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The Secret War in Central America: Sandinista Assault on World Order

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able utility and perhaps serves only to authenticate his work.

After sketching the history of the military's need to peer down at their opponents from balloons and aircraft, Burrows jumps into the interagency fights over control of overhead surveillance assets in the cold war. Eisenhower, and later Kennedy, would not allow the military to control these assets because that would have given them control of the interpretation of the product which could be "used" to further their budget requests. Following the U-2 and early photographic satellites, space surveillance and reconnaissance became so widely accepted and reliable that they were the cornerstone to verification of the SALT I and ABM agreements. Both agreements contained clauses about noninterference with "national technical means" of verification, a euphemism for satellites.

Burrows raises the question of why, if satellite surveillance is so crucial to national security, is the national program so cloaked in secrecy. His answers, which lie in the political arena, miss the most fundamental point: if the technical details of the capabilities of the systems were open, then the surveilled would know how to hide the very things we must see to maintain stability and mutual security.

The bulk of Burrow's work is devoted to describing what he believes to be the technical details of code words, bureaucratic connections, ground station locations, intercept capability, and photographic resolution. While this makes interesting

reading, it contributes little to understanding the value these systems have to the Nation. While Burrows does substantiate the case for overhead surveillance systems as a requisite to any successful arms control agreements, it is regrettable that he did not devote more of his efforts to developing that case fully. Had he done so, this would have been an important, rather than a merely interesting book.

F. LEITH
Washington, D.C.

Moore, John Norton. *The Secret War in Central America: Sandinista Assault on World Order*. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1987. 195pp. \$17.95

This important book presents carefully documented and well-argued international legal justification for U.S. assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance forces (the "contras") as well as a well-documented account of the actions of the Sandinista regime which provoked our legal and political intervention. Supporters of U.S. intervention will find arguments of world order and legal principle transcending the more often-heard rationale of U.S. national interest, of anticommunism or of protection of human and democratic rights. Open-minded opponents will be disabused of the ideas that the Sandinistas are not the major source or funnel of support for Salvadoran and other Central American insurgents and that

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their obvious Soviet/communist links and internal human rights violations may have been a reaction to, rather than a cause of, U.S. hostility.

Both sides will find copious, well-researched footnotes conveniently grouped after each chapter to substantiate Moore's claims. The notes and appendices accompanying the texts of key documents constitute half of the book's pages and are valuable as a guided bibliography and handy reference.

Moore's book is divided into two major parts. The first, written in a fact-packed, easily readable style, gives the background of the Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua; their consistently close ties to Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other communist states; their immediate, almost continuous and multifaceted support for the Salvadoran guerillas; and the phased U.S. reaction. He shows that this support and guidance to the Salvadoran guerillas began as soon as the Sandinistas took power. The United States was simultaneously offering the new Nicaraguan Government assistance unprecedented during the Somoza years. The second part is written more like the legal brief it probably was in its original draft (Moore was a special counsel for the United States in the jurisdiction phase of Nicaragua's complaint before the International Court of Justice). It justifies U.S. actions against Nicaragua (including support of the "contras") as collective defense authorized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and perhaps even required by Article 3 of the Rio Treaty.

In making his case, Moore shows that Sandinista support for the Salvadoran guerillas meets the legal definition of aggression and then excuses the subsequent and continuing U.S. support of the "contras" from the "aggression" category as being only a response to the Sandinistas' aggressive acts, a response that is clearly proportional to the provocation. He quotes even the Soviet Union as defining the attacker as that side which *first* supports armed bands "or refuses, on being requested by the invaded State, to take in its own territory any action within its power to deny such bands any aid or protection."

Following chapters address what Moore considers to be factual and legal misperceptions of the Central American conflict, and the danger to world order and international law caused by "radical regime assaults" not effectively stopped by collective defense when the target state is too weak to squelch the attack with its own resources. Moore, correctly, in this reviewer's opinion, places major responsibility for the Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua on U.S. actions during the 1970s, particularly the policy of the Carter administration—which first disengaged from Central America with termination of military assistance and then deliberately strangled the right-wing authoritarian but would-be friendly regimes of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua with arms embargoes. Finally, the United States pressured the few other nations still selling arms to the Nicaraguan Government to join the

embargo, turned a blind eye to Cuban and other arms flowing to the Sandinistas, and backed an extraordinary Organization of American States (OAS) resolution calling for the overthrow of the Somoza regime in the face of its, by then, rapidly deteriorating war with the Sandinista insurgents.

With this degree of responsibility for the Sandinista takeover, Moore argues—as an additional ground for intervention, though subsidiary to collective defense—that the United States and the OAS have a responsibility to ensure that the Sandinistas carry out their formal written pledge to the OAS, upon whom they relied to withdraw legitimacy from a member government. That pledge promised, inter alia, “full respect for human rights” and “free elections.” Ironically, many of the current, most vocal U.S. advocates of “hands off Nicaragua” were, in the 1970s, loudly proclaiming a moral if not a legal duty of the United States to overthrow the Somoza regime because of arguably similar U.S. involvement in the establishment of the first Somoza-controlled government almost 50 years earlier.

Though Moore brings in rationale for U.S. anti-Sandinista actions other than collective self-defense, he insists that the “principal motivating factor” for critics’ use of “snippets taken out of context from presidential press conferences” is to allegedly show that the U.S. aim is really to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. He believes that the United States made an error in refusing to follow through to the

merits phase of the International Court case after the court ruled against us on jurisdiction. With the persuasive facts and legal arguments Moore presents for the defense in this book, at least this juror is inclined to agree.

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Jones, Rodney W. and Hildreth, Steven A., eds. *Emerging Powers: Defense and Security in the Third World*. New York: Praeger, 1986. 441pp. \$45

This is a clearly written study by a group of well-chosen chapter authors, introduced effectively by the two editors in the first chapter and then summarized in the last. In between are six chapters on the Asian powers, one each on the Middle East and Africa, and three on Latin America. The chapter authors, in order, are Gerrit W. Gong (China), Edward A. Olsen (Korea), John Blodgett (Vietnam), Donald E. Weatherbee (Indonesia), Rodney W. Jones (India), Joseph J. Malone and J.E. Peterson (Egypt), Pauline H. Baker (Nigeria), William Perry (Brazil), Perry, again (Argentina), and George Fauriol (Mexico).

Each chapter author was asked to provide a general discussion of four problems: national ambitions, threat perceptions, defense problems, and strategic responses, and their impact on the regional and international behavior of the nation being discussed. This objective is carried out,