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# Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The Implications for NATO

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Colin S. Gray

**A**mbitious in its purpose, this article seeks to explore the implications for NATO of developments in the Pacific—both in the near term and the far term, and both in peace and in the case of a major failure of deterrence, in war.

This exploration is all about strategic linkages that are certain, near-certain, plausible and implausible. Thoroughly inappropriate though it may be, debates over national security policy, even over alliance and national military strategy, have a way of being focused upon the relatively narrow interests of some of the leading debaters or upon the fashionable issue of the hour. As a consequence, one finds issues and clusters of issues being debated in near isolation and out of context. *For example:*

- There is a major industry of speculative theorizing about the defense of NATO's Central Front, an industry that pays only the most cursory attention to the fact that a Soviet attack in Central Europe would be an attack upon a global maritime alliance. Important, critically important though it would be to hold onto the Central Front, the Soviets do not require lectures on geostrategy to tell them that any war in peninsular Europe would have maritime flanks in the north, the west, the south, and very distantly, in the Far East.

- The Maritime Strategy, evolved in the United States in the 1980s as an integral component of alliance and U.S. national military strategy, is all about the global maneuverability and flexibility of seapower for application as the principal long-suit of the Western maritime alliance against an essentially (though certainly not wholly) landlocked continental power who occupies a vast and overextended fortress position in Eurasia. Nonetheless, many critics—and even a few supporters—of the Maritime Strategy have trivialized debate by insisting that one talks, and one should only talk, about the prospects for military success in a hypothetical Battle of the Norwegian Sea, and about the value of success in the Norwegian Sea for NATO's fate in a very short war.

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Dr. Gray, an expert and a widely known publicist on national security affairs, is President of the National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax, Virginia.

There is a problem of ill-fitting agendas of concern. The most important questions pertain to “where the maps bend.” War is likely to be a combined-arms, all-environments enterprise, waged, as Clausewitz asserted, for the ends of policy. This should be a truism but, in practice, strategy debates appear to be conducted by groups of people with their own maps and with a considerable disdain for the maps of others. Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie made this point twenty years ago in his outstanding study of *Military Strategy*, when he wrote, “I have lamented the fact that there has been too little disciplined effort made to study warfare in its totality.”<sup>1</sup>

The strategic forces subcommunity argues about how many warheads the Soviets can place on an SS-18 (is it 10 or 14?), on the meaning of SDI and “SDIskiy” for strategic deterrence and war, and on just how “rough” rough parity is becoming. But, there is scant effort to relate the strategic nuclear balance to conflict at lower levels. The subcommunity of Central Front debaters has created a rich menu of military possibilities—including counter-attacks eastwards to liberate the Soviets’ allies and foster mutiny among their forces, emerging technologies that might re-create the stalemate that appeared in the early winter of 1914, and proposals for “maneuver warfare” (though some people have noticed that Hitler’s Germany conducted a mobile defense all the way back from the Volga to Berlin).

Yet the concerns of most of the Central Front theorists tend to be narrow ones. Their focus is upon nonnuclear landpower in Europe. In principle they will concede some significance to the engines of long-range nuclear bombardment, and even to the maritime power of NATO, but for them *the war* is on the Central Front and the first, second, and third question is: “Can NATO defeat a Soviet ground-forces and tactical air *Blitzkrieg*?” This question is so pressing that it has a way of crowding off the agenda the paying of any very serious attention to such other questions as: “If NATO does well on the Central Front, what does it do next?”—or: “If NATO fares very badly in a land war in Europe, what happens next?”

It is a dual contention of this article that the deterrence of war in Europe can be influenced importantly, perhaps critically, by Soviet appreciation that they could not choose to wage war only in Europe; and that even if they could unravel NATO’s Central Front after the fashion of the German success with the Manstein Plan in May 1940, the global alliance with which they would be at war would have the means and the will to protract hostilities in ways and in places that should render victory in peninsular Europe a hollow triumph.

