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Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President Elect, 1890-1952

Mark A. Stoler

Stephen E. Ambrose

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underlying motivation. He further indicated his belief that the opportunity for the parties to renegotiate the Antarctic Treaty in 1991 would constitute the greatest challenge we must face in the final decade of this century.

The discussion of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis underrates the threat posed to British forces by Argentine submarines. Had the *Queen Elizabeth II* or one of the carriers been sunk prior to the landing—or even severely damaged, instead of the *General Belgrano*—the outcome of the conflict could have been quite different. The Thatcher government might have folded instead of Galtieri's.

The charts of today's worldwide territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves clearly show that the "high seas" are rapidly disappearing. The strategic consequences of this for maritime states remain to be seen, but they are both foreseeable and pernicious.

There is a good thumbnail sketch of naval operations since World War II. It does not claim to be all inclusive and one would be better served by using the appendix to Sir James Cable's recent update of *Gunboat Diplomacy*. Nevertheless, the *Atlas* would be a useful place to start research on a specific event because of the chronological format used in the supplementary appendix that briefs each incident listed in the text.

The treatment of the Indian Ocean in the Naval Operations section asserts that the Soviets are only supported at Aden. This ignores the use of the roadstead at Socotra Island and the Soviet-built facilities at Dehalak, Ethiopia in the Red Sea which service the Soviet naval forces operating in the theater.

The *Atlas*, despite the minor inaccuracies noted, is a well-written work which constitutes a valuable resource. It should be a part of every wardroom library and required reading for career-minded junior officers. It will provide them with knowledge in breadth, if not in depth, in the shortest possible time. For this temporarily land-locked sailor, it provided a much needed "simulated" visit to the sea.

Ambrose, Stephen E. *Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983. 637pp. \$22.95

Originally dismissed by many scholars as an individual with limited abilities who simply happened to be in the right place at the right time, Dwight D. Eisenhower is now being recognized for his extraordinary

talents and achievements in both the military and the political realms. To an extent, this "Eisenhower revisionism" can be traced to revelations in recently opened documents, most notably the Eisenhower "diaries." As with most revisionism, however, the key factor in the Eisenhower reassessment has been the impact of recent events on our perceptions of

the past; after Vietnam and a decade of disastrous activists in the White House, an individual capable of leading a coalition army to total victory, and then a nation through eight years of peace and prosperity, seems rather extraordinary.

Stephen Ambrose certainly thinks so. For many years he has been a leading Eisenhower revisionist as well as one of our foremost military and diplomatic historians. A former editor of the Eisenhower papers, his voluminous writings include three books on specific aspects of Eisenhower's career as well as numerous other studies. All of these works have been characterized by solid research, provocative conclusions, and a clarity of style which have made him that great rarity—a serious scholar with a general audience. In *Eisenhower*, he has combined these talents once again and revised some of his earlier conclusions to produce an outstanding first volume in a projected two-volume biography.

The first volume covers the years from Eisenhower's birth in 1890 to his election to the presidency in 1952. Major emphasis is placed on the World War II years, and the work will thus be of considerable interest to those concerned with Eisenhower's military career. Those interested in his political rise will not be disappointed, however, for Ambrose devotes considerable attention to the years 1945-1952. Throughout the volume he exhibits a mastery of the documents and previous literature, and he adeptly combines personal with official papers to give a very

clear sense of Eisenhower's character, feelings and beliefs as well as activities.

The Eisenhower to emerge from Ambrose's portrait is an individual whose key characteristics reflected both family and Army values. Most notable in this regard were an emphasis on action over thought, and team over individual effort. The former trait led Eisenhower to concentrate his talents on "making things work better, not differently," while the latter became the trademark that played a major role in so many of his military and political successes. Equally important in those successes were his innate talents, most notably an extremely photogenic appearance and outgoing personality, a genius at press and public relations, and enormous energy and powers of concentration. His two key mentors, Generals MacArthur and Marshall, both recognized these talents and helped to develop them.

While Ambrose makes clear in the introduction his intention to explain and describe rather than judge Eisenhower's actions, judgment is inevitable in such a study and appears quite frequently. Overall he praises Eisenhower as a military commander, yet simultaneously criticizes some of his decisions—most notably those taken in North Africa. While blame must be shared with civilian superiors and advisers who often provided insufficient guidance and incorrect advice, Eisenhower himself was consistently too cautious in the military realm, too lenient with incompetent subordinates, and too

immersed in political intricacies. Most of his ensuing decisions were correct, according to Ambrose, but these problems in the realm of method continued to haunt Eisenhower in Europe, often with unfortunate results.

Ambrose's judgments are less critical after 1945. Perhaps this is because Eisenhower's activities in those years have already been severely criticized by others; or perhaps Ambrose's efforts to see the world as Eisenhower saw it have led the biographer to adopt the general's exacting standards in the military but not the political realm. Whatever the cause, Ambrose paints a sympathetic portrait after 1945 of an individual who did not wish to become involved in politics and who did so largely because he feared Senator Taft's foreign policies as much as he disliked President Truman's domestic policies. In so explaining the situation, Ambrose defends many of Eisenhower's moral compromises as necessary to co-opt and defeat the right wing of his own party along with the Democrats. He thereby sets up a basic revisionist theme to be completed in the second volume.

The iconoclasm involved in this reversal of traditional Eisenhower criticism is matched by Ambrose's consistent refutation of Eisenhower myths, most notably those involving Berlin in 1945 and his relations with MacArthur, Mamie and Kay Summersby. In regard to the latter two individuals, Ambrose makes extensive use of the Ike-Mamie correspon-

dence as well as appropriate memoirs to explain Eisenhower's personal relationships both objectively and sympathetically, and to refute some of the more outrageous conclusions recently published by journalists and oral historians.

In all respects, *Eisenhower* is thus a provocative and outstanding study which is worthy of its subject and author. If Ambrose is able to maintain this quality in his second volume, the two will clearly constitute the definitive study of Eisenhower for many years.

MARK A. STOLER
University of Vermont

Olvey, Lee D., Golden, James R. and Kelly, Robert C. *The Economics of National Security*. Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, 1984. 404pp. \$35

Anyone looking for a systematic treatment of the principal issues relating economics to national security policy need look no further. Although there have been other applications of economic analysis to defense policymaking, such as the 1960s classic, Hitch and McKean's *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*, none of the recent works has attempted a formal textbook survey of national security topics which can be illuminated by the use of the tools of economic analysis. The authors, who are or have been members of the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, have achieved their goal of providing the economic literacy essential to contemporary national