

Naval War College Review

Volume 41
Number 3 *Summer*

Article 9

1988

In My View

E.D. Smith Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Smith, E.D. Jr. (1988) "In My View," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 41 : No. 3 , Article 9.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol41/iss3/9>

This Additional Writing is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.



Ian Oliver

IN MY VIEW . . .

On Being Red

Sir,

As a former officer-in-charge of the Naval Operational Intelligence Center (NOIC) Detachment at the Naval War College War Gaming Center, I enjoyed reading David Allen Rosenberg's article, "Being 'Red': The Challenge of Taking the Soviet Side in War Games at the Naval War College," in the Winter 1988 edition of the *Review*. While his article appears to have been well-researched, there are some areas which I believe deserve clarification. The first concerns the function of the NOIC Detachment. It should be noted that NOIC Detachment personnel not only provide opposition (Red) play in war games, but also provide intelligence support to Blue players, a significant function that utilizes the operational intelligence expertise of the detachment's intelligence officers. In addition, NOIC Detachment's "Red" play is not limited solely to the Soviets. Some games require expertise in the doctrine, strategy, and tactics—as well as capabilities—of "Third World" threats. When this expertise is not available within the detachment, NOIC headquarters in Suitland, Maryland can usually provide it.

Another point of clarification also seems in order. While the detachment's original charter did indeed call for intelligence support to gaming, an in-house opposition team, and support to opposition players, the detachment's role as a permanent opposition team was not fully recognized until 1983. Prior to that time, at least for the significant fleet games, the detachment's principal opposition role was advising and otherwise supporting "Orange" commanders, often flag officers drawn from the fleet and fleet training infrastructure. In many cases, these games were strongly affected by the "mirror-image" type of opposition play described by Rosenberg. It was after one particularly blatant example of this unlikely Soviet play by a "COMORANGE" that NOIC Detachment, with the support of the then Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral John Butts, was given the responsibility of providing all opposition play in Naval War College war games. This concept has

proven itself to be effective in incorporating the latest intelligence assessments into war-gaming.

Regarding Rosenberg's comments on the historical relationship between Navy intelligence and the War College, it appears that the definitive work on this subject has yet to be written. It seems that there are some real gaps in documentation of this relationship, particularly of the period between the World Wars. It should be noted however, that intelligence support to the academic arm of the War College (as distinct from war-gaming) does have a long history. In fact, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval War College have been closely connected since the War College was established in 1884. Beginning in 1887, ONI staff officers served as lecturers at the Naval War College courses. The Secretary of the Navy's Annual Report for 1896 stated that "A close union should be maintained between it (ONI) and the War College, both working to the end of meeting all possible naval problems that may arise from any international difficulty, keeping all the time abreast with the actual facts and existing conditions of naval warfare."

By 1897, a program had been established to periodically exchange officers between the War College staff and ONI. As the then President of the Naval War College stated, "The desirability of close relations between these two institutions leads me to hope that each year we shall have one or two officers from the Office of Naval Intelligence in attendance upon the college session."

In 1910, the concept of developing an "Estimate of the Situation," borrowed from the German Army General Staff system, was formally introduced into the War College course. Such innovations enhanced the utility of intelligence in the War College planning process and spurred a succession of ONI lectures at the College.

In those early days of ONI, the function of war-planning provided another direct link with the War College. ONI developed the plans in collaboration with the War College and the latter tested them in war games and tactical exercises. So close was this relationship that on several occasions the idea of combining ONI and the War College to establish a Navy General Staff was seriously discussed.

While much has changed since this period, the close relationship established between ONI and the Naval War College during their formative years has continued to the present. This relationship was formalized in 1971, when Captain Art Newell, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), became the first incumbent of the newly established Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton Military Chair of Intelligence. Captain Newell was the first naval intelligence specialist to be assigned to the War College staff in 1959-1961.

To date, there have been seven Layton chair-holders and each has made his own contribution to the corporate memory of the position. These have included Captain Lew Connell, Captain Bob Bathurst (currently teaching at the Naval Postgraduate School), Captain Bob Seifert, Captain Dick Casey, Captain Gary Hartman, and me, the current incumbent.

The chair-holder acts as a primary means of liaison with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Intelligence to ensure that the current intelligence requirements of the War College are met. From the beginning, the incumbent of the Layton Chair has had two principal tasks: first, to provide the War College faculty, staff, and students with substantive intelligence concerning all foreign military activities with the emphasis on Soviet military and naval

developments; and second, to provide courses on the functions and process of intelligence.

