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Fleet to Fleet Encounters: Tsushima, Jutland, Philippine Sea

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for wanting too many armored, antitank, antiaircraft, and mountain outfits, since he could not have guessed how well aviation would squelch the panzers and Luftwaffe, or know the number of tanks shipped to allies or about the bypassing of Norway and the Balkans.

Charles Kirkpatrick is a line officer and a former history instructor at West Point. His research for this work has been thorough (but for a few mistakes that could have been avoided had he checked prewar plans such as Rainbow Five), and he had the good fortune to interview General Wedemeyer in 1987. He is a sound scholar of his subject with a knack for breathing life into statistics, but he fails to persuade on two critical points.

First, Wedemeyer's vision was not that of a grand strategist. His approach was demographic, a residual calculation of men at arms that was correct but merely "superficially impressive," as the author admits. The flawed allocations to unit types, theaters, and action dates were hardly "remarkably prescient." Secondly, the author believes that Wedemeyer got his smarts from reading the classics of Prussian and British strategy, which are recounted at length. This suggests that the author is projecting his own tastes on his subject. Perhaps a more plausible explanation is the wisdom that Wedemeyer garnered in Germany, prized no doubt by his superiors. However, I still would like to know the source of that bedrock constraint of ten percent of population

on which everything in his plan rested.

Discounting a biographer's adulation, the Victory Plan was still a remarkable document. It did chart a mobilization vastly larger than the million-man armies expected to fight Japan or defend the Western Hemisphere, and it granted the priority of industry. It outlined a new sort of army. Yet the plan belongs to a bygone era. To call it a model for today seems dubious: the world shall never again see a great-power mobilization, the equivalent now of twenty-five million American men and women, for a war of many years. The firepower of a half-million in the Persian Gulf was awesome enough. Wedemeyer based everything on manpower. The limiting factors in future wars are sure to be munitions, equipment, and tolerance for devastation.

A final note. In 1989 General Wedemeyer died at the age of ninety-two. Sadly, he may never have read this fine tribute.

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Grove, Eric. *Fleet to Fleet Encounters: Tsushima, Jutland, Philippine Sea*. New York: Sterling, 1991. 160pp. \$24.95

Eric Grove's book, *Fleet to Fleet Encounters*, emphasizes tactics and their influence on battle outcomes—tactics as they are used in the broad and classical sense by naval officers to encompass the effects of technology and

warship design, fighting instructions (or tactical doctrine), and leadership.

Grove strives for depth, and so limits himself necessarily to three climactic battles: Tsushima (1905), Jutland (1916), and the Philippine Sea (1944). It is pleasant to report that he cheerfully credits all participants with the talents, skills, and fortitude that each of the six managers brought to their game; in his eyes these are six big-league teams. Grove wants us to see the battles as the participants saw them before and during the action; his postmorteming is blessedly brief. Even Rozhdstvensky and the often despised Russian fleet come off as devoted fighters, and not without capable warships who were beaten by a classier enemy with all of the advantages of freedom of action.

If the United States had grasped the abilities of the loser at Tsushima, perhaps we would have been better prepared to fight the winner forty years later in World War II. It is particularly gratifying to see the Japanese at the Battle of the Philippine Sea given proper credit for a well-conceived, high-risk plan, and the resolution to pursue it against long odds. As is well known, the Japanese were overwhelmingly defeated by two matchless tactical commanders, Spruance and Mitscher, who were aided by some of the most coherent tactical-technological integration ever evolved.

With regard to the skillful fusion of technology with tactics exhibited by the U.S. Navy, Grove gives due attention to our Combat Information

Center as the central tool in exploiting our radar advantage. He goes so far as to say "LT Joe Eggert, [Task Force] 58's fighter director, had the leading role in the entire battle," and even cites by name the lieutenants (and one lieutenant commander) who played similar roles in each task group. In my book that is due recognition of what might be called the weapon-aiming problem in the era of sea-based air.

Grove pays similarly close attention to weapon aiming and fire control in the battleship era. He concludes that the Royal Navy's fighting materiel vis-à-vis the German High Seas Fleet was better than I had credited it with, but he also points out the British fleet's fire control problems. He bases his conclusion on a careful technological discussion of gunnery developments. He rightly shows that the difference between short-range (5,000 yards) fighting at Tsushima with mixed batteries of heavy and light-caliber guns, and long-range (15,000 yards) fighting with "all big gun" battleships at Jutland, was less an advance in weapon range than in weapon accuracy. Nor does he neglect the advances in torpedoes and their serious effects at Jutland, not so much in damage done but in the tactical caution engendered. I wish Grove had said more about the operational consequences of greater German weapon accuracy exhibited in the battle. He might have cited John Campbell's *Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting*, where it is found that the British achieved 123 hits from 4,480 heavy-caliber shells while the Germans achieved 122 hits from

3,597 shells fired—that is 2.75 percent for the Grand Fleet, 3.39 percent for the High Seas Fleet. Put another way, though outnumbered twenty-one to thirty-seven in dreadnoughts and battle cruisers, Scheer's force matched Jellicoe's in major-caliber hits.

My sole disappointment was in the battle narrations. They are a jumble and will put off many readers. It is a common problem among narrations of sea battles, and perhaps there is no getting around it: to grasp the "macro" of tactics one must sift one's way through the "micro." Still, I'm waiting for a genius to come along who can synthesize a battle and reconstruct the vision of it in a way that helps a reader to grasp the sum of the parts. Better diagrams would have helped; Grove's are not original and not very clear.

That having been said, Grove's theme, which is how technology changed tactics from 1905 to 1916 to 1944, is solidly communicated. It is not the well known *fact* of the change but the detailed *how* of it that makes the book worth reading. Since we are probably entering into a period of sweeping change in naval technology and tactics, high on every naval officer's professional reading aspirations should be gaining an intimate familiarity with how materiel and tactical progress have gone arm-in-arm in the past.

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Winston, Robert A. *Dive Bomber: Learning to Fly the Navy's Planes*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 182pp. \$17.95

Winston, Robert A. *Fighting Squadron: A Sequel to Dive Bomber*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 191pp. \$17.95

At best, autobiographies and biographies provide later generations with a better perspective of an individual. At worst, they are vehicles for self-justification and rambling minutia. Fortunately, Captain Robert Winston's autobiographical accounts are firmly in the former category.

These books provide a perspective of U.S. naval aviation both before and during World War II and are primers about what it was like to fly the aircraft of that era. *Dive Bomber* is about Winston's experiences as a naval cadet in the training command and at sea aboard the *Lexington* and *Enterprise*. *Fighting Squadron* is appropriately subtitled as the sequel to the former book, and describes the author's experiences during World War II, particularly as a fighter squadron commanding officer.

Dive Bomber was first published in 1941, when Winston was a lieutenant. Although the author's fascination with dive bombing is apparent and figures in several anecdotes, the subtitle is more pertinent. The book is about learning how to fly and how to be an effective carrier aviator. His discussion of his induction into the navy in 1935 as an aviation cadet should be especially familiar to the flyers of later generations, and also Pensacola, the locale for much of his