Seapower is not exercised as an end unto itself. Nobody inhabits the sea. Admiral Wylie has advised that maritime theory “. . . consists, briefly, of two major parts: the establishment of control of the sea, and the exploitation of the control of the sea toward establishment of control on land.”<sup>2</sup>

The subcommunity of naval theorists and planners has tended to be far more persuasive on the absolute necessity of a maritime alliance establishing

“working command,” or control of the sea lines of communication, than it has on the follow-on subject of the uses of the sea, duly commanded, for deterrence and defense against a preponderantly landpower adversary. The most persistent and strongly worded criticisms of the Maritime Strategy—aside from those relating to the survivability of large carriers—pertain to the interface between seapower and landpower. This is a particularly important matter if one intends, as NATO should, to exercise maritime power for positive as well as negative strategic purposes. If it is the NATO, and more narrowly the U.S. intention to carry the fight to the enemy with power from the sea, it is not sufficient to argue simply that—in East Asia, for example—Western sea and sea-airpower will or should be able to deny the Soviets credible options to interdict sea lines of communication and/or to intimidate the local allies and friends of the United States. In 1892 Alfred T. Mahan posed the following question to the Naval War College class of that year: “All the world knows, gentlemen, that we are building a new navy . . . Well, when we get our navy, what are we going to do with it?”<sup>3</sup>

By logical extension and in a global context, if the Western Alliance controls the seas of greatest strategic significance, then what use does it make of that control against a continental landpower?

### Geopolitics and the Pacific

The Pacific is not merely “out of area” for NATO, it has tended to be very much out of mind. For the most obvious of geographical reasons the United States long has been a Pacific power in a way that has been shared by none of the Great Powers of Europe, including Russia, even during the heyday of their colonial empires. The American interest in East Asia has been sentimental, economic and strategic, while today it is all of these in addition to an ethnic-cultural input from new waves of Asian immigrants.

It might be recalled that the reality of Allied grand strategy, in American performance in World War II, did not quite reflect the principle of “Germany First.” The British Government waged ceaseless, yet not overwhelmingly successful, political guerrilla warfare in the endeavor to discourage the United States from diverting scarce resources from the European theater to the Pacific War. The war in the Pacific was, in reality, an American war, and the more important conflicts and debates in that war over strategy and resources were waged not between state allies, but rather between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army. Fortunately, the Japanese Navy and Army were even less well coordinated in their several military endeavors than were the U.S. Navy and Army. The Pacific orientation of the U.S. Navy and the European orientation of the U.S. Army continues in minor key to this day, and is both a plus and a minus for national military strategy. It is a plus that diversity in geographical orientation and even preference, helps ensure

that some critical opportunities and problems are not neglected. It is a minus in that issues of deterrence and defense may not be treated as coherently as they should be, given the truly global geographical referents of East-West competition.

Before exploring some possible operational implications of strategic relationships in East Asia for deterrence and defense in the NATO area, it is important to recognize some essential facts, and plausible probable facts, about the Pacific Basin. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the center of gravity of world economic—and probably eventually military and political—attention and power, is moving towards the East Asian rimland of the Pacific. For excellent and obvious reasons, most U.S. and NATO-European strategic thinkers have Europe and European waters as the focus of their attention. Given the continuity, indeed increasing potency of the Soviet military threat in and about Europe, this focus is entirely appropriate. Nonetheless, the global context of NATO's security concerns, particularly in East Asia, literally has been transformed since the early 1950s. In the colorful language of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone: "History teaches us that civilizations shift gradually toward the periphery, creating new civilizations as they move. Flourishing civilizations have constantly moved toward the frontier: from Greece to Rome, from Rome to England, France, and Germany, and from Europe to the American colonies. Even within America itself, the torch of civilization advanced westward from the Atlantic to the shores of the Pacific Ocean. The compass needle of history has swung from Mediterranean to Atlantic civilizations. Now it is pointing toward the Pacific. Today there can be no doubt that we are on the verge of a new economic and cultural sphere that, while centered on Japan and the United States, will encompass the Pacific shores in both the northern and southern hemispheres . . . . The Pacific Ocean is becoming the new and historic stage for the drama of human interaction and development."<sup>4</sup>

These are strong, as well as colorful words. But, on the evidence of sustained, albeit recent, economic dynamism, as well as of what history teaches us about the relationship between wealth and power, what the world is witnessing are the early stages of a geopolitical and geostrategic transformation in the international security order in favor of the importance of Asia, and particularly of Northeast Asia.

The economic trends that demonstrate the resurgence of East Asia, following a half-millennium of decline relative to Atlantic-facing Europe (and later the United States), are well known. Suffice it to say that: by the end of the century the countries of the Western Pacific will provide approximately 25 percent of the gross world product; Japan's GNP is fast closing upon the size of the Soviet GNP; and China's GNP, projected out 15-20 years, may well equal that of the Soviet Union today. U.S. trade with East Asia was worth \$42 billion in 1973-1974, but had climbed to \$170 billion 10 years later. In his

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*Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1987*, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger cited the figure of 35 percent as the share of East Asia in total U.S. trade.<sup>5</sup> In economic terms, East Asia today is more important to the United States than is Western Europe, and that fact expresses a trend which seems certain to continue and even accelerate, as China modernizes.

