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The Military Balance 1985-1986

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date back to 1947 with figures on real growth in DOD spending from 1964. Annex C is a very useful glossary of terms with short paragraph explanations of military expressions. Annex D is "Abbreviations and Acronyms" and Annex E is a glossary of names for weapons systems.

It's very hard to find fault with this book as long as you realize its composition. The narrative chapters are not in-depth analyses but very short, only about five-page introductions on each subject. While they appear to be adequate and well footnoted, because they are so short, it might have been useful to have a selected bibliography or better yet, a "for further reading list" for each chapter. Most of the tables and charts have no source listed although there is a general note that many were supplied by the Department of Defense. Again, for someone wanting to do more research, this could be a problem. In his chapters on policy, he has some comparative charts on roles and missions which, because of the short explanations and lack of sources, could be confusing or at least challenged. Finally, about the only statement that one might seriously challenge is his description of the Soviet military planning to fight a nuclear war from the outset of any hostilities. Pioneered by James M. McConnell of the Center for Naval Analyses and others, most analysts now believe the Soviets are preparing for a conventional, even protracted war. Interestingly, in another section he includes quotes by Secretary of Defense Weinberger commenting on

the Soviet military planning for a protracted, conventional war. But these are all truly minor nitpicks.

The most outstanding feature of Collins' book is its comprehensiveness. There is simply no other single volume, classified or not, that has all this information. Between this and his earlier book covering the period 1960-80, "everything" is covered. It's also nice to see important, although usually neglected areas such as defense technology, industrial base, merchant marine, and chemical and biological weapons included. And, despite the title, all the tables are actually from 1975 to 1985 so there is a nice 10-year comparison. Also, despite the title, there are comparisons of other countries, especially the other NATO and Warsaw Pact states. The tables are interesting, comprehensive, and you can easily find yourself poring over them for hours.

JAMES L. GEORGE
Center for Naval Analyses

The Military Balance 1985-1986.

London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985. 200pp. \$21

Just as all newlyweds deserve an unabridged dictionary for resolving arguments, so every professional library concerned with military affairs must have *The Military Balance*. Specialists interested in the Soviet or U.S. Armed Forces will bolster their use of this volume with much bulkier and more detailed sources of data,

but even they will read the introductory essays on the major powers, NATO, the Warsaw Pact and regional developments with great interest. And as for an educated estimate on military manpower, spending, and weaponry in every country from Albania to Zimbabwe, no other single source will prove as useful.

The editors of this publication deserve special congratulations for their care in proofreading, since the figures contained herein will be used (often without attribution) by quite a number of academic specialists and journalists over the coming year. They are also as helpful and imaginative as they have been in previous editions with their presentations of tabular data (e.g., worldwide nuclear delivery vehicles; global defense expenditures; identified arms agreements of the past year; comparisons between East and West in both strategic and conventional terms; Soviet Army organization and equipment; and the global potential for civil airliners to augment airlift capabilities). The volume is rounded out by thoughtful essays on estimating the Soviet-U.S. strategic balance, the conventional balance in Europe, and defense economic trends.

Some of the data presented are more or less incommensurable between countries. If one wonders, for example, about the feminization of the forces, *The Military Balance* gives the number of females on a service-by-service basis only for the United States, Britain, and France. For some other NATO countries there is a figure on the total number of women

in the armed forces, but in virtually all other cases there is no information whatever on this point.

One of the most helpful elements of this work concerns the presence, numerical strength, and weaponry, of "opposition" forces in certain countries. This approach entirely omits mere terrorist organizations, as in Northern Ireland or Italy, but provides information of great utility on Lebanon, Afghanistan, Burma, Kampuchea, and other nations where a significant level of insurgency does exist.

In the case of forces deployed abroad, the editors have performed a real service by presenting information not easily obtainable elsewhere. However, it is unfortunate that such forces are listed only under the countries whence they originate and not the countries where they are presently assigned. This is tolerable in the case of Mongolia or Afghanistan, for example, where the Soviet presence is painfully well known. But how many readers contemplating the military situation in Equatorial Guinea will think to look under Morocco, whose troops assigned to Equatorial Guinea are over 10 percent as large as those of the local government? The editors would do well to correct this potential source of confusion by appropriate cross-referencing.

In most of its broad conclusions, *The Military Balance* is optimistic. It judges that deterrence is firm between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, since neither side has enough overall strength to guarantee victory. It similarly appraises the Korean Peninsula,

concluding that the two sides are roughly equivalent and thus incapable of a successful major offensive without significant foreign assistance. Careful readers should compare these conclusions with the more pessimistic publications of the United States, NATO, and nongovernmental authorities who give greater weight than do the editors of *The Military Balance* to factors such as chemical and toxicological weapons, surprise, deception, and covert mobilization—all of which could tilt some of the balances under analysis toward the Communists.

G. PAUL HOLMAN, JR.
Naval War College

Taylor, Robert. *The Sino-Japanese Axis, A New Force in Asia?* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 132pp. \$27.50

This slim volume addresses a very important topic: the nature of emerging Sino-Japanese relations and how they may influence Asia. The author's key message is well encapsulated by a phrase from his preface, "Sino-Japanese economic ties are already creating a political alliance, promising a new balance of power in Asia within the next two decades." This is the essence of the "Axis" suggested in the title.

Though this is a well-written book, it never makes a persuasive case that such an axis is credible to either Beijing or Tokyo, much less desirable by either. On balance, the book presents a reasonably coherent argu-

ment why the PRC might contemplate such an alignment in pursuit of its interest, but it never succeeds in explaining why Japan might seriously consider shifting away from existing economic and strategic networks that anchor it in the international system. In this sense the author displays a Sino-centric tendency in his analysis that discounts Japan's many other—and more important—global political, economic, and strategic interests which make it unlikely that Tokyo will opt for any explicit tilt toward China.

The thrust of the analysis points to an emerging yin-yang style of economic complementarity which will integrate China and Japan. Though some Japanese also share such a vision, most are skeptical about the feasibility and desirability of Japan edging that close to China. The PRC is simply too uncertain an economic and political entity for the Japanese to gratuitously rely on China in any of the ways the author suggests. Far more likely is the prospect that Japan will try to solidify its place in the larger Western community of free market nations and deal with China from that vantage point. From that perspective, Japan-PRC ties are more likely to become just one facet of broader Western relations with China. China cannot offer Japan what the West can and Tokyo knows this very well. Because of this predisposition of the Japanese, the idea of a Sino-Japanese "axis" is a curiously outdated notion more suited to Japan in an earlier stage of its development. Though some in Asia, the Soviet