

Naval War College Review

Volume 45
Number 2 *Spring*

Article 15

1992

The Coming War with Japan

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Recommended Citation

Anderson, Gary; Friedman, George; and Le Bard, Meredith (1992) "The Coming War with Japan," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 45 : No. 2 , Article 15.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol45/iss2/15>

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which units actually constitute "spetsnaz." The editor boldly offers six plausible criteria for identifying a Soviet military unit as spetsnaz: "(1) a specialized mission, e.g., ground reconnaissance to operational depths in the enemy rear, (2) a unique organization and/or unusual equipment, (3) high political reliability, (4) extraordinary selections and training, (5) unusually high level subordination, and (6) utility at all levels of conflict and war." No one has better solved the identification problem.

Historically, Soviet reconnaissance and sabotage forces are naval oriented—raising comparisons between spetsnaz and the U.S. Navy Seals. Two chapters are devoted to an explanation of this comparison, in which the World War II defense of Soviet naval bases in the Murmansk area by spetsnaz units was directly under the commander of the Northern Fleet, Fleet Admiral Golovko. He, of all the wartime Soviet commanders, displayed the greatest personal interest in the development of spetsnaz units, and the Murmansk campaign may be their greatest individual success. In contrast, spetsnaz activity in Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan, while dramatic and undoubtedly ruthless, was of less military significance. This use of spetsnaz to defend the Soviet northern flank (and to counterattack), and the means and methods of infiltrating and extracting them, appear to hold valuable lessons for any future northern maritime campaign.

The importance of the spetsnaz naval predisposition is underscored by recent reports that the Soviets have attempted to bend the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty by redesignating certain army units as "naval infantry." Naval infantry is not covered by treaty restrictions, and, presumably neither are naval spetsnaz units—even if their functions and specialties parallel that of their G.R.U. and K.G.B. counterparts. If such redesignation were permitted, we might find that all spetsnaz became "naval" in orientation thanks to "arms control."

However, William Burgess offers compelling logic in his portrayal of the "spetsnaz threat" as only a fragment of the massive military apparatus that, despite perestroika, remains the primary threat to permanent peace in Europe. After all, if Nato could not win the central front tank battle (if such a battle ever took place), its inability to detect and disarm special reconnaissance forces operating in the rear would be academic.

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Friedman, George and Le Bard, Meredith. *The Coming War with Japan*. New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 429pp. \$24.50

The authors ask, who in 1900 would have predicted the cataclysmic turmoil that occurred by 1920 as a result of World War I? They also point out that if anyone in 1980 had predicted

the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, they would have been ridiculed. Having said that, the authors now challenge the reader to consider the amazing possibility of the United States entering into war with our closet ally in the Far East before the middle of the next century. Their presentation is persuasive.

Friedman and Le Bard state that unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Japan are natural economic rivals. They argue that Japan cannot long tolerate a world where her chief economic competitor virtually controls her entire access to vital raw materials. The authors believe that Japan accepted this situation during the Cold War because the United States was preoccupied with the Soviet Union and Japan served both as part of the strategic shield of containment and as an economic partner in arming the free world. They contend, however, that the end of the era of superpower confrontation also will signal the end of our special relationship with Japan.

A detailed history of the U.S.-Japanese relationship is provided that emphasizes the post World War II era and the natural points of contention inherent between the two nations. The authors predict that the relationship will deteriorate slowly but steadily as we approach the new century; we will be in a cold war at best, or a shooting war at worst, but the United States will win.

Those who do not accept this prediction as inevitable (this reviewer

is one) will still find this text an excellent primer on relations with Japan, one that includes several revealing anecdotes. For example, few in the United States may be aware that in 1950, when North Korea invaded the south, the U.S. occupation government in Tokyo was about to dissolve the *zaibatsu* (linked firms), which are now the driving force behind industrial competitiveness in Japan. The need for immediate Japanese production capacity convinced U.S. authorities to allow the *zaibatsu* to survive.

The authors propose that for the U.S. to meet this future threat, the navy should retain fourteen carrier battle groups and double the size of the marine corps. This can be accomplished if the army and strategic nuclear forces are cut to the bone and the air force is pushed toward a greater maritime role.

As this writing, a key issue of debate in U.S. defense circles is the idea of reconstitution: the ability to “ramp” back to a pre-1989-scale military establishment, with state of the art technology, in the event of a resurgence of hostility by the Soviet Union or in the event of a combination of threats that approximate prior Soviet capability.

Reconstitution relies on the ability to retain in key defense industries seedbed technologies that can mature and be harvested within a relatively short time (eighteen to twenty-four months) should a large threat loom on the horizon. It may be surprising to know that presently Japan has such a

capability in place, which is not officially acknowledged by the Japanese government. Friedman and Le Bard contend that the Japanese have retained this capability in critical defense technologies such as main battle tanks, advanced fighter technology, and in licensing Aegis technology (though it was cheaper to purchase it elsewhere), and they believe it is kept as a hedge against time should the United States and Japan part company.

Friedman and Le Bard have presented a thought-provoking argument that skeptics should not ignore. If Shintaro Ishihara in Japan, and politicians in the United States and Europe, continue in their ugly culture bashing, this work may indeed prove predictive.

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Cheeseman, Graeme and Kettle, St. John, eds. *The New Australian Militarism: Undermining our Future Security*. Leichhardt, New South Wales: Pluto Press Australia, Ltd., 1990. 231pp. \$18.99

Upon reading the title of this book and reviewing its contents, it is easy to see why serious students of security studies may dismiss this compendium of essays as yet another "silly" diatribe against contemporary Western security.

There is no question that this text is an ad hominem polemic against the defense modernization program,

known to this group as "militarism," that was initiated by the former Australian minister for defence, Kim Beazley (albeit the editors have wisely included a rejoinder by Mr. Beazley). With one exception—Cheeseman's excellent and balanced critique of Australian defense policy—Beazley is vilified for his efforts to modernize the Australian Defence Force (A.D.F.) and to reform its (until recently) ill-coordinated planning structure. One can assume that because most of the contributors to this text are members of the Australian political far left and "peace movement" they must feel a strong sense of betrayal, since it has been a Labor Party government which has overseen the reequipment of the A.D.F.

There is an amazing essay written by Chris Tremewan about how New Zealand is allegedly affected by Australia's defense modernization program. He has written what can only be described as the most vitriolic (if not paranoic) polemic against European cultural values I have ever read. For example, "The recent heavy Australian pressure to purchase Australian-made frigates [N.B., all of two, with an option for two more] is seen by many New Zealanders as a political move by Australia and the United States to counter the possibility of Aotearoa [the Maori word for New Zealand—very "Politically Correct"] taking an independent political path." In essence, the entire South Pacific and Southeast Asian region are at serious risk due to Kim