However, economic facts and relationships, vital though they are, do not even begin to comprise a sufficient basis upon which to construct a competent analysis of security questions. In a security context, Japan's wealth is largely defense potential, constrained as she is politically by the decade-old "one-percent solution" for her defense responsibilities. And for China, her wealth remains potential rather than actual as she struggles to implement her four-point modernization program, defense receiving the last priority.

Nonetheless, the trend is plain enough. One may debate the when and the how, but East Asia is in the process of becoming a, and perhaps even *the* predominant, center of world power. The security architecture for this region, and the geostrategic significance of the region for other regions, will change as China modernizes and as Japan adjusts to that trend.

The particular geographical character and sheer scale of the Pacific Basin is a dominating feature of security problems and opportunities in the region. Measured along the Equator, the Pacific extends for 10,000 miles, while north to south it stretches for 8,000 miles. The contemporary economic giant of East Asia, insular Japan, holds a geographical blocking position *vis à vis* most of the principal centers of Soviet maritime power in the region, comparable to that held and exercised by Great Britain relative to German seapower in the first half of this century. Soviet seapower attempting to sortie into the Pacific is obliged by geography to transit the Sōya Strait (between Hokkaidō and Sakhalin), the Tsugaru Strait (between Hokkaidō and Honshū), or the Tsushima Strait (of historical ill-omen for the Soviets, between Honshū and Korea). Passage of the Sōya, or La Pérouse Strait, brings Soviet seapower into the Sea of Okhotsk, whence it would need to effect transit between the Kuril Islands in order to be upon the high seas. The major Soviet naval base on the Kamchatka peninsula at Petropavlovsk has the disadvantages of ice for many months of the year and sheer isolation. It is more than a thousand miles from the nearest railhead.

Geopolitically, the entire Soviet position in Siberia and on the Pacific is flanked on land by China and generally offshore (with the exception of the modest garrison in South Korea) by the United States with its air-seapower anchored in bases in Japan, including Okinawa and the Philippines. For a variety of purposes for peace and war, the Soviets effected a successful, if very isolated, geostrategic leapfrog by establishing a major base complex on the South China Sea at Cam Ranh Bay (and Da Nang). In addition they are working their way towards outflanking their substantially blocked condition in the Pacific by means of developing Petropavlovsk, notwithstanding its

limitations. They are also extending their reach through South Asia to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan, taking advantage of the favorable options that may present themselves in Iran and Pakistan, and the amicable strategic relationship that they have nurtured with India.

Geography is not the same as geopolitics. Geography is only the raw material that suggests strategic possibilities that states may or may not elect, or be able to exercise. Geopolitically, the Soviet position in East Asia would appear to be a very unenviable one. Virtually every Soviet asset east of the Urals may be menaced by the power and ambition (and desire for recompense and revenge for the "unequal treaties" of the 19th century) of a modernized China; their maritime power is liable to confinement in coastal waters by the blocking potential of Japanese geography; their one sovereign naval base on the open ocean is blocked by ice for months at a time and is logistically isolated; while their one warm water port (in Vietnam) is utterly disconnected from potential reinforcement or supporting complementary action, by Chinese geography and the global reach of U.S. naval airpower.

However, all may not be as it seems. It is not so much Japanese geography that could blockade Soviet seapower in the Sea of Japan, but rather the willingness of the Japanese Government to permit the United States to use Japanese territory, waters, and airspace for that purpose, or to provide itself with military means that it would be willing to use for an active and expansive conception of self-defense. Similarly, the Soviets' China problem is a potential nightmare for their defense planners, but operational reality could be very different. The United States cannot assume Chinese cobelligerency in functional, tacit alliance in a global war.

A general difficulty with geopolitical vulnerability analysis is that its precise meaning, as contrasted with its potential meaning, is driven by the political-military context. The armies of Eastern Europe may well mutiny against their Soviet masters, but not in the course of a successful Soviet *Blitzkrieg* that is concluded in two weeks. China could, at the least, behave in a very threatening manner on some portions of her vast frontier with the Soviet Union, and thereby massively distract Soviet military power and attention; but again, not in the context of a war that the Chinese believed or suspected strongly that the Soviets were likely to win.

