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The Success and Failure of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945-1946: Last Chance in Palestine

Richard E. Barcus
U.S. Navy

Allen Howard Podet

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and sought to redirect the U.S.S.R.'s destiny back to that established by Lenin.

Andropov's untimely death in February 1984 threw these plans into abeyance. The elevation of Konstantin Chernenko, a Brezhnev crony, to General Secretary meant a shift back to easier times for the massive government and Party apparatus. The Chernenko era was short, however; Frankland calls him the "Temporary Tsar." In March 1985 the U.S.S.R.'s leadership once more was in the hands of an orthodox Leninist: Mikhail Gorbachov.

Gorbachov immediately resumed the course set under Andropov. He called for the Soviet people to "restructure" themselves in order to accelerate the gains made by the Revolution in 1917. Gorbachov and the reform-oriented members of the Politburo believed that part of the U.S.S.R.'s decline in the 1970s and early 1980s was due to the ability of government and Party officials to work in secret. This belief provided part of the impetus for the well-known *glasnost* campaign.

The author limits the scope of the *The Sixth Continent* to the great domestic drama that ensued between the death of Brezhnev and the rise of Gorbachov; thus, he spends little time on items of particular interest to naval officers, such as foreign and defense policy. Still, he devotes the last chapter to the Soviet Union's relationship with the rest of the world.

Frankland displays a keen understanding of the Soviet Union. He was

a journalist in Moscow in the early 1960s and from 1982-1985. He also has written a biography of Khrushchev in a style that tends to be anecdotal; *The Sixth Continent* reads like a series of political profiles in a long election campaign. Nevertheless, he is capable of incisive analysis. For instance, he criticizes the Soviet thinking which maintains that the U.S.S.R. progressed nicely until "Stalin drove the Soviet Union out of the paradise that Lenin had so carefully planted." He asks to what degree the Party had corrupted itself by claiming absolute power.

The Sixth Continent's story ends in late 1986, before *perestroika* entered the political lexicon of the West. But even without using the word *perestroika*, Frankland provides a fascinating glimpse of its genesis. The restructuring of the Soviet Union did not begin with the publication of Gorbachov's *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* in 1987. Instead, restructuring is a force that has influenced Soviet politics since Brezhnev's last years and is destined to influence it for years to come.

DAVID T. NORRIS
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Podet, Allen Howard. *The Success and Failure of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945-1946: Last Chance in Palestine*. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986. 351pp. \$59.95

Military officers have long been aware—often frustratingly so—of

the conflicts between policy and action, between political concerns and field realities. The most successful have been able to achieve an integrated understanding of all sides of questions involving the interplay of international influence, domestic politics, and both the apparent and the real goals assigned to the military. This is not always an easy task. Commonly, the realities of policy negotiation have been obscured by red-herring directives, disinformation given to the media, misinformation collected by them on their own, or excessive classification.

Addressing this problem, Allen Podet has painstakingly unraveled the story of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on the post-war status of European Jews, producing not only an impressive historical study, but an invaluable insight into the methodology of geopolitical negotiation and accommodation.

Using both British and American sources recently made public, Podet investigates the formation, conclusions, and effectiveness of the committee established in 1945 by Harry Truman and Clement Attlee to examine and advise on the plight of Europe's 100,000 homeless Jewish refugees. The international group was tasked with considering the needs of both the Jews, most of whom wanted to immigrate to Palestine, and the Palestinian Arabs—always keeping in mind, of course, American and British political concerns. The British, administering Palestine since World War I

under a League of Nations mandate, found their position increasingly untenable: afraid of angering Arab interests, they had curtailed Jewish immigration, thus sparking uncontrollable violence among the Palestinian Jews. At the same time, pressure was mounting in the United States to resolve the European refugee problem. Both countries approached the situation with suspicions of Soviet intent in the area.

In the course of its deliberations, the committee conducted extensive research, interviewing refugees, Arab representatives, pro-Zionist witnesses (including Albert Einstein and Reinhold Niebuhr), Lebanese Christian Maronites, and British officials in Palestine. Their findings indicated that although almost no one was anxious to see an independent Palestinian Arab State, support for Jewish settlement in Palestine was widespread. The committee's eventual report advocated, among other things, immediate refugee settlement without the establishment of a Jewish state.

One of Podet's most significant contributions is his sensitive analysis of the circumstances which led the British to reject the committee's report. The influence of the traditionalist British diplomatic community, still caught up with obsolete views of empire, played on the indecisiveness and weakness of the political leaders. An essential misunderstanding of both Zionism and of Arab thinking, characteristic of the Foreign Office's permanent staff, encouraged Attlee and Foreign

Minister Ernest Bevin to dismiss the committee's conclusions on the basis of erroneous ethnic stereotyping. And the private political agendas of both Britain and the United States skewed reasoned judgment. The results of the consequent makeshift policy are still being reflected daily on newspaper front pages.

Podet has brought to his task not only a scholar's meticulous research, conducted over ten years on both sides of the Atlantic through examination of documents and through personal interviews, but a balanced and objective analysis of the evidence. His stance is neither polemical nor apologist. Rather, he lays bare the complicated and dismaying details of international political manipulation and its effects in microcosm. In so doing, he has not only laid a firm foundation for future work in this field, but he has provided an object lesson of value to all those involved with the advancement of national goals.

RICHARD E. BARCUS
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval Postgraduate School

Yaniv, Avner. *Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy*. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1987. 324pp. \$35

At a time when Israel's conflict has come full circle, with Jews once again facing their Palestinian neighbors just down the road instead of Arab States or remote exile outfits, Yaniv's book provides an excellent

guide to what has happened so far and what is likely to happen in the future. The author steadfastly maintains his focus on the formation of Israeli strategy, and that, in turn, has been the chief determinant of the flow of events, notwithstanding the persistent interventions of greater powers outside the region, the constant attempts of other regional actors to impose their will, and the occasional initiatives that succeeded, of which Sadat's diplomatic revolution was by far the most important.

The peculiar value of Yaniv's book arises from his concentration on the level of grand strategy. He resists detours into the military history of the conflict, except to document very specifically some aspect or another of grand strategy. Hence we learn nothing at the tactical or operational levels, and not much at the level of theater strategy (How to defend the Sinai, etc.) or force strategy (How large an air force? What kind of navy?) but, on the other hand, we can really follow the evolution of Israeli grand strategy from 1949 till the present because 278 well-written pages are enough for that, given the author's disciplined refusal to be diverted from his aim.

Were the subject other than the Arab-Israeli conflict, one would not need to add that this is an analytical work concerned with the dissection of events and the evaluation of their proximate causes, i.e., the proper concerns of such scholarship as the field of political science allows. The *ex parte* claims, emotive justifications, deceptive suggestions, conscious