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# The Navy's Battle of the Budget: Soviet Style

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Norman Cigar

**M**ikhail Gorbachev's ascent to power in March 1985 has spurred a reassessment of Soviet military doctrine and spending, which, among its results, could have a major impact on the Soviet Navy's development. One of Gorbachev's most notable initiatives so far has been to articulate a strategy that simultaneously addresses the Western threat to the U.S.S.R. and the latter's own domestic woes. The more extensive reliance on political means, such as arms control, to deal with security concerns, in effect, can also mesh with his domestic agenda calling for *perestroika*—restructuring—of the country's economy. In response to these domestic economic imperatives, Soviet leaders appear to be encouraging a rethinking—spearheaded by the civilian think tanks—of the appropriate role and claim to resources of the military in general, including the navy. This could lead to substantial cuts in the Soviet Navy's budget in future years, with an impact on its construction program and mission.

Reconsideration of the navy's role has engendered an intense debate, particularly between the civilian think tanks and the navy. While this debate is far from the structured process familiar to those who follow equivalent discussions in the West, far-reaching financial and doctrinal issues may nevertheless be at stake. Despite the obvious professional interests and personal passions involved, even major differences usually are couched at a level of openness still well short of what one would find in the West. *Glasnost* notwithstanding, participants, particularly those in the military who may feel more vulnerable than civilians, still seem to prefer to argue in the discreet manner of traditional Soviet political discourse. The use in public of such established techniques as historical analogies and oblique allusions continues to be the safest way to present arguments on a sensitive topic.

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## Dealing with the West's Naval Capabilities

Among both civilians and the military, there appears to be a broad appreciation of not only the challenge posed to Soviet political and military interests by the naval power of the West, and that of the United States in particular, but also of the key role that naval power plays in the West's defense strategy. If anything, Soviet awareness of the challenge was heightened in the 1980s by the U.S. Navy's enhanced nuclear and conventional capabilities and then amplified by the assertive application of naval power posited by the publicly announced U.S. "Maritime Strategy." Significantly, when Marshal Sergei Akhromeev was Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, he would be briefed first of all on the location of U.S. naval forces when he came to his office each morning.<sup>1</sup>

While the U.S. naval challenge is certainly the key Soviet naval concern, it is not the only one. Moscow must also consider that posed by the other Western navies. Soviet observers have devoted particular attention to the Japanese Navy's "latest military technology," increased area of operations, growing budget, and possible acquisition of aircraft carriers.<sup>2</sup>

## Economic Imperatives and Defense

Even if it were possible to match the West's capabilities, it would not only work against the détente on which Gorbachev has set his hopes for the new inflow of aid and technology that is needed to modernize the Soviet system, but it would also be exorbitantly expensive. Gorbachev has emphasized that, in order to facilitate economic restructuring, it is imperative to scale back military spending in general, which he believes has played a major role in obstructing the U.S.S.R.'s economic development. In fact, he has maintained (probably for domestic consumption) that the arms race is a Western strategy designed to exhaust the U.S.S.R. economically and therefore requires a slowing down in both the U.S.S.R. and the West if the U.S.S.R. is to strengthen itself.<sup>3</sup> From Moscow's perspective, the current trend of the competition would prove even more unfavorable to the U.S.S.R. in the future. General of the Army Mikhail Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, for example, has underlined that "The potential for [Japan's] militarization is enormous. . . . The scientific-technical and industrial potential of many of the countries allied to the U.S. permit the acceleration of any type of arms race."<sup>4</sup> As Gorbachev has acknowledged, "We cannot permit ourselves the luxury of 'imitating' the U.S., Nato, and Japan in all their military-technological innovations."<sup>5</sup> His "spin doctors" have railed against Soviet military spending in even more explicit terms. *Izvestiya's* political observer, Stanislav Kondrashov, for example, bluntly called defense "a holy matter . . . not holy in the sense of religious worship, [but] a fetish,

blind faith." In fact, he claimed that a lowering of military spending is unavoidable if Gorbachev's *perestroika* is going to succeed, presenting the choice starkly as: "Guns or butter."<sup>6</sup>

### Measuring the West's Threat

Soviet leaders view the overall threat, and in particular the likelihood of an attack by Nato, as having diminished considerably. They believe that there is scope for accommodation. In a speech to Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze maintained that no one can argue that the threat has not been reduced and "This is a reality of which every Soviet individual is aware."<sup>7</sup> In part, this may stem not only from a more realistic assessment of the situation, but also from a need to show success as a result of Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives and as a rationale to justify cuts in Soviet defense spending. In that sense, Gorbachev's promotion of a defensive doctrine (reasonable sufficiency); political means (especially arms control); and the resolution of regional conflicts, which would result in lower international tensions and, therefore, a decreased need for military spending, are closely interrelated.<sup>8</sup>

The civilian think tanks have furnished expert support for the political leadership's reassessment of the threat, with reassurances that even unilateral cuts in military spending are both practical and safe. For example, Oleg N. Bykov, Deputy Director of the Institute for Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), has noted that: "Our military machine is so enormous that even a whole series of unilateral cutbacks will not turn us into a second-rate military power. . . . We do not always have to look at the West. The time has come to act, based above all on our own internal political and economic interests. . . . I must say this bluntly: in my opinion there is no need at this time to frighten ourselves. The situation in Europe is radically different from what it was at the beginning of the 1940s or the mid-1950s. The world has changed."<sup>9</sup>

### The Age of the Think Tank

Under Gorbachev, the civilian think tanks have gained unprecedented prominence in Soviet military affairs. They have often articulated the issues on defense and have provided the political leaders with an alternative source of military expertise and policy options. In general, they have been closer to Gorbachev's thinking than has been the military.<sup>10</sup>

The relationship between the civilian experts and the military, not surprisingly, has often been adversarial. Civilian experts are resentful that, until recently, the military has excluded them from any role in military matters in general. The withholding of information from civilians has been

a particularly sore point. One analyst aired this complaint openly in *Izvestiya*: "Alas, only yesterday there were as many military secrets kept from our own people as from 'the foreign military'. . . . Society should monitor more widely and effectively the decisions of the military, because these decisions have a significant impact on much that concerns us all."<sup>11</sup>

Military spending has also become a salient issue of debate now that civilian experts are able to express their views publicly. Typically, Bykov speaks of "the enormous harm to our economy [caused by] the need to maintain parity even at a constant level," and claims that "unproductive military expenditures shackle *perestroika*." He accuses the military of being "a gigantic uncontrollable enclave" within the economy, "functioning according to its own logic and devouring colossal resources."<sup>12</sup> As Georgii Arbatov, Director of the influential Institute for the USA and Canada, has remarked, "the time when defense issues were above criticism is ending."<sup>13</sup> The role of the Congress of the People's Deputies in military issues is also expanding, further increasing civilian involvement.

As one could expect, there seems to be resentment within the Soviet military in general against the civilian encroachment on what was once a tightly guarded preserve. The commander of the navy, Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin, for example, has quipped that "Unfortunately, recently many incompetent publications on this topic [i.e., military] by ignorant individuals are creating confusion and chaos and are leading to an attempt to decide on the extremely important issue of the country's defense from positions which are emotional rather than reasonable. On the issue of the country's defense this is not only harmful but dangerous."<sup>14</sup>

A work published by the military, in fact, stresses that in order to strengthen the country's defenses against aggression, "reliance on the experience and knowledge of the military leadership, and on their participation in working out the most effective solutions" is essential even for "the political leadership."<sup>15</sup> Fleet Admiral I. Kapitanets, the First Deputy of the Commander in Chief of the Navy, was critical of the fact that the navy leadership had had no input on decisions affecting naval development under Stalin and Khrushchev.<sup>16</sup> One can assume that, although addressing the safer past, the navy's desire for meaningful input in such matters also applies to the present.

