

1991

The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939

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Recommended Citation

Baer, George W. (1991) "The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 44 : No. 1 , Article 12.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol44/iss1/12>

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important factors. It is comprehensive, well balanced, and manages to avoid becoming excessively entangled with detail, whether technical, strategic, or political. Yet, at the same time, it clearly delineates critical technical and strategic factors, such as number of units or performance capabilities, that are crucial to the subject at hand.

Making Space Defense Work begins with an examination of what has happened to the idea of deterrence in the past decade or two. Then it deals with SDI, assessing its ideas, its weapon systems, and the requirements that would be placed upon them. It looks into the concepts of a partial defense and of population defense and concludes with a discussion of strategic defense options. An appendix provides a succinct summary of space weapon capabilities and technical issues.

Fenner, Davis, and Parmentola have solid backgrounds in physics, strategic weapon systems, and defense policy. This text is the result of a project of the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies. The authors were assisted by a panel of eminent defense technologists and strategic analysts, consisting of former leaders of the Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. SALT delegation.

The authors' perspective on the benefits of arms control agreements for the U.S. may surprise those who have not previously explored this subject carefully. Working through

the logic and evidence presented here could prove valuable and possibly an eye-opening experience. It clearly shows that this subject is complex and there is no simple "always right" approach to answers in this area, without regard to other factors. The impact of those other factors, such as cooperation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on strategic weapon systems, can completely reverse the benefit or harm to U.S. strategic interests that can be expected to result from a particular policy. Appreciation for these complex interrelationships is vital, especially for those of us in the defense community, because of the many simplistic, doctrinaire solutions proposed by advocates of various policies.

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Clayton, Anthony. *The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939*. Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1986. 545pp.

This is a detailed record of Britain's use of force by the army, navy, and air force—from display to action, from Aden to Zanzibar—as one means to maintain an empire. It is military history through the study of imperial technique.

The book deals with the restrained use of power. What the British did they did well, basing the system on force, but using it rarely. Nonetheless, Clayton shows, this was done at

the expense of economic and strategic overextension.

The British government followed a policy beyond its resources, and the British political tradition and morality had a grander vision of empire than simply one held together by brute force. In his concentration on force, Clayton says too little of how the exceedingly constructive institutional transformations, and examples of moral and political leadership—despite all repression—paved the way for the support Britain received in World War II, and the ease with which the empire was dismantled immediately thereafter.

Clayton's conclusion will give a contemporary superpower pause. Britain maintained its empire with bluff, pragmatic concessions, and the show of power. These worked for a while, but all evidence suggests that sooner or later the bluff would have been called. Restrained force was not enough to hold back centrifugal tendencies, such as nationalism and anticolonialism. In the end, the British could not, nor did they want to, hold the empire together by force; and so they gave it up to institutions they had let develop within the system.

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Bruce, Robert H. *Australia and the Indian Ocean: Strategic Dimensions of Increasing Naval Involvement*. Studies in Indian Ocean Maritime Affairs No. 1, Perth, Australia:

Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, 1988. 138pp. \$20

This collection of papers from a 1988 conference examines the Indian Ocean region in light of the Australian decision to head toward a two-ocean (Pacific and Indian) fleet.

One of the most interesting papers documents the importance of the Indian Ocean for Australia, noting, for example, that over half the seaborne commerce moving to Australia sails through that ocean. This paper examines why it was not until the mid-1980s that steps were taken to protect the vulnerable northwest coast with a permanently stationed naval presence. The long-standing Australian reliance on the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the lack of a defined threat perception are noted as the major causes of the laxity of Australian defense policy toward the Indian Ocean.

The essay likely to be of most interest to the American reader is by K. Subrahmanyam, formerly director of India's Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, who presents an Indian perspective on the Indian Ocean that is far different from that found in the United States. His is a view that should be considered carefully. The Indian Navy is one of the fastest growing in the world. India is now the sixth nation to be operating a nuclear-powered attack submarine. Countering the perceived U.S. threat has been a major stimulus for this growth. As Subrahmanyam notes, "India had been subjected to an exercise of force