### Soviet Policy and Anxieties in the Pacific

In a recent important article in *The National Interest*, Professor Alvin Bernstein of the Naval War College painted a somewhat pessimistic and persuasive picture of the trend in Soviet military policy towards, and military deployments in, East and Southeast Asia.<sup>6</sup> He drew attention usefully to the degree to which the new Soviet maritime and air base complex at Cam Ranh Bay (the one that Leonid Brezhnev told Jimmy Carter in 1979 the Soviet Union

would not have) is a breakout from erstwhile Soviet encirclement in East Asia; flanks the Japanese maritime energy lifeline through the Indonesian islands; adds greatly to the sustainability of Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean; serves as a critically important geostrategic offset to the U.S. bases in the Philippines; extends Soviet reach towards Australia; heightens Chinese perceptions of vulnerability; and, in time of acute crisis or war, would have to function as a major complication for the U.S. exercise of its maritime power in the region.

It is important to ask the direct question, "What are the Soviets about in Asia?" Can one identify maximum and minimum Soviet policy goals? And what are the implications of those inferred goals for NATO for deterrence and defense in Europe, and for the United States in its global competition with the Soviet Union? What is a plausible Soviet view of Asia from the perspective of their national security? It will be suggested that Soviet policy is motivated by a mix of defensive and offensive considerations.

First, the Soviet Union is an Asian power by virtue of sovereign territorial holdings, and not merely a power in Asia, like the United States. More than two-thirds of Soviet territory lies in Asia, while fully one-third lies to the east of Irkutsk, beyond Lake Baikal. Ethnically, 50 million-plus Soviet citizens are Asians.

Second, the Soviet Union's economic future lies east of the Urals and, generally speaking, very far east of the Urals. The Soviets need technology and capital to overcome the problems of distance and climate. It so happens that the raw material assets of Siberia are reposing, if not exactly on the doorstep, at least relatively close to the most rapidly growing center of economic activity in the world, in rimland and offshore East Asia.

Third, the Soviet Union cannot be a true world power without being a power of major consequence in the Pacific. For defensive and offensive reasons, the Soviet Union requires the countries of the East Asian rim to take her interests into account, at the very least.

Fourth, the Soviets, in common with the United States, can calculate that the modernization of China, including military modernization on an impressive scale, is likely to alter the geometry of world power, both in and beyond East Asia. Furthermore, the Soviets may suspect, as should Americans, that China is quite likely to succeed the United States as the security patron of Japan. If one were to hazard a prediction, one might well choose to advise policymakers that the architecture for security in Northeast Asia will witness some fundamental changes over the next 50 years.<sup>7</sup> For linked reasons of economic and military security, a Sino-Japanese coalition, as a security community, could be on the horizon. This, to some extent, will be unwelcome to the United States, but it will be considerably more unwelcome to the territorially contiguous power of the U.S.S.R.



One should not need the services of a Mahan or a Mackinder<sup>8</sup> to tell one that time is running out for the rival Soviet-American organization of security politics in East Asia. China's foreign policy role, currently, is generally a strongly positive one in U.S. and NATO perspective; though, of course, today China is playing with a relatively weak hand. The U.S. security role in East Asia is invaluable for China, all the while that she recovers the lost ground (in competitive assets for security) of centuries. But, when one considers the policy a weak China has had the nerve to follow—recall the punitive incursion into Vietnam—one should be moved to speculate that a China that will have rearmed from a thoroughly modern economic base is bound to be the dominant regional power. Japanese politicians are going to be more attentive to the policy views of a regional-superpower Beijing than they are to the concerns of the United States that is a very large ocean away.

Fifth, to return to the present day, the Soviets are only too well aware of the historical facts; first, that Germany lost two wars in this century because she was obliged geopolitically to wage war on at least two fronts. Second, the Soviet Union won the Great Patriotic War both because Japan decided to abide by the neutrality treaty she had signed with Moscow on 13 April 1941, and because Anglo-American seapower distracted the Germans (to the tune of 42 percent of the field divisions of the German Army by mid-1944) and contributed massively to the equipping and feeding of the Red Army.<sup>9</sup>