### Targeting the Navy's Mission

The think tanks and other civilians have taken the lead in public criticism of the Soviet Navy, voicing openly what they see as the navy's most appropriate role in the changing environment. For example, a front-page article in *Pravda*, on the occasion of Gorbachev's visit to the Northern Fleet's headquarters at Murmansk in October 1987, apparently set the tone for the

new civilian perception of what the navy's reduced, defensive role should be within the context of *perestroika*. The article praised the navy's role in World War II and, significantly, highlighted its "strenuous safeguarding of the Red Army's flanks, [and] its carrying out jointly with the ground forces of a protracted defense of naval bases, islands, and the littoral."<sup>17</sup> In his work on the military thinker M. V. Frunze, Colonel-General Makhmut A. Gareev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, quotes Frunze as saying that "the fate of a future war will be determined on the continental theaters of military operations and the main mission of the Navy is to support the operations of land groupings on the maritime sectors"—a statement that appears to reflect a similar perception among the current military leadership.<sup>18</sup>

Others have more explicitly drawn implications as to the navy's more appropriate defensive role. As Aleksei Arbatov, Director of the Disarmament and Security Department of IMEMO, notes, the Soviet Navy should have only enough means necessary to defend its ballistic missile submarines in coastal waters. He rejected explicitly such missions as attacking Western sea lines of communication in the Atlantic and Pacific as "hardly consonant with defensive strategy." In fact, he concludes bluntly: ". . . it would be useful to reassess the plans for constructing a large surface fleet, including aircraft-carrying ships, nuclear cruisers, and landing ships. The existing forces, it seems, are already fully sufficient to defend the Soviet coast and to defend our sea-based long-range missile strategic forces in coastal waters. Clearly, it would be more convenient to concentrate further efforts [instead] on constructing a smaller number and fewer types of higher quality multi-purpose submarines armed with anti-ship missiles and torpedoes and, if needed, with long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs (Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles)."<sup>19</sup>

In fact, another departmental director at IMEMO, G. Kunadze, discussing the navy and the Western threat to the U.S.S.R., concludes that the only sea lines of communication that the U.S.S.R. has to worry about might be on the northern route—and that is qualified as only "perhaps." Suggesting that the development of the navy is tied more to copying the United States rather than to real defense needs, he asks rhetorically even about the Pacific: "Is there a direct threat to our security from that area? Or, does the Soviet naval presence there in general reflect the logic [only] of a symmetrical response to the actions of the U.S.? Is such a response in the Asia-Pacific region really necessary from the point of view of the security of our eastern frontiers?"<sup>20</sup> Calling for a clear distinction between security interests and mere competition with the United States, Kunadze concludes that the Pacific Fleet not only already has enough forces, but that "one cannot exclude, probably, that some portions of the Pacific Fleet's forces or of its current missions are even unnecessary."<sup>21</sup> Moreover, and perhaps reflecting Gorbachev's decreased focus on military involvement in the Third World,

another departmental director at IMEMO, S. Blagovolin, also claims that “[we] have not found such overseas political and economic interests which would require us to spread our military presence around the globe and to create a navy to safeguard the latter (all the more so that this, evidently, is also the most expensive area of military preparations).”<sup>22</sup>

### Targeting the Soviet Navy's Cost

Criticism focusing on the cost of the Soviet Navy has been equally forthright. An article in *SShA*, the journal of the Institute for the USA and Canada, for example, equated the earlier decision to expand the Soviet Navy to falling into a U.S. trap. According to the authors, the United States has tried “to push the USSR into the water” since the 1960s and provoke it into building “large surface warships, including aircraft carriers.” The United States has allegedly sought to engage Moscow in a race which would play to U.S. strengths in “existing shipbuilding capabilities and scientific-technological potential,” as well as to its advantages of geography, basing network, and alliances.<sup>23</sup> In fact, the article claims that a “symmetric response” would be “exhausting,” while, on the contrary, a “refusal to ‘play by American rules’ up to now has been viewed negatively in Washington.” In particular, this could be understood as an allusion to the U.S.S.R.’s decision to build conventional aircraft carriers for the first time.<sup>24</sup>

Aleksei Arbatov concludes that “the Navy merits special attention because of its vast cost, complexity, and the long time needed to build modern surface ships and submarines” and that to try to compete with the United States at sea “diverts resources from important tasks to goals that are unachievable.”<sup>25</sup> It appears that Colonel-General Gareev echoes similar concerns on the General Staff about the navy’s costs: “. . . the specialist sailors, naturally, in being involved in their job, will inflate any figure, while with the enormous expenditure which we have assigned to aviation we should be doubly and triply cautious in terms of expenditures on the fleet.”<sup>26</sup> There are indications that such doubts may be fairly widespread in the U.S.S.R. and that they are being voiced more openly, even by laymen. For example, readers of *Voennye znaniya*, the journal of the DOSAAF—the volunteer auxiliary organization, whose main mission is to prepare youth for the military—reportedly have asked, “Does our country at this time need a Navy that is so expensive, with the three-year length of service for sailors?”<sup>27</sup>

### Land Power versus Sea Power

What may be of particular concern for the Soviet Navy is the apparent reopening of an even more basic debate between land power and sea power. In the Russian context, particularly during times of difficulty, the choice has

most often been made to the disadvantage of sea power, as Bruce Watson has pointed out recently in an insightful article.<sup>28</sup> In this vein, Aleksei Arbatov also notes that, unlike the United States, the U.S.S.R. already has a heavy continental defense burden and asks "Why get involved in competition on someone else's turf when all the conditions are more favorable for us on our own [i.e., continental turf]?"<sup>29</sup> As Blagovolin, in making a case that downplays the need for a strong navy, concludes: "Is it really in vain that our greatest military figures—A. A. Svechin, M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskii—stressed that we need a navy that is defensively oriented, given our country's specific geographic position and economic situation? One can retort that more than a half century has passed and that much has changed during that time. That is true, but there is one enduring factor that has not changed, that is that we have remained primarily a continental state."<sup>30</sup>

### Protecting Institutional Interests

The Soviet Navy, as well as the rest of the military, has found itself in a particularly uncomfortable position in relation to the new security thinking, which could affect its mission and claims to funding. The navy's leaders are keenly aware that others in the U.S.S.R., including high-level military and civilian leaders, have a perspective of the navy's future which differs significantly from their own. Although the navy has usually presented its case in muted tones, it has nevertheless put up a spirited defense of its interests. While the significance of such institutional viewpoints in the U.S.S.R. may be a point of debate, their existence is undeniable. Despite the Communist Party's role as the ultimate locus of decision making (at least until very recently) and its intrusive activity to prevent the rise of autonomous centers of power, more parochial institutional interests nevertheless are present and can contribute to the shaping of policy, especially with the expansion of *glasnost*, if only by articulating the available options.

The Soviet Navy has sought to protect, in particular, its shipbuilding programs and as much of its blue-water mission as possible by stressing the navy's importance to the U.S.S.R. Limitations on operations or a restrictive defensive strategy, of course, would be considerably easier to reverse than cutbacks in long-term construction programs. While operating areas can be changed with relative ease, reviving shipbuilding would be a much more complicated endeavor; there is no feasible quick "break-out" option in the latter should the international situation deteriorate.

### The Soviet Navy's Anxiety

The implications of these trends have engendered considerable anxiety and doubts about the long-term future of the navy. Naval officers being retired



early, as part of personnel cuts, have complained about their fate, and there must be some concern for their future among those currently in service.<sup>31</sup> Vice-Admiral Georgii Kostev noted in a letter to *Krasnaya zvezda* on his last visit to the Northern Fleet that “without fail discussion would crop up about cuts in the Soviet Armed Forces” and he stressed that “such massive cuts concern and distress sailors.”<sup>32</sup> Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, likewise, has continued to voice lingering misgivings about any extensive budget cuts, noting that “a reduction in appropriations for defense must be within reasonable limits.”<sup>33</sup>

These expressions of chagrin and unease appear genuine enough—not part of a massive disinformation campaign. Given the precarious nature of traditional Russian and Soviet naval development, where a strong fleet has been the exception rather than the rule, such attitudes are not surprising. The reaction within the navy when Khrushchev’s cutback of surface ships seemed to portend a break in the service’s development provides an insight into what many may be feeling today. In his memoirs, Admiral V. M. Grishanov recalls that in 1960 “the fate of surface ships worried us all, and we felt bitterness in our hearts.”<sup>34</sup> The long-term commitment which the navy requires was an area of particular concern at the time. As Admiral Vladimir A. Kasatonov had confided to his colleagues: “I’ll say it openly. It’s one thing to cut back the infantry, tanks, and aircraft, but the Navy is something entirely different. . . . Not everyone, probably, knows how many years it takes to build a cruiser and how much of the people’s money goes into it. The situation can change, but you cannot bring back these ships quickly.”<sup>35</sup>

