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The Secret War Against Hitler

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Contra Affair is used to illustrate how the CIA can be manipulated by the executive branch to affect not only foreign but domestic policy.

The final section, "Intelligence in a Democratic Framework," is a description of how Congress has finally asserted itself in the management of the CIA. The actions of the U.S. House Committee on Intelligence in its first full year of operation (1978) are described in very complimentary terms.

Despite its warts, this is an excellent single-source document for anyone interested in studying the Central Intelligence Agency. Many of the issues raised by the author are worthy of further examination, and its extensive footnoting and lengthy bibliography make it a handy reference for anyone interested in writing about the CIA or intelligence issues in general. It is not an adventure story, but rather an exceptionally perceptive examination of both the strengths and weaknesses of the CIA and how the agency should be used to ensure the security of the United States.

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Casey, William J. *The Secret War Against Hitler*. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1988. 304pp. \$19.95

William J. Casey is best remembered today for his recent activities as Director of the Central Intelli-

gence Agency under President Reagan. His book, *The Secret War Against Hitler*, provides not only new and important historical material on the conduct of intelligence operations in World War II, but also gives its readers a glimpse into the background, experiences, and beliefs of Casey himself.

"I've written this book because I believe that it is important today to understand how clandestine intelligence, covert action, and organized resistance, saved blood and treasure in defeating Hitler. These capabilities may be more important than missiles and satellites in meeting crises yet to come, and point to the potential for dissident action against the control centers and lines of communication of a totalitarian power." With these words from his preface, Casey encapsulates the underlying theme and his personal motivation for relating the often understated and misunderstood role that intelligence organizations (specifically the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS)) played in bringing about the collapse of Hitler's Reich. This is the story of an "insider." Casey was assigned as a staff officer in 1943 to the London office of the OSS under Colonel David K.E. Bruce and subsequently achieved the job of Chief of Secret Intelligence, European Theater by 1945.

The author provides a historical treatise on the difficulties and opposition received by the OSS from the military services, the State Department, and the White House staff in an attempt to establish itself

as an organized and validated intelligence service. To this end Casey outlines the fight waged by General William J. Donovan, President Roosevelt's Coordinator for Information, to legitimize the OSS as an organization capable of analyzing, appraising, and amalgamating raw wartime intelligence data and conducting covert operations behind enemy lines. It was not until October 1943 that the OSS finally obtained the necessary authority.

Casey offers a detailed insight into the evolutionary relationship between the OSS and Great Britain's secret intelligence organizations, namely MI-5 (internal security) and most especially MI-6 (Special Intelligence Service). MI-6 was the key office responsible for breaking the Germans' cryptographic codes thereby providing invaluable intelligence throughout the war. Casey also stresses the subordinate role that the OSS played to British security until reaching maturity in 1944, with its significant and successful involvement in Operation Overlord, the allied invasion of Normandy.

Casey's treatment of Churchill's and Roosevelt's relentless efforts to destroy German heavy water production—to preclude atomic bomb manufacture—underscores the importance of coordinated intelligence and covert operations in the conduct of the allied strategy. He similarly describes the intelligence impact on American, British, and French attempts to destroy Germany's rocket research plant at Peenemunde.

The primary focus of this book rests on explaining in detail the OSS' successful involvement in Overlord, Dragoon, the liberation of France, and the key industrial targeting recommendations performed by the OSS Research and Analysis Branch.

To the serious intelligence professional or World War II historian, this book is invaluable. Written in considerable detail, it presents a "no holds barred" attitude toward some of the operations undertaken, and the prominent personalities involved in the war. I would suggest having a detailed atlas readily available for reference to enhance the book's readability. The appendix provides a fascinating sampling of declassified OSS files. Among these documents is Casey's paper outlining the secret intelligence organization, and a final report prepared by Casey detailing that organization's activities in Germany. He also makes use of recently declassified CIA and State Department World War II operational records.

Overall, Casey's work sheds new light on many of the most studied aspects of the war. As an underlying theme, he provides sound justification for maintaining a highly trained, cohesive, covert intelligence capability that is prepared to prevent war, or if it occurs, to rapidly anticipate and respond to wartime intelligence needs.

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