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Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale, from the Pueblo to the Present

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Once the United States was committed to combat, the diverse aims of the leaders became evident. Roosevelt hoped to end colonialism throughout the world, whereas Churchill was dedicated to preserving the British empire.

The considerable friction which existed between the SIS and the American Office of Strategic Services is carefully and impartially analyzed and explained by the author.

After the fighting stopped in 1945, the SIS became involved in the cold war. Scandal rocked the British Government when the treacheries of Burgess, Maclean, and Philby were revealed. Menzies retired to private life, unscarred, and did not consider it necessary to defend himself. It is likely the problem could have been avoided had the signs of potential treachery, which were quite evident, been evaluated properly by those in authority, including Menzies.

This attention-holding book is more an institutional history than a biography. There are many exciting chapters and a number of surprising disclosures of interpersonal and intergovernmental relations. The reader must be alert at all times because high drama unfolds without warning and often involves almost forgotten characters.

The index and bibliography are adequate, as is the list of persons who shared their memories of events, great and small. An inexcusably large number of proofreader's errors mar the scholarly tone of this

important study of a little-known aspect of modern history.

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Allen, Thomas B. and Polmar, Norman. *Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale, from the Pueblo to the Present*. New York: Delacorte, 1988. 384pp. \$19.95

This book is the latest attempt to develop some generalized "lesson learned" from the recent rash of highly publicized American espionage cases, with special emphasis on three Navy cases of interest: the Walker spy ring, the Pollard spy operation, and the U.S. Embassy Marine guards in Moscow. It examines the espionage threat and the U.S. organization for dealing with this threat, using recent spy cases as case studies and providing details of certain cases not yet available from other public sources. For that reason alone, *Merchants of Treason* is worth reading.

The author's basic tenets hold that there is a considerable threat to our security from foreign espionage activity, that we are poorly organized for the prevention and detection of espionage, and that there is a need for a new government agency whose sole purpose would be to direct U.S. counterintelligence activities. While most professional intelligence or security officers would agree with the first two points, the third is a highly debatable conclusion that is not well supported in this book. As

was amply demonstrated after the founding of the Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, the bureaucratic imperatives and parochial views of the various elements of an intelligence community (in that case the various military intelligence organizations) do not necessarily disappear with the establishment of an overarching control organization.

As the title implies, the authors feel that the day of the spy who works for ideological reasons is over; the modern motivation is overwhelmingly financial. This is a rather gross oversimplification of what is usually a very complex issue. The authors indicate, for example, that in the case of Larry Wu-tai Chin, an employee of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service who spied for the People's Republic of China, ideology or loyalty to Chinese communism was a definite factor in his motives. Another recent book on espionage, *Traitors: The Anatomy of Treason*, by Chapman Pincher (New York: St Martin's, 1987), describes a wide variety of 20th century espionage cases from the standpoint of motivation. He concludes that while money is one such motivation, there are so many different factors that may induce an individual to spy that it is difficult to generalize. In both the John Walker and Jonathan Pollard cases, for example, money was certainly an important motivator, but not the only factor. Both of those individuals also craved the excitement of participating in clandestine activity.

Though some sections are well-written, clear, and full of detail, the book is sometimes difficult to read. It seems as though each of the authors wrote sections and then cut and pasted them together. The basic theme is difficult to follow throughout the book, and transitions from one subject to another are often abrupt and confusing.

In their chapter entitled "The Spy Who Saved the FBI," for example, the authors attempt to bring together many of the "loose ends" of the Walker case to establish a theory that the Navy knew about the Walker spy ring before Barbara Walker had contacted the FBI but did not share their information with the FBI. The logic in this chapter is particularly difficult to follow since many of the points discussed by the authors (e.g., the initial lack of FBI follow-up on Barbara Walker's call; the disruption of the "safe" signal at John Walker's 19 May 1985 "dead drop" in Maryland by FBI agents, which warned off John Walker's Soviet case officer; and the fact that the Soviet case officer, 3rd Secretary Aleksey Tkachenko, was not arrested after his car was observed in the area) could all have equally plausible and less mysterious explanations. The only ones given by the authors are those which support their case for a "conspiracy" by the Naval Investigative Service and the FBI to hide the real truth.

These caveats aside, however, this book is a valuable contribution to understanding a modern security problem. The chapter on bringing

spies to justice, in which the authors describe the legal issues involved in investigating and prosecuting spies, is particularly useful. Also of value for those who would like to examine the espionage threat further is a list of source materials. Although footnotes are not used (making it impossible to determine the source and validity of many details in the book), the source section provides an excellent bibliography of material for the serious researcher.

The subject of espionage deserves further serious study. While a new government agency for dealing with spies probably would not be the panacea that the authors believe it would be, the fact is pretty much as they state it: most spies are not caught by U.S. counterintelligence efforts. We must develop a better awareness of the espionage threat among our personnel and a better, more professional means of conducting espionage investigations. This book contributes to public understanding of the issues in the world of spy-counterspy and should be required reading for security professionals.

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Peeples, Curtis. *Guardians: Strategic Reconnaissance Satellites*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1987. 418pp. \$28.95

Many people in the military and intelligence communities have heard about *Deep Black* (reviewed in the

Autumn 1987 issue of this journal), while *Guardians*, the more complete book, is nearly unknown. Both tell how U.S. space reconnaissance began, tracing its development from its beginnings with balloons and aircraft. Both also show how it allowed the United States to face down Khrushchev in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both discuss at length how politics and world affairs have been changed by space systems; however, each focuses on a different aspect of the space race. If you are interested in systems, what they do and how they do it, then *Guardians* is the book for you. It covers early warning, nuclear detection, ocean surveillance, military man in space, and ferrets (signals exploitation) in great detail. Both books say that it was President Kennedy who ordered U.S. space intelligence efforts to go "black" (compartmented intelligence) in order to avoid embarrassing the Soviets publicly, forcing them to develop the means to shoot them down. While the author of *Deep Black* believes the last six administrations have deliberately lied to the American public in order to spend more billions on space systems and retain control of the arms control process, *Guardians* has a much more balanced approach.

Its discussion of ferrets is especially good, although Mr. Peeples continually uses the term ELINT (radar exploitation intelligence), when the correct term is SIGINT (signals-radar, communications and telemetry-intelligence). Peeples also says this type of airborne reconnais-