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The Chiefs of Staff and The Higher Organization for Defence in Britain, 1904-1984

John Gooch

The British chiefs of staff system first came into existence eighty years ago as part of a package of reforms designed to create a higher organization for defence. It was born of political pressures and created by civilians to fulfil political needs. The deficiencies of a monolithic military structure were clearly revealed during the Boer War (1899-1902), a campaign conducted without the benefit of any forward planning or intelligence such as European general staffs were equipped to provide. Thereafter military efficiency demanded that reservations be set aside and that the British Army be provided with a brain in the form of a general staff.

Politicians were also becoming aware of the need for specialized government machinery with which to consider defence policy. In Britain the customary solution to problems of coordination and of providing information across departmental boundaries was to create a committee of the cabinet.¹ Thus, after some experimentation, the Committee of Imperial Defence was born in 1902: a cabinet committee presided over by the prime minister, with flexible membership, which could discuss pressing defence issues of the day. In 1904, two years after its creation, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was provided with a permanent secretariat. At the same time—though not as part of the same measure—a board system was introduced into the War Office. One member of the board was the newly instituted chief of the general staff.²

The mere existence of a chief of general staff did nothing to guarantee the development of comprehensive military plans. Much depended upon personality, and the founding head proved a poor choice: lazy but socially well connected, Sir Neville Lyttelton's only real talent was his skill at lawn

Professor Gooch, on the resident faculty of the University of Lancaster, United Kingdom, is currently serving as a Secretary of the Navy Fellow at the Naval War College. He is a specialist in Strategic Theory and War Aims, Defense Policy, Tactical Doctrine and Military Culture.

tennis. Of the first group of directors serving under him, most were no more distinguished; but within two years a cohort of highly able staff officers had entered the general staff. In consequence war planning improved markedly in quality. The Royal Navy at this time had no specialized general staff at all: planning was carried out by the First Sea Lord, assisted by a Director of Naval Intelligence, as, when, and however he preferred.

The architects of the new system saw the general staff as one component of a larger structure. The broad functions of collectively examining defence problems and creating a defence posture were to be performed by the CID, whose secretariat was originally intended to act as "a Great General Staff suited to our Imperial requirements."³ The secretariat grew in power and influence, as secretariats will, by virtue of its position at the intersection between politicians and the military. Under the hand of Sir Maurice Hankey it became an active component in the higher organization of defence, producing papers, offering opinions and formulating cabinet decisions as minutes.⁴

Although machinery now existed to coordinate government policy on defence, this did not of itself mean very much. Everything hinged upon the nature and interests of the prime minister of the day, for it was he who called the CID into session, determined its membership and set or agreed to the subjects for examination. Balfour, under whose premiership it came into being, had an unusually philosophical turn of mind and regarded it as a problem-solving machine. His successors up to 1914 were in varying degrees uninterested in it. No one gave any thought to its role in war. More importantly, it was not used to integrate the two services in joint planning. Admiral Fisher effectively withdrew the Navy from its deliberations in 1906 when it began to trespass into matters he regarded as his own preserve.⁵ The two services finally met at a celebrated CID meeting on 23 August 1911, held to consider naval and military planning for a war with Germany, at which the Admiralty unveiled a strategy of considerable ineptitude which was wholly at odds with accepted CID policy. As a result, Winston Churchill was imported into the Admiralty as First Lord to oversee the creation of a naval staff able to conduct proper planning.

When war broke out in 1914, the extent to which planning had been limited, the problem of command in war unforeseen and coordination dependent upon political authority was quickly revealed. Asquith tried to run the war by means of a series of large and unwieldy cabinet committees as successors to the CID; and, by 1915, war by cabinet government had completely collapsed.⁶ In an ill-considered attempt to secure authoritative military advice, Asquith installed a soldier, Lord Kitchener, as Secretary of State for War in August 1914. Kitchener was totally unfitted for the post. Secretive, constitutionally unable to delegate authority and quite unfamiliar with the general staff idea, he confided in neither soldiers nor politicians.

Once, in August 1915, he refused to appear before the War Policy Committee on the grounds that such an action should be reserved for the cabinet alone; it subsequently became apparent that what he really objected to was the presence of a shorthand writer.⁷ The vast bulk of the general staff left for the front in August 1914, and the "dugouts" who remained behind in their stead proved utterly incapable of standing up to Kitchener's forceful personality. They forebore to offer him any strategic advice, and he forebore to ask for it.

