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Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security

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wargames. One realizes with a start that the appreciable differences between reality and these games is probably quite similar to the differences between a real war and a Pentagon simulation.

Prados does not state that wargames have no utility, only that now, during a period of peak interest in gaming technologies, they are being used far in excess of their abilities to predict anything real. Commanders who play wargames are often lulled into believing that they have had real battlefield experience, when in reality they have nothing of the sort. The true strength of wargames lies in their ability to inculcate basic tactical concepts into field commanders and to give the experience of making command decisions to higher level officials. To claim that a wargame, however complex, simulates the actual events of a war is the purest fantasy.

HENRY W. MAHNCKE
Washington, D.C.

Burrows, William E. *Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security*. New York: Random House, 1987. 401pp. \$19.95

As impelled by the title, William Burrows takes the reader on a fantastic, sometimes disconcerting, and often incredible journey into the deepest reaches of the so-called black world of the U.S. intelligence community. He approaches the subject with the zeal of an investigative reporter preparing an exposé and the

plodding style of a graduate student writing a history seminar paper. His uneven handling of this material, while a distraction, fortunately does not detract from the fundamentally solid nature of the book.

Mr. Burrows begins and ends his book with the same thesis. According to him, "[I]n the case of arms control, it is important for the citizens of the Western democracies to grasp enough of the process of the national technical means of verification and about space surveillance in general so that they can make informed judgments on the matter, rather than abandon such an important subject to the whims of successive politicians and their subordinate ideologues."

Despite the title, this work addresses much more than just the business of "space espionage and national security." The contents of the book range from a continuing discourse on the competition between the U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for control of U.S. space-based reconnaissance assets, to a review of the growth of the U-2 and SR-71 programs, to rather elaborate (and one suspects sometimes speculative) discussions of past, present, and future space surveillance systems. The author even includes a discussion of the Soviet space reconnaissance programs and antisatellite weapons as he and his sources understand them. The technical descriptions make for fascinating reading, and the conviction with which Mr. Burrows describes the sophisticated equipment makes one believe that the

systems described could indeed do what he says they do. Unfortunately, the secrecy that shrouds such technology makes it virtually impossible to verify even the existence of these systems, not to mention their capabilities.

If the information presented is correct, as Mr. Burrows alleges, there is much that the intelligence community can point to with pride. The author examines in some detail how the developers of space-based surveillance systems continually push technology to the very limits in their search for a better way to gather the information demanded by the National Command Authority. There is also a great deal about the U.S. intelligence collection process that should be an embarrassment to the Government. Mr. Burrows does not seem to find fault with the trial and error methods employed in the pursuit of new technology. Rather, he criticizes the apparently unnecessary competition between agencies within the Government as each tries to best the other through its design contractors. His contention that secrecy often is used to hide inefficiency and a lack of cooperation between Government organizations is the heart of his criticism and is well-documented.

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of this book is the reader's inability to confirm the accuracy of the author's statements. It is the nature of such works that the sources who are willing to discuss (for attribution) their experiences are often those who have expressed dissenting views,

either during their tenure "on the inside," or after they have left the Government. This may mark them as "rabble-rousers" or "sore losers," and cast some doubt on their comments. The use of unnamed inside sources or expert sources who are outside of the system, while lending credibility, still falls short of confirming the accuracy of the author's allegations. Thus, the reader is left to decide for him/herself exactly where the truth lies.

In this book, the author has resorted on several occasions to the technique of "validation by condemnation." That is, he cites a well-placed individual who expressed fear or anger at the revelations being offered and then implies to the reader that this is proof of the accuracy of those revelations. This is an appealing argument and may have some basis in fact. The author's use of buzzwords and certain documentable facts also has the effect of lending credibility to what might otherwise be called innuendo or speculation. A good example of this is his habit of referring to space reconnaissance programs (real and postulated) by declassified or compromised code names that have appeared in the open press. This gives him the aura of someone on the inside, in spite of his acknowledgment that his data has been gathered from available unclassified sources.

The underlying motivation for this book is revisited convincingly in the final chapter. Mr. Burrows concludes his examination of the growth of the various "national technical means of

verification'' with an intriguing enigma. His questions are simple and straightforward. If the United States has been able to detect and identify Soviet violations of previously negotiated arms control agreements through the use of the aforementioned national technical means, why do current Government officials contend that future arms control agreements are impossible because they would be vulnerable? If past systems have been sufficient to support allegations of Soviet treaty violations, why would the present and future surveillance systems described in this book be unsuited to the task of treaty monitoring in the future? The questions are good ones, no matter how one feels about the factual content of the rest of the book. The average reader will be left with an uncomfortable feeling that perhaps there is indeed something that the Government is not telling the American public. If that feeling persists, Mr. Burrows will have achieved his objective.

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Lockhart, Robin Bruce. *Reilly: The First Man*. New York: Penguin Books, 1987. 167pp. \$3.95

Readers who enjoyed Lockhart's *Reilly: Ace of Spies* will want to read his sequel, *Reilly: The First Man. Ace of Spies* was made into a TV mini-series and, in the final episode, after learning his fate from the Cheka (Soviet secret police) boss, the dreaded Feliks Dzherzhinsky,

Reilly is gunned down in a forest clearing.

In his new book, Lockhart reveals the disagreement he had with the series' producers about this ending. He wanted the series to end as the book did, with Reilly's fate wrapped in mystery. In reality, the original Russian news version of Reilly's death stated that he had been killed on the Soviet-Finnish frontier in September 1925. But, there has never been an official Soviet statement that Reilly died at the hands of Soviet authorities.

Lockhart's sequel makes the startling claim that Reilly not only was not killed, but in fact defected to the Soviet side and for the next two decades assisted Soviet intelligence in setting up and running foreign clandestine operations. Lockhart's new book is a storehouse of evidence to support this unsettling thesis.

Why should it be unsettling that Sigmund Rosenblum (Reilly's real name) was not shot by Dzherzhinsky's fanatics, but ended up working for them? What importance would this have other than tidying up a footnote in the narrow and murky *demimonde* of espionage history? According to Lockhart, it is extremely important because Reilly's defection to the Soviets over 60 years ago so damaged Western security interests that the consequences are still with us today. Such was the evil fruit of Reilly's change of uniform that Western intelligence agencies, especially the British, have been crippled by the implantation of a coven of moles or by a suspicion of moles which has