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Visions of Infamy

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More significant than failed leadership was the operational flaw in the Anzio planning. The distance between the main Allied forces at Cassino and the Anzio beachhead was too great to allow for mutual support. Both the author and Martin Blumensohn (in the army's official history) point out that neither sector could influence the other. In short, the operation had been doomed from the beginning.

In the final analysis Anzio was a campaign marked by ineffective leadership at the highest levels. Too few forces allocated to Shingle jeopardized the attainment of even limited objectives. Moreover, the Allied operational and tactical commanders failed to exert the proper supervision and battlefield audacity that was required to ensure military success. The author claims that only the enemy leader possessed the ability to choose instinctively the right course of action on the field of battle.

Perhaps d'Este makes his greatest contribution in assessing the Anzio campaign as part of the overall Allied strategy in the Mediterranean. Was it worth 85,000 Allied battle and non-battle casualties? The author leaves such judgments to us.

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Honan, William H. *Visions of Infamy: The Untold Story of How Journalist Hector C. Bywater Devised the Plan*

that Led to Pearl Harbor. New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 346pp. \$22.95

Bywater, Hector C. *The Great Pacific War: A History of the American Japanese Campaign of 1931-33.* New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 321pp. \$22.95

Hector C. Bywater was a journalist for thirty-six years during which time he contributed to, or was employed by, leading newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic. After writing for James Gordon Bennett's *New York World* on the Russo-Japanese War between 1904-1905, Bywater shifted to Europe where he reported on the rising German navy even as he spied for British naval intelligence. Living mostly in Britain after 1919, Bywater wrote on the naval rivalry between the United States and Japan in the Pacific. His first major volume, *Sea Power in the Pacific*, assessed the situation in the Pacific at the time of the famed Washington conference of 1921-1922 for the limitation of arms. Four years later, when relations between the United States and Japan had passed through an acute crisis over immigration, Bywater produced his fictional account of *The Great Pacific War* of an American-Japanese war between 1931 and 1933.

William M. Honan, a gifted journalist and newsman, has searched in Britain, Japan, and the United States for clues that would indicate that Hector C. Bywater helped to shape Japanese and possibly American war planning before World War II. Honan wishes to convince his readers that Bywater, in *The Great Pacific War*

and elsewhere, predicted the shape of World War II in the Pacific, countered a basic weakness in American war planning, and influenced Japan's great Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku into thinking that Japan should carry out a surprise attack on the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Honan has found no writings by Yamamoto to prove he was moved by Bywater, but it is surely safe to assume, as Honan does, that Yamamoto read *The Great Pacific War* while serving as naval attaché in Washington (1926-1928), if not before. As further evidence of Yamamoto's commitment to Bywater, Honan draws attention to a few other incidents: reports about Bywater by other Japanese officials in the United States; two Japanese army General Staff papers of 1926 (that apparently carry no proof of Yamamoto's authorship); a lecture by Yamamoto given in 1928 as recalled by a member of the audience forty-two years later; a brief encounter between Bywater and Yamamoto at the naval conference in 1930 held in London; and a more extended meeting in 1934 between the two, upon which Honan speculates at some length. Honan concedes that no Japanese naval intelligence reports survive for the period, nor does he cite any Japanese war plans records that prove a Bywater influence.

The author wants his readers to find the source for Yamamoto's plan to attack Pearl Harbor in Bywater's account, written sixteen years earlier. In the tradition of the Japanese attacks on the Russians at Port Arthur in 1904

and on the Germans at Tsingtao in 1914, the Japanese in Bywater's tale planned to capture swiftly and deny to the Americans any naval base facilities in the western Pacific that might serve the United States fleet once it had moved from Hawaii to the Philippines. Yamamoto's attack, of course, was a blow at the main battle forces of the Pacific Fleet, not the crucial support facilities. Only the element of surprise was common to the plans of the two men.

Honan sees in the final battle in *The Great Pacific War* the inspiration for Yamamoto's 1942 plan to attack Midway. Whereas Yamamoto aimed to extend Japan's defense perimeter eastward to Midway and perhaps farther, the Japanese fleet in Bywater's final battle was provoked to fight by a supposed American threat to capture Yap. To this reviewer the circumstances of Bywater's battle were far closer to the desperate sorties by the Japanese against the Americans in the battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf than to Midway.