The Navy was afflicted by very similar problems. The 73-year-old Admiral Jackie Fisher was recalled as First Sea Lord in October 1914 and brought back to Whitehall an obsession with amphibious landings on the Baltic coast which he refused to discuss either with his own staff or with Kitchener's. His chief of staff, Admiral H. F. Oliver, was incapable of delegation and spent so much time allocating ships to different duties that he had little time left for strategy.⁸

Lack of determined leadership, service compartmentalization and an almost complete lack of forward planning created fertile soil for disaster. In an atmosphere of enthusiastic ignorance, and totally unencumbered by technical advice,⁹ amateur strategists with Churchill in the van devised the Dardanelles campaign in 1915. Ill-conceived and spectacularly misconducted, the Dardanelles campaign did have one important long-term consequence: the report of the government enquiry into it, published in 1917, painted such a damning picture of the consequences of staff officers suppressing dissent that it acted as a spur to senior officers to speak their minds during the Second World War.¹⁰

Having at first paid too little attention to staff advice, the British now swung to the opposite extreme. In December 1916 Sir William Robertson took over as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) and Kitchener's powers were whittled down until he became little more than a cipher. Backed by Douglas Haig, who had taken over command of the British Armies in France, Robertson informed the government that Flanders was the decisive theatre of operations and that no more troops should be diverted to useless sideshows. He then invited the government either to accept this policy or to formulate its own alternative. The government chose to accept professional advice. The bloody campaign on the Somme in 1916 was the consequence.

In December 1916, Lloyd George took over as premier; he believed the strategy of attrition advocated by the general staff to be wholly wrong. However, the Haig-Robertson axis prevented him from gaining full control of events. He found it difficult directly to contradict the strategic arguments put up to justify concentration on the Western Front because of his amateur standing.¹¹ Therefore, Lloyd George tried a number of political expedients. Eventually, over the winter of 1917-18, he broke the Robertson-Haig axis by skilful and contorted political manoeuvring, and was able to instal his own candidate, Sir Henry Wilson, who was prepared to back peripheral

operations, as CIGS.¹² Not exercising such a powerful political grip on the conduct of the war, the Navy posed no such problems of control, although its staff work remained uncoordinated and its administration grossly overcentralized.¹³

As both prewar and wartime experience had demonstrated in different ways, effective functioning of the chiefs of staff system within the higher organization for defence depended upon the active involvement of prime ministers, for only their authority was powerful enough to overcome friction and resolve problems. During the 1920s successive prime ministers were largely uninterested in defence matters and therefore a key element in the efficient functioning of the machinery was absent. One important development did, however, occur. During the Chanak crisis of 1922, the three chiefs of staff began to meet informally in order to be prepared to take combined action if called upon to do so.¹⁴ Sir Maurice Hankey suggested making this a permanent arrangement, and the chiefs of staff subcommittee met for the first time in formal session on 17 July 1923. The prime minister did not attend, and the chair was taken by the senior head of service. Thus the link between premier and services, a critical one in the British system, was broken.

An enquiry set up in 1923 found against centralising control of the armed forces in a single ministry on a number of grounds: that it would be superimposed upon the extant tripartite service organizations, with resulting friction and duplication; that its head might rival the prime minister in power; and that the Dominions would never accept anything more than the CID, which was an advisory body.¹⁵ This finding was agreeable to the Treasury, which feared the creation of a united service bloc beyond its control. During the course of the enquiry Sir William Robertson produced what would become the fundamental Service grounds for opposing the "dreadfully mischievous" proposal of a chief of combined staffs: "An important cornerstone in military organization is that he who makes a plan ought to be responsible for its execution."¹⁶

The chiefs of staff liked to suggest that their new committee was a success but it was generally perceived as a failure. One reason was the dispiriting economic climate of the 1920s. A second was that the chiefs of staff were given no guidance by the Foreign Office as to the political assumptions upon which war plans should be based other than a generalized warning about Russia and India. So they were left to devise their own. Not surprisingly, all three services usually differed. As late as 1937 the chiefs of staff were still complaining—with some justification—about the lack of clear political guidance by means of which to frame plans.

