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## The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War With Germany

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cant role in winning that victory. Horner's careful research rises above the drums and trumpets style that frequently limits the scope and value of military history, and his effort to view Australia's role in the broader context of a lesser allied power within a great power coalition is both interesting and successful.

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Erickson, John. *The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War With Germany*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 877pp. \$42.50

In *The Road to Berlin* John Erickson completes his study of Soviet military operations during the Second World War. This monumental work traces Russian campaigns from the counterattack at Stalingrad to the fall of Berlin and the capture of Prague. In addition to detailed operational narratives Erickson also provides a bibliography of such volume and detail that it virtually constitutes a second book.

There is much to learn from Erickson's book. Every major Soviet operation is described in great detail, and it is apparent that Soviet command talent went well beyond the names of the famous generals like Zhukov, Rokossovskii and Konier, who are well-known to Western readers. Generals like Vatutin, Bagramyan and Tolbukhin were able, even brilliant, commanders, who had mastered the art of leading combined arms formations with drive and dash.

Erickson also explores in much detail Stalin's wartime relations with FDR and Churchill and examines the evolution of his policies toward Poland and the Balkans. He also notes that there was a plot to kill or capture the Big Three at Teheran, that the Russians were in fact unprepared to help the 1944 Warsaw rising and that the Soviets were in fact in favor of having allied forces in Italy advance into Austria and northern Yugoslavia in 1945.

Problems with the book include a number of pointless illustrations, too few maps which too often fail to include cities, towns, and rivers mentioned in the text and some minor errors with the German order of battle. The Hermann Göring armored division, for example, was not an SS formation.

Such problems are, however, trivial when compared to Erickson's overall achievement. What Weigley in *Fisenhower's Lieutenants* has done for the US Army in Europe, Erickson has now done for Soviet operations on the Eastern Front. In the future no history of the Russo-German war can be written without reference to Erickson's detailed research and brilliant narrative.

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Morris, Eric. *Salerno: A Military Fiasco*. New York: Stein and Day, 1983. 358pp. \$19.95

For most Navy and Marine Corps readers, the term amphibious warfare evokes a mental picture of such World War II landings as Tarawa and Iwo Jima. This view is under-