The Soviets are obliged, courtesy of the fact that their principal current enemy is a maritime superpower with a reasonably well-anchored security reach to Northeast Asia, to believe that they would have to fight on their Pacific rim whether they wanted to or not. The Soviet minimum objective in East Asia is to hold what they have, exposed as it is, along and at the end of a single railroad line (the Baikal-Amur line still is not functioning), and to discourage further security cooperation by regional states with the United States. The maximum objective in peacetime must be so to intimidate *or entice* the regional powers that they will “tilt,” as the saying goes, towards political and economic cooperation with Moscow, and step back from much of the military cooperation, formal and tacit, that exists today among the United States and the countries of the region. Needless to say, both the rigidly negative Soviet stance regarding Japan's “lost territories” at the southern end of the highly strategic Kuril Islands' chain, and the Soviets' underwriting of Vietnam's regional imperialism, are considerable hindrances to a Soviet policy line of friendly engagement with key players at geographically opposite ends of the region.

### Europe and the Pacific: The Strategic Connection

The enormous Soviet military buildup in East Asia since the mid-1960s—initially from 1965 to 1977, along and oriented towards the border with

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China; and then, from 1978 to the present, oriented outwards to secure military and consequentially political reach through the length and breadth of the region—reflects both the changing Soviet view of the inherent importance of the area and, more generally, an evolving theory of future war.

It is as plain as anything can be concerning Soviet military policy—which is to say it is not to be assumed in the West with great confidence—that they have been posturing themselves to seek ever-greater imperial security through the agency of intimidation in peace and crisis-time (that is what the extraordinary, large SS-20 deployments are all about). *In extremis*, it would provide the means for a swift conventional victory should they ever feel compelled to fight. The overriding role of nuclear weapons in the Soviet arsenal, at all levels of potential conflict, is counterdeterrence. They hope to be able to dissuade the West from introducing nuclear weapons into a conflict.

It is not assumed here that any East-West war would be entirely nonnuclear, any more than prudent Soviet leaders could assume the same. However, if nuclear deemphasis is an enduring trend in Soviet operational preferences, which it probably is, it behooves NATO to consider its strengths and weaknesses for the deterrence and, if need be, the actual conduct of a conventional conflict.

The Soviets should understand—but because their military tradition and culture is that of a landpower, perhaps they do not, at least not fully—that their potential enemy is a Europe-focused alliance led by *the* first-class superpower that is, of geostrategic necessity, a maritime superpower who knits together, albeit perhaps uneasily, security structures in Europe with those in East Asia.

The dominant Soviet operational military experience was the contest with German landpower in a single-theater war from 1941 to 1945. The Germany that the Soviets beat in their genuinely heroic endeavors in World War II: posed a powerful threat only from the Baltic to the Black Sea; lacked armament in depth; was critically short of motor vehicles for mobility; was compelled by Anglo-American maritime and, eventually, air supremacy to divert scarce assets on a massive scale to garrison *Festung Europa* in the north, the west, and the south, and directly to defend the airspace of the Reich; was hindered by unreliable and ill-armed allies; was commanded by a man totally out of touch with reality—need one go on? The point is that even for a Soviet General Staff reared in the glorious shadow of the achievements of 1941–45, it should be distressingly plain that their potential enemy today is about as different from the enemy of yesterday as one could imagine.

In any future major war, the Soviets must worry about:

- nuclear escalation that could rob them of the fruits of victory;<sup>10</sup>
- the fact that, unlike Hitler's Germany, their enemy this time would be a coalition that quite literally dwarfs them in economic strength (that is to say in defense mobilization *potential*);

- the fact that, this time, *they* would be the coalition leader with fundamentally unreliable allies;
- the fact that this time their enemy would have global maritime mobility and, in most likely circumstances, would press the conflict in geographically very disparate theaters of war.

One should not suggest that by forward military action against the Soviet Union in the Pacific, the Western Alliance could find sufficient leverage for favorable war termination in the context of a disaster in the European theater. Far from it. But what is suggested here is that the West should capitalize upon its inherent strengths in designing a strategy that both threatens, plausibly, to undo Soviet strategy, and with which it could live were the United States and her allies ever obliged to execute it. That strategy has to be keyed to relative economic strength for competitive defense mobilization, to protraction of the conflict in time, and to the extension of the conflict geographically. Critical prerequisites for the global strategy that the author has in mind are: first, the provision of an all-level nuclear counterdeterrent (that is a *sine qua non*); and second, provision for NATO in Europe of a reasonably assured capability to deny the Soviets a *Blitzkrieg* victory in the span of days or a few weeks.