The heart of the problem, however, lays in the issues raised by airpower.¹⁷ Its capacity to police the empire more cheaply than ground forces produced

clashes between the Army and the RAF over who would have command in the event of operations in theatres where both services would have to operate together, such as the Middle East. At another level, the capabilities of the aircraft were unproved. The so-called "bomber versus battleship" controversy, upon the resolution of which hinged the decision as to which service would have the lion's share in the defence of Singapore, rumbled on throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. The dispute was resolved politically, and against the RAF, by Stanley Baldwin in 1932, but even then the question was regarded by the RAF as still an open one.¹⁸

Not only could the chiefs of staff not agree on how to use their own weapons, but they were also unable to agree on how other powers would use theirs. Responding in 1934 to a questionnaire on the likely shape of a future war with Germany, the chief of naval staff replied that he expected a classic big fleet action from which a victor would emerge, the CIGS expected enemy airpower to be used in support of the advancing German Armies, and the chief of air staff thought that the Germans would go on the defensive against France and use air attack over these fortifications.¹⁹

The failure of the chiefs of staff to reach anything approaching agreement on such issues as the capacity, role and control of airpower was partly the outcome of their having to grapple with novel and difficult problems without the aid of either machinery or techniques to help them. But one more factor should be noted. Writing in 1936, Admiral Lord Chatfield ascribed the difficulties of the past to the personalities who composed the Chiefs of Staff subcommittee after the war, "men who had risen chiefly by their forcefulness of character, whose general line of argument was 'what I say is right.'"²⁰

With the ending of the Ten Year Rule in 1932²¹ and the first steps towards rearmament two years later, the chiefs of staff were replaced by a system of direct cabinet intervention in defence through ministerial subcommittees. The first stage of Treasury control was now applied. Each department submitted its estimates separately, assuming that taken collectively and developed over five years they would provide a reasonable level of rearmament. An uncoordinated programme which overshot the financial target allowed the politicians to determine priorities according to nonstrategic—or at best semistrategic—grounds. Heavily influenced by Neville Chamberlain's economically based theory of parity deterrence, the government took the decision to put the bulk of the money into building a bomber force.²²

The ineffectiveness of the Chiefs of Staff subcommittee was underlined in a different way by the Italo-Abyssinian crisis of 1935. Although confident that in the event of war Britain would win, the chiefs could not agree on how to act, and a bitter quarrel broke out in August 1935 over the correct tactical role of the RAF. The war raised the even more fundamental question of whether

the chiefs of staff had the authority to act executively as a battle headquarters. The then prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, said that he would be glad to consider this question and then, characteristically, did nothing about it. The chiefs of staff were never given cabinet approval to exercise executive powers, and it was widely assumed that in war the government would establish a ministerial committee of control. The public disquiet aroused by the Abyssinian crisis did result in the creation in 1936 of a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, but the office lacked executive authority and its first incumbent, Sir Thomas Inskip, was not much respected within the services.²³

At the outbreak of the Second World War Chamberlain's lack of wartime experience, and Churchill's plethora of it, soon became apparent. A small war cabinet was set up on the Lloyd George model, including the chiefs of staff and all three service ministers, but the military soon showed too much initiative for the newly installed First Lord of the Admiralty. After a war cabinet meeting on 21 September 1939, at which they resisted extending the war into the Balkans, Churchill wrote to the premier suggesting that politicians should be able to meet without servicemen present. Chamberlain responded by setting up the Military Co-ordination Committee, chaired by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, Lord Chatfield, and comprising the three service ministers and the minister of supply, assisted by the chiefs of staff, to scrutinize proposals for presentation to the war cabinet. This body had a short and troubled life. Strategic differences were now debated three times instead of twice—in the Military Co-ordination Committee, the chiefs of staff committee and the war cabinet—and unresolved disputes were simply passed up the line because Chatfield lacked the political authority to resolve them.²⁴ The machinery functioned fitfully and ineffectively for some six months before the Narvik campaign demonstrated how poorly both elements of the higher defence machine were functioning. Shortly afterwards the German attack on France swept Chamberlain from office, and Churchill succeeded him.

Churchill moved swiftly and purposefully to revitalize the system. The war cabinet was slimmed down by dismissing the service ministers from it. The prime minister created and took for himself the new post of Minister of Defence; but instead of setting up a central staff to service him in his new role, he took over the military section of the war cabinet secretariat under General Hastings Ismay, who became what he liked to call his "handling machine." The Military Co-ordination Committee disappeared into the limbo in which it belonged and was replaced by a Defence Committee with two panels, one for operations and one for supply. In effect, Churchill had created a combined battle headquarters under the direct supervision of the head of government, through which he could exercise continuous direct and personal control over the formulation of military policy and the conduct of military operations.

