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## High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945

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outcome was in any case predetermined by other factors? I am afraid that I do not find this kind of theorizing either rewarding or useful. It seems to me to be both sterile and misleading. It may be, as the authors assert an enjoyable "game," but it is not history.

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Horner, D.M. *High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945*. Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1982. 556pp. \$40

For an American, even one familiar with the history of the Second World War, D.M. Horner's book comes as a revelation. Americans know that Australians fought in the Western Desert, Syria, Greece, Malaya, and the South Pacific, but the problems facing the Australian government and High Command generally elude them.

Australia, Horner points out, had to operate as a small power engaged in coalition warfare with Great Power partners, Great Britain and the United States. In World War I Australia simply sent troops to the Middle East and the Western Front where they operated under British direction. Australia also occupied German holdings in the South Pacific. By contrast in World War II Australia had not only to participate in Imperial defense but also provide for home defense against the Japanese.

This situation created serious problems for the Australian govern-

ment since the British and Americans often regarded Australian concerns as secondary to their own. The Australians therefore had to use a number of techniques to assert their views, including face-to-face meetings with the Great Power leaders, the refusal to commit troops according to allied wishes and the establishment of a good fighting reputation which in turn enhanced the impact of Australian proposals.

The war was not without friction with the allies. The British, for example, often ignored Australian advice and sensibilities. British commanders in the Middle East tried to use Australian divisions as *ad hoc* formations parceling out brigades and even battalions instead of placing them under direct Australian divisional and corps headquarters. In the Pacific MacArthur became Prime Minister Curtin's chief military advisor and like the British avoided the creation of higher echelon Australian commands.

Horner also explodes some of the war myths, so necessary at the time to sustain the nation's morale. General Blamey appears to be at best an average commander whose personal ambition led him to advocate strategic proposals designed as much to enhance his own role in the war as to win it. Prime Minister Curtin lacked the military expertise to deal effectively with MacArthur and was overly diffident in defending Australian interests.

The war, nevertheless, ended in victory and Horner concludes that on the whole Australia played a signifi-

cant role in winning that victory. Horner's careful research rises above the drums and trumpets style that frequently limits the scope and value of military history, and his effort to view Australia's role in the broader context of a lesser allied power within a great power coalition is both interesting and successful.

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Erickson, John. *The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War With Germany*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 877pp. \$42.50

In *The Road to Berlin* John Erickson completes his study of Soviet military operations during the Second World War. This monumental work traces Russian campaigns from the counterattack at Stalingrad to the fall of Berlin and the capture of Prague. In addition to detailed operational narratives Erickson also provides a bibliography of such volume and detail that it virtually constitutes a second book.

There is much to learn from Erickson's book. Every major Soviet operation is described in great detail, and it is apparent that Soviet command talent went well beyond the names of the famous generals like Zhukov, Rokossovskii and Konier, who are well-known to Western readers. Generals like Vatutin, Bagramyan and Tolbukhin were able, even brilliant, commanders, who had mastered the art of leading combined arms formations with drive and dash.

Erickson also explores in much detail Stalin's wartime relations with FDR and Churchill and examines the evolution of his policies toward Poland and the Balkans. He also notes that there was a plot to kill or capture the Big Three at Teheran, that the Russians were in fact unprepared to help the 1944 Warsaw rising and that the Soviets were in fact in favor of having allied forces in Italy advance into Austria and northern Yugoslavia in 1945.

Problems with the book include a number of pointless illustrations, too few maps which too often fail to include cities, towns, and rivers mentioned in the text and some minor errors with the German order of battle. The Hermann Göring armored division, for example, was not an SS formation.

Such problems are, however, trivial when compared to Erickson's overall achievement. What Weigley in *Fisenhower's Lieutenants* has done for the US Army in Europe, Erickson has now done for Soviet operations on the Eastern Front. In the future no history of the Russo-German war can be written without reference to Erickson's detailed research and brilliant narrative.

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Morris, Eric. *Salerno: A Military Fiasco*. New York: Stein and Day, 1983. 358pp. \$19.95

For most Navy and Marine Corps readers, the term amphibious warfare evokes a mental picture of such World War II landings as Tarawa and Iwo Jima. This view is under-