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An Alliance Unravels

The United States and Anzus

Wallace J. Thies and James D. Harris

ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1951, REPRESENTATIVES of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States met in San Francisco to sign a treaty of alliance commonly known as the Anzus pact.¹ The signing ceremony had been preceded by two years of sporadic negotiations during which the Australians had pressed hard for joint military planning and discussion of global strategy. The Americans, however, had been determined to limit formal security arrangements to the minimum necessary to win the consent of their negotiating partners to the relatively mild peace treaty the United States intended to sign with Japan.² The American view prevailed, and Anzus thus came into being with a council charged with considering matters related to the implementation of the treaty but with no standing military organization and no integrated military force.

Thirty-five years later, on 27 June 1986, Secretary of State George Shultz announced that the United States was suspending defense cooperation with New Zealand on the grounds that the latter's refusal to accept port visits by warships that might be carrying nuclear weapons had rendered impossible the degree of military cooperation deemed essential by the United States. The incident that precipitated the dispute between the United States and New Zealand had occurred on 4 February 1985, when Prime Minister David Lange refused a request for a port visit by the USS *Buchanan* because the United States would neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board the destroyer. Two days later, Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke reneged on a pledge to allow American aircraft to use Australian bases to monitor flight tests of the MX missile. Security cooperation between the United States and Australia was not suspended, however, even though Hawke, like Lange, made his decision largely for domestic political reasons. Instead, American officials heaped praise on Hawke and his government for their fidelity to Anzus.³

This article tells the story of the collapse of Anzus. The story is worth telling because the Anzus case is both puzzling and enlightening—puzzling because states normally reserve punishment for their enemies rather than their friends,

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enlightening because of what it reveals about the absence of memory within the U.S. government and the inability of statesmen generally to learn from the past. The Reagan administration, which for years had argued that sanctions were inappropriate for changing the behavior of a friendly state like South Africa, announced its intent to retaliate against New Zealand the same day that Lange rejected the port call request.⁴ Retaliation took the form of excluding New Zealand first from military exercises with the United States, then from the Anzus Council, and ultimately from the alliance itself. In effect, the Reagan administration sought to thwart the designs of "anti-nuclear and other movements which seek to diminish defense cooperation" between the U.S. and its allies by itself diminishing defense cooperation with one of its allies—precisely the goal of anti-nuclear activists in New Zealand.⁵ The United States could not afford to be lenient, administration officials argued, because of the effect on other allies like Australia and Japan, although the praise heaped on Hawke after he reneged on his pledge to support the MX test very likely conveyed the message that defiance was not only possible but profitable.⁶

The New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) government of Prime Minister David Lange did not exactly cover itself with glory either, as Anzus slowly came apart. Lange and the NZLP ran for office in 1984 on a platform calling for a nuclear-free New Zealand in Anzus; by the time of his resignation five years later, New Zealand was neither in Anzus nor was it completely nuclear-free—in view of its willingness to participate in naval exercises with American and British warships, even those that were nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed.⁷ Lange claimed that New Zealand would rather go it alone than be defended by nuclear weapons, but a strong case can be made that his government's actions had the effect of making New Zealand more, rather than less, dependent on a larger power, namely Australia, whose policies constituted an emphatic affirmation of nuclear deterrence.⁸ Between 1984 and 1989 New Zealand lost the protection of its most important ally, became more dependent on its sole remaining ally, and was rendered strategically irrelevant by its claim that its policies were not intended "as an example to others."⁹

The collapse of Anzus thus stands in retrospect as virtually a textbook example of how not to manage an alliance. A reexamination of the Anzus case should be useful both for an understanding of past challenges to American interests in the Pacific and as a source of guidance for officials who will be called on to manage relations with other Pacific states, many of which have grown restive under American tutelage. The Bush administration temporarily defused the issue that precipitated the collapse of Anzus by publicly announcing the removal of all nuclear warheads from the Navy's surface combatants and attack submarines. If, however, the post-Cold War world proves less idyllic than hoped, the very act of having removed the warheads will likely heighten the sensitivity of allied and friendly states to accepting port calls by ships that may in the future once again

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
be nuclear-armed. While there are sound reasons for the U.S. Navy to continue to adhere to the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on its ships, sea-based nuclear weapons will remain a potential irritant to American foreign policy for many years to come, and the Anzus case offers a vivid illustration of why even the closest alliance relationships can never be taken for granted.

The Origins of the Anzus Alliance

Perched on the periphery of Asia and distant by half a world from their cultural roots in Britain and Europe, Australia and New Zealand have historically allied themselves with the dominant Western power for deterrence and defense against security threats. They have also repeatedly answered the call of that ally to fight in wars far from their homelands, in partial payment for the protection they have received.

The early Australians saw themselves as an integral part of the British empire, an attitude that appears to have heightened rather than alleviated their feelings of isolation and insecurity. Almost from the time that Australia was first colonized, the attitudes of its settlers "have been characterized with remarkable consistency by a sense of remoteness from the sources of authority, power and protection, vulnerability to hostile forces deployed in the region, . . . and—especially since the gold discoveries of the 1850s—fear that hostile forces will descend and take away the settlers' hard-won physical or social gains."¹⁰ Dependence on what former Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies called "great and powerful friends" encouraged Australians to believe it their duty to contribute to the security of the empire in order to secure themselves against external threats. Australians went to New Zealand to fight in the Maori wars of 1863–1864, to the Sudan in 1885, to South Africa at the turn of the century, and to China to fight against the Boxers. Some 330,000 volunteers—more than thirteen percent of Australia's male population—served overseas in World War I, and nearly 60,000 did not come back. Australia, with a population of five million, suffered more fatal casualties than did the United States, which had a population twenty times greater.¹¹

As early as 1907 Australia had looked to the United States for protection, but the latter was not yet interested in the responsibilities of a global power.¹² Only Great Britain had the global reach and regional interests to provide a measure of security for Australia and New Zealand in the event of a threat against either or both of the latter. In 1939 Australia and New Zealand entered the war against Germany for reasons that identified their national interests with Britain's national interests and their security with Britain's security.¹³ Their readiness to send forces to North Africa, Greece, and Crete to defend British imperial interests



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encouraged them to believe that Britain would defend them in their own hour of need.¹⁴

During 1941 and 1942 this reliance proved a very weak reed, as Japan thrust south and east to the gates of Australia itself. Both Australia and New Zealand pressed the British to keep substantial forces in the Pacific, but the loss of Singapore, the virtual collapse of British military power in Southeast Asia, and Churchill's "Hitler first" strategy convinced the Australians in particular that Great Britain could no longer fill the role of "great and powerful friend."¹⁵ Australian forces were withdrawn from the European and African theaters for the defense of their homeland, and Prime Minister John Curtin wrote that Australia would look "to America, free from any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom."¹⁶ The American victory in the Battle of the Coral Sea and the presence of American forces in the mud and jungle of New Guinea would make it an article of faith among Australians that America, not Britain, had saved them from the Japanese.¹⁷

Australian defense policy after the Second World War was thus torn between reestablishing the pre-war relationship with Great Britain as principal friend and protector and reorienting defense planning toward greater reliance on the United States. As seen from Australia, though the war had been won, security remained elusive. The British withdrawal from India "removed the shield of British protection in large measure from the top of the continent."¹⁸ Post-war Australian governments were obsessed with what they saw as a uniquely unfavorable geopolitical position: that of "a small Pacific power with a population of some eight million concentrated primarily on the fertile crescent along the south-eastern fringe of the continent, . . . a remote outpost of Western civilization in a predominantly Asian area."¹⁹ Communist-led insurgencies in Malaya and Indochina, the communist victory in the Chinese civil war, and communist-led industrial strife in Australia itself created the impression of a monolithic movement on the march throughout Asia.²⁰ The speed with which the British were reassessing their own role was particularly galling to Australians. "Unlike the Western powers, Australia cannot contract out of the Pacific or out of Southeast Asia"; the latter in particular had become "a vital strategic area for Australia."²¹

New Zealand's defense policy, in contrast, did not undergo the kind of anguished reappraisal that characterized Australian thinking after the Second World War. Unlike for Australia, "the direct experience of New Zealand's armed forces in World War II was not in nearby Southeast Asia, nor in combat with the Japanese, but in fighting Germans and Italians in North Africa and Italy." Australia was different from Asia yet irretrievably tied to it; New Zealand was "a collection of islands in the South Seas, a South Pacific maritime state."²² Australians felt directly threatened by the activities of Asian communists; New Zealanders, being further removed from Asia and more inclined to equate isolation with security, took a more relaxed view of developments there. While

Australia was orienting its foreign policy toward Washington rather than London, New Zealand continued to conduct its foreign relations primarily within the context of its membership in the British Commonwealth.²³ New Zealand's ties to Great Britain remained closer than those of Australia, its military planning continued to center around the defense of Commonwealth interests in the Middle East, and the desire for close ties with the United States was not nearly as strong as in Canberra.²⁴

The considerably greater sense of threat felt in Australia accounts in large measure for the more vigorous role played by Australian officials in the formation of Anzus in comparison to that of their New Zealand counterparts. If Australia could not "contract out" of Asia, the Americans would have to be persuaded to "contract in." During 1949 the Labor government headed by Prime Minister J.B. Chifley attempted to persuade the United States to enter a Pacific pact modelled on the Atlantic alliance between America and Western Europe. "The American response was bleak, and given only three days after Mr. Chifley had said that planning for the Pacific was proceeding parallel with corresponding planning for the North Atlantic area: the United States had enough on its hands with NATO."²⁵

