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The Presidency and the Management of National Security

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characterized as "the failure of security policy."

Mandelbaum ranges widely, including much on international economic theory as well as game theory. His basic proposition is that state behavior can be understood better by observing the international situation than by any "inside-out" explanations. Nevertheless, he devotes a good deal of time to internal phenomena before he is finished.

The author's previous books have concentrated on the nuclear field. This is his first venture into a general treatise on international relations. There is much in it which is stimulating, and the book rarely drags. It is much more useful on the post-World War II era than on the earlier periods because the author is more familiar with the later period. In the first hundred pages there are some minor factual errors. For example, the author states that the secret clauses of the Nazi-Soviet Pact "left open the question of whether Poland would remain independent." But paragraph two of the secret protocol specifically says, "In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the sphere of influence of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San." As the author states, he relies on secondary sources, but he also uses more recent ones, not listing some of the old classics like Langer. That may account for his conviction that Germany was *most* responsible for

World War I (which seriously understates or ignores Austria-Hungary's increasingly untenable position).

The chapter on Israel is a very strong analysis, excellently done. It covers from 1948 to 1979 and is focused on Israel's "security dilemma." Mandelbaum relates very well the painful series of choices Israel faced as it traded land for promises. It is to be regretted that Mandelbaum did not cover Israel to the present, since its dilemma has surely become more acute as the influence of the PLO and West Bank unrest has increased.

The treatment of Japan is also first-rate. All of the chapters covering the post-World War II period are very good. However, the book as a whole is considerably repetitious due to its structure—its mixture of facts and analyses for roughly contemporary foreign policies. It might have helped to put a succinct history of the postwar period up front. The book would have also benefited from a concluding chapter, to sum up.

Despite its minor flaws, the book displays a powerful analytic ability and is well worth reading.

This reviewer's copy was bound without pages 179 to 210 (but with two copies of pages 211 to 242). Buyers will want to check this out.

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Lord, Carnes. *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. New York: The Free Press, 1988. 207pp. \$22.50

Encouraged by the double whammy of Irangate and the presidential transition, an unprecedented flood of publications about the National Security Council has arrived. Many do not go beyond rehashing the problems of Iran-Contra and fail to create a context worthy of serious study. Some have titles suggesting serious treatment but turn out to be kiss-and-tell pieces with a singularly myopic vision of the NSC. (*Inside the NSC* by Constantine Menges is one of these.) Carnes Lord, on the other hand, has set his sights much higher—a serious study of the NSC in the largest possible political and policy context. In this short book (175 pages plus 22 pages of notes), he addresses almost every issue that could be raised and provides recommended solutions for most. This is an important and possibly landmark work.

As a former NSC staffer in the early Reagan years, Lord is not without a point of view. While talking the scholarly high road, he makes clear that he is highly skeptical of the capabilities, and hence proper role, of military and foreign service officers. Although his call for equal attention to civilian control of the foreign service will be applauded by many professional military officers, the recurring allusions to “politicals” battling “careerists” reflect a distinctly Reagan-era ideological bias. In my experience,

that was simply not a useful distinction in predicting staff competence. That said, Lord is on solid ground in titling his first chapter “The Presidency and the Problem of Bureaucracy.” To fail to understand and deal with the institutional dimension of power in Washington is to miss the point, and Lord’s emphasis on the pervasive importance of bureaucratic culture is a major strength of this work.

Lord’s strength is the richness of his thinking on the nature of policy development. Using an elegant turn of phrase, he breaks this process into strategic planning, the catalyzing of decision, and the management of decision, and deals at length with each. His major thesis, with which I completely agree, is that the primary focus of the President should be to give strategic direction to the bureaucracy. Lord notes that “Policy devolves to the operational level only through a failure to capture it at the level of strategy,” and he argues that the NSC staff should assert dominance over strategic planning. With better strategic planning, there is less need for the NSC staff to dabble in “tactics,” and the tensions between the NSC staff and the implementing agencies can be reduced. Thus his “single most important innovation” would be to create a separate planning element within the NSC staff, with responsibility for strategic intelligence, net assessment, long-range planning, short-range and crisis planning, economic and resource planning and writing (!) In his view, this NSC

element would cut across all areas, including planning for general war and the military and economic aspects of crisis and contingency planning. The speech-writing function is interesting and recognizes the reality that a presidential speech is a strategic document and frequently is the most effective vehicle for integrating differing institutional and policy perspectives into a larger whole.