### Rebutting Domestic Critics

The navy has retaliated against unfriendly views with veiled but mordant criticism. Admiral K. V. Makarov, the Chief of the Main Navy Staff, lashed out at those “in the West . . . who seriously claim that the Soviet Union does not need a powerful Navy.” His statement, which was accompanied by arguments on the utility of the Soviet Navy which were not likely to matter to foreigners, suggests that domestic critics were probably as much, if not more, a target of his barb as were foreign ones.<sup>36</sup> Vice-Admiral (Ret.) G. I. Shchedrin, reviving the Gorshkovian view, labeled the claim that the U.S.S.R. is a continental power and that it therefore did not need a navy as “inventions of Western propaganda,” which have to be opposed.<sup>37</sup> More basically, the navy has argued for the significance of sea power to the country’s fundamental development. In 1989, the lead article in *Morskoi sbornik* for July, the issue dedicated to Navy Day, carried an impassioned plea for support of the country’s “historic” naval mission, noting that “Only oceanic thinking will help us to fulfill completely the sacred frontiers of the motherland and the capabilities of our [national] character [*dukhovnyi tip*].”<sup>38</sup> It also included

a pointed warning that, had Peter the Great not made the necessary commitment to sea power, "The inertia of Muscovy Russia would again have dragged [Russia] into the depths of the continent. That same inertia also exists today."<sup>39</sup>

One can view the posthumous rehabilitation campaign of the controversial naval figure Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, begun in 1987, as part of the navy's case in favor of the need for a powerful oceangoing fleet. Kuznetsov had been one of its leading proponents, and naval spokesmen today portray this as the key reason why Khrushchev had relieved him of duty as commander of the navy in 1956.

The navy now accuses Khrushchev of having been shortsighted and of having had only a shallow understanding of military matters, and those who propose similar views today can be tarred with the same brush. Using this criticism-by-analogy, Vice-Admiral Kostev, for example, noted that in the Northern Fleet the question that is asked most frequently is: "Was it not a mistake to reduce the Army and Navy by 1,200,000 individuals in N. S. Khrushchev's time?"<sup>40</sup> Admiral Kapitanets, the First Deputy Commander in Chief, has also spoken out against Khrushchev's cuts, including specific references to the latter's blocking of the projected aircraft carriers, labeling the policy "voluntarism," which in Marxist parlance is the error of not paying sufficient attention to "the objective laws of history."<sup>41</sup> One can read in such observations a not too heavily veiled criticism of any similar naval restrictions under Gorbachev.

### The Navy View of the Threat

Perhaps key to the Soviet Navy's case has been its presentation of the overall threat because of the close likely relationship among threat, mission, and claim on resources. One can argue that anything less than rousing support for Gorbachev's view of the threat, and how to deal with it, is worth noting. In fact, the navy view, if not outright contradictory, has been at least different in nuance. At times, naval spokesmen and other military sources have portrayed the threat in starker terms than has Gorbachev, or at a minimum have lagged behind Gorbachev in adopting positions more conciliatory to the West. In particular, Soviet naval sources have stressed the aggressive nature of the U.S. Navy's "Maritime Strategy."<sup>42</sup> Vice-Admiral Kostev was particularly visible for his hardline view of the general threat from the West during the first few years after Gorbachev came to power. He argued that the West is aggressive and dangerous, that the U.S.S.R. has always had a defensive orientation, that a war might not necessarily escalate to a nuclear level, and that "the maintenance of military-strategic parity by means of strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces is exceptionally important," with

ominous warnings that a situation similar to that in 1941 must be avoided—all positions more reflective of the old thinking than the new.<sup>43</sup>

Rear Admiral V. Gulin and Captain 1st Rank I. Kondyrev, although nodding to Gorbachev's claims that the U.S.S.R.'s main goal now is to prevent war and that it will use political means to a greater extent to ensure security, nevertheless stress that the country still needs a strong defense. They also maintain that the West is still planning for a conventional global war and that, while there can be no victory in a nuclear war, victory in a "local" or conventional war is still possible. They even claim that the United States still retains as its ultimate goal "the destruction of socialism as a socio-political system."<sup>44</sup> Admiral Chernavin has also noted that "The nature of imperialism is such that it is not capable of renouncing its hopes of changing the course of historical development through the use of military force" and that the Soviet Navy's role and importance in "repelling aggression," if anything, are increasing.<sup>45</sup> His interpretation of Gorbachev's "reasonable sufficiency," as is true among the military in general, seems to put emphasis on the need to ensure a sufficiently high ceiling. As Chernavin has stressed: "I am convinced that one can talk of reasonable sufficiency in the military establishment only from a position of sufficient reason, specially on questions of allotting resources for defense. . . . Only such an approach toward defense will not damage it."<sup>46</sup>

To be sure, recently, the positions of at least some naval officers appear to include a less ominous overall view. Admiral of the Fleet Aleksei Sorokin, for example, has voiced views of the threat and even of unilateral military cuts in a vein identified with Gorbachev.<sup>47</sup> However, as First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces, he is no longer in the Soviet Navy's hierarchy and need not be viewed, strictly speaking, as a spokesman for the navy. Moreover, an article that appeared in *Morskoi sbornik* at about the same time still spoke of "the openly anti-Soviet direction of its [i.e., the U.S.] foreign policy and propaganda," and concluded that "no substantive changes whatsoever confirmed by practical steps by the U.S. have been observed yet."<sup>48</sup>

### Waving the American Flag

Predictably, the Soviet Navy has highlighted the capabilities of the U.S. Navy. Admiral Kapitanets claims that the United States and Nato have no intention of reducing their naval power or of responding to calls for naval arms control. According to him, "the threat from the U.S. and Nato naval forces is increasing," due to a planned U.S. Navy upgrade and a greater emphasis on putting nuclear arms at sea.<sup>49</sup> In fact, he has accused the West of allegedly seeking the Soviet Navy's "unilateral disarmament, to which, of course, we will never agree."<sup>50</sup> As a retired rear admiral put it, the U.S.

submarines still target Soviet cities with missiles and “That is why it is still essential for the Soviet Union to have a powerful navy. One cannot get away from reality.”<sup>51</sup>

Soviet Navy sources in general often refer to the substantial funding that the U.S. Navy is said to receive, both in absolute terms and in relation to the other services.<sup>52</sup> Typically, Vice-Admiral Vasilii I. Panin, while Chief of the navy’s Political Directorate, even used a discussion of the Soviet escort operations in the Persian Gulf as a springboard for a thinly disguised pitch for continued funding for his service. As he saw it, the Soviet Navy has to be able to keep up with the U.S. Navy, which he stressed receives one-third of “the Pentagon’s colossal budget.”<sup>53</sup>

In order to strengthen their case, Soviet naval leaders have also highlighted elements of the international naval balance apart from the United States and Nato—in particular, Japan. Admiral Chernavin, for example, has argued that “We cannot fail to take into consideration the program for the future buildup of Japan’s naval power because of the construction and inclusion of aircraft carriers in its naval order of battle.”<sup>54</sup>

### Dealing with the Threat

To be sure, insofar as the Soviet Navy portrays the U.S. Navy’s capabilities as a significant threat to the U.S.S.R., it is in agreement with the Soviet political establishment. However, where the navy differs is in its strategy for dealing with this threat, with its lesser emphasis on political means, which, on the contrary, assumes a central role in Gorbachev’s new thinking. In an earlier day, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who was in command of the navy from 1956 to 1985, had openly favored an assertive Soviet naval response as the most effective counter, a perspective shared with the political leadership before the Gorbachev era. According to Gorshkov, the only way to deal with this threat was to present the West with the same problem, that is, for Soviet forces to operate in ocean areas previously used by the United States as a buffer. In fact, as he saw it, under such circumstances, the need for the Soviet Navy “increases sharply.”<sup>55</sup>

The navy has since not been so outspoken. Still, while recognizing the changing parameters of Gorbachev’s new outlook, it has continued to make arguments similar to Gorshkov’s, albeit with reduced intentions and in more muted tones. The general thrust of the navy is that the best approach to meeting the threat is still a strong, active navy. One aspect of this is the promotion of “out-of-area deployments” [*dal’nye pokhody*]. Admiral Chernavin, for example, noted in an interview that the Soviet Navy’s out-of-area deployments serve to deter Western aggression against other countries and contribute to defending the U.S.S.R. from surprise attacks.<sup>56</sup> An authoritative study on the navy, published in 1988, also echoes this perspective,

favoring the repositioning of submarines and surface ships in forward positions so that they will be ready "to use their weapons quickly when war starts."<sup>57</sup> Admiral K. V. Makarov, the Chief of the Main Navy Staff, has also highlighted the continuing need for readiness "during the initial period of war, under conditions of surprise attack," and asked rhetorically about the new defensive doctrine: "Does this mean giving up the initiative to the other side and waging combat actions at sea passively? Of course not."<sup>58</sup> On the question of restricting operations on a unilateral basis, Admiral Chernavin has remarked that "It is completely understandable that the further reduction in the operations of the Soviet Navy in ocean areas on a unilateral basis would decrease the security of the country, and could prompt aggressive forces to launch a sudden attack. We cannot give up our security."<sup>59</sup>

