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The Path to Gallipoli: Defending New Zealand, 1840-1915

Thomas-Durell Young

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(Saddam Hussein and Qadhafi). Tensions between the rich pro-American states and the poor Islamic states are also explored, often in the context of the late Gulf War.

Anticolonial passions born of European imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries still run strong in the region, and those feelings are reflected here. Great Britain is repeatedly castigated for its past imperial sins, and Israel for its present ones. Religious rivalries figure prominently in both the Arab-Israeli context and in terms of the internal social and political environment of the Islamic states.

There is a definite anti-American thread that runs throughout this study, and though most of the criticism is subtle, implied, or thinly veiled, to find fault with the United States while ignoring or downplaying its positive contributions is a convention in Middle Eastern political writing. So too is the concomitant "explaining" or covering-up for the antics of the likes of Saddam Hussein.

This bias is understandable and, to a degree, supportable, at least from the nationalist's point of view. Still, the work would have been both more palatable and effective had the authors been straightforward and direct in their criticism of the United States.

The authors, professors of political science and social welfare at the University of Calgary, have written widely on the Middle East. In this particular effort they were aided by ten area experts whose contributions account for nearly half the book. The

result is an authoritative, well organized, and readable academic survey. It is also a treatment that opens a window to understanding on the human level, with its display (probably unintended) of the passions and prejudices that are so much a part of that increasingly important region.

THOMAS SEAL
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Stafford, Virginia

McGibbon, Ian. *The Path to Gallipoli: Defending New Zealand, 1840-1915*. Wellington, New Zealand: GP Books, 1991. 274pp. (No price given)

This work represents yet another excellent New Zealand defense policy study sponsored by the Historical Branch of the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs. The author has employed a wealth of primary source material to describe the development of that distant country's early defense policy within the British imperial security system. Attention is focused on the dilemma faced by successive governments whether to spend their meager financial resources and manpower on imperial commitments ("out-of-region," in modern parlance) or to develop local defense capabilities. McGibbon explains that the ascendancy of the local-defense school in the 1880s was caused by the fear of rogue cruiser attacks (principally Russian) on New Zealand ports. The government responded by directing enormous attention and

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resources to the development of port defenses.

By the turn of the century and following the defeat of the Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima in 1904, Wellington's security perceptions had changed considerably in response to the need to protect the ever-precarious imperial interests. New Zealand's naval and military establishments were reformed during this period so that Wellington could deploy trained and relatively well-equipped forces abroad for imperial duty. The move to reform New Zealand's forces just prior to the First World War is well described by focusing on the visionary minister of defence, Colonel Sir James Allen, an important personality that clearly calls out for an extensive biography.

Overall, the scholarship of this work is excellent, as is its clear writing. However, as a government publication, though the book is well endowed with photographs (and even diagrams!), public penury is seen in the ever more common practice of employing endnotes, and incomplete ones at that. This reviewer is pained to make this point, since McGibbon's last work, *Blue-Water Rationale: The Naval Defence of New Zealand, 1914-1942* (1981), which was also published by the Government Printer, was of such quality and completeness as to recall a time when such craftsmanship was the norm in publishing. Alas, the exigencies of finite government finances have reached even the distant antipodes.

Notwithstanding this *cri de coeur*, *The Path to Gallipoli* should be required reading for those with even a cursory interest in New Zealand history, let alone those who wish to understand the basis for modern-day security policy in that country.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG
U.S. Army War College

Wirtz, James J. *The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991. 290pp. \$34.95

The Tet Offensive of 1968 was the decisive battle of the Vietnam War. In Vietnam, the offensive became the dividing line between the periods of U.S. escalation and withdrawal. At home, the surprise of its occurrence discredited the Johnson administration's conduct of the war, which resulted in the president's decision not to run for reelection. For many Americans, Tet '68 also marked the beginning of their disillusionment with overseas military intervention and ever-larger defense budgets justified in the name of anticommunism—a reaction commonly known as “the Vietnam syndrome.”

Yet at the battlefield level, the outcome of the Tet Offensive was a resounding U.S. victory. To compensate for and neutralize our side's superiority in firepower, mobility, communications, and logistics, the communists planned for the offensive's countrywide wave of surprise attacks to be the signal for a