

Naval War College Review

Volume 43
Number 2 *Spring*

Article 23

1990

George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century

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Recommended Citation

Kinnard, Douglas and Stoler, Mark A. (1990) "George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 43 : No. 2 , Article 23.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol43/iss2/23>

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secretary of defense from 1959-61, in laying the foundation for the McNamara revolution as well as getting the JCS to come to an agreement on such critical issues as Joint Strategic Target Planning. Nor does he discuss the legendary blowup between CNO George Anderson and Secretary McNamara over the conduct of the naval blockade during the Cuban missile crisis—an incident which had more impact on Anderson's tenure on the JCS than his opposition to the TFX. Finally, the author ignores the outcry that followed the firing of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger by President Gerald Ford in 1975—an outcry that forced Ford to attempt to increase defense spending and to reverse his position on SALT II.

Third, on several critical occasions, the author's hybrid methodology, which he calls investigative history (a combination of investigative journalism and historiography), lets him down. Some of these occasions are particularly disturbing to me because I am cited as the source. For example, Perry describes the initial meeting between Weinberger and the JCS on 15 January 1981. According to him, there were more than 40 people at the meeting, including several new civilian appointees. (I was not one of them.) Perry alleges that in the course of this meeting Weinberger attempted to resolve the MX deployment mode controversy by proposing to deploy the missiles on surface ships. Perry then has me describing the reaction of the partic-

ipants in the meeting in language that I never use. When the author interviewed me, I discussed a meeting that occurred in Weinberger's office toward the end of January 1981. This session was held to prepare Weinberger for his first congressional appearance. The MX basing mode did indeed come up, and I did discuss the reaction of the participants to Weinberger's MX proposal. Perry could have avoided this problem by allowing his interviewees to check what he attributed to them—a practice followed by Hedrick Smith in *Power Game*.

Despite these flaws, Perry does succeed in capturing the essence and evolution of the JCS. It is unfortunate that his mistakes will be cited by those who disagree with his thesis, which is essentially correct.

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Stoler, Mark A. *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989. 252pp. \$10.95

Professor Stoler has taken on a formidable task—summarizing the life and times of George Marshall in less than 200 pages. There is, to be sure, the monumental four-volume work of Forrest Pogue for those interested in pursuing the subject in depth; but for most students and general readers, a briefer treatment is in order.

The first third of the book covers Marshall from his birth in 1880 until he became chief of staff on 1 September 1939. Included is the usual biographical development: junior officer in the Philippines; service with Pershing in World War I; and the frustrations, as well as the opportunities for professional development, characteristic of the interwar American army. All of this is presented from the perspective of the man who, at age 59, took over as military head of the American army on the eve of its greatest expansion.

Stoler is an expert on the European phase of World War II, and it shows. (His *Politics of the Second Front* deserves much more attention than it has received.) He is able to present the issues faced by the new chief of staff lucidly and with great insight. A particularly interesting aspect of his analysis is his portrayal of the evolution of the Roosevelt-Marshall relationship. In the end, the do-it-yourself mode of operation of the commander in chief shifted to one of depending on Marshall as the first among equals of his strategic advisers.

The Eisenhower-Marshall wartime relationship—which was a good one—is not developed in any detail. There is the usual discussion of Marshall being so valuable in Washington that Roosevelt was unwilling to appoint him as Supreme Allied Commander (which turned out to be the greatest military command ever held by an American). The truth is that based on

personality alone, Marshall, who was ten years older than Eisenhower, was far less suited to the job than the latter. It would have been most difficult for Marshall, as Supreme Commander, to have borne the cross of Churchill, let alone that of Montgomery.

After the war Truman sent Marshall to China on that ill-fated monument to American arrogance: resolving the Chinese civil war (an episode which the author treats with sensitivity). The main postwar role for Marshall came immediately after China, when Truman appointed him to succeed Byrnes as secretary of state for what turned out to be a tumultuous two years for makers of American foreign policy. Here the brief space allowed the author shows. Imagine trying to include in 22 pages of biography of a secretary of state the following: the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Containment Policy and the Czechoslovakian coup of February 1948.

The kinds of important issues that cannot be treated in a book of this length include the tight U.S. defense budget of those times and the resulting deterioration of American military forces. When the Korean War came along in 1950, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson was forced to walk the plank for those inadequacies. The truth is that one of Truman's allies in preventing Johnson's predecessor, James Forrestal, from building up the American defense establishment was George Marshall. For example, Forrestal's last attempt to improve U.S. defense

posture came in the fall of 1948 with the preparation of the Fiscal 1950 budget. He took his case personally to Secretary of State Marshall. Marshall listened, but he was not about to support Forrestal with the president lest it interfere with outlays for the Marshall Plan. Hence, Secretary of Defense George Marshall, whom the author credits for his great efforts in the 1950-51 defense buildup, was in fact correcting his own earlier misjudgments.

With regard to George Marshall's role as defense secretary (from September 1950 to September 1951), the author correctly emphasizes that Marshall reestablished the prestige of that office following Johnson's tenure. The secretary was past his peak at this point and knew it, and let Robert Lovett, his deputy, run the department. This being a war period, defense budgets were no longer the central problem in the Pentagon. Hence, interservice tensions (then as now budgetary, not doctrinal in origin, whatever the rhetoric employed) were no longer a problem.

There was one problem that developed in Marshall's tenure as defense secretary that Lovett could not handle for him: the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Professor Stoler handles the issue and Marshall's role in a balanced and interesting manner. There were personality issues of course (feisty Harris versus insubordinate MacArthur is the usual portrayal), but the real issues and the resultant lessons are political-

strategic—lessons which, by the way, were largely forgotten during the next decade as the Vietnam tragedy unfolded.

In sum, Professor Stoler, with style and verve, has produced an excellent summary volume on George C. Marshall and his times. As supplemental reading for courses in American foreign policy and military history, the book should prove insightful, readable, provocative, and manageable. I highly recommend it for such courses and for the general reader.

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Shortal, John F. *Forged by Fire: Robert L. Eichelberger and the Pacific War*. Columbia Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1987. 154pp. \$24.95

Forged by Fire is an admiring account of the accomplishments of Lieutenant General Eichelberger in the Pacific during World War II. The author, John Shortal, is a serving army officer and a former member of the department of history at the United States Military Academy. Shortal quickly sets the scene in his introduction. On 30 November 1942, at his forward headquarters in Port Moresby, Guinea, General MacArthur decided that the poor performance by American troops in their first offensive of the war at Buna required a change of leadership at the front (as much to protect MacArthur's personal reputation as for any other reason). Eichelberger, who