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The United States and the Defense of the Pacific

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sea powers in times of war *and* in times of peace, the latter almost always forgotten in the rhetoric of statecraft, or dismissed in a simple line.

The third part of this book addresses the topic of "Anglo-American Rivalries and Coalitions." It contains useful essays (all of them starting points for more extended treatment, I should think) by Paul Kennedy, Kenneth McDonald, Malcolm Murfett, and Marc Milner. This is the core of the book, not because it is comprehensive (for it is not) but because it suggests the larger theme that our editors had in mind. Britain and the United States had interests in the security of the seas in common; strangely enough old national rivalries frequently stood in the way of their cooperation, an age-old and ongoing story that has lessons for the future. The last section is entitled "Planning for a Future War in the Nuclear Age." It contains essays by Eric Grove and Geoffrey Till on Anglo-American strategy in the era of massive retaliation (to 1960) and by Joel Sokolsky on the same for the era of flexible response (since 1960), on fleet renewal and maritime strategy in the 1980s by Robert Wood, and a concluding summary by Hattendorf and Jordan which says it all: "It is still a wise admonition to choose one's allies wisely and to conserve one's enemies carefully."

This book was well worth doing, and is a credit to its editors and the publisher. It will long be the source that strategists and naval theorists refer to for collective wisdom on the

themes of maritime strategy and, to a lesser degree, alliance politics. In future, whether in times of war or peace, students of international affairs would do well to remember that seemingly contending rivals have a lot more in common than meets the eye, and that partners in maritime preeminence can hold together the Trident of Neptune.

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McLaurin, Ronald D. and Chung-in Moon. *The United States and the Defense of the Pacific*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989. 353pp. \$45

This is a systematic and generally positive politico-military analysis of the security posture of the United States in the Pacific basin. Starting from the premise that the U.S. has been a Pacific power for more than two hundred years, it advances a careful argument that the present U.S. employment of significant political, economic and military resources to defend the present Pacific order is both necessary and appropriate. Although the authors recognize that the massive American investment in Pacific security has allowed Pacific states to focus their resources on other issues, they maintain that the security of the Pacific is no longer dependent upon U.S. actions alone. Regional security must be and is dependent upon the full participation of all

Pacific nations that have a vested interest in the current order.

The focus of the book is on the military element of the U.S. role in the security of the Pacific region, but it does not attempt an analysis in onerous detail. It provides, rather, a coherent broad-brush view that is often lacking in more detailed analytical works. To explain U.S. strategic decisions, the authors carefully review U.S. national interests and defense posture in the Pacific, focusing on the capabilities, intentions, and will of the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam as the major threats to regional stability. From this foundation they then provide an overview of U.S. strategic thought as a basis for subsequent discussion of the structure and deployment patterns of U.S. military forces. To their credit, the authors avoid the temptation to dwell on the details of weapons systems or extensively enumerated orders of battle. In successive chapters on the navy, air force, and army components of the U.S. Pacific Command, the authors focus on major organizational elements of these forces, emphasizing missions, readiness, sustainability, and modernization.

The review of the foundations and facts of the current U.S. defense posture in the Pacific is interesting, but the real strength of the book lies in its chapters which analyze the security relationship of the U.S. to the individual nations of the Pacific. Because the U.S. defense concept for the Pacific requires forward deployment of American forces in and around the

countries along the Asian rim, the authors assert that the security relationships the U.S. maintains with each of these countries is a crucial component of U.S. defense. Though they acknowledge that these relationships contain significant components in addition to security issues, the authors analyze the strengths and weaknesses of security cooperation as a benchmark of the overall connection. Calling attention to the critical nature of the security ties to the U.S., the authors repeatedly make the point that for all its strength and wealth the U.S. is not a solitary actor in Pacific defense matters. Directing attention to areas of agreement and disagreement on a broad range of security issues including policy coordination, U.S. military activity in country, intelligence cooperation, security assistance, attitudes toward nuclear issues, and potential threats, the authors make the subtle point that U.S. defense is in fact dependent upon the nations of the Pacific rim.

This is a book that should be read carefully by anyone seriously interested in U.S. defense matters. It operates on two distinct levels—as an excellent primer on U.S. defense capabilities issues in the Pacific, and as a careful reminder of the importance of international relations to the security of the United States. By highlighting the range of difficulties the U.S. faces in maintaining effective security relationships with the nations of the Pacific basin, the authors make an important point. American leadership in regional defense matters requires

comprehension, direction, confidence, and constancy. Unfortunately, the U.S. has not always displayed these qualities in its dealings with its Pacific neighbors.

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Tarrant, V.E. *The U-Boat Offensive 1914-1945*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989. 190pp.

Ministry of Defence (Navy). *The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 1939-1945*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1989. 396pp. \$49.95

John Keegan once observed that the vast amount of raw data in logs, signals, orders, charts, and the like burden naval history with such a density and volume of facts that the prospect of writing it might "crush the spirit and blind the imagination of all but the most inspired and dedicated scholar." Compared to the more visceral problems confronting those who wrestle with land battles, modern naval "battle" history does present unique challenges. One of them is that the historiographical concept of naval battle has been extended in this century to include episodes that were, in essence, protracted campaigns of attrition waged by submarines against shipping. Far more than the distinct and discrete "battle piece"—like Jutland or Midway—throughout that Keegan had in mind, these campaigns were shaped and driven by hard data: such as loss and tonnage rates, wastage

rates of new construction, volumes of cargoes delivered, and serviceability and strength returns. The submarine campaigns of this century were battles writ large, with all the detail of particular actions overburdened by the mountains of data compiled by shore staffs.

That essential truth is amply demonstrated in these two excellent books. However, they do more than simply recount the relentlessly accumulated data in plus and minus columns. They fill large gaps in the English language literature on the U-Boat campaigns. Tarrant's *The U-Boat Offensive 1914-1945* covers the whole sweep of two world wars and provides a remarkably concise yet thorough account of the German U-boat campaigns in both. His discussion of operations is set in a solid strategic context and within the broader context of the evolution of naval warfare itself. His account of the wedding of time-honoured blockade strategy with the new possibilities—and limitations—of submarines in the First World War is tightly focused and marvelously balanced. The same can be said of his handling of World War II in which the complex pressures of strategy, the intelligence war, and the contest between Allied tonnage losses and new construction are clearly set forth, he displays a fine sense for the limits of Dönitz's fleet and for the imperatives of the war of attrition. *The U-Boat Offensive* also provides enough technical detail on U-boat development to carry the story.