A system so highly centralized as the one Churchill had created could pose as great a danger as the one it replaced. Sir Alan Brooke, newly installed in the summer of 1940 in command of the defence of the United Kingdom, certainly thought so. "It was a highly dangerous organization; had an invasion developed I fear that Churchill would have attempted as Defence Minister to co-ordinate the action of these various commands. This would have been wrong and highly dangerous, with his impulsive nature and tendency to arrive at decisions through a process of intuition, as opposed to 'logical approach,' heaven knows where he might have led us!"²⁵ No invasion ever came. But Churchill's fertile imagination required anchoring to the shores of reality if it were not to bear aloft all those who were within its power.

The appointment of two outstanding individuals ensured that the new integrated system worked to best effect. The first was Ismay. As head of the military secretariat, he, together with his deputies Hollis and Jacob, serviced the many formal and ad hoc committees and subcommittees spawned by the system; and as principal staff officer to the minister of defence, he attended all the meetings of the chiefs of staff committee. Ismay was thus in a position to act as a two-way communications channel, conveying information and impressions to and from the prime minister.²⁶ The second was Brooke. Under his chairmanship the chiefs of staff committee became the very necessary ballast which weighed down the Churchillian imagination.

Repeatedly the chiefs of staff had to stand their ground against Churchill in long, vigorous and exhausting debates before they could persuade him to abandon some cherished idea. Occasionally they simply withdrew support for a project before it had time to turn into a plan.²⁷ Sometimes, although rarely, Churchill overruled them on matters of policy.²⁸ Sometimes he ignored them.²⁹ Overall, however, the system produced good decisions. It did so because Brooke adopted three working principles and stuck to them. As chairman of the chiefs of staff, he believed they must always reach agreement; he did not believe in meddling with field commanders, and frequently stopped Churchill from doing so; and he always honestly spoke his mind, resisting Churchill's efforts to wear down his resistance to some pet idea with a battery of long dinners, late nights, brandy and cigars.

The hallmarks of the system of higher organization for war devised by Churchill were the separation of the military and the strategic from the other functions of government; the creation of a machinery of control which allowed direct—and indirect—communication between the prime minister and his chief military advisers; and a staff system which put those responsible for advising on strategy in direct control of the armed forces. It was this last feature which compelled realism and honesty. Staff work conducted through adversarial debate had another compelling advantage, as the Americans found out to their cost at the Casablanca conference: "minds were thoroughly prepared, and few counter-arguments were new."³⁰

Peacetime presented very different requirements from war, and between December 1945 and February 1946 a study group headed by Ismay and Jacob weighed the alternatives: absorption of the service departments within a ministry of defence; a combined general staff on the lines of the German Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW); and a powerful independent chairman of the chiefs of staff reporting direct to the Minister of Defence. All these were rejected in favour of a Defence Committee of the Cabinet, including the three service ministers and their chiefs of staff, and a minister of defence whose peacetime powers were drastically curtailed by reason of the fact that the political heads of the three services remained responsible to parliament for expenditure.³¹ Without prime ministerial authority the Minister of Defence became, as Macmillan put it after a brief and unhappy sojourn in the job, "a co-ordinator, not a master."³² To counteract any future moves towards undue centralization, the 1946 Defence White Paper laid down as a cardinal principle of British organization that it should be the men responsible in the Service Departments for carrying out the approved policy who were brought together in the central machine to formulate it.³³

The postwar system had to deal with familiar problems of demarcation, such as the struggle for control of Coastal Command, which went to the RAF. It also had to cope with the enormous problem of the development, production, and control of nuclear weapons. The first effect of this was to set the services against one another as they struggled for control of a weapon which appeared to be appropriate to only one medium, and which would therefore enable one of them to claim the primary task in defence policy. In the prerocketry years it was the Navy which felt most threatened: in a note to Lord Mountbatten urging him to take up the position of First Sea Lord, the Vice Chief of Naval Staff stressed the need to refute "the 'one big bang and it is all over' theory so cleverly sponsored by Jack Slessor and the US Strategic Air Force."³⁴