### Supporting Soviet Foreign Policy

Navy spokesmen in the U.S.S.R. have emphasized the important role the U.S. Navy plays in implementing foreign policy and the implicit need for a strong Soviet Navy in order to play a similar role. In discussing the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, for example, one Soviet naval officer claimed that the United States was able to project "great force" to an area thousands of miles from its shores, thanks to its navy. He stressed that "on the other side of the ocean they do not hide the fact that if one has a powerful navy, one can find one's self 'the neighbor' of any coastal state," and concludes that in the Persian Gulf "we are justified in calling it 'aircraft carrier diplomacy.'"<sup>60</sup>

Soviet Navy spokesmen have sought to use such arguments to promote the use of the Soviet Navy as a key tool of Moscow's foreign policy. Speaking of the Mediterranean Flotilla, for example, one naval source noted that "in the final analysis . . . [it consists of] deployed, and far from negligible, military might which exerts real influence on the political-military situation of the entire region."<sup>61</sup>

The Persian Gulf operations, in particular, probably came as a windfall for the Soviet Navy. Not surprisingly, the navy has showcased, at every opportunity, the role that it played there and has stressed its significance to the nation. For example, Rear Admiral Vitalii Sergeev, who commanded the task force in the Gulf, equated his mission there to "defense of the homeland," even noting that: "Peter the First had already said: 'The purpose of the Russian Navy is to defend the homeland.' The ships of our Soviet Navy are also defending the interests of their state—[that is] our [merchant] ships, our people, and ultimately our economy."<sup>62</sup>

## Deploying to Train

In addition, navy spokesmen have repeatedly opposed cutting funds for out-of-area deployments for training. According to Fleet Admiral N. Smirnov, such operations continue to be necessary, since “it is on the open ocean . . . that the development of skills and the training of commanders and crews take place.” In fact, he stresses that “Only then will the Navy be able to not only sail and carry out some everyday tasks but also to build up its power in practical terms.”<sup>63</sup> An editorial in *Morskoi sbornik* categorically stated that “one cannot fully agree” with the view that there are any viable substitutes, including technical simulators, for such training.<sup>64</sup> While some navy spokesmen, such as Admiral Smirnov, acknowledge the high costs involved, the latter is also quick to give assurances that the navy is already doing everything it can to make such deployment as efficient as possible.<sup>65</sup>

## The Soviet Navy and Arms Control

Moscow’s push for naval arms control as a “political means” to neutralize the U.S. Navy is likely to continue. This will entail the use of the Soviet Navy as a bargaining chip to the greatest extent possible. While any success in this area would be of overall benefit to the U.S.S.R., given the asymmetric role of naval power in Western defense, this would not necessarily be the best outcome for the Soviet Navy’s narrow institutional interests, and could have a significant impact on its future development.

As one might expect, the Soviet Navy has been somewhat reticent about naval arms control. Admiral Chernavin has expressed his doubts about the likelihood of the West’s agreeing to arms control, noting that Soviet naval arms control initiatives “are not meeting with the appropriate support from the Western imperialist states.” He has used this as a rationale for calling for continued support for the Soviet Navy, claiming that “therefore, the Party and the Soviet people are compelled to show constant care to guarantee the security of the homeland’s ocean and sea frontiers.”<sup>66</sup>

Also significant has been the navy’s apparent skepticism about verification in general—a key element in arms control—and particularly of SSBNs. When asked about submarine verification, Admiral Kapitanets did not reject its feasibility outright, but sought to downplay it by maintaining that “The modern-day submarine is a very complex engineering system, in which the latest achievements of science and technology are embodied. It is obvious that it is extremely difficult to detect, and even more so to track constantly.”<sup>67</sup> A lack of enthusiasm for the reduction of SSBNs is perhaps not surprising, since this is the bread-and-butter mission of the Soviet Navy, and, according to U.S. Naval Intelligence estimates, a START agreement could lead to a reduction in Soviet SSBNs from the present 62 to 15-30.<sup>68</sup> As a corollary,

the need for other naval assets to protect the latter would diminish accordingly.

Overall, the navy claims that it is already a defensive force and, implicitly, in no need of arms control. Admiral Chernavin has stressed, for example, that the Soviet Pacific Fleet is “above all for the defense of the Soviet Far East coast.”<sup>69</sup> He has even contrasted Soviet and U.S. aircraft carriers, calling the former defensive and the latter offensive because they have a land-strike capability.<sup>70</sup> Moreover, Soviet naval spokesmen portray the U.S.S.R.’s naval effort as only a reluctant response to provocative Western threats. Typically, Vice-Admiral Dmitrii Komarov, the First Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, in a written reply to Australian and New Zealand journalists, claimed that there was little reason for Soviet warships to operate in the South Pacific, and that their activities there were only “a forced countermeasure” to U.S. operations there.<sup>71</sup>

### Arguing in Economic Terms

Recognizing the financial imperatives which loom on the military agenda, the navy has been anxious to put itself in as favorable a light as possible in economic terms and to reassure Soviet audiences that it is not being wasteful. Vice-Admiral V. Petrov, for example, assured readers that waste and inefficiency are being eliminated and promised that “Every ruble and every gram of fuel and raw materials must work actively to guarantee the navy’s combat readiness.”<sup>72</sup> The navy also has pointed out that “many elements” of the expensive new technology and capacity of the defense industry that the navy uses also benefit the other services.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, navy spokesmen have stressed that their plants also produce goods for the civilian sector.<sup>74</sup>

However, at least one admiral has called for part of the savings from any financial reductions to be returned to the military to improve the quality of life of its personnel in areas such as housing and social services.<sup>75</sup> At the same time, Admiral Kapitanets has cautioned against funding such improvements at the expense of combat-related construction, and took the opportunity to note that the navy’s portion of the total defense budget in any case is already “small.”<sup>76</sup>

The navy has tried to shunt some of the blame for its spending onto others. According to one navy source, it is not military spending *per se* that is to blame for the U.S.S.R.’s economic problems. Rather, the culprits are said to be the pre-Gorbachev “administrative-command methods” and “horizontal concept of development”—safe enough targets. However, he also notes that part of the problem is the recent increased cost of inputs—technology, fuel, food, uniforms—that is raising the navy’s operational costs.<sup>77</sup> More recently, the navy seems to be trying to shift some of the responsibility for its high operating costs onto the shipbuilding and defense industries, which it alleges provide

poor-quality systems (particularly electronics) that require expensive repairs and maintenance.<sup>78</sup>

Perhaps it is not coincidental that a navy source has suggested the creation of a new navy expertise in military economics. Ostensibly, this would facilitate the provision of "recommendations on the economy" to the navy leadership.<sup>79</sup> Left unsaid, however, is that this could lead to a group of in-house experts who could prepare and defend a budget case and deal more effectively with civilians seen as hostile to navy interests, something that formerly was not necessary.

### Interservice Rivalries?

While one might expect shared concerns to lead the military to formulate a united platform on cuts, it is perhaps likely that interservice competition for a shrinking pie will triumph. It appears that the navy has found the rest of the military, as well as civilian experts, to be unsympathetic to its concerns. Although interservice debate generally has been kept out of the public eye, glimpses of it have been apparent when the navy has vented its frustration.

