

# Naval War College Review

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Volume 44  
Number 4 *Autumn*

Article 18

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1991

## This People's Navy

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Kenneth J. Hagan

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### Recommended Citation

Beach, Edward and Hagan, Kenneth J. (1991) "This People's Navy," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 44 : No. 4 , Article 18.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol44/iss4/18>

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inefficient use of resources. Regardless, this book poses many troubling issues well worth debating.

*The Training of Officers* is short, to the point, and well worth reading. It should cause more than a little discomfort among those associated with the nation's military colleges.

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Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy  
USS *Gallant*

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Jones, R.V. *Reflections on Intelligence*.

London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1989. 383pp. \$45

In 1939, R.V. Jones was the principal scientist, (indeed the *only* scientist) in the Air section of MI-6, Great Britain's foreign intelligence service. He was twenty-eight years old.

His first book *The Wizard War*, published in 1978, was an account of the Oslo Report, the search for German radar, the ECM battle in the strategic bombing campaigns, and the search for countermeasures to the V-1 and V-2 weapons. It sparkles as literature.

*Reflections on Intelligence* is a commentary on *The Wizard War*. Professor Jones leads the reader through the postwar corridors of power.

The first section contains eight essays that deal with the relationships between intelligence and ethics, secrecy, security, deception, and command. In addition, Jones discusses both science of World War I and the general subject of the scientific method as applied to defense. The second section contains postscripts on

the "most secret war" that tell of the men and women whose determination and dedication helped to win World War II (alias the wizard war).

Part three is an assessment of the impact of the Oslo Report as wartime scientific intelligence. The Report came into British hands in 1939, and uncovered the German secret weapons research program: homing torpedoes, proximity fuzes, jet aircraft, ballistic and anti-shiping guided missiles. The Oslo Report's role in World War II scientific intelligence was profound: it told the British what to look for and how to look.

The "Reflections" section is a fine commentary on the author as a human being. Jones repeatedly protected the identity of his sources (some of them authentic heroes) until either they gave him permission to disclose their identities or they had died. This scrupulously ethical behavior says much about Professor Jones, and makes reading his book a nice experience.

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Hagan, Kenneth J. *This People's Navy*.  
New York: The Free Press, 1991.  
434pp. \$27.95

Theodore Roosevelt wrote: "There are two kinds of historians: one, the delver, the bricklayer, the man who laboriously gathers together bare facts; and the other, the builder, the architect, who out of these facts

makes the great edifice of history. Both are indispensable; but only the latter can be called a historian in the highest sense."

He might have added a third criterion: one who seeks the true, often hidden, often seemingly quite unrelated causes behind the history he recites. Kenneth Hagan fulfills both of President Roosevelt's perceptive requirements and has made such research the principal focus of his new U.S. naval history. For that alone it should be read by all individuals interested in our sea heritage.

Our constitutional appropriations process guarantees a debate on every item in our national budget, and records every word. But the vastness of the resulting records and their arcane storage have thwarted their thorough study. Merely finding them, especially old ones, is a challenge.

As was inevitable, reviewing our naval history in the light of its congressional background brought its own problems for Dr. Hagan, due to the amount of relevant but undigested information available. Combining all two-hundred-plus years of it into one volume, Ken Hagan had to eschew obvious temptations. Each battle is described in only one or two paragraphs. Others have already told those glorious yarns anyway. For Hagan, what's important is what went before, and what came after; and he is not above making judgments—some rather unusual.

The author also points out that long before there was any formal alliance between Great Britain and the United

States they enjoyed a very special relationship. Winston Churchill made note of it, but the naval communities of both nations came about it quite naturally and held to it with pride. For about a century and a half America was shielded by the Royal Navy, and the United States profited. The tables have turned. Like it or not, we lead the unofficial Western empire.

As other reviewers of this work have noted, Hagan takes issue with Mahan and his sea power theories. The world has greatly changed since the days of Trafalgar, or even Jutland. Mahan's basic dictum—that forces must be concentrated, that control of the sea will follow an apocalyptic fleet battle, and that victory in war flows from control of the sea—was true for England in the eighteenth century, and it was true for France, whose principal enemy was England. However, it is much more difficult to apply Mahan's theories to the United States. We are a continent, not an island, and no one has yet proposed a way to "control" the three dimensions of water in which submarines may hide.

The battleship has always been the very symbol of the navy. And yet the steel battleship fought very few battles. The aircraft carrier, its successor, by contrast came of age through battle and has in effect been in battle ever since. But the carrier has not the *panache* of the battleship, and because of its ungraceful appearance probably never will. Moreover, the end of World War II profoundly changed the carrier's mission. Now she is a mobile airfield, tasked to bring air power

wherever it is needed. Like the submarine, she is a creature of the war of maneuver, not of the line of battle.

Hagan makes a good case that our naval policy has been too much influenced by the British use of great fleets. He argues that Mahan, expounding with ringing language upon England's experience two centuries ago, fixed the idea of *commanding* the sea upon us just when submarines, aircraft, communications technology, radar, missiles, and computers were beginning to change the old rules.

Fleet action is grander than commerce raiding and thus more attractive to persons bred to the pursuit of glory, as naval officers were in Horatio Nelson's day. But as Hagan states, in all our wars except for that with Spain in 1898 (and always excepting the September 1781 Battle of the Virginia Capes during our Revolutionary War) it was the *guerre de course*, the war of maneuver—much of it commerce raiding—that got the job done. This was especially true during World War II.

Not all will agree with everything Ken Hagan says, and there are a few unimportant bloopers (the *Oregon* went through the Straits of Magellan and not around Cape Horn, Admiral Spruance commanded at Midway from the carrier *Enterprise* and not "a cruiser," and Japanese tankers were top-rated submarine targets from the beginning of World War II and not only since 1944).

But though I admire former secretary of the navy John Lehman, I cannot but disagree with the

penultimate paragraph of his otherwise outstanding review published in *The Washington Post*. There was no "lunatic" who got hold of one of the manuscript pages and scribbled nonsense. Ken Hagan may have misplaced part of his sequence of events, but he is right-on in predicting impending and fundamental changes in how we look at sea power.

In sum, *This People's Navy* is a totally admirable book, a veritable *tour de force* that not only goes at our naval history in an original way but is fascinating reading at the same time.

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Musicant, Ivan. *The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama*. New York: Macmillan, 1990. 470pp. \$24.95

Military intervention is touted by statesmen as a diplomatic tool of last resort. The statesman boasts of personal and diplomatic skills, eschewing the use of military force, as most effective and proper for managing relations between nations. Ivan Musicant, in his book, *The Banana Wars*, clearly shows that American diplomatic skill in Latin American affairs in the last ninety years has been replaced by military force as the primary diplomatic tool.

Ivan Musicant is a historian who writes from Minnesota and has authored two previous works on naval