The second effect of the nuclear revolution was to place the chiefs of staff in an environment in which the complexity of the new weapons and the pace of their development posed unforeseen problems of cost-control in a domestic environment in which economy was almost always the tune of the day. Research and development costs of the first generation of nuclear missiles were huge, and budgeting was a total failure—largely the result of the absence of centralized control. The scandalous inability to control weapons costs was to be one of the most powerful factors in the move towards centralization.³⁵

In 1955, following the example of the United States, Canada and France, Anthony Eden created the position of chairman of the chiefs of staff. The aims behind this were to add continuity to the defence decisionmaking process and to lighten the burdens imposed upon one man by the requirements of Nato and the Western European Union. Almost immediately afterwards

the new system was tested in the fire of the Suez crisis of 1956. It apparently had little influence on Eden's attitudes or behaviour, and in several major respects he ignored its advice completely.³⁶

In 1957 Harold Macmillan appointed Duncan Sandys as Minister of Defence to work out a new defence policy in the light of present strategic needs which would secure a substantial reduction in expenditure and manpower; and at the same time to prepare a plan for reshaping and reorganising the armed forces.³⁷ The result was Sandys' advocacy of an independent British nuclear deterrent. In devising that policy he worked largely through his own senior departmental staff and the chief scientist, prompting the chiefs of staff formally to protest in February 1958 that they were not being consulted over important decisions.

To some extent, the chiefs of staff were themselves to blame for the position they now found themselves in. For one thing, as so often in the past, they were incapable of speaking with one voice on the desirability or otherwise of an independent British deterrent. In September 1958 the First Sea Lord and CIGS wrote a joint memorandum flatly opposing it, in direct contradiction to the view of the then current chief of air staff. For another, in trying to block Duncan Sandys they worked independently of the new chairman of the chiefs of staff, fearing that to do otherwise would be to contribute to a process of aggrandizement which would result in their losing control of their own affairs. The position of the first chairman, Air Chief Marshal Sir William Dickson, grew so bad that in January 1958 he wrote to the minister complaining that the cooperation he was getting was reluctant almost to the point of nonexistence.³⁸

Macmillan reacted by strengthening the powers of the Minister of Defence, and by creating the position of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). The CDS was given the responsibility of issuing operational orders; the Joint Planning Staff was put under his control; and he was also empowered to call on the staffs of the three services for assistance. Macmillan's purpose in reconstructing the staff system was to produce an independent officer who could give the minister impartial advice.³⁹

Two years later, in 1960, Lord Mountbatten was appointed CDS and began a personal crusade to centralize control of the armed forces. His experience in South East Asia Command during the Second World War had led him to favour unified control and he had many weapons at his disposal in trying to bring it about, not least the very best of social connections. It was not a prospect the services looked forward to with much relish; Marshal of the RAF Sir Dermot Boyle told Mountbatten to his face "I consider your appointment as Chief of the Defence Staff the greatest disaster that has befallen the British Defence Services within memory."⁴⁰

Mountbatten prepared the ground by setting up unified commands in the Near East in 1960, in the Middle East in 1961, and in the Far East in 1962. Then,

on 10 October 1962, he presented his proposals to the Minister of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft. They amounted to unification of the higher levels of the armed forces. A secretary of state for defence would be serviced by two functional ministers; a Defence Staff would be created to service the CDS, who would now only be “advised” by the chiefs of staff; and the CDS would select and promote senior officers of one-star rank and higher from a single list. All three service chiefs were opposed in varying degree to Mountbatten’s proposals. Their main grounds of concern were two: that those making plans and policy should not be divorced from those carrying them out (here the German OKW was once again pressed into service as a good example of a thoroughly bad practice); and that the new structure would prevent the cabinet from having the opportunity to hear dissenting views.

Lord Ismay and General Jacob were called out of retirement to examine the proposals, and made one very significant change in them; contrary to Mountbatten’s intentions, they recommended that the three service chiefs of staff should continue to have access to the prime minister and that all alternative military policies originating in the chiefs of staff committee should always go up to the Defence Committee for decision.⁴¹ The 1963 White Paper set up a three-tier structure, at the top of which was the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the cabinet, with the CDS and the chiefs of staff in attendance. Below this a Defence Council was established, to be chaired by the newly titled Secretary of State for Defence. And the chiefs of staff committee remained untouched: chaired by the CDS, it was to be collectively responsible to the government for professional advice on strategy, military operations and the military implications of defence policy. The position of the CDS was strengthened by the addition of a headquarters staff comprising a Defence Operations Executive, a Defence Signals Staff, a Defence Intelligence Staff, and a Defence Operations Requirements Staff.⁴² These latter were small, and were intended to work alongside the existing Joint Planning Staff and Joint Warfare Staff.