Among Honan's other claims are: that Bywater revealed the Japanese strategy at the Washington conference in 1921 to force from the United States a renunciation of further building of fortifications or naval bases in the Pacific west of Hawaii; that Bywater was the first to expose German building of "pocket battleships"; that the Japanese demand for a "common-upper-limit" for the American, British, and Japanese navies in the 1930s was really Bywater-inspired; and that Bywater in 1937 uncovered

the Japanese construction of super-battleships. Even Honan concedes that Bywater underestimated these great ships by 30,000 tons. Finally, Honan concludes that Bywater's death in August 1940 may have been arranged by Admiral Yamamoto in order to prevent him from discovering and publishing the admiral's plan to attack Pearl Harbor fifteen months later.

Honan's conjectures make for entertaining reading. But they contain more than a hint at the old and, one would hope, outmoded myth that while the Japanese may be smart, they really cannot think things through for themselves.

The Great Pacific War is a novel that was written by a man generally well grounded in the facts of the situation. Perhaps it is chiefly significant as evidence of Bywater's remarkable ability to bring before the public the strategic problems then being discussed by the professionals behind closed doors. To evaluate Bywater's predictions fairly, it should be kept in mind that he placed his war in 1931, the year of the Manchurian incident, when Herbert Hoover was president. It is safe to conclude, as the American military had estimated since 1906, that Japan would have mounted a massive attack on Guam and the Philippines. American war planners also feared, as Bywater warned, that Japan would somehow block the Panama Canal. In light of the revised estimates upon which the 1929 War Plan Orange was based, Bywater was surely correct in predicting a step-by-step movement

by the American fleet across the Pacific. It is difficult to accept Bywater's warning that the administration in Washington might, in panic, approve an inadequately covered attack on the Bonin Islands just south of Tokyo. American war planners were then firmly convinced that the United States fleet required a main advanced base in the Philippines before moving north to blockade Japan.

The Pacific war (1941-1945) departed significantly from Bywater's vision. Naturally Bywater did not anticipate that Japan would fight a coalition of the United States, Britain, China, and the Netherlands. Writing in the day when air power was still considered as useful support for battleships, Bywater did not dream of the role of carrier air in World War II. Moreover, assuming that the United States would remain true to its earlier commitment to freedom of the seas, he wholly failed to anticipate the consequences of the mounting of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Americans against Japan's maritime arteries. In addition, he erroneously expected that gas would be an important factor. Given his obvious respect for both the Americans and the Japanese, he conceived of a civilized war in which each belligerent would be solicitous of the other's defeated and helpless combatants, and he did not foresee that Japan would continue the struggle for nearly a year after the bulk of her fleet had been destroyed. However, none of this detracts from the novel. It is a remarkable estimate

of the situation by one of the distinguished naval writers of his generation.

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Goldstein, Erik. *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991. 307pp. \$69

A crafted analysis of bureaucracy and personality, *Winning the Peace* explores how Britain after the Great War emerged from the Paris Peace Conference with its postwar objectives substantially intact. France had obtained neither Luxembourg nor the Rhineland, and Keynes managed to have the reparations sum left blank in the treaty. In Eastern Europe, the New Europe idea had created a relatively stable group of medium-sized powers generally well disposed toward Britain. British interests in the Middle East were protected and consolidated.

How did Britain do it? Goldstein's answer is, preparation. Through the establishment of a Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department (PID) that was staffed by outstanding civilian regional experts, position papers were prepared that addressed the general issues and knotty details that would face the Paris conference participants. These papers served as the informational basis for negotiation.

The book examines the politics surrounding the establishment of the PID in March 1918 by Lord Hardinge of the Foreign Office (a counter to Lloyd George's personal secretariat, the "Garden Suburb"). To begin his operation Hardinge pirated twelve members of the Department of Information's Intelligence Bureau (DIIB) into the Foreign Office, despite the protests of the Department of Information's new minister, Lord Beaverbrook. The twelve included such subsequently well known figures as Robert William Seton Watson, Lewis Namier, and Arnold Toynbee. Brief biographies are given of the principal players in the PID; these provide a rich picture of the personalities who prepared the seventy-one PID memoranda for the conference negotiators. These memoranda were supplemented by 174 Historical Section handbooks and thirty-five military intelligence reports.

Sifting through the mountain of Admiralty, cabinet, foreign office, and personal papers, Goldstein has constructed a coherent thread. His account is not without humor from time to time, as in this discussion of the exultation of the British imperialists in early 1919: "The war was won and the British Empire once again stood victorious. What was more, British armies were in occupation of most of the Middle East. It was not so much a question of what Britain could get, but rather what it would choose to keep. Undoubtedly some dregs would have to be provided for France, preferably in darkest Africa, while some