These tasks are accomplished by a variety of means including current intelligence briefings, lectures, syllabus inputs, and elective courses. To accomplish them, the chair-holder currently has an intelligence staff of two intelligence specialist officers, two civilians, and an enlisted communications technician who provide support and comprise the rest of the staff intelligence office. Briefings on current substantive intelligence topics are provided to students and faculty on a biweekly basis, interspersed with recent intelligence video presentations provided by the Naval Operational Intelligence Center, the Fleet Intelligence Centers, and other sources. Lectures on operational intelligence and syllabus sessions for seminars on the Soviet military are incorporated into the Operations Department curriculum, and the two intelligence officers of the staff intelligence office function as full-time faculty members of the Operations Department (the chair-holder also functions as head of the Intelligence Division of the Operations Department). Two elective courses are offered each trimester on The Soviet Navy and Intelligence for Commanders. These ten-week elective courses are strongly supported by the Office of Naval Intelligence and other agencies, who send their best analysts and briefers to Newport to lecture. (Of interest, one of the required readings for the Intelligence elective is Rear Admiral Layton's book, *And I Was There*, which tells his side of the Pacific campaign in World War II and was written just before he passed away in 1984.) In addition to these activities, key ONI personalities come to Newport several times a year to address students and faculty on a variety of subjects and to participate in conferences and war games. For example, Mr. Rich Haver, the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, is particularly supportive of the War College and a frequent speaker to both the War College faculty and students, as well as other War College organizations.

Thus the ONI-War College connection continues in the spirit established over one hundred years ago. Rear Admiral Eddie Layton would have been pleased that intelligence has been recognized as critically important in today's very complex Navy and proud of the way that the chair named for him has progressed at the Navy's senior educational institution.

In February 1987, the former Layton chair-holders were asked their views on expanding the intelligence efforts at Newport. Some answered by mail. Three came to Newport. The consensus of our discussion, which included other members of the War College faculty, was that the basic requirements of the job—substantive intelligence support and educating students about the intelligence process—have remained much the same over the past sixteen years. In some areas, more work needs to be done. These include more emphasis on joint intelligence capabilities (and limitations), more exposure for War College students to the operations of non-Navy intelligence agencies, and more education of the future commanders and staff officers who comprise the War College student body on the complex issues surrounding future intelligence systems.

E. D. Smith, Jr.
Captain U.S. Navy

Somebody, but not Clausewitz

Sir,

I noticed in Egan and Orr's Winter 1988 article on a hypothetical Soviet attack on the Arctic region of Canada the use of several quotes by Clausewitz. I realize that Clausewitz is widely regarded in America as the infallible authority on military matters, and that therefore it is fashionable for authors to use his words (often out of context) to lend an aura of authority to their articles and books.

I think it extremely unlikely that the two fictive Soviet defense experts in the article, if they were real, would actually have made use of quotes by Clausewitz as Orr and Egan have them doing. While it is true that V.I. Lenin expressed approval of a statement by Clausewitz in *On War* about war being in some ways a social act, and while it is true that the Soviets have some regard for Clausewitz as a military writer, Clausewitz' influence in the Soviet Union should not be exaggerated.

If we take the time to open an English-language translation of the official Soviet encyclopedia (available at many American libraries) we find that the Soviets fault Clausewitz for assuming that a government's policies reflect the attitude of the entire nation, rather than of the ruling class, as Marxist-Leninist theory holds. The Soviets regard Clausewitz as a "bourgeois" military thinker whose writings were influenced by his social position, although they do express approval of some of his ideas on military matters with which they agree. I think it quite inaccurate to assume that just because the Soviets have expressed some approval of Clausewitz that they have based their military theory and doctrine upon Clausewitz, and that Soviet military theory and doctrine would be substantially different had Clausewitz not written *On War*. The Soviets may in fact consider such an invasion of Canada envisaged in the article. But they would justify it by quoting Lenin and Russian and Soviet military thinkers rather than by quoting Clausewitz. (I also doubt that real Soviet military analysts would make such extensive use of quotes by Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military writer, as the fictitious ones do in the article.)

