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Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects

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theater of operations has now been changed from neighboring waters to the high seas, possible scenarios in both areas are discussed with a careful eye to Soviet weaknesses as well as strengths. The author judges that, for now, Soviet deployments are very limited and can only be seen as demonstrating a presence. Soviet deployments are thus for political as well as military purposes.

It is in the political realm that the author is at his best. His final chapter provides an excellent overview of Soviet naval diplomacy and the importance the Soviet Union attaches to it. The credibility of the USSR in the Third World and the symbolism of the fleet as evidence of US-Soviet parity in the strategic arena rank high as Soviet aims. Short but fascinating case histories of Soviet naval diplomacy—adventures as well as misadventures—are used to illustrate its coercive and its cooperative nature. Successes have been limited and failures have been many.

However, Coutau-Bégarie cautions that one should not underestimate the effectiveness of Soviet naval diplomacy. Just because one cannot measure its influence beyond local crises, one should not conclude that it has no influence. He believes that the fundamental goal of Soviet naval diplomacy is the maintenance of the *status quo*. What really counts is the maintenance of total power and parity with the United States. One should especially not conclude that the military or diplomatic functions are secondary. On the contrary, he

asserts, the fleet is now a key player of the Soviet armed forces and an indispensable instrument in local crises. The author concludes with the view that, whatever the military worth or the degree of effectiveness of its naval diplomacy, the Soviet fleet is first and foremost a method of affirmation of power, and in this role, it has acquired a privileged place in the structure of Soviet power—a role which will only be increased in the course of the coming years.

The “good news” is the book itself. The “bad news” is the fact that it is presently available only in French. Since this work is the first in a series on “Maritime Power in the 1980’s,” one hopes that IFRI will provide an English version as a significant contribution toward the better understanding of a serious problem.

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Sigal, Leon V. *Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984. 181pp. \$22.95, paper \$8.95

At first blush it would seem like an impossible task to fit the myriad complexities of the Euronuclear issue into 173 pages of text. But Leon Sigal has come close, in this well-organized and cogently argued book.

Sigal reminds the reader that while deterrence is the *raison d'état* behind the Euromissile force, deterrence

itself may present contradictions with *assurance* (the political dimension of European security), and especially with *stability*. Particularly with respect to the latter, Sigal notes that extending US deterrence to Europe theoretically implies first use—itself not exactly conducive to the stability of the European military situation. He returns to this point in the last chapter on battlefield nuclear weapons, whose vulnerable presence near borders and difficulty of use imply special stability problems. One can disagree with Sigal's implied recommendation of "no first use" of battlefield nuclear weapons (which would erode what deterrent effect they may have) and still appreciate their very limited contribution to European security, especially comingled with conventional weapons.

In his examination of the rationale for the Euromissile modernization decision of 1979, Sigal looks at the most common justifications and finds them wanting. The new weapons do not give more target coverage, as Pact targets are already covered by present systems. This is true, though Sigal might have noted that many of these systems are aircraft, which would have difficulty penetrating Soviet anti-aircraft defenses. He also finds flaws with the "continuum of deterrence" argument, which implies that escalation must only run up a "ladder" of weapons structured according to their range. He additionally faults the public rationale for long-range modernization, noting that both the Pershing IIs and cruise missiles were planned in advance of

the first Soviet SS-20 site preparation.

The vulnerability to preemption of these systems is noted by Sigal, as is the difficulty of crisis dispersion; a move in itself that could raise the risk of Soviet preemption. But Sigal does find limited rationale for the long-range theater weapons in that their presence in Europe complicates Soviet ability to perform an overall nuclear first strike. But, for Sigal, the overall contribution of these forces to European security is quite marginal, in *military* terms.

Indeed most of the Euromissile controversy, according to Sigal, is *political*, with the initial decision to modernize the force made largely to mollify the political right in several European Nato nations, particularly Germany. The ensuing debate has imposed its own cost on the European Nato host nations, with large-scale demonstrations against the weapons breaking out. Moreover, Chancellor Schmidt found himself caught between his political left and right, as well as in conflict with both the Carter and Reagan administrations. Political problems existed in the other host nations as well, and Sigal gives a good account of the internal political factors that made it difficult for Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy to either fully embrace or reject the new weapons scheduled to be based on their soil.

Political problems in the host nations gave a real impetus to arms control negotiations at the Euro-theater level. But these negotiations were hampered seriously from the

start by the distance between opening US and Soviet positions, and by Soviet insistence that British and French systems be placed on the agenda. The distance began to narrow with the so-called "walk in the woods" arrangement (75 launchers each) in July 1982, but ultimately no agreement emerged. Sigal indicates that serious differences may continue this state, noting that equal ceilings on weapons may be difficult to achieve, given that Soviet weapons seem related to target requirements different from Nato's. Moreover, verification and monitoring problems remain formidable, particularly given the mobility characteristic of European-based nuclear systems and especially the short-range weapons which are virtually identical to conventional weapons.

British and French nuclear systems compound not only arms control negotiations, but also Western nuclear policy. Sigal points out that French doctrine not only implies first use, but also a limited ability to extend deterrence into Germany. And while British policy is more restrictive and closely tied to Nato, both European nuclear powers steadfastly refuse to have their weapons negotiated away from them by the United States.

Given the breadth of the topic, Sigal has covered it admirably. It is a one-sided treatment, as Sigal concentrates on the Nato side, and one will have to find the Soviet postures elsewhere. But it is a fair and comprehensive treatment and should be required reading for anyone desiring

a well-documented scholarly overview of Nato's nuclear posture and problems.

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Bradley, Omar N. and Blair, Clay. *A General's Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 752pp. \$19.95

This autobiography, written in the first person by Clay Blair, author of *Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan* and other books, takes Bradley from his youth in Missouri through his tenure as the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with an Afterword covering his subsequent activities. A studious boy, he "loved every minute" of his four years at West Point and graduated with the class of 1915. During the interwar years Bradley spent much of his time as an instructor at service schools, "not a bad way," he concluded, "to learn your profession thoroughly." At Ft. Benning Infantry School he met and favorably impressed George Catlett Marshall. "No man," says Bradley, "had a greater influence on me personally or professionally."

Ordered to duty on the General Staff in 1938, Bradley learned the politics of War Department management and the Washington scene, while acquiring administrative experience that prepared him for