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War: Ends and Means

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system, if communications is defined with sufficient breadth; it is a C^3 system; if C^3 is defined in that useful and increasingly common way, “communications for command and control.” Allard describes the evolving skills, attitudes, and genuine military and economic interests of the air force, navy, army and marine corps (some united and some badly disjointed); and of the secretaries and deputy secretaries of defense (with emphasis on two technically skillful and devoted assistant secretaries of defense for command, control, communications and intelligence—Dr. Gerald Dineen and Donald Latham of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff); and of key congressmen and staffers, who for once were patient and supportive. Allard’s wise and thorough discussion extends for fifty-one pages—the tale is impossible to compress further—and is worth the price of the book. A cynic could use JTIDS as another horrible example of “interservice rivalry,” but there is none of that in Allard’s narration.

In addition one finds two solid reviews of navy and army-air force [!] tactical communications. Particularly instructive is the *intraservice* army debate over Air-Land Battle and its associated doctrine and technology. The army debate illustrates two things: first, that rivalry within a service can be just as vigorous, and in this reviewer’s eyes, just as vital to combat effectiveness, as any that goes on across services. Second, it illustrates the difficulty of deciding what does and does not come under the umbrella of “command and control,” for Air-Land Battle is not so much a debate over C^2 as it is over the conduct of modern war on the land and above it.

Naval officers should read *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*. Writing as someone sympathetic with the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s objectives, I offer it as a way—usually a painful way—to illustrate how the navy often walks its own path. Our paranoia may be justified by opinions like Allard’s, but there is no gainsaying that the boundary between land and sea must not be a boundary between service domains, because the reach of sensors and weapons of war has become too far and too deep. It is a commonplace of war to guard against enemy attacks in the seams of your command authority. One of the great seams has always lain along a coastline.

Seabury, Paul and Angelo Codevilla.

War: Ends and Means. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989. 306pp. \$19.95

This book proved to be a surprise. It was not written for military and defense professionals, although many of them will find it of special interest. The intended audience for the book
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is the generation of Americans who have been “trained to live as if military matters were a spectator sport, whose popular culture gives the impression that violence belongs exclusively to the past or to lower forms of life, and whose university curricula make it well-nigh impossible to put one’s self in the shoes of history’s protagonists—

or of those caught in the middle." As such, one might expect it to be a simplistic and sophomoric piece of work; instead, it is a stimulating book of unexpected scope, covering how wars start, how they are fought, and how they end.

The authors are distinguished political scientists, and both have intelligence experience. They demolish many currently fashionable illusions about war. Their book is the kind that one wishes could be forced into the psyches of every American political leader, policy maker, academic, and social commentator. If that could be done, one would expect the quality of decisions that impact America's future to be improved dramatically.

The text is filled with an abundance of judicious and enlightening historical and contemporary examples that reveal much about the nature of war, some of which, as Americans, we must consider highly embarrassing because they point up our dumb decisions so clearly. The book begins with the meaning of war (later treating the concept of a "just war") and of "peace." It addresses the causes and justifications put forth for past wars. It explores the political and material conditions (weather, terrain, logistics, technology, etc.) of battle, and how the fog of war affects battle. Requirements to win on land, at sea, and in the air (including space) are discussed with the panache of a Clausewitz or Machiavelli: also covered are military operations in the nuclear age. The often neglected topics of political warfare in both large and small wars, and

intelligence operations and special operations as well, also receive attention. The authors conclude with considering what outcomes are desirable after a war and how they might be achieved.

For most military specialists, much of the material in this book will be familiar. However, there are a number of interesting and not so well known historical tidbits. In addition, this is the kind of book one wants to know personally so that it can be recommended to friends, students, and others who don't seem to comprehend how important the study of war is for real and lasting peace.

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Gray, Colin G. and Roger M. Barnett, eds. *Seapower and Strategy*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989. 383pp.

This is the book I was looking for throughout my year as a student at the Naval War College, and have been ever since. What Colin Gray and Roger Barnett have done is combine history and strategy into a cohesive whole—so that, for once, the past really is prologue, the present is understandable, and the future has some direction. They do not do it alone, which makes the book even better.

The work is built around ten themes that are worth summarizing here.

- The natural condition of the land is to be politically controlled.