The Americans were reluctant partners, but this did not stop the Australians from trying to bring them around. The Liberal-Country Party government elected in December 1949 continued the process of reorienting Australia's foreign policy toward the closest and most cooperative relations possible with the United States. During a visit to Washington in September 1950, Foreign Minister Percy Spender again broached the idea of a Pacific pact that would guarantee the security of Australia and New Zealand and enable them to participate in the discussions of global strategy that the Australians assumed were taking place in Nato. Spender wanted close ties with the United States, primarily in the area of military planning, in return for which Australia would establish a joint base with the United States on Manus Island (north of New Guinea) and share facilities elsewhere. Spender's offer was not warmly received in Washington, which was preoccupied with the war in Korea and also with a U.S.-led buildup by the Nato countries that had sparked a lively row with the French over German rearmament. Spender's proposals concerning bases and joint military planning were accepted by American officials merely as points about which further discussions could be conducted.²⁶

A more detailed response to Spender's proposals was not delivered until 15 February 1951, when American thinking on security arrangements for Asia and the Pacific was presented to the foreign ministers of Australia and New Zealand by John Foster Dulles (not yet secretary of state) in the context of his "first formal negotiating expedition" concerning a peace treaty with Japan.²⁷ Even as it presided over the enormous expansion of American military power required by the war in Korea, the Truman administration sought not to let its attention stray

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too far from Europe, which was a prize of far greater significance than anything in Asia with the exception of Japan.²⁸ Containment of Soviet expansionism in Asia was to be pursued primarily by the creation of a democratic Japan and secondarily by maintenance of existing ties with Australia and New Zealand, whose cooperation was required for the rehabilitation of Japan.²⁹ In the American view, the first priority was a peace treaty with Japan devoid of provisions for reparations, foreign occupation, or other punitive clauses. Nothing was to be done that might cause Japan to turn against the victorious Allies

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as Germany had done after the First World War.³⁰ A punitive reparations policy or even failure to provide assistance for reconstruction could produce an economic situation in Japan that would be unable to support the growth of democratic political institutions. Without aid and support from the Western democracies, Japan—with its history of acquiescence to dictatorships—might become a victim of communist subversion.

The Americans, however, were not content merely to sign a peace of reconciliation with Japan. They wished Japan to reenter the family of nations not as a defeated power but as a dependable ally. To the dismay of the Australians and to a lesser extent the New Zealanders, “Japan was not only to become economically self-sufficient, it was also to be converted into ‘the workshop of East Asia.’”³¹ A treaty that did not include harsh restrictions on Japanese rearmament would permit a reindustrialized and defensively armed Japan to provide the United States with bases from which communist expansion into the Pacific could be blocked.

A peace treaty with Japan, however, required the consent of the other members of the Allied coalition, many of whom were fearful of a renewal of Japanese militarism. Australians saw Japan not as a potential ally but as a “convicted aggressor” that must never again be allowed to threaten Australian security.³² A “soft” peace coupled with the apparent emergence of a Moscow-Peking axis might encourage a resurgent Japan to forgo its previous designs on the Asian mainland in favor of expansion southward. During his initial foray at the start of 1951, Dulles was able to bring “the Australians and the New Zealanders to the realistic views that reparations were not possible and that security relations with [the United States] were superior to punitive or restrictive provisions in the Japanese treaty,” but these views were accepted only grudgingly

sixty percent of the Australian people were opposed to ratification of the peace treaty, and debate within the Australian parliament was prolonged and bitter.³⁴

The origins of Anzus thus lay in the unwillingness of Australia and New Zealand to be reconciled with Japan unless they received a security guarantee from the United States.³⁵ The Americans were willing to provide such a guarantee but differed profoundly with their future allies on the kind of arrangement needed. The Australians wanted a Pacific counterpart of Nato, including joint military planning and a standing military organization; the Americans wanted to offer only enough to secure ratification of the peace treaty with Japan.³⁶ The Australians leaned toward "wide-reaching arrangements that might ultimately include European states having 'interests' in the Pacific as well as interconnections with other security arrangements of which the [United States, Australia, and New Zealand] might be members"; the Americans saw this as an implied guarantee of the remaining colonial possessions in Asia of the European members of Nato and "such an entanglement of the work of the NATO military staff and of the Inter-American Defense Board with Western Pacific matters that planning, to say nothing of action, would be well-nigh impossible in those fields."³⁷

The most contentious issue in the Anzus negotiations centered on the Australians' request for a standing military organization that would give them access and input to American thinking on matters of global strategy. Their interest in this regard was due in large part to their experience of being a small power in a world of giants. Even though Australian forces had fought hard and well during the Second World War, Australian representatives had been shunted aside when many of the major decisions concerning wartime strategy and postwar matters had been taken. Australian representatives were excluded from the discussions at Cairo and Potsdam on the war in the Pacific, and British officials had proposed that Australian representatives should attend the Japanese surrender as "attached to" the British delegation. Australia furnished part of the force that occupied Japan, but MacArthur took little notice of the Allied Council for Japan, on which an Australian sat as the representative of New Zealand, Great Britain, and India in addition to his own country.³⁸ The Australians felt so vulnerable and so in need of a great power's protection that they claimed that matters as remote from them as the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in Nato were of vital strategic importance—because those decisions would determine the extent to which the Americans could come to the assistance of Australia.³⁹

The Australians' "most cherished idea" was a "direct and permanent relationship between their Chiefs of Staff" and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS, similar to that offered by the Nato Standing Group.⁴⁰ Spender raised the issue of joint military planning with Dulles during their discussion in February 1951 of Pacific security arrangements. As recounted by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, when Dulles "informed the [Joint] Chiefs of the Australia-New

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Zealand proposal, they broke into such a sustained tantrum of negation that I took it upon myself to withdraw the suggestion. So tactfully, however, did Mr. Dulles communicate its fate to our friends that they received the impression that it was happily on its way through the bureaucracy." Acheson blamed Dulles for not dispelling Australian illusions, but he too found it convenient not to be too explicit, so as not to jeopardize the peace treaty with Japan: "At the time, the best solution of our Australian troubles was to put them off until we had our European ducks in a row. This we did by arranging a full-dress meeting of the [Anzus] Council in Hawaii in August [1952], when the whole accumulation of woes would be aired."⁴¹

The Australians were thus unable to obtain a Nato-like arrangement for the Pacific, but this did not stop them from pressing the Americans for a military planning relationship. In May 1952, Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies and Spender stopped in Washington en route to London for what Acheson described as "a long heart-to-heart talk with the President and me": "In Australia they felt very far from developments in Europe and North America that were of immense importance to them and very conscious of the hundreds of millions of oriental people to the north of them. Their 12 million people seemed a small drop in that vast ocean of humanity. Menzies wanted to discuss some way in which Australia could participate in discussions of what he referred to as 'global strategy,' chiefly on the military side."⁴²

Viewed from Washington, however, the problem was not to invigorate Anzus but to placate the Australians short of granting them direct access to the Joint Chiefs. Once the Japanese peace treaty had been secured, the Truman administration slipped into a mind-set that viewed Anzus mostly as a distraction to be accorded only as much time and energy as was necessary to avert any unpleasantness with the Australians.⁴³ Indicative of Washington's thinking in this regard was the approach taken by Acheson to the first meeting of the Anzus Council in Hawaii in August 1952. In his view, that the Council met at all was mainly due to a prior agreement that a meeting should be held before the first anniversary of the signing of the treaty. "No important questions awaited decision but . . . our friends in the antipodes felt a long way from their allies and far too close to war in Indochina and Korea and civil unrest in Indonesia and the Philippines." Acheson's goal for the meeting was essentially negative—to dissuade the Australians from raising their idea of a direct link to the JCS. When Australian Foreign Minister Richard Casey called on Acheson prior to the first session to inquire about an agenda, the latter "suggested first what we should avoid. Chief on the list was not to get bogged down" with the matter of military liaison. In the American view, such liaison should be handled by the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command at Pearl Harbor, rather than the JCS in Washington, a proposal that the Australians reluctantly accepted. Casey had come to Hawaii hoping

to achieve "the utmost integration of military obligations . . . , but he was frustrated by the inability of Australia and New Zealand to offer anything worthwhile in return for a more definitive United States commitment to their defence."⁴⁴

In effect, the Americans got their way on every major issue that arose during the creation of Anzus. The United States succeeded in persuading the Australians and the New Zealanders to trade their signatures on the Japanese peace treaty for an alliance that left the United States free to go its own way with only minimal input from its Anzus partners. There was, however, a price to be paid. When a great power pulls small powers along in its wake, the result is often resentment and even fear on the part of the latter—an outcome that was particularly evident in the response of the New Zealand Labour Party to the signing of the Anzus treaty.

