

1992

Voyenno-morskey slovar' (The naval dictionary)

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Recommended Citation

Green, William C. (1992) "Voyenno-morskey slovar' (The naval dictionary)," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 45 : No. 3 , Article 14.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol45/iss3/14>

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past five years suggest a new pattern. States of the twenty-first century may be smaller than their predecessors, but they are likely to be more stable and confident. Their firmer moral base will facilitate the deterrence and defeat of the kinds of threat posed by low-intensity conflict.

Of course, these hypotheses are as open to challenge as are van Creveld's. However, they are offered not so much to refute his arguments as to highlight the cunning of history. As van Creveld demonstrates in his critique of Clausewitz, using the past and present to structure the future is at best a risky undertaking. The skills of the historian are not the gifts of a prophet. It would be an intellectual loss if van Creveld, in his efforts to supplant Carl von Clausewitz, should forget how to be Martin van Creveld.

Chernavin, V.N. *Voyenno-morskey slovar'* (The naval dictionary). Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1991. 511pp. (No price given).

The *Naval Dictionary* is the latest in a series of "encyclopedic dictionaries" offered by the Soviet military over the past decade. This work is part of an overall Soviet general staff effort which took over twenty years to complete. In it the entire core of military knowledge has been organized, defined, systematized, and centralized. As such, each encyclopedic dictionary is an authoritative summation of official military views that have been assembled and promulgated by the general staff with the participation and concurrence of the service most closely associated with the work.

The *Naval Dictionary's* importance is underscored by its sponsorship by Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Soviet navy. By authorizing the use of his name as chief editor, Chernavin placed his imprimatur on its contents. He and his colleagues in the Soviet Ministry of

Defense produced a comprehensive reference work for all Soviet military personnel involved in research or publication of naval issues. It contains up-to-date, crisply worded definitions of all terms and concepts related to naval theory. It remains a valuable tool for any officer of the former Soviet navy given the lack of the clear doctrinal boundaries that earlier guided him, whether the service itself evolves into a commonwealth navy or "devolves" into republic forces.

Such high-level patronage was typical of Soviet encyclopedic reference works. For example, the first edition of the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* (1983) credited Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov as its editor in chief, while the second edition (1986) cited his successor Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev. Colonel General Pavel Zhilin, chief of the Military Historical Institute, is listed as sponsor of the *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Civil War* and the *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Great Patriotic War*. The most important work of all, the magisterial

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eight-volume *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, was initiated under the sponsorship of defense minister Andrey Grechko and continued under Marshal Ogarkov after Grechko's death. Its second edition (of which the first volume has just appeared) began under the sponsorship of General Mikhail Moiseyev, then the chief of the general staff.

The purposes of the *Naval Dictionary* were to minimize disruptive policy debates among military officers and to emphasize the heroic past and present importance of the Soviet military. Its introduction impresses on the reader that however far democratization had spread within the Soviet Union, it had yet to touch the top echelons of the Soviet navy. The most important resolutions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding questions about the creation and development of the Soviet navy for defense of the socialist fatherland are reflected in this dictionary: illuminating the heroic past of the Russian and Soviet navies, the revolutionary and combat tradition of the latter, the history of military art, the most important principles of Soviet military science, naval geography, and international maritime law and maritime practices.

Yet the impression made by the volume's introduction is not confirmed by its contents. Compared with the earlier Soviet military reference works, its content of ideological rhetoric is surprisingly low. Lenin is given only a half-page mention which replaces the two-page article on him

in the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* in 1986. Almost all the entries on military theory are suffused with Marxist-Leninist concepts and terminology, but the florid sloganeering that dominated earlier works is absent. The introduction, then, was an assurance to the Soviet naval reader that this volume was indeed an officially approved, authoritative statement of military doctrine and policy, rather than an indication that an ideologically charged approach to military issues was being maintained.

It is difficult to say how much of this was due to the policy of glasnost (which was at its peak at the time of publication), or to the very technical and maritime nature of the work. The *Naval Dictionary* has relatively few entries that deal with the broad, ideology-suffused framework of Soviet military concepts, and these lack the exhortative character of the articles in previous volumes. Even such an entry as "Laws of War" offers no more than a terse, factual summary of the Soviet military position on this concept. One might find such an entry in a U.S.-produced military dictionary that attempted to include Soviet terms and concepts.