The top military leadership has been traditionally a sea of green, with an occasional "blue suit." In the overall scheme of things, the Soviet military as a body would probably view naval cuts with little regret. When speaking of the cuts made in the Pacific Fleet, Minister of Defense, General of the Army Dmitrii Yazov noted with relative equanimity that the threat to the U.S.S.R. had diminished and that U.S.-Soviet relations were improving. Therefore, he concluded, "Under these conditions, it becomes possible to decide on large unilateral cuts in our armed forces," adding that the cuts made in the Pacific Fleet were "a thoroughly thought-out step," and that they would be implemented in a way that "there will be no damage to our security."<sup>80</sup> The military leadership would probably be willing to use the navy as a bargaining chip, along with less palatable ground force reductions, to try to reduce the U.S. Navy's capabilities and freedom of action and, in particular, to limit those U.S. Navy systems which concern the Soviets most: ballistic-missile submarines, sea-launched cruise missiles, and aircraft carriers. For example, when asked about the possibility of a mutual U.S.-Soviet elimination of ballistic-missile submarines, General-Colonel Nikolai Chervov, Director of the General Staff's Treaties and Arms Control Directorate, was not negative, noting simply that "The Americans haven't made such a proposal yet. If they do, we'll study it."<sup>81</sup> Indeed, trading off Soviet naval capabilities might seem a small price to pay, from the perspective of the other services, to neutralize the U.S. Navy's potential impact on the outcome of a conflict.

In pressing the argument against the West on the need to trade cuts in naval forces for those in ground forces, non-naval Soviet spokesmen have had



recourse to concepts very much in the vein of such proponents of naval power as Admiral Gorshkov—although applying them only to Western naval power. For example, Marshal Akhromeev, by then retired and a special adviser to Gorbachev, claimed that: “Since when has the Navy ceased to be an indicator of the might of states and of military alliances? There is absolutely no substance to claims that naval forces do not participate in the seizure of territory or land because they operate on the seas and oceans. The only danger, so they say, comes from motorized rifle and armor forces. This assertion is directed to those who are ignorant of military matters or are naive simpletons. Three-fourths of the earth’s surface is made up of expanses of oceans and seas. For centuries, we have heard the leaders of the U.S. and Britain, and others, claim: ‘Whoever rules the seas and oceans rules the world.’ Military history confirms the enormous role of naval forces in overall military power, particularly the employment of the U.S. Navy in World War II, and in the Korean and Viet Nam wars.”<sup>82</sup>

This, however, does not necessarily mean that the military sees this as also applicable to the Soviet Navy. Colonel-General Gareev probably expressed the Soviet military consensus about the navy when he noted that Lenin allegedly believed that “a significant fleet with a large number of capital surface ships for the Soviet state was an ‘excessive luxury.’”<sup>83</sup> When the military as a whole will have to make sacrifices, the other services will probably offer up the navy to take the relatively deeper, long-term cuts. While some suggestions, such as one by a retired major-general to use SSBNs for ecological and civilian purposes, may appear whimsical, they are probably no less of a concern to the navy because of that.<sup>84</sup>

The navy, of course, has been careful to make the appropriate obeisance to the established joint doctrine. Deeply ingrained in Soviet military thinking, this is a sliding scale which can accommodate different mixes among the individual services and which has varied from one period to another in its specific balance. The navy, apart from a short-lived foray for a more independent role under Gorshkov, has tried to take advantage of joint doctrine to argue its case, when possible. *The Navy*, for example, has maintained that “Helping the ground forces requires significant naval forces for combat against both the naval and land enemy.”<sup>85</sup> *The Navy*, in fact, comes back repeatedly to the argument that the Soviet Navy is important as a strategic force, having the ability to play a major role in a war even against targets on land, such as hostile military forces.<sup>86</sup> However, at the same time, Admiral Chernavin, although including among the navy’s missions “if need be” also “cooperation with our ground forces in carrying out defensive operations,” has also gone out of his way to reiterate that, while cooperating, each service nevertheless should still retain primary responsibility for carrying out its “specialized traditional missions.”<sup>87</sup>

The navy's perception of its subordinate position within the Soviet military hierarchy has apparently heightened its unease in the jockeying for position on defense allocations. Some of the most trenchant criticism by the navy on this issue, reflecting concern about seeing its missions subordinated even further to the other services, has appeared under the plausible denial afforded by Admiral Kuznetsov's rehabilitation campaign. One segment of his memoirs, published in *Krasnaya zvezda*, ostensibly at his widow's initiative, centered on his calls for a greater naval role in joint decision making and his accusations that the army had not appreciated the navy's full potential in the past.<sup>88</sup>

The navy has expressed discontent in areas such as the army's neglect of training for the Naval Infantry, prompting the suggestion that responsibility for training plans be transferred from the army to the navy. Admiral Chernavin has also called for the navy to train its own pilots once again, rather than relying on the Air Force.<sup>89</sup>

### Recent Reductions—How Significant?

While its policy on naval arms control so far has been largely declaratory, the U.S.S.R. nevertheless has made some unilateral cuts and restrictions in operations, probably intended primarily as an economic measure, as well as a political gesture. For example, since 1986, the Soviet Navy's operational tempo has been reduced, with less time spent at sea and, especially, on out-of-area exercises, with most major exercises carried out in waters close to the U.S.S.R. As such, the focus is even more on the "defensive" bastion concept. Moreover, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov announced that, as part of Gorbachev's one-half-million-man reduction, a projected 20,000 personnel would be cut in the Leningrad Military District and would include personnel from the Northern Fleet. The Baltic Fleet would also be reduced, with a focus on the retirement of its submarines.<sup>90</sup> Likewise, the Minister of Defense made public that sixteen ships of the Pacific Fleet would be eliminated as part of the proposed force reductions in the Soviet Far East.<sup>91</sup> Plans to scrap ships have received considerable publicity in the Soviet media. There have also been calls for the transfer of naval equipment and auxiliary ships to civilian purposes, e.g., for use by the fishing industry.<sup>92</sup> As one might expect, Soviet spokesmen have portrayed to foreign audiences the reductions and changes in operational routine that have already been made as major steps. For example, Admiral Amel'ko, in an interview with a Japanese news agency, claimed that such measures had already transformed the Pacific Fleet into a "defensive force."<sup>93</sup>

The Soviet Navy does not appear to have reacted negatively to these steps, and one can argue that the cuts announced or made so far are not in themselves significant. In fact, the Soviet Navy contains numerous obsolete ships whose

removal from the active inventory would hardly affect capabilities. According to *Krasnaya zvezda*, the Pacific Fleet, for example, includes such obsolete ships as a 1956-vintage destroyer, which is relegated to dockside duty. On the rare occasion when it gets underway, it is only for a few hours during the daytime, for phony exercises. The same article tells of a destroyer that has to be towed out for gunnery practice. The reporter, following an interview with a vice-admiral in the Pacific Fleet, concluded that such ships should be "closed down," noting that "Every day that an obsolete ship stays on means that hundreds and thousands of rubles' worth of resources literally go up in smoke" which, he stresses, could be used instead for other purposes.<sup>94</sup> The Golf-class submarines, which are being eliminated from the Baltic Fleet, are also, as even the Soviets admit, "technically obsolete."<sup>95</sup>

### Cuts on the Horizon?

In the short term at least, the navy's funding appears to be embedded in the 1986-91 Five-Year Plan. The Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Moiseev, has noted that most of the announced 19.5 percent cut in military spending will come from savings related to the INF Treaty and the 500,000-man reduction; that is, largely from non-navy sources. However, this refers to the current five-year plan.<sup>96</sup> Money has already been invested in those ships being built, and it would be drastic indeed to scrap them in mid-stream. This means that new submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and weapon systems already in the pipeline—including the aircraft carriers being built—will continue to enter the Soviet naval order of battle to replace obsolete ships being eliminated. This will enable the Soviet Navy to maintain, or even enhance, its overall capabilities in the short term.

However, even without a *quid pro quo* of mutual arms control-mandated cuts, domestic economic imperatives in the U.S.S.R. are likely to lead to unilateral cuts for the navy in the 1991-95 Five-Year Plan and beyond. The Soviet economy may be in even more dire straits than the leaders had earlier believed, and speeches by Gorbachev in May 1989 and Prime Minister Ryzhkov the following month reaffirmed the intention to cut military spending in general. Of course, there is no way to forecast the extent to which the ideas of the think tanks, navy, and military leadership will shape Gorbachev's final decisions. However, the Soviet Navy's secondary role in defense and limited bureaucratic influence may well lead it to absorb major, or even disproportionate, cuts for at least a certain period of time—all the more so because of the contribution this could make to the U.S.S.R.'s new positive image, particularly with some of its neighbors in Northern Europe and the Far East. At the same time, the Soviet government may come to feel increasingly that existing U.S. budgetary trends, combined with the pressure generated if Moscow makes unilateral cuts, will also lead the United States

to cut funding for the U.S. Navy, thus making unilateral Soviet cuts less risky.<sup>97</sup> Even if Soviet proponents of such a view do not really believe the U.S. naval budget will be slashed drastically, this can still be used as an argument in the domestic debate in support of Soviet naval cuts.