Unlike the Australian Labor Party (ALP), which had been in the vanguard of the post-war reorientation of Australia's foreign policy from London to Washington, many in the NZLP had remained skeptical of the need to replace the traditional policy of reliance on Britain and the Commonwealth with one that accorded primacy to relations with the United States. Both Australia and New Zealand had elected conservative governments toward the end of 1949. But while the ALP in opposition had been generally supportive of the continued strengthening of ties with the United States, some of the harshest attacks on the Anzus Treaty came from Labour members of the New Zealand parliament protesting the exclusion of Great Britain and the treaty's impact on the Commonwealth.⁴⁵ As described, all references to a standing military organization and combined military planning had been deleted from the Anzus treaty. By limiting the cooperative arrangements embodied in the treaty and thus the opportunities for Australia and New Zealand to influence American policy, the Truman administration contributed to reservations in New Zealand about American power and the uses to which it might be put. "All such criticism, in any case, [sprang] fundamentally from the same motive: not so much from dissatisfaction at the supposed commitments and policies associated with the Pact as from frustration at New Zealand's and, indeed, at everyone's helplessness to deflect the policies of a too-powerful friend—a friend without whom it would be impossible to get on at all, but alongside whom one might one day find oneself fighting in a last convulsive Armageddon."⁴⁶

The Growth of Military Cooperation in Anzus

The evolution of Anzus during the 1950s and the 1960s was shaped largely by complementary notions of forward defense in Canberra and Washington. For the Australians, "forward defense" meant encouraging the Americans to interpose themselves between Australia and its potentially hostile neighbors to the

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north. Australian governments found it prudent to extend such encouragement "lest the United States experience feelings of loneliness and discouragement and eventually use these as an argument for withdrawal."⁴⁷ This arrangement suited the Americans because "they had their own reasons for being there, and they welcomed the modest Australian military presence in its own right and even more as a political gesture."⁴⁸

In Wellington, in contrast, the Anzus treaty was seen as a statement of political intent rather than the basis for extensive military cooperation with the United States. "New Zealand Governments were considerably more reticent than Australia about the benefits of the American alliance, and, during the 1950s and early 1960s the primary focus of AFNZ [Armed Forces of New Zealand] defence thinking and co-operative activity remained on the UK." It was only after the latter announced in 1966 that it intended to reduce substantially its military presence in Southeast Asia that "New Zealand's defence planners began to look to the need to develop a closer relationship with the United States."⁴⁹

Australian efforts to encourage the United States to maintain a military presence in their part of the world took on new urgency during the 1970s in light of the Nixon administration's twin goals of withdrawing from Vietnam and encouraging greater self-reliance on the part of America's Asian friends and allies. Australians professed acceptance of the implications of the Guam doctrine, but they also evinced considerable nervousness over American intentions: "Australians note American naval participation in joint tactical maneuvers and the United States statements that it will continue to supply its allies with defense equipment. But they also note that American strategic priorities have shifted from Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific to the Persian Gulf, Japan, and Korea. There is a feeling that in a major-threat situation, America will be too busy looking after its other strategic interest—Europe—to come to Australia's aid."⁵⁰ Australian policy during the 1970s was thus shaped by the "widespread feeling...that the United States should be sent strong signals of encouragement; otherwise, its post-Vietnam depression could lead to demoralization and to a diminished interest in the region's security."⁵¹

Over time, the Australian strategy of encouragement had three effects, one intended by the strategy's framers, the other two very likely unintended and unforeseen. The planned effect was the gradual embrace by the United States of more extensive and intensive military cooperation with its Anzus partners, particularly Australia. Beginning in the 1950s and continuing through the 1970s, U.S.-Australian military exercises and planning and intelligence exchanges became steadily more widespread. American military aircraft deployed through Australia on reconnaissance and training flights, and American naval vessels called frequently at Australian ports. The United States established elaborate joint communications and surveillance facilities on Australian territory.⁵²

Second, however, the gradual expansion of military cooperation had the effect of infusing Anzus with an operational significance that its American founders had never intended it to have. The Truman administration never wavered from its policy of keeping the Australians at arm's length, but Truman's successors quickly discovered the advantages of a closer military relationship with Australia and New Zealand. Anzus never involved the kind of close strategic and tactical planning and integration of military forces found in Nato, but as other Cold War alliances faded into obscurity the Americans became more appreciative of the steadfastness of their Pacific partners.⁵³ Despite the narrow wording of the treaty, Anzus became the "convenient and sensible umbrella under which all U.S., Australia, and New Zealand military interactions occurred."⁵⁴

Third, as the Americans became more accustomed to and more appreciative of military cooperation with their Anzus partners, there developed in Washington a mind-set that viewed New Zealand as merely a smaller version of Australia. Like Australia, New Zealand sent units from its armed forces to fight alongside those from the United States in both Korea and Vietnam. Like Australia, New Zealand participated in the defense of Malaysia both during and after the mid-1960s confrontation with Indonesia. Like Australia, New Zealand condemned the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and expressed willingness to participate in a joint naval task force that would add the flags of both to those of other Western nations having naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Like Australia, New Zealand participated in the multinational peacekeeping force established to patrol the border between Israel and Egypt after the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. Although military cooperation between the United States and New Zealand was never as great as that between the United States and Australia (joint military facilities were non-existent, bilateral military exercises were infrequent, and port calls by American naval vessels were limited to about a dozen per year), American officials were inclined to assume that Australians and New Zealanders thought and acted alike and, accordingly, that both could be counted on to support American interests in critical situations.

This tendency on the part of the United States to take for granted the support of its smaller partners offended the sensibilities of some Australians and even more New Zealanders and planted the seeds of conflict that would ultimately result in the breakup of Anzus.⁵⁵

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Australian efforts to send signals of encouragement to the United States were particularly evident in the aftermath of the Australian 1983 federal election, which resulted in the replacement of Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser's Liberal-Country government by a Labor government headed by Robert Hawke. Prior to the Hawke election, the ALP had been sharply critical of the Fraser

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government's version of the strategy of encouragement, particularly the offer of air and naval facilities at Darwin and Cockburn Sound.⁵⁶ In May 1981, then-Labor leader Bill Hayden stated that a Labor government would not permit the United States to use the North West Cape communications facility to transmit orders to initiate military action without Australia's consent. If the United States refused to comply, Hayden warned, "we would ask it to wind down North West Cape as quickly as possible."⁵⁷ In 1982, John Cain, the newly elected Labor premier of the Victoria state government, announced that his state's ports would no longer be open to warships that were nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed.⁵⁸ Left-wing Laborites were able to include planks in the ALP's 1983 electoral platform calling for economic aid to communist Vietnam, a gradual termination of uranium ore exports, and an end to Australian participation in the Sinai peacekeeping force.⁵⁹

Hawke's election as prime minister, however, was followed by the virtual exclusion of the ALP's left wing from the Cabinet and the de facto repudiation of several foreign policy planks in the ALP's platform.⁶⁰ Shortly before the swearing-in ceremony, Hawke told a broadcast audience in Australia that the relationship with the United States would remain "fundamentally important" during his term in office, and within a week of being sworn in Hawke put on record his determination to allow continued American access to the facilities at Pine Gap (near Alice Springs), Nurrungar (in the remote northwest of the state of South Australia), and the North West Cape.⁶¹ Hawke visited the United States in June 1983 and reportedly established an immediate rapport with President Ronald Reagan and senior members of the administration. He also demonstrated an innate skill for telling American audiences what they wanted to hear. To Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz, Hawke's message was that "there will be no country that [the U.S.] can rely on more than Australia." Before the National Press Club he added, "Australia is not and cannot be a nonaligned nation. We are neutral neither in thought nor action." During an interview in New York, Hawke acknowledged that some Australians wanted the facilities used by the Americans closed but added, "I believe I have a clear perception of global realities, and I would regard it as an exercise in delusion to think that we can engage in some unilateral processes of disarmament and detachment from the alliances of the West."⁶²

Hawke's actions during his first year in office, in turn, were the source of a reassuring analogy, or parallel, that powerfully influenced the American reaction to the 1984 victory by the NZLP, led by David Lange. A week before the election in New Zealand, Hawke won the approval of the ALP conference for continued participation in a military alliance with the United States.⁶³ Secretary Shultz, himself in Australia for consultations with Hawke and Foreign Minister Hayden at the time of the New Zealand election, responded to Lange's victory by noting

military cooperation with the United States, all of which had been answered satisfactorily.⁶⁴ The analogy between Hawke and Lange seemed so obvious and so compelling that American officials were strongly inclined to hope that Lange's government would prove as responsive to American concerns as Hawke's had proved to be.⁶⁵

"When a great power pulls small powers along in its wake, the result is often resentment and even fear on the part of the latter—an outcome that was particularly evident in the response of the New Zealand Labour Party . . . to the signing of the Anzus Treaty."

These hopes, however, combined wishful thinking with a failure to grasp important differences between the geopolitical situations and political cultures of Australia and New Zealand. Australia's heritage of perceived vulnerability, near-invasion during World War II, and dependence on great and powerful friends produced a political culture in which national elections have frequently turned on the question of which party is better suited to manage the alliance with the United States. The conservative governments that ruled (with but one interruption) between 1949 and 1983 made that alliance the "keystone of their policies" and based their electoral appeal on the claim that they were "on better terms with the United States than the Labor Opposition ever could be." As was observed at the time "the thrust of government electoral propaganda is that the ALP is distrusted in the United States for its tendencies to socialism in domestic affairs and to isolationism in defence and foreign policies, and that if it came to power in Australia the defence alliance with the United States would be endangered."⁶⁶

In 1983, most of the potential swing voters who would determine the success or failure of Hawke's candidacy were to the right of him.⁶⁷ Facing an extraordinarily conservative electorate and a governing coalition that sought to play on voters' fears of what an ALP victory might mean for Australian security, Hawke's best hope of victory lay in promising not just to maintain the alliance with the United States but to manage it better than had the government he was seeking to oust. Once in power, his path to future electoral success lay in consolidating his standing as a statesman by stifling the left wing of his party and ignoring those planks in the ALP's platform that might allow the opposition to argue that he was jeopardizing Anzus.⁶⁸ Australia's three-year term for national governments, moreover, required that Hawke move quickly to build a record of accomplishments that he could use in the reelection campaign that would soon be upon him.