The roughly 11,000 entries focus instead on maritime issues. The naval translator or interpreter will find it a gold mine of otherwise unclear and undefinable terminology. For example, the entry "Reference Ellipsoid" carefully explains the minor ways in which this navigational term, as used in the Soviet navy, differs from its usage by the mariners of other

nations. The entries have a nationalist flavor; there are many more entries about the Imperial Russian fleet than one may be used to seeing in Soviet naval works—particularly on that fleet of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The point of their inclusion was, of course, to draw a historic connection between the glorious traditions of the Imperial Russian Navy and its Soviet successor.

The same might be said of the volume's numerous biographies of Soviet and Imperial Russian naval leaders. At the back of the volume are numerous charts and tables, and although some are technical in nature, most deal with subjects such as "Honorary Names Awarded to Formations and Units of the Navy from 1943-1945," or "Memorial Places of Glorious Victories and Heroic Defeats of Ships in the Russian and Soviet Fleet."

The *Naval Dictionary* has a number of entries that indicate the then-current state of Soviet thinking on naval organization and missions. Although its list of missions is essentially consistent with earlier lists, this volume provides more detail and precision on their content and how they were to be achieved. Operationally and organizationally this work defines terms that Western naval analysts encountered in other Soviet naval writings, and it explains to some degree how they relate to each other.

One particularly interesting set of entries is on "Naval Art" and "Naval Science," which indicate new developments in a Soviet military

debate that dates back to the mid-1970s: is naval theory independent of general military theory or subordinate to it? The debate was resolved at the time of the disappearance of the term "naval science," with retention only of the term "naval art" to set aside peculiarly maritime issues that could not easily be incorporated into Soviet Military Science or Military Art. This arcane matter was important because it meant that theoretical issues regarding the Soviet navy would be decided by the general staff, not by the navy itself.

The entry on "Naval Art" is short, no more than three sentences, and summarizes the standard Soviet military definition of this concept. It refers the reader to the entry "Principles of Military Art" for more detail, but adds that "naval art" is the "most important part of the Theory of the Navy." The entry "Naval Science" initially qualifies this term as having only historical significance, but nevertheless gives a more detailed definition than that for "Naval Art." It goes on to state that "Naval Science is a constituent part of a unified Soviet military science, into which it was organically integrated in the 1970s. By 1991, issues which had been categorized under Naval Science were examined using "Theory of the Navy," a division of "Soviet Military Science." The entry Theory of the Navy implies—through the comprehensive list of issues this concept covers—that the old debate had been reopened to the distinct advantage of the Soviet navy. The new term

appears to be the exact equivalent of the old "Naval Science," except that formally it was "a division of Soviet Military Science."

In sum, this is an exceptionally well-written and researched reference work. Like its predecessors, it will be of great use for Western analysts in developing insights into the former Soviet navy and its successors. But unlike its predecessors, it is not particularly tendentious. If it were translated into English it would be a helpful reference for any U.S. naval officer.

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Tunander, Ola. *Cold Water Politics: The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1989. (No price given)

Many studies in progress (including my own) about Soviet security problems have suffered miscarriage before delivery. For decades, we could write at a leisurely pace, confident that nothing would change soon enough to embarrass us. However, the incredible changes that have occurred in all of Eastern Europe have put out of business those of us who made a living with periodic Cassandraesque warnings of the threat to Europe. We cannot write fast enough nor can our publishing houses print fast enough to keep up with the new states and governments of the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union.

Ola Tunander has managed to avoid that fate. What he has given us contains something new: a method of analysis which strategic writers will understand can save their craft in these perilously peaceful times. It is the application of semiotics (the science of signs) to the strategic competition.

What Dr. Tunander has written is brilliant, and a welcome relief from the stale reprocessing of commonly held information characteristic of the genre writing about the Soviet navy. Using the Maritime Strategy—the U.S. Navy's apparently unilateral operational plan for how to defeat the Soviet Union of 1986—as a kind of metaphor, both a sign and a signal, Tunander demonstrates how the different Nordic nations interpreted it within their own contexts and how they tried to adapt it to their own needs and wants. The result is a fascinating study of cross-cultural interpretations.

This invaluable book will be of interest to Americans for the lesson offered in the subtleties of seapower, complete with illustrations. From across the Atlantic, Americans were inclined to assume that Western Europe perceived its threat in compatible ways. However, Tunander details how differently the Nordic countries established their defensive fronts to the East.

Although the text is filled with convincing insights and research, the reader should first check Appendix II, "Sea and Sign." Here is something new, brilliant, and daring. Tunander applies the method of semiotics to the