Big-ticket items such as aircraft carriers and other large surface ships still on the drawing boards may be the most attractive areas in which to make such cuts. Not surprisingly, aircraft carriers and the anticipation of the imminent entry of the first such ship into the force have been of special concern to the navy. This system has generated considerable criticism, particularly on the part of the think tanks, in the areas of cost, vulnerability, and mission, and the navy has felt it prudent to address the critics with counterarguments. Overall, given the long lead-time involved in building ships, the impact of such cuts will be clearer as time goes on, especially since much of the previous naval buildup occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s, with the corollary that an increasing number of Soviet ships will be coming up for retirement in the 1990s.<sup>98</sup>

### Options for the Navy

Misgivings and grumbling notwithstanding, the Soviet Navy, apart from articulating its case, can do little to prevent unfavorable decisions at the national political level. Once a decision is made, the navy will have little choice but to put it into effect, although its preponderance of expertise may allow it to advise on how cutbacks or restraints are to be applied. The navy's leaders doubtless are well aware of Gorbachev's willingness and ability to change top military leaders should they prove resistant to his vision of reform. The navy appears particularly vulnerable, with sufficient pretexts likely to be available, given its propensity for spectacular accidents. While the navy might dismiss criticism in such sources as *Komsomol'skaya pravda* or *Ogonek*, which nowadays often express maverick opinions, it is more difficult to overlook criticism which began appearing in the more official fora such as *Pravda* in mid-1989, excoriating the navy for such faults as poor safety and its penchant for secrecy.<sup>99</sup>

Although, thanks to its hierarchical nature, one can expect the navy to speak in public with a fairly united voice, one can assume that, as in any organization, there are some internal fissures along personal, factional, and professional lines, and all the more so in a period of considerable change and uncertainty. Even under a strong leader such as Admiral Gorshkov, for example, we know now that there were internal disagreements on such issues as the building of the *Kiev*-class VTOL aircraft carriers, with some senior officers, such as Admiral Nikolai Amel'ko (formerly Commander of the Pacific Fleet), arguing against them.<sup>100</sup> This no doubt provides Gorbachev with

additional leverage and an implicit club with which to hammer the navy by selecting its new leaders from among those who agree with him.

This is not to say that the navy may not try to slow down or minimize change by dragging its feet on significant decisions. For example, it appears to have been unhappy about Gorbachev's announcement in 1986 to open up Vladivostok to foreigners as a confidence-building measure.<sup>101</sup> Not surprisingly perhaps, the opening of Vladivostok appears to have proceeded very slowly, with the city still largely inaccessible to foreign businessmen. According to Soviet reporters critical of the slow pace, "It is the military who oppose the development of foreign economic links. The location of the Pacific Ocean Fleet's base in Vladivostok is the stumbling block."<sup>102</sup> Political leaders have also expressed some impatience with the military in general for what it perceives as its slow development and implementation of a defensive doctrine.<sup>103</sup>

### Coming to Terms with Reality

Increasingly, however, there are indications of the navy's adjustment to the changing situation. Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral F. Gromov, recognizing what may be inevitable, noted that naval training would have to be changed "in light of the substantial forthcoming unilateral reductions in the Soviet Armed Forces."<sup>104</sup> The navy's leaders may now even be trying to leave a way out for themselves by building a case that blames the navy's shortcomings on its past leaders. Admiral Gorshkov himself has been criticized in what may be the beginning of a campaign to "demythologize" this overpowering figure, although this may also be a case of alternate views being aired.<sup>105</sup>

Significantly, an article in *Morskoi sbornik* portrayed the navy's development under the czars and in the Soviet period as a cycle of expansion and contraction, depending on the country's level of economic development. The emphasis, interestingly, is on the periods of stasis and contraction, both as far as the number and types of ships and their missions. With Russia's allegedly backward economy in the late 19th century, the article argues, it would have been unrealistic to seek naval superiority, while a fleet with a strictly defensive character and mission was seen as appropriate at that stage. Again in the 1920s, a big fleet and offensive strategy are said to have been unrealistic, due to the country's difficult economic conditions, making the "Young School" and its defensive orientation more suitable. Stalin's intended buildup of a large fleet is also taxed as having been expensive and inappropriate to the threat faced in World War II. The article's admonition to heed the "historical rule" in developing the navy suggests strongly that another contraction cycle, reflecting the country's economic restructuring, is now on the horizon.<sup>106</sup>

However, another article in *Morskoi sbornik*, rehabilitating a former commander of the navy who was purged in 1937, Admiral Romual'd Muklevich, counters this view, suggesting a continuing internal debate. While approving Muklevich's acceptance of the Party's 1928 decision to have a navy "for the defense of the homeland, not for combat to control the seas," it takes to task at the same time some members of the Revolutionary Military Council who had claimed that "the Navy gets too many resources, [and who] proposed to cut allocations." According to this second article, even Admiral Muklevich—who was well-known as a promoter of the more defensively minded "Young School"—allegedly "showed the error of these ideas," for, supposedly, even in a defensive mode he favored the navy's quantitative and qualitative development.<sup>107</sup>

By mid-1989, however, at least one low-level naval source—perhaps a harbinger of the navy's grudging resignation—had come to echo the think tanks' key position to the effect that an arms race at sea was to the West's advantage, and that "Western strategists" intended to use this means to "weaken the USSR economically once and for all."<sup>108</sup>

Given the navy's limited options, it is perhaps not surprising that however strongly it has made its case it also appears to be hedging its bets for the future. *The Navy*, for example, had already acknowledged the relationship between the country's economy and the development of the navy.<sup>109</sup> In fact, it places some of its hopes on future development, emphasizing the need to maintain funding levels for R&D. The authors stress, in particular, the great strides and generous funding of Western naval R&D and imply that the Soviet Navy could be left behind in the future if sufficient resources are not provided.<sup>110</sup> The navy's implied long-term "wish list," including items such as submarines with a speed of 100 knots, able to dive 2,000 meters and to fire torpedoes traveling at 200-300 knots, relies heavily on continued R&D funding.<sup>111</sup> The navy has attempted to latch on to additional new missions which could be used to strengthen its case for such R&D funding. For example, *The Navy* maintains that naval forces can play a significant role in countering the aerospace threat against the U.S.S.R.<sup>112</sup> Some civilian proponents of cuts, for their part, have sought to soften general military opposition by holding out the lure of enhanced military capabilities in the long-term in exchange for a deferral to the civilian sector at present.<sup>113</sup>

Despite its attempts at damage control, the Soviet Navy may find itself reduced to hoping that, through a focus on R&D and the entry into service of those ships already in the pipeline, it will be in a position to resume its development if an atmosphere economically and politically conducive to naval concerns once more pervades the Kremlin.

## Notes

1. According to Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence, in public testimony before Congress on 22 February 1989.

2. See A. Gol'ts, "Istoriya: daty i razmyshleniya. Vnov' po puti samurayev?" [History: Facts and Reflections. Again on the Path of the Samurai?] *Krasnaya zvezda*, 2 September 1988, p. 3, and V. Vinogradov, "Im tesno?" [Do They Find it Crowded?] *Krasnaya zvezda*, 28 April 1989, p. 3.

3. In an interview with a Czech journalist, for example, Gorbachev noted that "Behind the unbridled arms race isn't there an attempt to undermine the USSR and the socialist community economically? . . . we will do everything in order to prevent these evil plans from succeeding. We will be active immediately and in several directions: diplomatic, military, political, and—yes, yes!—with propaganda, but, above all, economically." *Pravda*, 9 September 1986, in *M.S. Gorbachev: Izbrannye rechi i stati* (Moscow, Politizdat, 1987), v. 4, p. 77.

4. "Istoki napryazhennosti," [The Sources of Tension] *Pravda*, 4 May 1989, p. 4.

5. Cited by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, "Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya KPSS: Vneshnyaya politika i diplomatiya," [All-Union Conference of the CPSU: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy] *Pravda*, 26 July 1988, p. 4.

6. "Prioritety novogo myshleniya," [The Priorities of New Thinking] *Izvestiya*, 9 July 1988, p. 4.

7. *Vestnik ministarstva inostrannykh del SSSR*, no. 22, 1 December 1988, p. 13.

8. For an exceptionally insightful discussion of current security thinking in the U.S.S.R., see Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking," *International Security*, Fall 1988, pp. 124-163.