New Zealand's heritage, in contrast, was one of isolation from Asia and reluctance to become embroiled in superpower conflicts. Whereas the ALP had

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been in the vanguard of the reorientation after the Second World War of Australia's foreign policy away from London and toward Washington, the NZLP was more skeptical of the need for an alliance with the United States. In contrast to the Australians, whose feelings of insecurity and dependence on a great-power protector have encouraged candidates for national office to compete on the grounds of superior competence to manage the all-important relationship with the United States,⁶⁹ the tendency of New Zealanders to equate isolation with physical security has produced an electorate inclined to favor a more independent foreign policy intended to set an example for the rest of the world. For Hawke, the path to power had been to move toward the center while ignoring the idealists to his left; for Lange, the principal threat to his hold on power, first as leader of the NZLP while in opposition and later as prime minister, came not from the right but from the left. Lange shared with Hawke a desire to preserve the alliance with the United States, but the differing political constraints that each faced meant that Lange's approach would of necessity be more circumspect than that of his Australian counterpart.

When Lange became NZLP leader in 1983, he told his members that the party's stand on nuclear weapons was "unrealistic," but to quell the subsequent revolt against his leadership he promised to support the anti-nuclear program and implement it once in power.⁷⁰ Lange's actions as prime minister are best understood as an attempt to strike a balance between the ideals and national pride of his electorate, who in a February 1985 poll would strongly favor the alliance with the United States (seventy-eight percent "for," twelve percent opposed) but had voted during the July 1984 election for an anti-nuclear policy by a two-to-one margin.⁷¹

Lange's efforts in this regard were themselves hampered by a second reassuring analogy, one that suggested that New Zealand could have its anti-nuclear policy and membership in Anzus too. The Americans expected that a Labour government in Wellington would jettison its anti-nuclear rhetoric once in power, just like the Labor government in Canberra; the New Zealanders expected the Americans to find a way to accommodate local sensitivities to things nuclear, just as they had always done in the past. Conservative and labor governments in both Australia and New Zealand had denied entry to nuclear-powered warships during the 1970s, yet port calls by conventionally powered U.S. Navy ships had continued, and neither nation had been drummed out of Anzus.⁷² The Reagan administration had itself countenanced a violation of the neither-confirm-nor-deny (NCND) policy by telling the Fraser government that B-52s transiting Australia on training missions would be nuclear-free.⁷³ Hawke's government had come to power committed to a package of arms control measures that included opposition to the militarization of space and to space-based weapons, yet relations between Australia and the United States had flourished after his victory.⁷⁴ Japan, Norway, Denmark, and Greece all objected to the presence of

nuclear weapons on their soil and in their ports, yet the United States had found ways to accommodate their concerns, albeit without waiving its policy of NCND.

The problem facing Lange was thus to establish the principle of a nuclear-free New Zealand but without compelling the Americans to make formal declarations concerning the weaponry carried by particular ships. His first move was to postpone the question of ship visits, in order to give the Americans time to adjust to the new situation in New Zealand. The day after the election, he told a New Zealand television audience that while he stood by his party's pledge to ban nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships from New Zealand's ports, "I think it would be necessary to take up the really basic substantive issue in the alliance at later rounds, and that of course is the intelligent agreement of us all." Lange met with Shultz on 17 July 1984 (three days after the election); afterward he pointedly declined to affirm to reporters that he would ban visits by warships that were either nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed.⁷⁵

Time, of course, was something the Americans were happy to provide, because the analogy to Hawke and the ALP suggested that all they had to do was wait until Lange and the NZLP came round to their point of view.⁷⁶ This was an impression that Hawke and Hayden helped reinforce by recalling for Shultz how their own party had run for office in 1983 on a platform of cutting back on military ties with the United States only to reverse itself once in office.⁷⁷ They thus advised Shultz to give Lange time to change his party's position, and the Americans in turn let it be known that they would not attempt to schedule any ship visits to New Zealand before the second quarter of 1985 at the earliest.⁷⁸

In retrospect, a strong case can be made that the Lange government and the Reagan administration each came away from their initial encounter convinced that the other would eventually come around to its own point of view, thereby avoiding the need to choose between matters of principle and the alliance. The more Lange suggested that he wished to defer the question of ship visits, the more he reinforced the American view that he was maneuvering to change his party's position on that issue.⁷⁹ The more the Americans spoke of "good will" and of seeing "what we can work out," the more they reinforced the New Zealanders' belief that matters would not be pushed to the breaking point.⁸⁰ The New Zealanders thought they were being magnanimous in deferring the issue of ship visits until 1985; the Americans thought they were being magnanimous by not insisting on immediate access to New Zealand's ports.⁸¹ The six months that followed Lange's election were thus a period when Americans and New Zealanders alike were expecting their respective ally to capitulate gracefully.

Lange's actions during his first year in office suggest that he was indeed attempting to introduce some flexibility into his party's position on the port call issue, but this was not easy to do because the political center of gravity in the

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NZLP had shifted considerably to the left during the party's years in opposition. In September 1984, a large majority of the NZLP party conference voted in favor of nonbinding resolutions calling on New Zealand to withdraw from Anzus, cut the defense budget, withdraw from military exercises with the armed forces of nuclear powers, and terminate the use of Harewood Air Base in Christchurch by U.S. military cargo aircraft en route to Antarctica.⁸² For his part, however, upon returning in October to New Zealand from a visit to the United States, Great Britain, and India, Lange stated publicly that if the Americans could prove there was no safety or environmental danger from a nuclear-powered vessel, he would "urge...the Government and [the NZLP to] consider allowing that vessel in." Also in October, American F-16 aircraft were allowed to land in New Zealand without a formal declaration that they were nuclear-free. In December Lange asserted that nuclear-powered ships were "not going to come" and that his government was reassessing its stand on the question of nuclear-armed vessels.⁸³

Lange's comments on the port call issue appear in retrospect as intended to clear the way for a tacit bargain with the United States that was sealed during a January 1985 visit to New Zealand by Lieutenant General John Chain, U.S. Air Force, director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.⁸⁴ By this understanding, the New Zealanders expected the Americans to request a port visit "by a vessel which appeared to comply with New Zealand's policy," after which Lange's government would declare that the vessel was not nuclear-armed and approve the port call.⁸⁵ The Americans believed they had an assurance from Lange that he would find a way to approve the port call request that they would soon submit, without any requirement that they declare the ship in question to be nuclear-free.⁸⁶

This was the background to the American request for permission for the conventionally powered USS *Buchanan*, a *Charles F. Adams*-class guided missile destroyer, to visit Auckland in connection with naval exercises scheduled for March 1985. The tacit bargain, however, broke down as soon as it left the realm of bureaucratic channels and entered the more highly charged atmosphere of the NZLP parliamentary caucus. Lange told the *Wellington Evening Post* at the end of January 1985 that on the basis of his "skill . . . judgment [and] conscience" he could determine that certain vessels met his government's criteria for being non-nuclear and thus could be allowed to visit New Zealand's ports. His confidence in this regard was not shared within the NZLP parliamentary caucus, many members of which believed they had been elected on the nuclear ship issue.⁸⁷ On 4 February, after meeting with the caucus, Lange announced that the port call request had been rejected. He tried to cushion the blow by suggesting that the Americans propose another ship, specifically a frigate of the *Oliver Hazard Perry* (FFG 7) class, which was not believed equipped to carry nuclear weapons. Lange hinted that such a ship would be accepted without any

formal declaration by the United States concerning the presence or absence of nuclear weapons.⁸⁸

The Reagan administration's response was a combination of shock and chagrin. The analogy with Hawke had suggested that Lange would need time to change his party's stance on the port call issue; the administration had given him seven months, but his response was to renege on what the Americans took to be a firm agreement.⁸⁹ "There are many people in this government," a senior State Department official opined, "who feel we have been diddled by the New Zealanders for seven months and we ought to do something in retaliation."⁹⁰ An Anzus naval exercise planned for March was cancelled the same day that Lange announced that the *Buchanan* would not be welcome; the next day a senior

"History . . . can mislead as well as enlighten, and in retrospect a strong case can be made that at the critical moment both sides overlapped their hands."

State Department official informed reporters that a wide range of retaliatory measures was under consideration. On 26 February, after what the administration described as a thorough review of the security relationship with New Zealand, Lange was personally informed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Brown during a meeting in Los Angeles of the measures that would be taken against his government: military cooperation between the United States and New Zealand was suspended; the flow of intelligence information was cut off; future military exercises would be cancelled.⁹¹

The Reagan administration argued that it was New Zealand that had over-reacted, but from Lange's viewpoint, matters very likely looked quite different. In 1982, when the NZLP was in opposition and Lange was deputy leader, the party conference had voted overwhelmingly to withdraw from Anzus should it come to power.⁹² After he had become leader of the NZLP, Lange had been able to soften that stance, and the NZLP ran in 1984 on a platform that called for renegotiating the Anzus treaty rather than repudiating it.⁹³ Once in power, he had delayed introducing legislation that would ban port calls by ships that were either nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed, or both, thereby gaining time to fashion a compromise that would allow the United States to avoid breaching its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on a particular ship. He had temporarily lost control of the issue when the question of a port call by the *Buchanan* was debated within the NZLP parliamentary caucus, but he had managed to keep alive the possibility of future port calls.⁹⁴ The Americans, however, had responded not with the good will they were always talking about but with immediate sanctions and threats of more to come.

