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Leaders and Intelligence

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the superstructure of the state, and thus the state lacked the resources to govern and defend the nation. New dynasties reconstituted the state, revived the economy and taxation system, and reinforced the Confucian social system, but remained unwilling and unable to effect the necessary reforms to make China "mathematically manageable."

Yet, Huang contends, beginning with the onslaught of the West in the 19th century, China has been shifting from its outdated agrarian-bureaucratic management to the system of "monetary management" that characterizes modern nations. Monetary management is the application of commercial principles to the governance and economic life of a nation, whether it be capitalist or socialist. Huang believes that China's move to monetary management is irreversible. He maintains, nevertheless, that the strength of the legacy of the past, as testified by the difficult and protracted course of the Chinese Revolution, means that this change will be slow and will experience reverses, contradictions, and readjustments.

China: A Macrohistory offers an excellent analysis of the logic of Chinese history to specialists and nonspecialists alike. Huang's concise volume, however, may leave some readers hungering for more details on contemporary China. Those concerned principally with issues related to national security, therefore, should read this book for background, and consult other

works on the People's Republic of China. Finally, in light of the riveting events of the spring of 1989 and the conservative backlash thereafter, Huang's optimistic conclusion that China is well on its way to becoming "mathematically manageable" by modern standards seems premature.

ROXANE D.V. SISMANIDIS
The Library of Congress
Washington, D.C.

Handel, Michael I., ed. *Leaders and Intelligence*. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd. 1989. 300pp. \$12.95

"There are in any army, and for that matter any big organization, very large numbers of people whose existence is only remembered when something for which they are responsible has gone wrong."

When British Field Marshal Slim pointed this out in recounting his experiences in World War II, he was not specifically referring to the intelligence community. But his comment, included in the anecdotal and highly enjoyable essay by former head of British scientific intelligence, Professor R.V. Jones in *Leaders and Intelligence*, neatly characterizes one of the major themes of this collection.

Leaders and Intelligence contains nine essays which were originally delivered during three international conferences on Intelligence and Military Operations that were held at the U.S. Army War College

between April 1986 and May 1988. Each essay examines a historical case study relationship between either political or military leadership at the operational or strategic level, and the intelligence resources that were available and utilized. These relationships and the utilization of those intelligence assets are critiqued in light of the historical and contemporary lessons to be drawn.

As with any collection, there is difficulty in establishing a specific line of thought which flows neatly through to the end, but the editor's introductory essay, while putting forth personal views on the state of current leadership-intelligence relationships, also serves to provide an overview of the works that follow, and establishes a reasonable framework to support the volume as a coherent whole. The tone it sets, initially providing a not-so-subtle bemoaning of the unfortunate fate of intelligence officers in general, does, in the final analysis, give a balanced account of the problems and shortcomings of both sides of the leader-advisor relationship and presents sound arguments, evidence and principles to support the need for further attention on both sides to improve the way each does business.

The case studies selected for this collection vary both in aspect and in style, and cover nearly 200 years: Napoleon in the Jena campaign; German, English and American leadership in World War II; the Army-CIA-media clash during Vietnam; and American and Israeli actions in the Middle East.

"Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker," by Major-General (Res.) Shlomo Gazit, former Israeli Head of Military Intelligence, is a frank, pointed and remarkably revealing position piece. Using examples from recent U.S. and Israeli history, he provides a refreshingly non-American critique of events in the Middle East and the intelligence (and leadership) successes and failures that affected and sometimes precipitated them. He describes in stark and brutal detail how the abortive Israeli war in Lebanon, the occupation of West Beirut, and the resulting Phalangist massacre in the refugee camps were the result of leadership or intelligence failings.

Not only does *Leaders and Intelligence* provide historical lesson and elucidation, it also provides current, real-world examples of what can go right and what can go wrong in the complex environment of leadership-intelligence relations, and offers relevant suggestions for improving them.

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U.S. Navy
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West, Nigel. *The SIGINT Secrets*.
New York: William Morrow &
Co., Inc. 347pp. \$22.95

Anyone who is looking for the complete history of signals intelligence, as defined by the United States, will have to look elsewhere