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A Question of Trust: The Origins of U.S.-Soviet Relations; The Memoirs of Loy W. Henderson

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rent. The political value of Britain's nuclear forces is not well addressed. The book lacks substantial discussion of submarine intelligence missions, probably inevitable because of the classification of the data on such missions. The final chapter is an attempt to apply the "Principles of War" to determine the future of underwater warfare. Their effort is not entirely successful and a summary of the authors' recommendations would be more useful.

On the whole the book is a credible effort to provide readers with a broad picture of submarine warfare. The writing is a little uneven, sometimes very informal and sometimes very dense, and the use of British examples can slow a non-British reader down a bit. Short vignettes of submarine life are scattered throughout the chapters and provide interesting sidelights on submarine operations. Most of the information is available elsewhere, but it is packaged well in this book.

EDWARD H. ALEXANDER
Captain, U.S. Navy

Baer, George, ed. *A Question of Trust: The Origins of U.S.-Soviet Relations; The Memoirs of Loy W. Henderson*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1987. 579pp. \$44.95

The memoirs of Loy Henderson, one of the designers of the U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union before and after the Second World War, is an insightful reservoir of information. His writing is elegant

and bears a remarkable stylistic similarity to Henry Kissinger's two recent volumes. Judgments are expressed with subtlety, and personalities, some of which are legendary, are described with understanding and sympathy.

Henderson dwells on the events surrounding the U.S. recognition of the U.S.S.R. in 1933 and the deteriorating relationship that followed, the Stalin purges, and Soviet attempts to avoid a German attack. His incisive description of the Soviet goal of world domination raises the hard question of whether that goal has changed. Indeed, it appears to persist with compromises or deviations occurring only where overriding parochial national interests are threatened. Henderson noted in 1939 that the ultimate aim of Soviet rulers was "to enlarge the Soviet Union and to include under the Soviet system additional peoples and territories." Their tactics were to "hold intact the territory already under their control" and to "increase as rapidly as possible the economic and military might of that territory." Brezhnev said the same thing to Kissinger when he stated "what we get, we keep."

Henderson brings an American point of view to the posturing of Britain and France on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, in the face of the growing Nazi threat. The British and the French clearly wished to avoid an attack against them, as did the Soviets. Each hoped for the best at the expense of the others. Indeed, the Soviets are portrayed as fearing nothing as much

as a reconciliation between Germany and France.

Stalin's failure to honor promises given Roosevelt in 1933 when recognition of Soviet Russia was granted; the treatment accorded the population of the U.S.S.R., including the murders of nonbelievers; and the purges, described in horrifying human terms, that consolidated Stalin's power, all prevented any meaningful pre-war U.S. initiative toward cooperation with Russia in opposing the Germans. Had the Germans believed such cooperation possible, the war might have been averted.

The events surrounding the Nazi-Soviet pact that ensured the invasion of Poland are also described firsthand and it is here that Henderson places Soviet goals in focus. During the war Stalin proclaimed to have abandoned the search for world domination in favor of more immediate self-interest. But, once the war was over, he quickly returned to the domination theme. Henderson's perspective of history and his recall of the statements of the leaders he met are extremely useful in placing current Russian efforts in context.

The men and events seen and witnessed by Henderson have been examined thoroughly in other publications, but no portraits appear fresher or more keenly observed than here. And Henderson's account is made even more appealing by the number of anecdotes he includes, such as the memorable story of Colonel Isabel, the chief of staff of the "American-Lithuanian Legion."

Isabel was sent to ensure the independence of that country between the wars. Concerned that the British would not consider the Americans real fighters, he acted to allay those fears at a dinner party given in his honor. To the horror of a British general's wife seated on his right, he finished a toast by chewing his glass down to the stem, and then stuck hat pins through both arms and cheeks, all the while staring at his lucky omen, which he had leaned against his saucer—a shrunken head from South America. Needless to say, his performance was convincing. So, too, are Henderson's and editor Baer's. It is only unfortunate that the price of this fascinating volume is so high, otherwise, it might reach a much wider audience.

RICHARD E. RIEDER
Essex, Connecticut

Pogue, Forrest C. *George C. Marshall: Statesman 1945-1959*. New York: Viking, 1987. 603pp. \$29.95

With this volume, Forrest Pogue cements his place alongside such giant biographers as Douglas Southall Freeman and Carl Sandburg. Pogue's task is particularly challenging in that he is forced to place relatively recent and complex events into an integrated historical context. He is successful and this volume reminds us of the stage that was set for the uncertain world in which we live today.

At Princeton in 1947, Marshall called for understanding the lessons