At the time that sanctions were first imposed, American officials looked for a change in New Zealand's position within a year or two, provided the pressure

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was not relaxed prematurely.⁹⁵ The sanctions, however, produced the opposite of the effect intended, and not just in New Zealand. The sanctions “did wonders for Mr. Lange’s electoral appeal,” making him appear the symbol of his country’s determination not to be bullied on a matter of principle. Hawke’s government, in contrast, which sided with the United States on the port call issue, became the subject of intense criticism from within the ALP for “putting the United States ahead of fraternal Labor links and the Anzac connection.”⁹⁶ By July 1985, even the U.S. State Department was conceding that New Zealand’s position had become “stiffer rather than looser” in the aftermath of the imposition of sanctions. In the hope of reaching a compromise with the United States, Lange delayed introducing legislation formally banning port visits by ships carrying nuclear weapons until December 1985; this, however, earned him little credit in Washington, which viewed any codification of the NZLP’s anti-nuclear policy as a turn for the worse.⁹⁷ On 27 June 1986, Shultz announced that the United States was withdrawing its security umbrella from New Zealand, and in August he declared that the U.S. was abrogating its defense ties with that nation.⁹⁸ Neither move was successful in deflecting the New Zealanders from the anti-nuclear path. In June 1987 the New Zealand parliament formally enacted the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Bill, and in August of that year Lange was reelected prime minister, the first NZLP prime minister to accomplish that feat since Peter Fraser (1940–1949).⁹⁹

How Not to Manage an Alliance

In a parliamentary system such as that in New Zealand, cabinet members are generally drawn from a relatively small pool of legislators who have often served long apprenticeships as backbenchers and junior ministers, during which they can observe the ebb and flow of policy as governments rise and fall. In the United States, in contrast, candidates for the presidency and for cabinet-level posts are drawn from a much larger circle, and many hold office for relatively brief periods before moving to new challenges in business, law, or the academic world. The heavy reliance on such “in-and-outers” to fill appointive positions, the wholesale turnover down to the deputy-assistant-secretary level after each quadrennial election, and the practice of regularly rotating military and foreign service officers to new posts have meant that institutional memory is almost completely lacking in the executive branch. Where the previous section of this article considered the effect of misleading analogies as to relations between the United States and New Zealand, this section considers the impact on relations between allies when they differ in their ability to recall and learn from the past.

The Americans argued that they could not understand the New Zealanders’ claim that they could be anti-nuclear and still retain Anzus membership in good standing. In the American view “an alliance partner cannot pick and choose the

nature of its contributions in a strategically interdependent world. Contrary to NZLP claims, Washington maintains that in more than 30 years of fruitful partnership ANZUS has never operated on any other premise.¹⁰⁰

The Reagan administration's view of the premise on which Anzus was based may have been technically correct, but it was also misleading and disingenuous, because it overlooked important precedents set by the United States both before and after the formation of the alliance. In 1944, the Americans discouraged the New Zealanders from organizing a small land force to participate in the final stage of the war against Japan on the grounds that New Zealand's most important task was to feed American troops.¹⁰¹ In 1950 and 1951, American officials attempted to persuade their European counterparts that Nato members *should* pick and choose their contributions as part of a Nato-wide division of labor, because to do otherwise would be either militarily ineffective or ruinously expensive.¹⁰² Within Anzus, the Truman administration resisted Australian efforts to establish a direct link to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and quite deliberately limited American participation to the minimum needed to maintain the alliance with Australia and New Zealand. In doing so, it sowed seeds of doubt, particularly in the NZLP, about American intentions and reliability that thirty years later blossomed into a determination to limit New Zealand's ties with a much larger ally over which Wellington had very little influence.

The American inability to understand the persistence of Lange's and the NZLP's anti-nuclear stance was due in part to unfamiliarity—Labour had been out of power in New Zealand since 1975 and had managed but two governments between 1949 and 1984, each of which lasted for only a single three-year term. Port calls had been a contentious issue during the previous NZLP government (1972–1975, led first by Norman Kirk and then by Wallace Rowling), and one might expect that the policies of that government and the American response to them would have been carefully studied in Washington as a source of guidance for dealing with a distant ally. The public record suggests that no such study was done, in part because officials in Washington believed they already possessed the key to dealing with Lange and the NZLP. Blinded by the analogy to Hawke, Defense Department officials told a friendly journalist that Lange and the NZLP would surely change their stand on the port call question because the Labor government in Australia had also banned port calls by nuclear-armed ships and then reversed itself later in its term.¹⁰³

The failure to recall, much less learn from, the past was important because a closer look at the American encounter with the Kirk-Rowling government would surely have cast doubt on the Reagan administration's claim that an alliance was meaningless unless all parties were prepared to welcome the full spectrum of forces represented within it.¹⁰⁴ During the 1960s, port calls by nuclear-powered vessels "had become the subject of international dispute over liability and financial indemnity for reactor accidents." Concern over liability

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was so widespread that "by the early 1970s there was hardly a port in the Pacific which would accept nuclear ships." The 1957–1960 NZLP government led by Walter Nash had welcomed the first nuclear-powered U.S. Navy vessel to visit New Zealand, but reservations about such visits grew steadily during the tenure of the National Party government headed by Keith Holyoake (1960–1972). After the visit to Wellington in 1964 of the carrier task force led by the USS *Enterprise*, no nuclear-powered ship visited New Zealand until 1976. Meanwhile in Australia, the conservative government led by William McMahon in 1971 requested the U.S. and Great Britain "to refrain from proposing visits by nuclear-powered ships. McMahon had made inquiries and been told that Sydney was unsuitable for nuclear-powered visitors. He withheld permission for visits in view of uncertainty over environmental safety."¹⁰⁵

The labor governments elected in both Australia and New Zealand in 1972 thus inherited de facto bans on port calls by nuclear-powered ships imposed by their conservative predecessors. Both chose to extend the ban on such visits into 1975, in part because of their interest in a Pacific nuclear-free zone, which would have precluded French nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll. The U.S. response to these restrictions was not sanctions but rather Public Law 93-513, passed by Congress on 21 November 1974 and signed by President Gerald Ford on 6 December 1974. Intended to regain access to foreign ports for the Navy's nuclear-powered vessels, the law established procedures for the payment of claims against the United States as a result of a nuclear incident involving the propulsion system of a U.S. warship. Passage of the law was followed by "vigorous diplomatic activity" by American representatives aimed at regaining access to Australian and New Zealand ports for nuclear-powered ships. The U.S. ambassador to New Zealand, Armistead Selden, Jr., tacitly conceded New Zealand's right to limit port calls by arguing that "continued stoppage after liability had been 'solved' was inconsistent with ANZUS."¹⁰⁶

The Rowling government's response to these pressures is best described as equivocal. On 14 April 1975, Rowling himself stated that the U.S. had "put out feelers" concerning the resumption of nuclear-powered ship visits and that his government would accordingly reconsider the ban on port calls. On 10 July he announced that the cabinet was reexamining its policy on ship visits but that "there are no plans for change." The NZLP Conference in May 1975 voted overwhelmingly to extend the ban to include nuclear-armed as well as nuclear-powered ships, but the NZLP manifesto for the 1975 election stated only that Anzus would be maintained, without mentioning the port call issue. In the interim, U.S. Navy frigates continued to call at New Zealand's ports.¹⁰⁷ Rowling's government was defeated in the ensuing election, and on 14 January 1976 Prime Minister Robert Muldoon announced that the ban on port calls by nuclear-powered ships was being lifted because it was inconsistent with New Zealand's Anzus obligations. That same

day, the newly elected Fraser government in Australia announced that it would review the question of port calls by nuclear-powered ships, having been advised by a delegation of U.S. senators that the ban was incompatible with Australian membership in the alliance.¹⁰⁸

Despite the passage of P.L. 93-513 and the lifting of the ban on nuclear-powered ship visits, the liability issue continued to intrude on relations between the United States and New Zealand. The latter "was anxious to secure assurances about nuclear weapons indemnity. An approach to Ambassador Selden produced an *aide-memoire* on 13 August 1976 similar to an agreement reached with Canada in 1968-1969, covering liability for warheads as well as reactors."¹⁰⁹

For an NZLP prime minister, the experience of the previous NZLP government would very likely loom large in efforts to deal with the United States.¹¹⁰ A ban on port calls by nuclear-powered ships is obviously not the same as a ban on visits by nuclear-armed ships, but to an NZLP prime minister the crucial precedent would be the Americans' willingness to respect New Zealand's right to determine which ships called at its ports. More specifically, an NZLP prime minister familiar with the events of the 1970s could reasonably be expected to conclude that the time available for reconciling disagreements about port calls would be measured in years rather than months, that port calls by U.S. Navy vessels deemed acceptable by New Zealand would continue while negotiations progressed, and that the Americans would prove accommodating if New Zealand held firm.

