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Disinformation, Misinformation, and the "Conspiracy" to Kill JFK Exposed

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future authors get sidetracked into perfecting techniques (like the systems analysts), planners may be in a better position to recognize that allocation and planning decisions are essentially political, and political decisions may often be made for extremely important, but not necessarily "rational" reasons. The book is highly recommended for the Government strategic planner.

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Moss, Armand. *Disinformation, Misinformation, and the "Conspiracy" to Kill JFK Exposed*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1987. 219pp. \$22.50

One's initial reaction to this title is difficulty in believing that any new light could be shed on this subject. Happily, Armand Moss does provide some. In general, he effectively destroys the "conspiracy myth." In particular, he even more effectively establishes why Lee Harvey Oswald killed the President.

Regarding the conspiracy, he painstakingly shows, through extensive quotes, that Oswald was the only assassin involved on that fateful day of 22 November 1963. He also shows that the myth of the conspiracy was nurtured through: disinformation provided by the Soviets and "fellow travelers"; misinformation supplied by "authors hoping for a best-seller, and . . . serious writers who relied on chapter 7 [which is entitled 'Lee Harvey Oswald: Back-

ground and Possible Motives'] of the *Warren Report*."

The only criticism I have of Moss's disinformation theme is that he tends to overkill his argument. For instance, while he shows that writers of numerous essays and books may, or are, of the fellow traveler type (among others, he includes Thomas Buchanan, Mark Lane, and Joachim Joesten); and explains how the Soviets, through the use of their publications (e.g., *Novoe Vremia* [New Times], from which he quotes heavily) spread disinformation, and in some cases actually create it by clandestinely printing books abroad (e.g., *L'Amerique brule* [American Burns]); he tends to carry it too far when he makes such sweeping statements as "America began to lose its prestige immediately after President Kennedy's death [fully debatable!]," and "those who believe that the investigation . . . was scandalous do not know themselves what convinced them of the existence of a conspiracy [hardly!]"

However, as I alluded to earlier, where Moss really shines is in his explanation of why Oswald killed President Kennedy. The answer is alarmingly simple. Essentially, Kennedy's fate was sealed "by a frustrated, insignificant individual who believed that his wife had just decided to leave him."

His frustration, caused not only by his "wife's moods," but because of: an unhappy childhood; difficulty in coping with "a reading disability [dyslexia]" that was aggravated by an above average I.Q.; "disappoint-

142 Naval War College Review

ments [including a failed attempt on General Edwin A. Walker's life]"; and lastly, a "need to be noticed." And while it may be hard for some to swallow "that the most important political figure in the world . . . died merely . . . of a family quarrel," the *Report of the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy* notes that on the morning of the murder, Oswald "for the first time left his wedding ring . . . on the dresser . . . [and] took . . . [a] long brown package . . . to the School Book Depository."

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The Future of German-American Relations. Washington, D.C.: International Security Council, 1987. 207pp. \$4.95

The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States now find themselves in transit to a better balanced and mature partnership where rights and duties are more evenly distributed. This development takes place at a time when the Germans have become aware of the far-reaching consequences of the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) to their vulnerable and exposed country located in the heart of Europe; namely, the concentration of the remaining nuclear short-range weapons on German soil. The dominate question for Germany in light of the changing strategic conditions is, can a community of equally shared risks between

Europe and the United States, in which nuclear weapons play a role acceptable to the protectors and the protected, be maintained? The Americans, emphasizing a different issue, expect Germany to carry a fair share of the common defense burden—both inside and outside the NATO Treaty area—utilizing its considerable economic power as well as defense resources.

The International Security Council (ISC)—an independent, voluntary association for statesmen, senior officers, diplomats, scientists, and historians—deserves credit for the creation of a forum that provides the frank and intense exchange of ideas on those issues that are key to German-American relations. The symposium was held in June 1987 in Berlin, the divided city in the center of Europe, and the key to the necessary distinction between the freedom of the West and captivity of the East.

The ISC has published these worthy contributions to the Berlin conference, which provide an American and a German perspective on those catchwords defining the present debate: strategy and arms control, defense and deterrence, neutrality and reunification, cooperation and competition. Since the overwhelming number of speakers were outspoken right-wingers, and no liberals or socialists were represented, the views remain somewhat simplistic and unbalanced. This permits a misleading impression of the German domestic debate.