The Labour government which came to power in 1964 considered the higher war machinery chiefly from the point of view of the degree to which it constituted an efficient and effective machine to control defence expenditure. Unacceptable cost acceleration and technological supercession—neither of which the military could do much about—had led to expensive cancellations of weapons systems.⁴³ The record, however, was undeniably poor: the RAF had spent £11 billion between 1947 and 1965 and was left after the cancellation of TSR2 with an aging fleet of 150 V-bombers and not very much more. The government intended to hold defence costs down to a fixed ceiling of £2 billion, and to do this the new Secretary of State, Denis Healey, conducted a far-reaching Defence Review based on cost-benefit analysis. There was little input from the services, and Healey apparently ignored the Defence Council almost completely.⁴⁴

The government moved slowly forward towards Mountbatten's goal. In 1968 a single Defence budget replaced the triservice budgets, and in 1972 managerial functionalization on commercial lines reached new heights when a Minister of Defence Procurement was created to work under the Secretary of State. That same year the new post was dropped.⁴⁵

The staff machine was struck by a second wave of managerial economics in 1974-75, when a Defence Review was again instituted with the aim of reducing defence expenditure from 6 percent of GNP in ten years time to 4½ percent. Now, however, the machinery had learned better how to cope with the demands of politicians; and it had as its head a CDS who was willing to disregard official procedures in order to meet requirements. Care was taken to involve Treasury representatives in the review from the earliest stages in order to avoid producing a report which was financially unacceptable. The Assistant CDS on the review body worked to brief the CDS, who in turn brought round any recalcitrant chief of staff, either by individual meetings or through group discussion. And, thirdly, denied a satisfactory basis for setting strategic priorities, the CDS invented his own, in which priority was given to Nato and within that to the Central Front and the Atlantic. In one respect the system hampered the CDS in his task: he was required by the rules to gain the agreement of his colleagues before tasking either the chiefs of staff secretariat or his own Central Policy Staff and initiating studies. This rule was overcome by the simple expedient of breaking it.⁴⁶

The process of incrementing the powers of the CDS has been carried a stage further with the proposals made in 1984 by Secretary of State Michael Heseltine. Under the scheme he appears to envisage, the CDS will continue to chair the COS committee but will tender independent military advice on strategy, forward policy, resource allocation, commitments and operations; he will plan, direct and conduct all military operations; and he will direct the work of the Central Defence Staff. In a major departure from all previous practice the appointment of a CDS will be at the discretion of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence rather than being held on a "turn and turn about" basis, and will be for an indeterminate period. Four Deputy Chiefs of the Defence Staff will be responsible for strategy and policy, for programmes and personnel, for systems, and for commitments. The process of squeezing the heads of the three armed services has been taken a step further, leaving them with responsibility for little more than morale, management, discipline and efficiency in their separate arms, although they retain the right of direct access to the Prime Minister. The proposals have drawn strong criticism from Admiral Lord Lewin and Field Marshal Lord Carver, both former Chiefs of the Defence Staff. Their arguments—that single-service chiefs of staff must be left with adequate staffs to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities as professional heads of service and to contribute considered advice to the CDS on matters of strategy and policy, and that the

single-service machinery is best qualified to determine the weapons systems and organization which is required—will be hard to controvert, save by those who believe that management and policy are separate functions.⁴⁷