History, however, can mislead as well as enlighten, and in retrospect a strong case can be made that at the critical moment both sides overplayed their hands. As noted, coinciding with the rejection of the *Buchanan*, Lange suggested through diplomatic channels that a *Perry*-class frigate would be an acceptable substitute.¹¹¹ Unlike the *Buchanan*, which could carry nuclear weapons in its antisubmarine rocket (or Asroc) launchers, *Perry*-class frigates were widely believed to have no nuclear weapons capability.¹¹² Lange apparently tried to make this suggestion more palatable to the Reagan administration by stressing in his public statements that no breach of NCND would be required for such a visit—his government would decide for itself that the ship was not nuclear-armed, and without any intrusive inspection.¹¹³

With the benefit of hindsight, Lange's frigate proposal appears as the political equivalent of going for a grand slam—the Americans might grumble, but they would probably go along, just as during the 1970s they had continued to send frigates to New Zealand even though they resented the ban on port calls by nuclear-powered ships. More important, the frigate proposal offered a compromise that Lange could reasonably hope to impose on a restive parliamentary caucus. The widely held belief that *Perry*-class frigates were not nuclear-capable would allow him to argue that the ship could visit without violating the NZLP's pledge to make New Zealand nuclear-free. Such a visit would itself constitute

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a precedent that he could use to finesse pressures from the left wing of his party for a legislative ban on visits by ships that were either nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed, legislation that would have compelled the Americans to choose between New Zealand and NCND. Provided Lange could get all the pieces to fall into place, the Americans would be appeased, the militants to his left would be outwitted, and Anzus would be saved—at least until the next port call request.

The Reagan administration was itself thinking about precedents, but not the ones that Lange had in mind. American diplomats in Tokyo and naval officers at Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii had been appalled when U.S. Air Force representatives told the Fraser government that B-52s transiting Australia on training missions would be nuclear-free.¹¹⁴ The anti-nuclear protest movements that blossomed in Western Europe during the early 1980s and the anti-American and anti-nuclear rhetoric that was then fashionable within the British Labour Party and the German Social Democratic Party suggested a virus that threatened to undermine much of the foundation on which American foreign policy had been based since the Second World War.¹¹⁵ As seen by the Reagan administration, Lange's insistence on a *Perry*-class frigate appeared not as a last-ditch effort to preserve the alliance with the United States but as an attempt to dictate the types of ship that could call at New Zealand's ports. If the New Zealanders could get away with such a move, anti-nuclear movements in other allied states might be so encouraged that the governments of those nations might be unable to resist pressures for similar restrictions on the movement of U.S. ships and planes.¹¹⁶

Washington thus decided against accepting Lange's invitation to send a *Perry*-class frigate in place of the *Buchanan*. But did rejection of the frigate proposal require sanctions against New Zealand? American officials argued that sanctions were necessary to change minds in Wellington and to show other allied governments that restrictions on port calls would not be cost-free.¹¹⁷ By February 1985, however, Lange had already delayed for nearly seven months—much to the dismay of the left wing of his party—introduction of legislation that would have codified the NZLP's anti-nuclear stance. His efforts in this regard went unappreciated in Washington because American officials were for the most part unaware of the risks that he faced as a result of memories in New Zealand of the earlier ban on port calls by nuclear-powered ships. That ban had taken the form of government policy rather than legislation passed by Parliament. Rowling's equivocations in response to requests from the U.S. embassy for a resumption of port calls by nuclear-powered ships had been widely interpreted in New Zealand as intended to clear the way for a lifting of the ban in the event the NZLP won the 1975 election.¹¹⁸ The New Zealand peace movement was thus distrustful of the NZLP leadership, and after Lange's victory in 1984 both the peace movement and the NZLP parliamentary caucus "were absolutely determined not to tolerate a similar executive suspension."¹¹⁹ American officials

frequently decried the New Zealanders' inability to understand that the United States valued a policy (NCND) more highly than New Zealand's continued participation in Anzus. The Americans, however, were themselves insensitive to the likelihood that a majority of the NZLP parliamentary caucus would prefer a policy (a nuclear-free New Zealand) to Lange's continued tenure as their leader.

In these circumstances, the imposition of sanctions had the effect of making Lange's attempts to rein-in the left wing of his party appear misguided, thereby leaving him no choice but to offer an ardent defense of the NZLP's anti-nuclear stance if he was to continue as prime minister.¹²⁰ The costs inflicted by the sanctions were borne not by the peace movement, which wanted to sever all military ties with the United States, but by the most insistent advocates of a continuing military relationship with the United States: the Armed Forces of New Zealand, whose operational effectiveness was crippled by the abrupt termination of cooperative ties built up over the previous three decades.¹²¹ Meanwhile in Australia, Hawke's approval rating went down rather than up after the decision to retaliate had been announced, as did support for the ALP among the Australian public.¹²²

The imposition of sanctions thus appears in retrospect as one of those rare political events that produced outcomes that were for the most part the opposite of those intended. Were there, however, other options available? One possibility would have been a suspension of port calls and naval exercises but without any formal announcement of sanctions or abrogation of the alliance with New Zealand. The Reagan administration appears not to have grasped that the rejection of the *Buchanan* was in effect a public rebuke of Lange by the NZLP parliamentary caucus for his months of trying to fashion a compromise on the port call question. Prime ministers whose policies foment rebellion in their own ranks generally do not retain their grip on power for very long; governing parties that wage their internal struggles in public rather than in the caucus room are not in a strong position to convince the voters that they deserve another term. As of February 1985, New Zealand's electoral clock was ticking inexorably toward an election that would have to be called no later than mid-1987. No NZLP prime minister had been re-elected since the 1940s, and Lange's position was being undermined both by the split in his party and by the wrenching austerity program imposed by his government to wring out the excesses from a very sick economy.¹²³ The last time an NZLP government had lost a bid for reelection, the National Party government that replaced it had quickly scrapped the ban on port calls by nuclear-powered ships that had been maintained by the Kirk-Rowling ministry.¹²⁴ There are thus good reasons to believe that the dispute over port calls would have solved itself within a reasonable time had not the imposition of sanctions provided Lange and the NZLP with a foreign

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A better understanding in Washington of parliamentary politics in New Zealand would also have revealed opportunities to use Lange's offer to accept a *Perry*-class frigate in place of the *Buchanan* to pressure his government to change its stance on port calls but without resorting to drastic measures like sanctions and abrogation of the alliance. A majority of the NZLP parliamentary caucus did not want any port calls by U.S. warships unless accompanied by explicit assurances from the United States that the ships were nuclear-free. Lange wanted to preserve Anzus, but he also wanted to remain prime minister, and the price of the latter was public support for the anti-nuclear cause. In this context, sanctions had the dual effect of allowing Lange and his parliamentary caucus to avoid the consequences of the chasm that was developing between them and also of placing the onus for breaking the alliance on Washington rather than Wellington. Offering to send the frigate, in contrast, would have compelled Lange and the NZLP to choose between being blamed for wrecking Anzus (a step opposed by three-quarters of the public in New Zealand) or softening their position on military cooperation with the United States.¹²⁵ American officials were so concerned that sending the frigate would undermine their position on NCND that they lost sight of an opportunity to increase the pressure on Lange and his government without appearing to be bullying a smaller partner.

In sum, the tragedy of Anzus is that by the mid-1980s its fate was in the hands of officials in Washington and Wellington who knew relatively little about the motivations of their counterparts across the ocean and who were easily misled by comforting but false historical analogies. Differences in their ability to recall and thus learn from the past widened the gulf between them and ultimately led both to embark on policies that not only proved counterproductive but destroyed the alliance they claimed to value highly.

Notes

1. Trevor Reese, *Australia, New Zealand, and the United States* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), p. 107. The text of the Anzus treaty is reprinted in Dora Alves, *Anti-Nuclear Attitudes in New Zealand and Australia* (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 67-71. The treaty took effect on 29 April 1952 (Reese, p. 125).

2. See, for example, the comment by Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies cited in Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: New American Library, 1970), p. 813. See also Richard Rosecrance, *Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945-1951* (Melbourne: Melbourne Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 140-141; Norman Harper, "Pacific Security as Seen from Australia," *International Organization*, 7 May 1953, p. 214; and J.D.B. Miller, *Britain and the Old Dominions* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 174.

3. Bernard Gwertzman, "Shultz Ends U.S. Vow To Defend New Zealand," *The New York Times*, 28 June 1986, p. 1; Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Seeks To Send Warship To New Zealand Port Call," *The New York Times*, 22 January 1985, p. 3; Bernard Gwertzman, "New Zealand Bars Visit by U.S. Vessel Over Atomic Arms," *The New York Times*, 5 February 1985, p. 1; Bernard Gwertzman, "Australia Balks On Accord To Aid in U.S. Test of MX," *The New York Times*, 7 February 1985, p. 1.

4. Gwertzman, "New Zealand Bars Visit."

5. State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb, quoted in Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Plans Actions to Answer Rebuff by New Zealand," *The New York Times*, 6 February 1985, p. 6. Concerning the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand, see Alves, *Anti-Nuclear Attitudes*, pp. 10-11, 29-34; and Dora Alves, "The Changing New Zealand Defense Posture," *Asian Survey*, 29 April 1989, pp. 373-374.

6. See, for example, the comments of Laurence W. Lane, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Australia, quoted in Peter Costigan, "U.S. Woos Australia," *The Washington Post*, 11 February 1986, p. A20. See also Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand's Dilemmas," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, August 1985, p. 55.