One of Lord's most interesting (and controversial) ideas is that of restructuring the relationship between the field elements of the military and the State Department. As he correctly points out, there is no diplomatic counterpart to the military CINC, regional coordination being accomplished in the State Department in Washington. Lord would fix this by double-hatting selected ambassadors and giving them a more direct role in coordinating political-military matters on a regional basis, in concert with a restructured NSC staff. He has equally grand ideas to fix the over-concentration of power in the State regional bureaus and the weakness of the planning function in DoD—ideas which cannot be readily summarized but which raise fundamental issues. His suggestions of roles for the Vice President, particularly a strengthened role in reaching out to Congress and as a special troubleshooter in managing cabinet-level tensions, are highly innovative.

Although Lord recognizes the executive-congressional relationship as in need of repair, his heart does not

appear to be in addressing this issue, and he touches too lightly on the problem of congressional committee fragmentation that works against the integrating power of the President. He alludes to the (Tower board) recommendation to create a joint intelligence committee as a way of reducing leaks, but he ignores the fundamental recommendation (made elsewhere) that Congress be selectively invited into the NSC process. Congress could create a joint national security committee consisting of the majority and minority leadership of both House and Senate and their key committees. Such a group could be invited to meet with the President and NSC principals, with a view toward sharing the most sensitive issues and understanding the likely reaction of the Congress before final presidential decisions are made. No matter how good the planning, national security policy cannot be implemented if it is not sustained by the Congress, and fixing this has to be NSC agenda item one.

Carnes Lord has done a major piece of scholarly work that deserves more attention than it has received to date. He covers a great range of topics, but this must be done if the full scope of NSC responsibility is to be understood. His solutions need to be tailored to the specific personalities of a new administration, but the concepts he outlines ought to be taken into account. In particular, Lord's concept of the supremacy of strategic planning needs to be seriously considered, even if the

bureaucratic device of a separate planning staff is not adopted. This is a book full of ideas and will be of interest to anyone interested in the realities of the national security decision-making process.

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Holland, Harrison M. *Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma*. Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America, 1988. 154pp. \$26

This is a valuable but highly specialized book. Unlike most books or articles on Japanese security, it is much less concerned with grand strategy and broad policy options than it is with the bureaucratic nuts and bolts. Its chapter headings reflect this focus: defense organization, defense operations, the defense program outline (*taiko*) and planning estimate (*chugyo*), the budget process, and a case study of the FY 1985 defense budget. These, plus equally useful appendices that provide a small cross-section of basic documents, make the book worth reading.

The problem is that its audience is probably quite limited. Those scholars and officials who specialize in Japanese defense affairs should be familiar with its fundamental information and positions. Those who are anxious for a primer on Japanese security will almost certainly find this book too advanced and specialized. That audience might wish the

book had a subtitle warning them: "More than you ever wanted to know about the inner workings, procedures, and regulations of the Japanese defense community." Perhaps the most appropriate readers are non-Japan specialist defense-oriented scholars, officials and military officers who want to broaden their horizons and develop a "Japan expert's" expertise. It is recommended for that audience as background reading.

It could be recommended less equivocally, were it more timely. Based on research, interviews, and a conference conducted in 1984-85, it was not published until 1988. Although there is a two-page "epilogue" bringing it up-to-date through mid-1987, the book is somewhat dated.

This type of study should be done on a regular basis so that experts on U.S., Soviet, and European security can familiarize themselves with how the Japanese bureaucracy responds to the changing security situation in and around Japan. Perhaps the most valuable contribution this book makes is to break new ground which others can follow.

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Perry, Mark. *Four Stars: The Inside Story of the Forty-Year Battle*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989. 402pp. \$24.95