I note that on page 63 of the article, General Yermak mentions Clausewitz on "the center of gravity." I have never come across the term "center of gravity" in any Soviet military literature or in any non-Soviet writings on Soviet military thinking, and to the best of my knowledge the Soviets do not use that concept.

Clausewitz regarded the enemy's greatest concentration of forces on the battlefield to be the enemy's center of gravity and prime target, while he also considered the enemy's alliances and national will to be centers of gravity in that they are sources of strength. At the operational level of warfare, the Soviet doctrine of multi-echeloned "surge" warfare, striving to plunge deeply and rapidly, *avoiding enemy strong-points* while seeking weak points to penetrate, is obviously incompatible with the Clausewitzian imperative of seeking out enemy concentrations. And Soviet multi-echelon deployment along multiple axes is obviously incompatible with the Clausewitzian imperative of maximum concentration of forces.

Joseph Forbes
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

More on Being Red

Sir,

Professor Rosenberg's article on "Being 'Red'" in the Winter issue was very good. Let me comment from the perspective of one who was present when, under Commander (now Captain) Doug Smith, Newport's Naval Operational Intelligence Center was growing from three officers and analysts to ten. This was the time during which the role of the detachment grew from that of simply supplying advisors to that of becoming the opposition. I worked with the detachment from 1981 to 1986, first as a research fellow working on C³I and war-gaming, then as an umpire/game director in the War Gaming Center, and finally at the detachment itself as part of the "Red Team" buildup, so I had a pretty good look at how things were and what they became. The detachment really became "The Red Team" with its expansion in 1982-1983. Prior to that time we did not have the manpower to make it work.

The first point that I think should have been included in Professor Rosenberg's article was the fact that once we got the manpower, Commander Smith tasked each person to become "The Expert" in a specific subject area and geographic region, e.g., Soviet submarine operations, Soviet surface ships, etc. We had people assigned to all the areas covered in the games and to the research going on in the rest of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS), e.g., amphib ops, tac air, mines, space, C³I, naval air, ASW, REC, Army ops, and the Spetsnaz. We were also assigned to study a particular geographic area such as the western Pacific, the North Cape of Norway, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, etc. Some people had two or three related areas. Each person was assigned according to his previous experience, if possible. It made for a highly motivated crew.

We might not have been the "real" experts in each of these areas, but we certainly knew who to call in the various agencies if we did not know the answer. After the first year, each of us had a pretty good idea what questions were going to be asked in each game, and we had the answers ready. Between games all of us spent a great deal of time researching questions that had been raised in our areas of interest. I believe the assigning of areas of responsibility did more to improve the credibility and usefulness of the detachment than anything else.

A second important point that was not covered was the fact that we started playing games at very high levels of classification, primarily to test the ideas coming out of the Strategic Studies Group and to examine various aspects of the POM. In conjunction with this we also started emphasizing real-world intelligence systems in many of our games, often playing an intelligence game in the detachment at a very high level of classification as part of a game being played at the secret level or lower on the game floor. Real-world safeguards were applied to ensure that the security of specific collection and analysis capabilities were not compromised. Intelligence provided to both sides was provided only when specific collection assets were available (in the game) to gather it and then only after the time that it took to process the intelligence from that specific system. Every effort was made to be as close to real-world collection, processing, and reporting capabilities, as well as reporting guidelines, as possible.

To be sure, intelligence systems had been played before, but not nearly in the detail that they began being played during Captain Smith's tenure. Part of it was due to the increase in manpower, partly to the changes in the type of manpower with the addition of people with technical collection experience, partly because of the same changes in the Naval War College mission that founded the CNWS, and partly because of the foresight of Captain Smith. All in all, it made a significant difference.

G. Guy Thomas
Commander, U.S. Navy



The Stars and Stripes, the Perrys, the Armada, and the Bay

The Naval War College Museum, housed in the building where Alfred Thayer Mahan taught his first classes, will present the following special exhibits in the forthcoming months:

- Opening **14 June**, Flag Day, "Naval Flags of the Revolution."
Theme: the evolution of the Stars and Stripes from the demonstrated experience of ships at sea.
- Opening **in July**, "The Perrys of Newport: A Navy Family of the Young Republic."
- Opening **in August**, "The Spanish Armada, 1588."
Purpose: to mark the 400th anniversary of one of the greatest naval campaigns of all time.
- Opening **in the Autumn**: "Genesis of the Navy in Narragansett Bay."