9. "Zalog stabil'nosti—v peremenakh" [The Guarantee for Stability Is in Changes], interview by A. Kuvshinnikov, *Izvestiya*, 28 March 1989, p. 5.

10. For example, now-Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskii, while still an academic, already had developed the seminal concept, subsequently adopted by Gorbachev, that the goal of the United States was to "attempt through another cycle of the arms race to undermine the economies of the states of the socialist community." *Razoruzheniye: konseptsiya, problemy, mekhanizm* [Disarmament: Concepts, Problems, and Mechanism] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1982), p. 55.

11. Albert Plutnik, "Urok voennogo dela; polemicheskiye zametki shtatskogo cheloveka o perestrojke v armii" [A Lesson on Military Affairs; Polemical Notes by a Civilian on Perestrojka in the Army], *Izvestiya*, 20 March 1989, p. 3.

12. *Izvestiya*, 28 March 1989, Kuvshinnikov, p. 5.

13. Interview by Captain 2nd Rank V. Kocharev, "Razornzheniye i bezopasnost'" [Disarmament and Security], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 31 December 1988, p. 5.

14. Interview "Vremya glubokikh preobrazovanii" [A Time of Far-reaching Changes], *Morskoi sbornik*, September 1989, p. 4.

15. V[yacheslav] F. Khalipov, *Voennaya politika KPSS* [The CPSU's Military Policy], (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1988), p. 32.

16. "Kak razvivat'sya flotu?" [How Should the Navy Develop?] *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 August 1989, p. 1.

17. A. Mineev, A. Chernyak, and G. Yastrebtsov, "Perestrojka kasaetsya kazhdogo" [Perestrojka Applies to Everyone], *Pravda*, 3 October 1987, p. 1.

18. *M. V. Franze, Military Theorist* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), p. 246. The Russian-language original was published in 1985.

19. "Skol'ko oborony dostatochno?" [How Much Defense is Enough?] *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow), March 1989, pp. 45-46.

20. G. Kunadze, "Ob oboronnoi dostatochnosti voennogo potentsiala SSSR" [On the Defense Sufficiency of the USSR's Defense Potential], *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, October 1989, pp. 74, 78.

21. *Ibid.* p. 78.

22. "Voennaya moshch—skol'ko, kakaya, zachem?" [Military Power—How Much, of What Kind, and for What?] *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, August 1989, p. 8.

23. V. V. Zhurkin, S. A. Karaganov, and A. V. Kortunov, "O razumnoi dostatochnosti" [On Reasonable Sufficiency] *SShA*, December 1987, p. 17.

24. *Ibid.* p. 17.

25. *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, March 1989, p. 45.

26. *M. V. Franze*, p. 245.

27. Rear Admiral (Ret.) Valentin Kozlov, "O sluzhbe morskoi" [About Sea Duty], *Voennye znaniya*, July 1989, p. 1.

28. "A Farewell to Admiral Gorshkov and a Look to the Future of the Soviet Navy," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, (on press).
29. *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, March 1989, p. 45.
30. S. Blagovolinn, p. 8.
31. See Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Uvolen bez pensii. . . ." [Dismissed without a Pension. . . .], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 23 June 1989, p. 2.
32. "K novomu urovnyu kachestva" [To a New Level of Quality], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 29 January 1989, p. 1.
33. "Otvetsvennost' za perestroyku" [Responsibility for Perestroika], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 9 June 1989, p. 2.
34. Admiral V.M. Grishanov, *Vse okeany ryadom* [All the Oceans Are Nearby], (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1984), p. 31.
35. *Ibid.* p. 31.
36. "Pod flagom rodiny" [Under the Homeland's Flag], *Trud*, 31 July 1988, p. 3.
37. "Postscript" to G.V. Smirnov, *Korabli i srazheniya* [Ships and Battles], (Moscow: Detskaya Literatura, 1987), p. 158.
38. Karem Rash, "Okeanicheskoe myshleniye" [Oceanic Thinking], *Morskoi sbornik*, July 1989, p. 10.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 29 January 1989, p. 1.
41. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 August 1989, p. 1.
42. According to Vice-Admiral A. Smolin, reported by A. Gorokhov, "Okeanskaya vakhta" [Ocean Watch], *Pravda*, 31 July 1988, p. 2.
43. See "Nasha voennaya doktrina v svete novogo politicheskogo myshleniya" [Our Military Doctrine in Light of New Political Thinking], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, no. 17, September 1987, pp. 9-15. This journal is intended for political officers in the Armed Forces. A similar headline evaluation of the threat and prospects for accommodation with the West appeared in his "Dve politiki, dve doktriny" [Two Policies, Two Doctrines], significantly on the eve of Gorbachev's first trip to the United States, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 November 1987, p. 3.
44. "Oboronitel'naya napravlennost' sovetskoj voennoj doktriny" [The Defensive Direction of Soviet Military Doctrine], *Morskoi sbornik*, February 1988, pp. 9, 12-13.
45. "Gotov' sebya k sovremennomu boju" [Prepare Yourself for Modern Combat], *Morskoi sbornik*, January 1989, p. 8.
46. Interview in *Morskoi sbornik*, September 1989, p. 4.
47. Interview by A. Ivanov, "Uvol'neniye iz armii" [Dismissal from the Army], *Pravda*, 13 April 1989, p. 6.
48. L. Aleksandrov, "Kto zhe ugrozhaet mezhdunarodnoi bezopasnosti?" [Who Really Threatens International Security?], *Morskoi sbornik*, March 1989, p. 17.
49. Interview by Captain 2nd Rank V. Kocherov, "Ugroza iz okeana. Kak ee predotvratit?" [The Threat from the Ocean. How to Ward it Off?], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 April 1989, p. 3.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Voennye znaniya*, July 1989, p. 1.
52. For example, an authoritative navy book, published in 1988 by Rear Admiral Nikolai P. V'yunenko, Captain 1st Rank Boris N. Makeev, and Captain 1st Rank Valentin D. Skugarev, *Voenna-morskoi flot: rol', perspektivy, razvitiya, ispol'zovaniye*, (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1988) [The Navy: Its Role, Prospects, Development, and Employment] (hereafter *The Navy*), p. 90.
53. Vice-Admiral Vasilii I. Panin, "Korabli i lyudi" [Ships and People], *Trud*, 26 July 1987, p. 3.
54. Interview, "Protivostoyaniye" [Confrontation], *Agitator armii i flota*, no. 9, May 1988, p. 7.
55. "Okeanskii shchit rodiny" [The Homeland's Ocean Shield] *Krasnaya zvezda*, 7 July 1984, p. 2.
56. Interview "Flot—rodom iz Oktyabrya" [The Navy: Born in October] *Voennyi vestnik* (Moscow), February 1988, p. 19. Vice-Admiral Panin has also expressed the need for "a modern missile-nuclear ocean-going fleet" for this same purpose, *Trud*, 26 July 1987, p. 3.
57. *The Navy*, p. 237.
58. "Okeany pokoryayut'sya otvazhnyim" [The Oceans Submit to Those Who Are Brave], *Voennye znaniya*, July 1989, pp. 2-3.
59. From Chernavin's written responses to questions in "Chernavin Responds," *Proceedings*, February 1989, p. 75.
60. Captain 1st Rank V. Kuzar, "Kuda derzhit kurs amerikanskaya armada" [Where the American Armada's Course Is Heading], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 11 October 1987, p. 3. *The Navy* also makes an extensive argument in this vein, pp. 96-98.
61. Captain 1st Rank S. Bystrov, "Gde ne vidyat bereg mesyatsami" [Where They Do Not See the Shores for Months], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 6 September 1988, p. 2.



