not being the first" to use nuclear weapons in the Mideast. Concurrently, overt military aid increased—doubled and tripled—and a previously careful emphasis on defensive systems gave way to every variety of offensive weapons. In the three years of 1965–67 US military shipments to Israel exceeded the total shipped in the 16 years of 1948–64.

The Six Day War of 1967 was the manifest turning point in US-Israeli relations, and since then the United States has chosen to be a captive to

Israel's "whatevers." Unfortunately, the intellectual process by which this occurred within the Johnson administration is not described, but some of the results are made disturbingly clear.

It may be recalled that in the 1967 war the Egyptians claimed that Sixth Fleet aircraft participated in the devastating Israeli air strikes which initiated the conflict. The "knowledgeable" world dismissed this as Arab paranoia. But as is so often the case, there tends to be a modicum of truth in such charges. The Egyptians did see F4 Phantoms following up the Israeli strikes, and the F4 was an airplane not yet in Israel's inventory. In the confusion it was assumed that these F4s must have been carrier-based. These pages have the startling information that they were not Navy F4s but US Air Force RF4s clandestinely based in Israel to provide a sophisticated photo-recon capability not yet possessed by the Israelis. The instant availability of this photo-recon product permitted the Israelis to achieve maximum effects in re-targeting second strikes. The RF4s, painted in Israeli colors for the occasion, were flown and served by US Air Force crews who were said to be civilian mercenaries.

This book also produces conclusive documentary evidence which makes it clear what many persons have believed for 17 years: that the Israeli attack on the USS *Liberty* was not a mistake. But what is more, it is also made clear that US authorities had advance notice of Israel's intentions. On 17 June 1967, nine days after the

attack, Secretary of State Dean Rusk felt that he could tell a group of Nato representatives in Luxemburg that the Israelis knew that the *Liberty* was a US Navy ship and that the attack was deliberate (the document is reproduced by Green), but in 1984 American citizens are still supposed to accept the tale of "mistake." Unfortunately, the author does not attempt to make clear why authorities have been at pains for so long to cover up the slaughter of 34 Americans and the virtual destruction of a very expensive ship.

Green's 256 pages of text are served by 16 pages of documentation and 83 pages of appendixes which reproduce in full 17 key documents. From the naive extreme of Woodrow Wilson's "open covenants openly arrived at," it would seem that since 1965 US policy in the Mideast has been based on "secret covenants clandestinely executed," with dissembling forever after.

American memories are short and it already tends to be forgotten that the Marines would not have been in Lebanon if it had not been for an Israeli excursion in the summer of 1982. After the Marines' experience of two years in that unhappy land, it would be well to ponder these pages and ask how much we don't know about the processes which led to this misadventure of 1982-84.

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Taylor, William J., Jr., and Maaranen, Steven A. *The Future of Conflict in*

*the 1980s*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983. 504 pp. \$39.95

It is obvious to even the most casual observer of the news that the world is becoming a more dangerous place on almost a daily basis. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, massive sales of conventional arms to the developing world, increasing scarcities of vital resources, new arenas of conflict (such as the oceans, space, and the polar regions) emerging due to advancing technologies, and a myriad of other factors have all contributed to a world that seems at times unlikely to hold together for another day. This book offers little in the way of hope, but it does successfully survey the terrain of hostility in a series of short, specific essays and articles by a wide range of authors.

After a pair of well written introductory essays by James Schlesinger and Robert Komer, the remaining three sections of the volume focus on causes and conditions of future low intensity conflict, the military operations for low intensity conflict, and the future of regional conflict. The editors have done well in consistently focusing on *new* sources of conflict, proceeding broadly on the assumption that a nuclear exchange between the superpowers is relatively unlikely. The threat is much more likely to come from conflict in the periphery rather than war between the major actors in the global arena. Their catch phrase for such confrontations are "Low Intensity Conflict