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A Coast Too Long : Defending Australia Beyond the 1990s,

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would assume a defensive deep, luring-in strategy, both in its deterrent and war fighting components.

As the Soviet threat receded the Chinese were left with a doctrinal and force structure dilemma that sharpened as a result of potential conflict in areas other than along the Soviet border. In 1986-1987 there was tension with India over border issues, and worsening relations with a recalcitrant Vietnam eventually led to naval conflict in the Spratlys in March of 1988. By the late 1980s the Chinese strategists posited that the most likely form of conflict would be a local, limited war, and one had to search hard to find reference to people's war, except among the die-hard ideologues. Very little of this strategic shift is discussed in this book.

Although this work is well written and reads easily, this serious omission causes this reviewer to recommend that the interested reader wait for one more in tune with international and Chinese domestic reality.

MICHAEL BYRNES
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Babbage, Ross. *A Coast Too Long: Defending Australia Beyond the 1990s*. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1990. 231pp. \$18.95

Since the early 1970s, when the United States and Britain began withdrawing their ground forces from Southeast Asia, Australians have been confronted with the need to alter their country's defense policy to meet new

regional security challenges. Defense white papers have argued that the sole option left to Australia is to increase that country's defense self-reliance. Yet, until retired intelligence analyst Paul Dibb's seminal *Review of Australian Defence Capabilities* (1986), little attention had been directed toward reassessing the strategic concepts upon which this "greater self-reliance" was to be based.

This book, by Ross Babbage of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University, is an important contribution to the field. Babbage brings impressive expertise to his subject; his background includes the book *Rethinking Australia's Defence* (1980).

While Babbage gives considerable attention to local defense contingencies, his purpose is to offer a new strategic concept which will guide these national efforts if his recommendations were to be adopted.

The solution for Australia, according to Babbage, is to adopt a strategy of persuasion which "aims to resolve the issue quickly by attacking in political, economic, social, and military dimensions to undermine the willpower of the opponent's key decision makers." In essence, "deterrence" is to be achieved by "persuading an opponent's decision-making elite that operations against Australia are not worth the candle." He appreciates fully the key limitations which plagues Australian security planning: perennially inadequate financial resources and continuously poor central defense planning.

Given the conservative nature of all defense establishments, it is unlikely that Babbage's recommendations regarding strategy will find a receptive hearing in Canberra. While it is not hard to find numerous problems with the author's thesis, Babbage has succeeded in presenting a coherent vision for Australia's future national strategy. He sees correctly that in the future, given the changing security environment in Asia, Australia will require more, as opposed to less, national security. If we assume that Australia's national resources will not expand sufficiently to allow a net increase in defense expenditures, a reestablishment of priorities and methods as proposed by Babbage may provide the solution to this nettlesome conundrum.

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Schoonmaker, Herbert G. *Military Crisis Management: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990. 152pp. \$37.95

This is a particularly timely book even though it concerns an intervention that took place twenty-five years ago. The unique aspects of the Dominican affair still maintain much relevance for the present and future. Four American presidents, two Democrats and two Republicans, have intervened in the Caribbean region during the last three decades: John F. Kennedy in Cuba during the October 1962 missile crisis; Lyndon B. Johnson in the Dominican

Republic in 1965; Ronald Reagan in Grenada in 1983; and George Bush in Panama in 1989. These facts alone attest to the continuing, if not increasing, strategic importance of the area to the United States as perceived by its Chief Executive.

As a case study in U.S. crisis management, this work is a straightforward, factual account of the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. Written by a retired U.S. Naval Reserve commander who has made his career as a military historian for the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, this work reflects a good deal of painstaking and skillful research. Well written and organized, it is easy to follow through the often complicated course of events.

Although Schoonmaker reveals relatively little new material, he has combined a large amount of detail in a succinct, cogent fashion. Thus his text is a comprehensive reference that enables readers to grasp very quickly the salient aspects of the Dominican intervention.

After a brief historical overview of U.S. policies with respect to the Caribbean region in general and the Dominican Republic in particular, the book describes the outbreak of the 1965 revolution in the Republic, U.S. responses thereto, and initial U.S. actions. How the crisis was handled at the Washington level (White House, State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and the services), as well as at the unified command and major service command levels, is especially revealing. For example, the author points out that in