62. Interview, "Konvoi" [Convoy], *Trud*, 13 February 1988, p. 3.
63. Interview "Lyudi, korabli, okean" [People, Ships, the Ocean], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 July 1987, p. 2.
64. "Okeanskiye vakhty flota" [The Navy's Ocean Watch], July 1987, p. 6.
65. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 July 1987, p. 2.
66. "Na okeanskikh rubzhakh" [On the Ocean Frontiers], *Tyl voontzhenmykh sil* (Moscow), July 1988, p. 3.
67. Interview in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 April 1989, p. 3.
68. According to public testimony by Rear Admiral Brooks, 22 February 1989.
69. "Problemy tikhogo okeana: Sderzhannost' dolzhna byt' vzaymnoi" [The Problems of the Pacific Ocean: Restraint Must Be Mutual], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 7 December 1988, p. 3.
70. Interview in *Agitator armii i flota*, May 1988, p. 7.
71. Hong Kong Agence France Presse (AFP) in English, 21 March 1988, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-Soviet Union (SOV)-88-054*, 21 March 1988, p. 23.
72. "Ekonomiya i berezhlivost'—zadachi gosudarstvennoi vazhnosti" [Savings and Thriftiness Are Tasks of State Importance], *Morskoi sbornik*, December 1987, p. 6.
73. *The Navy*, pp. 46, 80.
74. Captain 1st Rank G. Yakushev, "Ne v usherb flotu—na pol'zu lyudyam" [Not to the Detriment of the Navy, but for the Benefit of People], *Morskoi sbornik*, January 1989, p. 62.
75. Admiral V[i]tali[i] Ivanov, Commander of the Baltic Fleet, "Ob armii sudit' ob'ektivno" [It Is Necessary to Judge the Army Objectively], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 June 1989, p. 2.
76. Admiral Kapitanets, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 August 1989, p. 2.
77. Captain 1st Rank A. Shevchenko, identified as "a senior officer on the Main Navy Staff," "Den'gi . . . v trubku" [Money Up in Smoke], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 January 1989, p. 2.
78. Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Korabli i rubli; flot tratit bol'shiye den'gi na remont tekhniki i voruzheniya. Pochemu?" [Ships and Rubles; The Navy Spends Huge Sums of Money on Maintaining Technical Equipment and Weapons Systems. Why?], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 12 May 1989, pp. 1-2; also, Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, "Vedomstvennyi diktat" [Departmental Dictate], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 30 June 1989, p. 2. Admiral Kapitanets repeats these accusations as an explanation for the recent spate of naval accidents, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 August 1989, p. 2.
79. Captain 1st Rank A. Shevchenko, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 January 1989, p. 2.
80. Interview "Gotovnost' k konstruktivnomu obsuzhdeniyu" [A Readiness to Discuss Constructively], *Pravda*, 28 May 1989, p. 4.
81. Interview by E.N., "I nodi militari da sciogliere" [The Military Knots that Have To Be Untied], *La stampa* (Turin, Italy), 29 May 1988, p. 5.
82. "Sootnosheniye voennykh sil v Evrope i peregovory" [The Balance of Military Forces in Europe and Negotiations], *Pravda*, 2 March 1989, p. 4.
83. *M. V. Frunze*, p. 246.
84. Major-General of Aviation (Ret.) V. Surikov, "Ne na sloni, a vo blago" [Not for Demolition, but Rather for Benefit], *Pravda*, 29 April 1989, p. 4.
85. *The Navy* p. 261.
86. *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 25, 42, 84, 88, 253, 261, 263, 268.
87. Interview by Miroslav Lazanski in Kagreb's Croatian-language weekly *Danas*, "Kasto Zapad oklyeva" [Why the West Stalls], 30 May 1989, pp. 52-53.
88. V. N. Kuznetsova, "Chemu uchila voina" [What the War Taught], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 29 July 1988, p. 4.
89. Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Mezhdu morem i beregom" [Between the Sea and the Shore], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 12 August 1988, p. 2, and "Kommentarii Glavnokomanduyushchego Voennno-Morskoin Flotom strany admiral flota V.N. Chernavina" [Comments by the Commander in Chief of the Country's Navy, Admiral of the Fleet V.N. Chernavin], *Pravda*, 19 October 1989, p. 3.
90. Gennadii Gerasimov, "Toward Security in Europe," *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 11, 18-24 March 1989, *FBIS-SOV-89-054*, 22 March 1989, p. 1.
91. Interview with General Yazov, *Pravda*, 28 May 1989, p. 4.
92. For example, General of the Army V.M. Arkhipov, Director of Rear Services, "Produktsiya voennykh korabl'" [A Warship Is Up for Sale], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 23 March 1989, p. 1.
93. JJI (Tokyo) in English, 14 April 1989.
94. Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, "Problema trebuets resheniya. Zastyvshiy u prichala" [A Problem in Need of a Solution. Paralyzed at their Mooring], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 April 1989, p. 2.
95. General Geliu Batenin, AFP (Paris) in English, 18 December 1987, *FBIS-SOV-87-243*, 18 December 1987, p. 67.

96. Mikhail Moiseev, "Oboronnyi byudzhët SSSR" [The USSR's Military Budget], *Pravda*, 11 June 1989, p. 5.

97. The idea of economically induced long-term cuts of the U.S. Navy budget is raised by V. Sukhoi, "Byudzhët zamedlyæt khod?" [Is the Budget Slowing Down?], *Pravda*, 3 May 1989, p. 1.

98. See the perceptive and well-reasoned arguments by Captain Arthur K. Cebrowski, "A Matter of Timing?" *Proceedings*, May 1989, p. 138.

99. See, for example, A. Gorokhov, "Opasnye glubiny; trevozhnyi schët chrezvychaynykh proisshествii na more" [The Dangerous Depths; The Alarming Number of Extraordinary Incidents at Sea], *Pravda*, 28 June 1989, p. 6.

100. Interview by Akira Furumoto in *Tokyo Shimbun* (Tokyo), 25 October 1988, p. 9. Other personal or professional conflicts from that era are now also coming to light, such as one between the cliques around Gorshkov and Vice Admiral Georgii N. Kholostyakov of the Northern Fleet, although in this case the context remains obscure, beyond apparent long-standing mutual antipathy, Captain 3rd Rank V. Urban, "Trevozhnye kolokola Kholostyakova" [Kholostyakov's Alarm Bells], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 November 1988, p. 4.

101. Retired Admiral Ainel'ko admitted that "I would be a renegade to deny that disagreements did take place on this issue when it came up for discussion. Yes, the military did find it difficult to digest this decision," "The Politics Behind Vladivostok," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 November 1988, p. 1235.

102. G. Alimov and A. Orlov, "Mir i my. Propishetsya li merkuriï vo Vladivostoke?" [The World and We. Will Mercury be Registered in Vladivostok?], *Izvestiya*, 10 April 1989, p. 5.

103. In his 1 November 1988 speech to Foreign Ministry personnel, Shevardnadze noted: "In effect, we are slow in working out and in implementing [konkretizatsiya] a military doctrine and to give it a strictly defensive tenor," *Vestnik*, December 1988, p. 13.

104. Interview by Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Boevaya podgotovka trebuët reorganizatsii" [Combat Training Needs to be Reorganized], *Krasnaya zvezda*, 3 January 1989, p. 3.

105. For example, Gorshkov has been blamed for his alleged sentimental attachment to even obsolete destroyers, which are now being eliminated; Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 April 1989, p. 2. Likewise, Gorshkov is portrayed unsympathetically because of his cavalier treatment of Vice-Admiral Kholostyakov, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 November 1988, p. 4.

106. Vice-Admiral R. Golosov, Captain 1st Rank V. Koryavko, and Captain 1st Rank F. Shevelev, "Nekotorye uroki iz istorii sozdaniya otechestvennogo flota" [Some Lessons from the History of the Creation of the National Navy], *Morskoi sbornik*, July 1988, pp. 18-26.

107. Captain 2nd Rank (Ret.) N. Badeev, "Flagmany. Chelovek gosudarstvennogo uma" [Commanders. An Individual with a Statesman's Mind], *Morskoi sbornik*, March 1989, pp. 84-85. He presents his argument by using quotes from unpublished portions of Admiral Kuznetsov's memoirs, providing some plausible denial on a sensitive topic.

108. Captain 2nd Rank V. Myasnikov, "VMS SShA: strategiya i moderizatsiya; 4. Snova gonka?" [The U.S. Navy: Strategy and Modernization; 4. A Race Again?], *Agitator armii i flota*, no. 15, August 1989, p. 31.

109. *The Navy*, pp. 43, 65, 76

110. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45, 63.

111. *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 113, 115. That emphasis on R&D is continuing is indicated by the Soviet attempts, despite "new thinking," to purloin naval technology from the West, as in the past, to supplement domestic efforts. See, for example, John F. Burns, "Canada Indicates Russians Sought U.S. Naval Secrets," *The New York Times*, 23 July 1988, p. 1.

112. *The Navy*, pp. 235-236.

113. For example, Albert Plutnik, *Izvestiya*, 20 March 1989, p. 3: "Does not economic and scientific progress strengthen defense capabilities? Is not the training of a good specialist a contribution to our defense capabilities?"

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