The Soviet military buildup in Asia, the 52 divisions, the augmentation of the Pacific Fleet (it has doubled in size since 1965), the creation of a new Far Eastern theater command organization (in 1978), the deployment of the full panoply of nuclear assets and so forth, certainly can and should be seen in the context of the diplomacy of peacetime and crisis-time influence. However, that buildup also should be seen in light of the relatively new Soviet belief that a future war may well be nonnuclear and—despite their best efforts—may be protracted. The focus of a future war undoubtedly would be in Europe, at least initially. But the Soviets would have every incentive to attempt to discourage the powers of East Asia from adopting any position more unfriendly than strict neutrality and physically to contest forward U.S. action in the region. In the context of war, the Soviets must have a damage-limitation philosophy regarding their position in the Pacific. They must know that their Far Eastern command will be on its own. Moscow, most likely, would neither have ready military assets to spare for the Far East, nor any reliable means of transporting any resupply or reinforcements save perhaps by air.

A U.S. forward strategy on the Pacific rim must be of benefit to NATO in Europe in:

- helping deny the Soviets any repeat of their November 1941 tactic of “swinging” divisions from Siberia to the Western Front;
- encouraging China (and others) not to issue assurances—and take reassuring military actions (withdrawal from border zones, for example)—of neutrality;

- encouraging Japan to resist Soviet threats and to adopt an expansive definition of her policy of self-defense;
- denying the Soviets the maritime and air options of blockading the Japanese economy; and,
- hopefully so weakening the Soviet grip on their empire on the Pacific that the net outcome of the conflict in the Pacific theater would be a strong plus for the West in any negotiations on conditions for war termination.

## Conclusions

East Asia, with particular reference to China and Japan, has, and more to the point, will have, the economic strength to create a new security order for Asia.

It is more likely than not that Japan will drift from the United States towards a new Chinese security orbit, and that U.S. influence in the Western Pacific gradually will decline—ultimately to a low level.

A Sino-Japanese coalition will be as opposed to Soviet hegemony in East Asia as those countries and the United States are today. Furthermore, with reference to classic balance of power mechanics, NATO in Europe will have no more sincere a well-wisher than an emergent regional superpower in East Asia.

At the present time and for decades to come, the United States and NATO Europe should attempt to wean themselves away from strategic (over) dependence on (self-detering) nuclear threats. The extended deterrent of the United States should not be an insane contingent promise to implement some facsimile of “Apocalypse Now,” in the event of impending defeat in a short war in Central Europe. Instead, NATO should adjust, albeit belatedly, to the unfavorable changes of the past two decades in all levels of the nuclear balance, and determine to acquire a genuine capability to stop any Soviet nonnuclear Schlieffen Plan in its tracks, conventionally.

The Soviets should be encouraged to recognize: that nuclear use would be self-defeating; that a short war, even a short war in Europe, would be beyond their ability to guarantee; and that the most probable scenario would be a long war waged globally against the giants of the world economy who would have the maritime strength to mass for attack at times and places of their choosing. This, admittedly, is a tall order. But what is the alternative?

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## Notes

I am grateful to my colleague, Roger W. Barnett, for permitting me to see and borrow lightly from his (as yet) unpublished paper, “The Pacific: An Oceanic Geostrategic Theater.” For further treatment of questions of global maritime strategy, see my *Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1986); and “Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy for a Maritime America,” *The National Interest*, Summer 1986, pp. 24-36.

1. J.C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980, 1st ed., 1967), p. 31.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

3. Quoted in Philip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 466.

4. Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Foreign Policy and Constitutional Views," *Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 1983, p. 4.

5. Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1987* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 5 February 1986), p. 276.

6. Alvin H. Bernstein, "The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay," *The National Interest*, Spring 1986, pp. 17-29.

7. Particularly useful is Robert S. Ross, "China's Strategic Role in Asia," in James W. Morley, ed., "The Pacific Basin: New Challenges for the United States," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, v. 36, no. 1, 1986, pp. 116-128.

8. Sir Halford J. Mackinder, British geographer and geopolitical theorist (1861-1947), author of the "Heartland" thesis. See Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Norton, 1962, 1st ed., 1942); and W.H. Parker, *Mackinder: Geography as an aid to statecraft* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

9. See Albert Seaton, *The Russo-German War, 1941-45* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 588-590.

10. See C.N. Donnelly, *Heirs of Clausewitz: Change and Continuity in the Soviet War Machine*, Occasional Paper No. 16 (London, England: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1985), pp. 20, 21, 29-30.

