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## To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America

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ing the author's) in combat; "How Courage is Spent in War"; and a discourse on "The Care and Management of Fear."

The author suggests that there are four degrees of courage, and four orders of men measured by that standard: men who did not feel fear; men who felt fear but did not show it; men who felt fear *and* showed it, but did their job; and men who felt fear, showed it and shirked. He notes that few men spent their trench lives with their feet firmly planted on one rung of this ladder. The story of modern war is concerned with the striving of men eroded by fear, attempting to maintain a precarious footing on the upper rungs of this ladder.

Courage, character, leadership and fortitude in war are important. Ultimately, however, it is the nation's attitude towards its military that is paramount. Is the citizen full of pride and "hot loyalty" when he either joins or is conscripted into the armed services? Does it give him prestige among his fellow countrymen to be seen in uniform? The answers to these questions may ultimately imprint on his courageous instincts, and may well determine the victory or defeat of a nation in time of war.

This is not a handy reference guide for those solely interested in augmenting leadership skills. Rather, it is only for those with requisite degrees of sensitivity, sympathy and empathy. It is for those who seek greater insight into the sublime complexities of human emotion

under the duress of wartime passage through the real-time equivalent of the biblical "Valley of the Shadow of Death."

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Chambers, John Whiteclay II. *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America*. New York: The Free Press, 1987. 386pp. \$24.95

This is an extremely interesting and successful book when it does not vary from its subject. Almost entirely about the advent of conscription in World War I, two short chapters in the beginning cover 1907-1914, and two short chapters at the end cover 1918-1988. The remaining 165 pages discuss 1914-1918. Indeed, Professor Chambers prefigures this concentration in his preface, which concludes: "It was in World War I that the modern draft first came to America."

Chambers' description of the advent of the draft of 1917 is fascinating. It casts useful light on the history of the prewar period, but it also contains much to help the reader understand present attitudes toward the draft and national service in American society. Before World War I, public attitudes in the United States were largely conditioned by recollection of the Civil War draft, with its infamous excesses and evasions. Furthermore, powerful groups, like the National Guard Association (NGA), opposed con-

scription. In the case of the NGA, it was less an aversion to compulsion than to being displaced as the nation's number one reserve force that led to their position. Basically the nation had little experience with conscription, and World War I posed an unprecedented challenge. Ultimately that challenge and the national response, in many ways conditioned by social change, led to a draft and, by implication, a military establishment very different from anything in our national experience up to that time. In fact, Chambers points out, only 8 percent of those serving in the Union army in the Civil War were draftees, whereas 72 percent of those serving in World War I were.

Chambers is at his best in describing "this new, internationally oriented, cosmopolitan expansionist elite which was responsible for the preparedness movement and its key military component, the conscription crusade." This group, led by men like Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood, pursued a goal of universal military training (UMT) and service, both in order to provide large military forces in keeping with their interventionist interests, and also as a tool for the socialization of American youth, a large segment of whom were at that time immigrants. The opposition, a ragtag collection of pacifists, socialists, agrarians, immigrants, industrial workers, members of women's movements, and the like, was able to stave off universal military training, but the arguments of the conscriptionists

eased the way for the ultimate and probably inevitable adoption of the military draft in 1917. Ironically, it was Theodore Roosevelt's desire to raise and lead several volunteer divisions in France that led President Wilson to request authority to begin conscription shortly after America entered the war. Wilson was not inclined to allow an independent character like Roosevelt to career around France in command of an elite expeditionary force. Roosevelt's arguments about the equity and efficiency of the draft thus came home in an entirely unintended fashion, and his offer was turned down.

While the better part of the book is interesting and useful, Professor Chambers' footing is less sure as he attempts to extrapolate from the World War I experience to the present. In his preface cited above, he devotes the bulk of his commentary to issues that relate to whether the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) can meet the nation's military needs, and will be consistent with its social traditions. These interesting and legitimate questions are relevant to the World War I experience, but the 30 pages devoted to the history of the draft since 1920 is scarcely adequate to support an in-depth analysis of our current situation similar to the way his scholarship has illuminated the situation facing President Wilson in 1917. Thus, some of his commentary will strike at least some readers as strange. For example, he treats as a serious issue the question of whether the country could prosecute a major

war with volunteers. Nobody really believes that it could, nor was the AVF ever intended to be able to do such a thing. Should the need arise, the Reserves would be mobilized and the Congress would be asked for authority to activate the standby draft. The real question is whether the peacetime armed forces should be all volunteer or mixed volunteer/conscript. And as to this question, in spite of the thin treatment during the last 68 years, Chambers offers an absolutely correct observation: "As the postwar experience has shown, the difficulty of achieving a durable American format is more than military."

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Fox, J. Ronald with Field, James L.  
*The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition*. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1988. 348pp. \$24.95

"Superb but depressing" is probably the best way to describe *The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition*. Everyone concerned about America's future should understand the material contained in this book. Our national security depends upon our ability to develop, procure, and support effective and appropriate weapons systems. This book does an excellent job of indicating how the weapons acquisition process really works, what its more important problems are, what approaches have

been tried in past efforts to improve the process and why they have had such little impact.

The book begins with a succinct description of the U.S. defense establishment and its complicated acquisition process. Then it examines the varied roles of the government personnel involved in the weapons acquisition process. It includes congressmen and senators, secretaries and assistant secretaries within DoD and the military services, senior military officers and civilians in the Pentagon, program managers and contracting officers, and both military officers and civilians at all management levels. It discusses interactions among these different groups, as well as career considerations for both civilian and military personnel who take part in weapons acquisition. It also addresses the relationships between DoD and industry as well as their impact on the acquisition process. Throughout the book, past proposals for improving defense acquisition are identified and reasons for their limited impact examined. The focus is on financial aspects of weapons acquisition, not on technical capabilities of the weapon systems.

The authors, Fox the senior, Field the junior, are extremely well-qualified to address this subject. Few people have been both personally and academically involved in Army, Air Force, and Navy acquisition processes; but the primary author has been. J. Ronald Fox's interest in this subject began almost 30 years ago when he became involved in design-