7. Lange's Minister of Defense, Frank O'Flynn, told the New Zealand parliament on 21 February 1985 that ships from the Royal New Zealand Navy would be allowed to exercise with nuclear-capable vessels provided the exercises were held outside New Zealand's territorial waters. See Michael McKinley, "Labour, Lange and Logic: An Analysis of New Zealand's ANZUS Policy," *Australian Outlook*, 39 December 1985, pp. 133, 137n.

8. Ian Templeton, "Lange Signals Readiness to Scrap ANZUS Pact," *The Washington Post*, 28 September 1985, p. A16; Ramesh Thakur, "Creation of the Nuclear-Free New Zealand Myth," *Asian Survey*, 29 October 1989, p. 928; Peter Jennings, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences* (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1988), pp. 84, 87; Young, p. 55. Australian policies in support of nuclear deterrence are described in William T. Tow, "The ANZUS Dispute: Testing U.S. Extended Deterrence in Alliance Politics," *Political Science Quarterly*, v. 104, no. 1, 1989, pp. 133ff.

9. Prime Minister David Lange, speech before The New Zealand Connection, Los Angeles, 26 February 1985, quoted in *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, January-March 1985, p. 6. See also Thakur, pp. 921-922, 939.

10. T.B. Millar, "The Defense of Australia," *Daedalus*, Winter 1985, p. 259. See also Henry S. Albinski, "Australia and the United States," *Daedalus*, Winter 1985, p. 414.

11. Millar, p. 260; Albinski, p. 414; Fred Alexander, *Australia and the United States* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), pp. 38-40; and Max Deloff, *Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921*, Vol. 1 of *Imperial Sunset* (New York: Knopf, 1970), pp. 191-192.

12. Dennis Phillips, *Ambivalent Allies* (New York: Penguin, 1988), p. 140; Norman Harper, "A Historical Perspective," in *Pacific Orbit: Australian-American Relations Since 1942*, ed. N. Harper (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1968), pp. 185-186; and Albinski, pp. 414-415.

13. Millar, p. 260; Miller, pp. 128-129; and Reese, p. 9.

14. Miller, p. 129; Rose Babbage, "Australia's Defence Planning, Force Structure and Equipment: The American Effect," *Australian Outlook*, December 1984, p. 153.

15. Millar, p. 261; Albinski, p. 415; and Miller, p. 129.

16. Quoted in Coral Bell, *Dependent Ally* (Melbourne: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), p. 45. See also Reese, pp. 14-15, 22-23; Millar, p. 261; Albinski, p. 415; and Miller, p. 129.

17. Harper, "Pacific Security," p. 218; Dean McHenry and Richard Rosecrance, "The 'Exclusion' of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS Pact," *International Organization*, Summer 1958, p. 320.

18. Harper, "Pacific Security," p. 214.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 213-214.

20. Millar, p. 262.

21. Harper, "Pacific Security," p. 214.

22. Millar, p. 273. See also Reese, pp. 23-24.

23. See, for example, "Extract from the Governor General Speech at the Opening of Parliament," 28 June 1949, in *Documents on New Zealand External Relations*, v. 3, no. 168, ed. Robin Kay (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1985), p. 484.

24. Michael McKinley, *ANZUS, New Zealand and the Meaning of Life* (Commonwealth of Australia: Legislative Research Service, 1986), pp. 8-9; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951* (hereafter FRUS), v. 6, pp. 1479-1490; and Reese, pp. 107-121.

25. Miller, p. 174; Rosecrance, pp. 140-141. Acheson's reply to Chifley's statement is quoted at length in Reese, p. 114.

26. The results of Spender's talks in Washington are recounted in various memoranda of conversation reprinted in FRUS, 1950, v. 6, pp. 211-228. The use of Manus Island by American and Australian forces during and after the Second World War is discussed in Reese, pp. 50ff.

27. Acheson, p. 694; FRUS, 1951, v. 6, pp. 156-164. See also Reese, p. 122.

28. The Truman administration's thinking in this regard is described more fully in Wallace J. Thies, "Learning in American Policy Toward Europe," in *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, ed. George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 160-171.

29. Joseph Siracusa and Glenn Barclay, "The Historical Influence of the United States on Australian Strategic Thinking," *Australian Outlook*, December 1984, p. 153.

30. See, for example, the remarks by John Foster Dulles at the San Francisco peace conference, quoted in Harper, "Pacific Security," p. 220. See also Reese, p. 102.

31. Harper, "Pacific Security," p. 219. See also Harper, "The American Alliance," p. 7.

32. Harper, "Pacific Security," p. 219. See also FRUS, 1951, v. 6, pp. 157-158.

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34. Harper, "Pacific Security," p. 221; Millar, p. 261; and Reese, pp. 103-104.
35. Acheson, p. 876; Reese, pp. 134-136.
36. FRUS, 1950, v. 6, p. 195; Reese, pp. 109-110; and Acheson, p. 696.
37. Acheson, p. 876.
38. Miller, pp. 166-167; Reese, pp. 10-11, 32-33, 88-89.
39. Harper, "Pacific Security," p. 214; Reese, p. 137. See also FRUS, 1950, v. 6, pp. 215-216, 223-225.
40. Acheson, p. 813. The Nato Standing Group consisted of a representative from the chiefs of staff of the United States, Great Britain, and France.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 813-814; FRUS, 1951, v. 6, pp. 157-158, 192-201, 252-253.
42. Acheson, p. 813.
43. Reese, p. 145.
44. Acheson, pp. 874, 877; Reese, p. 145.
45. McHenry and Rosecrance, p. 326.
46. W.F. Monk, "New Zealand Faces North," *Pacific Affairs*, September 1953, p. 227.
47. Albinski, p. 147.
48. Millar, p. 266.
49. Jennings, pp. 3-4, 68-69.
50. Peter Hastings, "Australia and the U.S.," *The New York Times*, 4 November 1979, sec. 4, p. 21. The Guam doctrine takes its name from a 1969 speech there by President Nixon in which he announced that the U.S. could no longer be expected to use its own armed forces to fight future insurgencies in Asia.
51. Albinski, p. 417.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 395-396. A detailed description of the operations of the joint U.S.-Australian facilities at Pine Gap, Nurrungar, and the Northwest Cape is provided in Andrew Mack, "Crisis in the Other Alliance," *World Policy Journal*, Summer 1986, pp. 453-458.
53. Harper, "The American Alliance," p. 13.
54. Sir Wallace Rowling, "New Zealand and ANZUS," *Armed Forces and Society*, Winter 1986, pp. 169-170.
55. See, for example, Hastings, and Bob Gilmore, "New Zealand's Unionists Move Closer to Moscow," *Business Week*, 7 June 1982, p. 52.
56. Fraser offered the United States access to the Australian air force base near Darwin for B-52s on training and surveillance missions over the Indian Ocean. Cockburn Sound was offered as a home port or a base port for an American carrier battle group.
57. Mack, p. 458. Hayden was subsequently defeated for the ALP leadership by Hawke. Hayden was appointed foreign minister after Hawke's victory in the 1983 election.
58. "A leftward tilt Down Under could Disrupt U.S. defenses," *Business Week*, 24 May 1982, p. 76; "BH is your man," *The Economist*, 17 July 1982, p. 39. See also Peter Costigan, "Proposed U.S. Naval Base Enlivens Australian Campaign," *The Washington Post*, 22 March 1980, p. A15; and "Premier's Coalition Trails In Australia," *The New York Times*, 13 October 1980, p. A11.
59. Richard Bernstein, "Labor Party Wins Australian Voting," *The New York Times*, 6 March 1983, pp. 1, 8.
60. Richard Bernstein, "Premier and Cabinet Take Office in Australia," *The New York Times*, 12 March 1983, p. 23; Russ Hoyle, "Whispering Sweet Nothings," *Time*, 27 June 1983, p. 41.
61. Bernstein, "Premier and Cabinet"; Richard Bernstein, "Australian to Review U.S. Ties," *The New York Times*, 19 March 1983, p. 4; and Mack, p. 458.
62. "Australian Says U.S. Can Rely on Close Ties," *The New York Times*, 14 June 1983, p. 7; Richard Bernstein, "Australian Vows Cooperation with U.S. on Military Bases," *The New York Times*, 19 June 1983, p. 15; and Hoyle.
63. Bernard Gwertzman, "Conservatives Ousted in New Zealand Voting," *The New York Times*, 15 July 1984, p. 10.
64. *Ibid.*
65. See, for example, Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Navy Won't Go to New Zealand for Rest of Year," *The New York Times*, 17 July 1984, p. 5; Gwertzman, "U.S. and New Zealand Affirm Amity," *The New York Times*, 18 July 1984, p. 4; and Drew Middleton, "Nuclear Fleet Raises Hackles on Shore," *The New York Times*, 22 July 1984, sec. 4, p. 4.
66. Bruce Grant, "The American Image in Australia," in *Pacific Orbit*, ed. Harper, p. 212. The only ALP government between 1949 and 1983 was that led by Gough Whitlam (1972-1975).
67. D. Campbell, "Australian Public Opinion on National Security Issues," *Peace Research Centre Working Paper No. 1* (Canberra: Australian National Univ., 1986). See also Mack, pp. 460-461.
68. The difficulties that previous ALP leaders have faced in this regard are discussed by Grant, p. 215; Joseph W. Sica, "A Cold War Alliance in Retrospect: 1980: A Historical Perspective," *Orbis*, Summer 1980,

pp. 276–277; and Owen Harries, "Australia's Foreign Policy Under Whitlam," *Orbis*, Fall 1975, pp. 1090–1091.

