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Military Crisis Management: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965

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Given the conservative nature of all defense establishments, it is unlikely that Babbage's recommendations regarding strategy will find a receptive hearing in Canberra. While it is not hard to find numerous problems with the author's thesis, Babbage has succeeded in presenting a coherent vision for Australia's future national strategy. He sees correctly that in the future, given the changing security environment in Asia, Australia will require more, as opposed to less, national security. If we assume that Australia's national resources will not expand sufficiently to allow a net increase in defense expenditures, a reestablishment of priorities and methods as proposed by Babbage may provide the solution to this nettlesome conundrum.

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Schoonmaker, Herbert G. *Military Crisis Management: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990. 152pp. \$37.95

This is a particularly timely book even though it concerns an intervention that took place twenty-five years ago. The unique aspects of the Dominican affair still maintain much relevance for the present and future. Four American presidents, two Democrats and two Republicans, have intervened in the Caribbean region during the last three decades: John F. Kennedy in Cuba during the October 1962 missile crisis; Lyndon B. Johnson in the Dominican

Republic in 1965; Ronald Reagan in Grenada in 1983; and George Bush in Panama in 1989. These facts alone attest to the continuing, if not increasing, strategic importance of the area to the United States as perceived by its Chief Executive.

As a case study in U.S. crisis management, this work is a straightforward, factual account of the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. Written by a retired U.S. Naval Reserve commander who has made his career as a military historian for the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, this work reflects a good deal of painstaking and skillful research. Well written and organized, it is easy to follow through the often complicated course of events.

Although Schoonmaker reveals relatively little new material, he has combined a large amount of detail in a succinct, cogent fashion. Thus his text is a comprehensive reference that enables readers to grasp very quickly the salient aspects of the Dominican intervention.

After a brief historical overview of U.S. policies with respect to the Caribbean region in general and the Dominican Republic in particular, the book describes the outbreak of the 1965 revolution in the Republic, U.S. responses thereto, and initial U.S. actions. How the crisis was handled at the Washington level (White House, State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and the services), as well as at the unified command and major service command levels, is especially revealing. For example, the author points out that in

the early days of the crisis, the secretary of defense, the Joint Staff, and the separate services (army, navy, marine corps, and air force) in their alerting and planning actions were about forty-eight hours ahead of the actual decisions and instructions emanating from the White House—a condition that under different circumstances might have had undesirable consequences. The author has included details of the massive air lift of U.S. forces, as well as of air and naval operations in the surrounding area, during the initial deployment of U.S. forces to the Dominican Republic. He has done this especially well.

The author makes no bones about ducking the political issues surrounding the intervention, and sticks to his military knitting. Not surprisingly, then, military-diplomatic coordination and political-military interactions are only briefly addressed, while the bulk of the book focuses on the military aspects of the intervention, both operational and logistic. Nevertheless, Schoonmaker includes considerable material on such things as U.S. civil affairs and humanitarian undertakings, Special Forces operations, psychological operations, and attempts to jam rebel broadcasts, all of which have political overtones. Particularly valuable are Schoonmaker's analyses of the U.S. intelligence performance; the initial communications difficulties experienced and how they were resolved; and U.S. contingency planning. All are reminiscent of similar problems experienced years later in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989).

This book has much to offer the civilian and military policymakers and planners in the U.S. government who are grappling with the complexities and challenges of situations short of war—so-called limited, or low intensity conflicts—that are bound to plague the United States in the future. In the Caribbean region especially, political, economic, and sociological conditions are dangerously unstable and the needs of the peoples concerned are rapidly mounting. The inescapable truth is that vital U.S. interests, sooner or later, will come in harm's way—thus guaranteeing American involvement.

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Goodman, L.W., Mendelson, J.S., and Rial, J., eds. *The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990. 327pp. \$24.95

Latin America is often covered by the experts as a single entity, more or less homogeneous, experiencing similar problems throughout. While this approach usually produces a well-written text that is easy to understand, the reader is often left with the impression that if only Latin Americans would read this and realize their folly, solutions would be forthcoming.

Unfortunately, this all-embracing approach fails to incorporate the perception of many Latin American countries of being different in many