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To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991

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has not delivered on his promise to offer a corrective to our understanding of British naval strategy in the period 1803-1805, he has provided a good account of French plans, preparation, and operations. Despite this book's flaws, it also places the fleet movements that ultimately led to the battle of Trafalgar within a larger strategic context.

JOHN MAURER
Naval War College

Howarth, Stephen. *To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991*. New York: Random House, 1991. 563pp. \$25

Stephen Howarth has provided an entertaining and readable work that is helpful in combining personal experiences and knowledge with the history of the navy as a whole. Written by a Briton, it is a history with a different view of our institution's historical wake. Reading it, one is reminded that many current problems have been around for many years. For example North African pirates and postwar budget cuts are nothing new, but it is instructive and sometimes entertaining to learn how these problems were handled in the past. Howarth has offered a single neatly focused and explicit volume of 214 turbulent years of history.

From the other side of the Atlantic the author writes lovingly of "our" navy and its heroes, with a palpable reluctance to step on America's toes. Unlike the navy's benefactors and heroes, those few characters who

attract his scorn do not have ships named after them—with one notable exception, Albert Gallatin, Jefferson's secretary of the treasury. Gallatin was notorious for cutting the navy budget, so it is appropriate that the ship which bears his name is a coast guard cutter.

Howarth can be forgiven for comparing American naval history to the British experience at sea and for quoting his own admirals. However, he is on target in employing a famous Nelsonian remark in defense of Admiral Halsey at the Battle of Leyte Gulf: "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy." He explains the controversy over Halsey's action, but he does not maintain the same balance in having apparently interviewed only Admiral Elmo Zumwalt to describe that officer's polemical years as Chief of Naval Operations in the early seventies.

To Shining Sea has changed my perspective of the U.S. Navy's history and of my own thirty-year participation in it. For example, I never knew before reading this book that the six Russian submarines discovered in the vicinity of Cuba in October 1962 actually surfaced at American request in obedience to orders from Moscow. This reviewer was witness to a Foxtrot surfacing off the north coast of Cuba; I had thought we had hounded them to exhaustion.

Another personal story: Howarth describes how after the battle off Santiago in the Spanish-American War of 1898 the Spanish admiral was fished out of the water hatless and shoeless. When he arrived on the quarterdeck

of the American ship that rescued him, he was cheered for a full minute by the American sailors. In 1988 I spent seven weeks at sea aboard the Spanish aircraft carrier *Principe de Asturias*. The executive officer, Commander Jaime Cervera, jokingly remarked, "My great grandfather Pascual was a 'guest' of the U.S. Navy in Annapolis for two years after 1898." Pascual Cervera was the same water-logged Spanish admiral who had stood on deck of the USS *Iowa* to the cheers of the American sailors and who had indeed been imprisoned in Annapolis. It would have eased my mind that day if I had known that we had treated him so well the day of his capture.

There are one or two discrepancies I would like to mention. First, the leader of the USS *Enterprise* dive-bomber attack on the three Japanese carriers at Midway was better known as "Wade" McClusky than as Clarence. Second, there were three carrier groups, not two, in the Aleutian exercises of 1982: those of the *Midway*, *Coral Sea*, and *Enterprise*.

The author brings to mind things I had learned long ago and had forgotten, but I also found information I had never known—the most important being that while we professionals understand the need for a U.S. Navy, the public must be repeatedly educated to gain this appreciation. (After every war the United States reduces the fleet and sends the sailors home.)

It will not have been a waste of time and effort for any officer who reads this book.

S.L. TURNER
Captain, U.S. Navy

Barnet, Richard J. *The Rockets' Red Glare: When America Goes to War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990. 442pp. (No price given).

Richard Barnet has described his study as the story of "the role the American people have played in the critical decisions of war and peace." The text is divided into four eras, based upon the primary national interest of the time: the Federalist period (steering clear of the Napoleonic wars); the nineteenth century (westward expansion); the Colonial period (expansion of empire at the turn of the twentieth century); and World War I to the present (saving Europe from dictatorial rule while picking up the mantle of world leadership). The book is therefore an examination of the relationship between presidential conduct in foreign policy and the will of the people.

Rulers of the past had usually managed to ignore the will of the people. Foreign policy was the business of kings. However, as a result of foreign policy's crucial impact on the American Revolution, a strong interest in it developed throughout the United States. Therefore, from the beginning each president has been forced to consider the impact of public opinion regarding foreign policy decisions. It was quickly learned that