69. See, for example, Bruce Grant's comments on the "psychology of protection," in "The American Image in Australia," p. 213.

70. Steve Lohr, "New Zealand on Ship Ban: Issue of Pride," *The New York Times*, 10 February 1985, p. A7. See also Alves, *Anti-Nuclear Attitudes*, pp. 28–29.

71. Peter Samuel and F.P. Serong, "The Troubled Waters of ANZUS," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1986, p. 48n; and Lohr.

72. Michael Pugh, "New Zealand's First Nuclear Ship 'Ban,'" *British Review of New Zealand Studies*, July 1988, pp. 50–52; F.A. Mediansky, "Nuclear Weapons and Security in the South Pacific," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1986, p. 33; Thakur, pp. 932–933; and Mack, p. 465.

73. Mack, p. 465. See also "Near is nervous, far is friendly," *The Economist*, 14 March 1981, p. 40.

74. Mediansky, p.432.

75. Bernard Gwertzman, "New Zealander Wants To Avoid Fight With U.S.," *The New York Times*, 16 July 1984, pp. 1, 6; Gwertzman, "U.S. Navy Won't Go to New Zealand" and "U.S. and New Zealand Affirm Amity."

76. See, for example, Gwertzman, "U.S. Navy Won't Go to New Zealand"; Middleton, "Nuclear Fleet Raises Hackles."

77. Gwertzman, "U.S. Navy Won't Go to New Zealand." The Australians had their own reasons for hoping that Lange's government would change course on the nuclear ship ban—the more firmly the NZLP clung to its anti-nuclear policy, the more it called attention to the gap between the ALP's electoral platform and the practice of the Hawke government (Mediansky, p. 35).

78. Gwertzman, "U.S. Navy Won't Go to New Zealand."

79. Officials in Washington told a reporter that Lange's government would have modified its stand on the question of nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ship visits by mid-1985, hence the decision not to request any port calls before then. See Middleton, "Nuclear Fleet Raises Hackles"; and Gwertzman, "U.S. Navy Won't Go to New Zealand".

80. See, for example, Gwertzman, "New Zealander Wants to Avoid Fight With U.S." and "U.S. and New Zealand Affirm Amity."

81. See, for example, Middleton, "Nuclear Fleet Raises Hackles."

82. "Party in New Zealand Wants ANZUS Pullout," *The New York Times*, 10 September 1984, p. 6; Alves, *Anti-Nuclear Attitudes*, pp. 10–11.

83. McKinley, *ANZUS*, p. 68; Tow, p. 128; Mediansky, p. 40; and Alves, *Anti-Nuclear Attitudes*, p. 12.

84. Gwertzman, "U.S. Seeks to Send Warship," "New Zealand Bars Visit By U.S. Vessel," and "U.S. Plans Actions to Answer Rebuff."

85. Statement by Prime Minister Lange in the 13 April 1985 issue of *New Zealand Listener*, reprinted in Alves, *Anti-Nuclear Attitudes*, p. 79; Samuel and Serong, p. 43; and Mediansky, p. 41.

86. Gwertzman, "New Zealand Bars Visit by U.S. Vessel," "U.S. Plans Actions to Answer Rebuff"; Charles Mohr, "New Zealand Rebuff: A Baffling Furor," *The New York Times*, 7 February 1985, p. 4; and Samuel and Serong, p. 43.

87. Quoted in McKinley, *ANZUS*, p. 680; Alves, *Anti-Nuclear Attitudes*, p. 13; and Mediansky, p. 41.

88. Bernard Gwertzman, "New Zealand Bars Visit By U.S. Warship"; Rear Admiral Joseph Strasser, USN, personal communication; and Samuel and Serong, pp. 43–44.

89. Tow, p. 127; Henry Alhinski, *The United States, Pacific Security, and ANZUS* (New York: Asia Society, forthcoming). For an obvious parallel, see the discussion of "disappointed expectations" and "paranoid reactions" in U.S.-U.K. relations in Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 71ff.

90. Gwertzman, "New Zealand Bars Visit By U.S. Warship"; and Mohr.

91. Gwertzman, "New Zealand Bars Visit By U.S. Vessel," and "U.S. Plans Actions to Answer Rebuff"; Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Retaliates in New Zealand Dispute," *The New York Times*, 27 February 1985, p. 7. See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Meeting of ANZUS Alliance Is Postponed," *The New York Times*, 5 March 1985, p. 3; and Tow, pp. 128–129.

92. Gilmore, "New Zealand's Unionists."

93. Gwertzman, "Conservatives Ousted in New Zealand Voting"; Mediansky, p. 33.

94. Samuel and Serong, p. 44; Alves, *Anti-Nuclear Attitudes*, p. 35.

95. Gwertzman, "Meeting of ANZUS Alliance."

96. Keith Suter, "Australia's Defence Debate: The Dibb Report," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, December 1987, p. 57. "Anzac" is a traditional reference to the "Australian-New Zealand Army Corps" of the two world wars.

97. Shirley Christian, "Shultz and Australians Reaffirm Ties," *The New York Times*, 15 July 1985, p. 3; John M. Goshko, "ANZUS Rift Not Healed," *The Washington Post*, 20 September 1985, p. A13; and Jim

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Hoagland and Don Oberdorfer, "New Zealand to Weigh Law Barring Nuclear-Armed Ships, *The Washington Post*, 24 October 1985, pp. A1, A27.

98. Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Withdraws New Zealand's ANZUS Shield," *The Washington Post*, 28 June 1986, pp. A1, A24; "U.S. Severs Defense Alliance With New Zealand," *The Washington Post*, 12 August 1986, p. A14.

99. "New Zealand Ban on Nuclear Arms Voted into Law," *The Washington Post*, 5 June 1987, p. A22; Richard Bill, "Lange Wins Second Term in New Zealand Voting," *The Washington Post*, 16 August 1987, p. A21.

100. Henry S. Albinski, "Australia and New Zealand in the 1980's," *Current History*, April 1986, p. 154. See also the remarks by Secretary of State Shultz quoted in Gwertzman, "New Zealander Wants to Avoid Fight with U.S." and the remarks of Assistant Secretary of State (Far Eastern Affairs) Paul Wolfowitz, quoted in "New Zealand Warned About Role in Alliance," *The New York Times*, 23 February 1985, p. 5.

101. Reese, p. 26. The Australians, after consulting with the Americans and the British, also transferred men from the armed forces to industry and agriculture, resulting in caustic comments in the U.S. that Australia and New Zealand were prematurely and unfairly relaxing their war efforts (*ibid.*).

102. See, for example, Acheson, pp. 512-523.

103. Middleton, "Nuclear Fleet Raises Hackles."

104. See, for example, Gwertzman, "New Zealander Wants to Avoid Fight with U.S.," "U.S. and New Zealand Affirm Amity," and "New Zealand Warned About Role in Alliance."

105. Pugh, pp. 50-52.

106. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-55.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 55; Thakur, pp. 932-933; and Tow, p. 124.

108. Pugh, p. 55.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

110. Lange himself cited the experience of the previous NZLP government in remarks before the New Zealand Connection in Los Angeles, 26 February 1985 (see note 9 above).

111. Rear Admiral Joseph Strasser, USN, personal communication; Samuel and Serong, p. 44. There were then about thirty-five such ships in the fleet; see International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1984-1985* (London: 1985), p. 8.

112. See, for example, Samuel and Serong, p. 44.

113. See, for example, Gwertzman, "New Zealand Bars Visit By U.S. Vessel"; and Samuel and Serong, p. 43.

114. We are indebted to an anonymous Naval War College reader for calling this point to our attention.

115. Note in this regard references to "Hollanditis" and the "Dutch disease," which became popular among American observers of European affairs. This literature is discussed at length in Wallace J. Thies, *The Atlantic Alliance, Nuclear Weapons and European Attitudes: Re-examining the Conventional Wisdom* (Berkeley: Univ. of California, Institute of International Studies, 1983).

116. William Safire, "Friends, Allies No More," *The New York Times*, 28 February 1985, p. 25.

117. See, for example, Gwertzman, "U.S. Plans Actions to Answer Rebuff"; and Mohr.

118. Pugh, p. 55; Tow, p. 124; and Jim McLay, "Disarmament and Security: An Alternative Viewpoint," *New Zealand International Review*, May/June 1985, p. 21.

119. Pugh, p. 59.

120. Steve Lohr, "New Zealand's Premier Supported on Ship Ban," *The New York Times*, 10 February 1985, p. 10.

121. The effect of the sanctions on the AFNZ is described thoroughly in Jennings.

122. Steve Lohr, "Australian's MX Stand Isn't Popular," *The New York Times*, 24 February 1985, p. 8. The polls cited in this article were taken after the American intent to retaliate against New Zealand had been expressed but before the nature of that retaliation had been made known.

123. New Zealand's economic woes are described by Albinski, "Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s," pp. 150-152.

124. The National Party opposition was critical of the NZLP's intent to enact legislation banning port calls by ships that were either nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed or both, but it was also aware of the extent of anti-nuclear sentiment in New Zealand. A National Party government would have been more receptive to port calls by U.S. warships, but it could also have been expected to move more slowly than in 1976. See Albinski, "Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s," p. 154.

125. Samuel and Serong, p. 48n; Albinski, "Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s," p. 154.