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Scraps of Paper: The Disarmament Treaties between the World Wars.

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wish to keep the torch of sea power alight.

Although his primary focus is on policy issues in the corridors of Whitehall, Grove provides a fairly full description of naval operations in peace, crisis, and war throughout the period. Sparing us no detail, he also describes the various classes of ship by which staff officers have sought to meet the strategic requirements of the day, and some classes which (thankfully) never progressed beyond the drawing board. Some readers will find this technical detail excessive, blurring the clarity of the main theme.

There will be an inevitable quibble about the quality of his sources. In Great Britain, the "Thirty Year Rule" is alive and well. When dealing with the period up to 1954, therefore, the author is on firm ground and has access to authoritative documents in the public record. Thereafter he relies inevitably on biography, interview (not always impartial), and anecdote. Nevertheless, as a two-term Whitehall warrior during the late seventies and early eighties and witness of the infamous John Nott Defense Review, I found his treatment of the issues convincing. He captures exactly the atmosphere of crisis, the shooting from the hip, the far-reaching decisions required overnight, and the shifting bureaucratic alliances from which "policy" emerges.

Where does the post-Falklands Royal Navy go from here? Eric Grove takes the conventional and

pessimistic viewpoint. He sees little scope for any increase in general defense spending, and he views Britain's pattern of trade and interest as increasingly Eurocentric. In this context Grove believes Britain's continental commitment, the Army of the Rhine and RAF Germany, to be sacrosanct, leaving maritime forces exposed and vulnerable to the Treasury axe. At the same time, he argues, institutional changes within the Ministry of Defense, and particularly the concentration of power in the hands of the Central (Joint) Staff will tend to dilute the expression of the naval viewpoint.

This book is required reading for anyone starting a career in the Ministry of Defense. Despite its British setting (and the author presupposes more than average knowledge of British governmental administrative practice) any U.S. Navy officer destined for the Pentagon should read it too. You have been warned.

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Hyde, Harlow A. *Scraps of Paper: The Disarmament Treaties between the World Wars*. Lincoln, Neb.: Media Publishing, 1988. 456pp. \$18.95

At a time when the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be moving toward important arms control agreements, Harlow A. Hyde has produced this provocative book on the efforts of the great

powers during the interwar years (1919-1939) to limit naval armaments. Hyde's book is not footnoted, but it is clear from his text and bibliography that he has read extensively in the basic published materials and has achieved a considerable command of factual information.

Hyde's *Scraps of Paper* are the Washington Five Power Naval Treaty of 1922, the London Naval Treaties of 1930 and 1936, and the other basic treaties and agreements that the major powers concluded during these years to promote peace and understanding. The innocents in this book are the Americans, who accepted and honestly observed the treaties that, in the author's view, may actually have contributed to the breakout of World War II. Hyde describes the Japanese as the leading villains, to whom he attributes lying and deceit in almost every one of their recorded actions. He delights in recounting the alleged "dirty tricks" by which Japan emerged to become the terror of East Asia. He fails to note, however, that practically every "aggressive" action by Japan found a precedent in the actions of the enlightened powers of the West during the Age of Imperialism.

He dismisses the Four Power Pact of 1921-22, relating to the Pacific, as a "miserable excuse for a treaty" that arose from the inability of Britain and Japan to end the equally miserable Anglo-Japanese Alliance without, "in effect," having the United States join it. The Nine Power Pact in support of the Open Door to an independent China is one

of those bad treaties that proved worse than no treaty, according to Hyde. He suggests that by the Five Power Naval Treaty, the United States surrendered to Japan military supremacy in the Western Pacific, a supremacy that the Japanese could not otherwise have achieved short of fighting for it. This naval treaty included the infamous Article XIX by which the United States gave up its right to build up bases and fortifications in Guam and the Philippines in return for comparable pledges from Britain and Japan that governed their Pacific island holdings.

Having thus dismissed the achievements of the Washington Conference, Hyde turns to the "miserable" 1930 London Naval Treaty that, he regrets, actually left Japan with 70 percent of the cruiser tonnage allowed the United States, and parity in submarines. The 1936 London Naval Treaty, which was confined to setting limits on tonnages and guns for various classes of ships, is seen by the author as a futile exercise of the democracies to limit armament by example.

Hyde describes in some detail Japan's programs to build "gyp cruisers" that initially were about 10 percent heavier than the 10,000 ton limit allowed under the Washington naval treaty. This reviewer does not believe, however, that Japanese cruiser building was as significant as does Hyde in sparking heavy cruiser construction by Britain and the United States. The Japanese throughout the twenties were model

participants at the naval conferences when the French and British were at odds over submarines and the Americans and British confronted each other on cruisers.

Without volunteering evidence other than an item from the *New York Times* in 1945 and rumors noted by Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in his diary of 1933, Hyde claims that beginning with a naval base at Truk in 1930, the Japanese built fortifications in the Mandated Islands that cost the lives of thousands of young Americans during World War II. In April 1955, 10 years after Japan's surrender, Thomas Wilds published a very factual report in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* in which he stated that Japan had scrupulously observed her nonfortification agreements until about 1934, the year she gave notice of her intent to abrogate the naval treaties. For five years thereafter, the Imperial Navy undertook harbor, airfield, and other development useful for either civilian or military purposes. Apparently, Japan began to build strictly military facilities in the islands only about two years before Pearl Harbor.

The author also denounces Japan for refusing entry to U.S. naval ships into the Mandated Islands in alleged violation of the American-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911, which was extended to include the islands in a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan in 1922. The 1911 treaty did permit free entry of American ships into Japanese ports that were open to foreign commerce. For a good part of the interwar

period, Japan agreed to permit American naval ships to visit ports in the Mandates that she herself had opened, but she did not agree that American naval ships could freely call at any island or atoll that the United States for its own purposes might select. Hyde suggests that the Mandates problem could have been resolved in 1935 by a surgical strike to relieve Japan of the islands on the grounds that she had stolen them from the League of Nations!

The author insists that he would approve arms control agreements providing they satisfy four requirements: that all types of "strategic" weapons be limited, that the agreements be verifiable, that they be verified, and that they be subject to review and updating at periodic intervals. To demonstrate his acceptance of arms control, he commends the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 by which the boundary between the United States and Canada has been demilitarized for over 160 years. That agreement today would not meet Hyde's four basic requirements.

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Halpern, Paul G. *The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 631pp. \$29.95

Historians of the war at sea from 1914-1918 traditionally focus on the activities of the major belligerents,