

1987

The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial

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Recommended Citation

Levie, Howard S. and Brackman, Arnold C. (1987) "The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 40 : No. 4 , Article 23.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol40/iss4/23>

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The Mallisons provide the first comprehensive and balanced view of the Palestine-Israel dilemma to appear in years. In this detailed and thoroughly researched analysis, the authors suggest that international law can provide a solution via sufficient and consistent application. They point out that the unprincipled politics played in the Middle East by the major powers have papered over the fundamental causes and have dealt, at best, with the violent symptoms of the underlying violations of law. The authors further suggest that U.S. interests have not been served because our national officials are specialists in dealing with the overall context of great power relations but are distinct nonspecialists in addressing Middle East concerns. The Mallisons hammer consistently on the theme that a legal solution to the Palestinian dilemma could provide Palestinians and Israelis alike with their first real peace in more than 50 years.

The initial two chapters analyze the political-legal objectives of first the Zionist and then the Israeli leadership, while the next several chapters concentrate on the partition of Palestine, Palestinian national and individual rights, and the legal status of Jerusalem. Further discussion provides a legal analysis of the Israeli settlements in the territories occupied after 1967 and then sets forth the humanitarian law applicable to the Israeli invasion of Palestinian-held areas of southern Lebanon in 1982.

The final chapter is the most important because it proposes to resolve the Palestinian problem and finally

concludes that a partition plan providing territorial autonomy for the Palestinian people must be seriously considered and supported by the major nations.

Dr. Mallison, a former Stockton Chair holder at the Naval War College, and Sally V. Mallison have undertaken a comprehensive study which dispels myths popularly advocated by the U.S. media. This is a book that argues positions that will be sharply criticized by certain interest groups within the United States and abroad. Nevertheless, it provides invaluable and, this reviewer believes, accurate insights in its consideration of the most involved and complex conflict setting in the world today.

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Brackman, Arnold C. *The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials*. New York: Morrow, 1987. 432pp. \$19.95

In 1950 Solis Horowitz wrote in the introduction to his *The Tokyo Trial* (International Conciliation, No. 465): "Despite its importance, little is generally known about this trial." Almost four decades later the author of *The Other Nuremberg* states in his foreword: "Written material on the Japanese war crimes trial is thin, especially in comparison with that available on the Nuremberg trial." Unfortunately, both authors were entirely correct. In a preface to the Horowitz monograph, Telford

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Taylor, Chief of Counsel at the "Subsequent Proceedings" at Nuremberg, said: "Unhappily, public indifference to the Tokyo trial has been matched by an apparent lack of interest on the part of the sponsoring governments themselves."

Few persons, other than students of World War II history will ever have the time or the inclination to read the entire transcript of the Tokyo war crimes trial. For this reason, a book such as Arnold Brackman has produced is invaluable to the individual who is interested in acquiring a general knowledge of some of the major events of World War II without making a lifetime study of the subject. After presenting considerable historical background for the trial, he takes the reader through each of the major areas of the indictment, consolidating and analyzing the evidence on each such subject. Two statements by the author with respect to the impact of the Tokyo trial on the Japanese public and on the public outside of Japan appear to be worthy of quotation:

. . . the prosecutor's [opening] statement, lengthy excerpts of which appeared in the Japanese press, encouraged soul-searching among many people, and herein lay a true value of the trial. The IMTFE provided the Japanese with a daily dose of information about prewar and wartime Japan that was foreign to them. . . .

During this period the tribunal acquired a new look. The appearance of so many Japanese ministers, generals, and admirals as witnesses for the prosecution to the secret struggle within Japan between the forces of good and evil had a salutary [effect?] on Allied

public opinion. The wartime myth that *all* Japanese were monsters began to fade. The testimony at the IMTFE put the Japanese in a new light. Like all other people, the Japanese were a mix of good, bad, and indifferent. The trial of the major war criminals thus acquired a new dimension—humanizing the enemy.

Of particular interest is the great amount of background which Brackman has added to the story of the trial itself. Thus, he discusses the facts behind: the decision not to include Emperor Hirohito as a defendant and the manner in which the defendants were selected; Judge Pal's arrival in Tokyo, prepared to acquit every defendant because of the history of European colonization of the Orient; the resignation (and nonreplacement) of the Chief of Defense Counsel, Captain Beverly Coleman, U.S. Navy, and several of his assistants; the attempt by members of the prosecution to have the Chief of Counsel, Joseph Kennan, replaced; the dispute over the resignation of the original American member of the Tribunal, Judge John Higgins of Massachusetts, and the appointment of a substitute; the attempt by the New Zealand judge to have the Tribunal refuse to hear any evidence concerning the atrocities committed by Japanese troops in the Philippines; the method by which the lengthy judgment of the Tribunal was drafted and the problems that this created.

Brackman has contributed a major addition to the literature with respect to the 1946-1948 trial in Tokyo conducted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. He

deals with 28 of the major Japanese war criminals who were primarily responsible for the aggressive wars waged by a militaristic Japan from 1928-1945 and for the innumerable atrocities which were committed by the Japanese military against civilian noncombatants and prisoners of war.

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Isaacson, Walter and Evans, Thomas.
The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986. 853pp. \$22.95

Autumn of 1944 found World War II drawing to a close and the alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union undergoing severe stress. Uppermost was the issue of who would be installed as the new Polish Government—the exile government in London or the Soviet-backed, Communist-dominated Lublin government. Underlying this issue were the differing objectives held by alliance members, the West holding to the Atlantic Charter, while Moscow, in Stalin's words, wished to ensure "friendly governments" on Soviet borders.

During this period the American Embassy in Moscow worked tirelessly to find a solution, or at least a compromise. Ambassador Averell Harriman, long involved in many business dealings with the Soviets, favored a tough approach, one effectively denying the Soviets the right to build a defensive perimeter at the

expense of bordering countries. His assistant, George F. Kennan, a foreign service officer sometimes given to intellectual arrogance, advocated a pragmatic approach: tolerate a Soviet sphere of influence; do not sacrifice diplomatic influence by advocating free elections in Poland, which would not happen anyway; establish a clear line in "friendly but firm" terms, beyond which the Soviets must not pass without a U.S.-U.K. response. Kennan's views were rejected by Ambassador Harriman in the fall of 1944, but several years later they were accepted as the Western strategy in the name of "containment."

The six "Wise Men"—Dean Acheson, Charles Bohlen, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Robert Lovett, and John McCloy—were the inheritors of a tradition established by Elihu Root and Henry Stimson in the early years of this century: specifically that of the wealthy, well-bred, well-educated public servant. They were truly a bipartisan group who shared the political center and served a variety of administrations, both officially and unofficially, for 60 years.

In time, some of their views and decisions proved to be less than faultless, and some contemporary critics disparage this old "Establishment" as having on occasion led the United States down the wrong road. Indeed, a couple of the figures, Kennan in particular, have made revisionist interpretations of their earlier work. Yet, a more understandable assessment is that these