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America's Secret Power

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158 Naval War College Review

development of military manuals such as the NWP-9 of the United States Department of Navy. The manuals fill out the details of customary international law. Given the attention of the experienced naval officer, and the interaction of the naval lawyer and the men of the naval forces, it is they that provide us with the law of state practice. We can anticipate that states will harmonize differences in their attitudes toward the law when expressed in their manuals, but we can also anticipate that as such manuals are adopted they offer us major evidence of state intentions to be law-abiding.

Much of the emerging law among states comes from their practice and their changing relations, and much is the outcome of the shaping of tolerances with political and technological change, change in naval craft, naval missions, and naval weaponry. For this reason the adoption of the great codes such as the Declaration of London have significance only because they could stand upon custom, not because they made major advances into a law that states have been unable to develop through practice. This suggests that states will fulfill their own objectives in achieving more effective law by finding the means to make their process of claim about their law more effective.

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Johnson, Loch K. *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989. 344pp. \$24.95

This book provides a scholarly examination of the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in modern America. Loch K. Johnson served as both a congressional investigator and as a staff aide for five years on four separate House and Senate committees which had official jurisdiction over intelligence and foreign affairs. He participated in the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the "Church Committee") when, in 1975, it probed alleged abuses by the U.S. intelligence agencies.

Johnson's stated purpose is to ". . . carry on the search for a greater comprehension of how the CIA, with its preference for the shadows, might best exist in America's open society—especially how the United States might better manage the difficult task of balancing the genuine needs of national security, on the one hand, and the protection of individual liberties, on the other." Johnson used three methodologies to gather information for this book: (1) document search, (2) interviews and (3) participant observation. This last technique, as he notes, ". . . holds a special danger for someone who aspires to detached, scholarly analysis, (for) one can become too close to the subject and lose . . . objectivity." In spite of his sensitivity to this risk, the author

seems frequently to have lost his objectivity by allowing a tone of cynicism to pervade many parts of the book. It is especially evident when he describes incidents in which the CIA conducted operations that were later criticized by the congressional committees on which the author served. Nonetheless, Johnson provides significant insight into how the CIA functions and makes several valid recommendations as to how the agency can adapt to changing times.

The book is divided into twelve chapters grouped into four sections. Each contributes to the central theme of the book; that democracy and secret intelligence organizations—despite the obvious conflict between the two concepts—can exist safely and effectively in the same society, but only if certain precautions are taken. The author attends to every aspect of the management (and mismanagement) of intelligence gathering and arrives at conclusions and recommendations which the author feels will serve as an effective basis for managing the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The first section, "The Intelligence Mission" discusses the dilemmas that face the operations of a secret agency in an open, democratic society. Johnson provides a description of how the CIA lost its aura of invincibility during the early-70s after a series of inquiries uncovered illegal operations and bungled collection efforts.

The second section, "Problems for Strategic Intelligence," focuses on the CIA's secret operations. The author categorizes the controversies that

surround these operations into seven "sins" and provides a brief examination of each. The seven "sins" are:

1. Distortions in reporting information
2. Distortions in collecting information
3. Indiscriminate collection of information
4. Indiscriminate use of covert action
5. Inadequate cover abroad
6. Improper use of intelligence within the U.S.
7. Inadequate accountability

Transgressions of the CIA are recounted in only superficial detail, and only the negative aspects of the operations are described, to best support the author's thesis. Chapter Five is especially interesting. It describes the "intelligence cycle" and includes a fascinating diagram titled "The Intelligence Cycle as Funnel of Causality" which is supposed to depict the "stimulus-response" aspect of the intelligence process. Chapter Six, titled "The Quiet Option," traces the CIA's involvement in covert action, but it seems heavily biased toward endorsing the need for congressional oversight. A good "Conclusions" section wraps up this chapter and section by raising several questions about the role of the CIA in relation to the governments of other countries.

The third section, "The CIA and the Rights of Americans," is a critical recounting of the use of the agency against Americans; the very citizens it was meant to protect. The involvement of the CIA in the Iran-

160 Naval War College Review

Contra Affair is used to illustrate how the CIA can be manipulated by the executive branch to affect not only foreign but domestic policy.

The final section, "Intelligence in a Democratic Framework," is a description of how Congress has finally asserted itself in the management of the CIA. The actions of the U.S. House Committee on Intelligence in its first full year of operation (1978) are described in very complimentary terms.

Despite its warts, this is an excellent single-source document for anyone interested in studying the Central Intelligence Agency. Many of the issues raised by the author are worthy of further examination, and its extensive footnoting and lengthy bibliography make it a handy reference for anyone interested in writing about the CIA or intelligence issues in general. It is not an adventure story, but rather an exceptionally perceptive examination of both the strengths and weaknesses of the CIA and how the agency should be used to ensure the security of the United States.

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Casey, William J. *The Secret War Against Hitler*. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1988. 304pp. \$19.95

William J. Casey is best remembered today for his recent activities as Director of the Central Intelli-

gence Agency under President Reagan. His book, *The Secret War Against Hitler*, provides not only new and important historical material on the conduct of intelligence operations in World War II, but also gives its readers a glimpse into the background, experiences, and beliefs of Casey himself.

"I've written this book because I believe that it is important today to understand how clandestine intelligence, covert action, and organized resistance, saved blood and treasure in defeating Hitler. These capabilities may be more important than missiles and satellites in meeting crises yet to come, and point to the potential for dissident action against the control centers and lines of communication of a totalitarian power." With these words from his preface, Casey encapsulates the underlying theme and his personal motivation for relating the often understated and misunderstood role that intelligence organizations (specifically the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS)) played in bringing about the collapse of Hitler's Reich. This is the story of an "insider." Casey was assigned as a staff officer in 1943 to the London office of the OSS under Colonel David K.E. Bruce and subsequently achieved the job of Chief of Secret Intelligence, European Theater by 1945.

The author provides a historical treatise on the difficulties and opposition received by the OSS from the military services, the State Department, and the White House staff in an attempt to establish itself