Notes

1. J.P. Mackintosh, *The British Cabinet* (London: Stevens, 1962), p. 274.
2. N.H. Gibbs, *The Origins of Imperial Defense* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1955), pp. 2-9; J. Gooch, *The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900-1916* (London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 32-59.
3. Gooch, p. 44.
4. S.W. Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets*, 3 vols. (London: Collins, 1970-74), *passim*.
5. N. d'Ombrain, *War Machinery and High Policy: Defence administration in peacetime Britain, 1902-1914* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 13, 99, 180, 211; see also Fisher to Tweedmouth, 9 July 1906, quoted in A.J. Marder, ed., *Fear God and Dread Nought* (London: Cape, 1956), v. II, p. 83.
6. P. Guinn, *British Strategy and Politics 1914 to 1918* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 115; John Ehrman, *Cabinet Government and War 1890-1940* (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1958), p. 61.
7. Gooch, p. 304.
8. A.J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1965), v. II, pp. 89-90, 196.
9. Admirals Oliver and Jackson were subsequently very vague as to what they had actually counselled at the Dardanelles Committee; and the CIGS, Wolfe Murray, admitted that he left meetings of the War Council and the Dardanelles Committee without having any idea that a decision had been reached at all: T. Higgins, *Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1963), p. 81; Gooch, pp. 303-304. See also Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, p. 218.
10. Personal information from Field Marshal Lord Harding of Petherton.
11. D.R. Woodward, *Lloyd George and the Generals* (London: Associated University Press, 1983), p. 176.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 196, 213, 224-225, 258-274.
13. A.J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1966), v. III, pp. 56-57, 177-178, 219-223; *ibid.* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1969), v. IV, pp. 314-315, 327-328.
14. Roskill, v. II, p. 290.
15. H.G. Welch, *The Origins and Development of the Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence: 1923-1939*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London 1973, pp. 36-42.
16. Public Record Office, Co-ordination of the Fighting Services, memorandum by Field Marshal Sir W.R. Robertson, 28 June 1923, Cab. 21/262, *cit.* Welch, p. 50.
17. Roskill, v. II, pp. 345-346.
18. J. Gooch, *The Prospect of War: Studies in British Defence Policy 1847-1942* (London: Frank Cass, 1981), pp. 73-79.
19. Welch, pp. 163-164.
20. Public Record Office, Chatfield to Hankey, 17 February 1936, Cab. 21/424, quoted in Welch, p. 115.
21. The Ten Year Rule, instituted in 1919 and put on a rolling basis in 1928, guided British military planners by allowing them to assume that Great Britain would not be engaged in a major war for the next ten years.
22. M.S. Smith, "Rearmament and Deterrence in Britain in the 1930s," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (London), December 1978, pp. 313-337.
23. Roskill, v. III, pp. 52-53; Welch, p. 250; M.S. Smith, *The Development of British Strategic Air Power Doctrine and Policy in Period of Rearmament preceding the Second World War c. 1934-1939*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Lancaster 1975, p. 107.
24. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: Vol. VI, Finest Hour 1939-1941* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), pp. 38-40.
25. David Fraser, *Alanbrooke* (London: Collins, 1982), p. 183.
26. *The Memoirs of Lord Ismay* (New York: Viking Press, 1960), pp. 167-170.
27. Joan Beaumont, *Comrades in Arms: British Aid to Russia 1941-1945* (London: Davis-Poynter, 1980), p. 71.
28. Gooch, *Prospect of War*, pp. 25-26.
29. Roskill, v. III, p. 506; D. Carlton, *Anthony Eden: A Biography* (London: A. Lane, 1981), pp. 168-169.
30. Fraser, p. 313.
31. Her Majesty's Stationery Office (hereafter, H.M.S.O.). Statement Relating to Defense, Cmd. 6743, 1946; J. Hughes-Hallett, "The Central Organisation for Defence," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, v. CIII, 1958, p. 490.

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36. Ziegler, p. 543.
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43. Peter Nailor, "Denis Healey and rational decision-making in defence," in I.F. Beckett and J. Gooch, *Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy 1845-1970* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1981), p. 159.
44. "Does the present Central Organisation for Defence meet the requirements of the 1970s," *Report of a discussion held at the Royal United Services Institution on Wednesday, 13 January 1971*, p. 2.
45. H.M.S.O. Government Organisation for Defence Procurement and Civil Aerospace, Cmd. 4641, 1971.
46. Personal information.
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Naval History Prize

The first US Navy Prize in Naval History, for the best scholarly article to be published on the history of the United States Navy in 1984, has been awarded to Professor John E. Talbott of the University of California, Santa Barbara, for his article "Weapons Development, War Planning, and Policy: The U.S. Navy and the Submarine, 1917-1941," published in the May-June issue of *The Naval War College Review*.

Professor Talbott's article discusses the development of the long-range submarine and the impact of the capabilities of that weapon on American naval strategy and foreign policy. The prize, sponsored jointly by the Naval Historical Center and the Naval Historical Foundation, consists of a certificate and a cash award of \$500. The purpose of the prize, to be awarded annually, is to encourage excellence in research and writing on the history of the US Navy. Nominations for articles published in scholarly journals in 1985 may be sent to Director, Naval Historical Center, Building 57, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC 20374-0571.