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"Verification: The Key to Arms Control in the 1990s" and "Naval Arms Control: A Strategic Assessment"

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his own admission, has "stirred the pot with vigour." The reader can be forgiven for feeling rather punch-drunk when finished reading the book. Controversy, innovative thought, and not a little bias drip from every page. Tomorrow's Royal Navy would benefit enormously if this book were made required reading for the operational requirements fraternity and for those who hold the purse strings. For the remainder of us, one needs look no further to be educated, exasperated, and stimulated. All for much less than the cost of a theatre ticket.

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Tower, John G.; Brown, James; and Cheek, William K., eds. *Verification: The Key to Arms Control in the 1990s*. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1992. 243pp. \$32

Blechman, Barry M., et al. *Naval Arms Control: A Strategic Assessment*. New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 268pp. \$45

These two books complement each other. Unfortunately, both were written before the extent of the collapse of the Soviet Union was appreciated. Therefore, each book has a distinctly "Cold War" flavor. One could almost draw the inference that the subject of arms control needs the dominating presence of the Soviet Union to be of interest. However, a moment's reflection puts that idea to rest. This review,

then, concentrates on the aspects of both books that offer an illumination of the arms control environment in a multipolar world marked by regional interest to the United States and by intractable disputes among the indigenous populations.

The authors of each book are distinguished in the arms control field. James Brown is the principal editor of *Verification*, which contains a number of essays by individuals at universities and national security "think tanks." Barry Blechman is the senior author of *Naval Arms Control*, in which each of the four authors contributed major sections. This reviewer found the two articles written by Cathleen S. Fisher, "Controlling High-Risk U.S. and Soviet Naval Operations" and "Limiting Nuclear Weapons at Sea," to be particularly valuable, as was William J. Durch's compilation of U.S.-Soviet maritime incidents in his article, "Things That Go Bump in the Bight: Assessing Maritime Incidents, 1972-1989." *Naval Arms Control* does not address regional security explicitly, and it only indirectly notes that other countries had at-sea nuclear capabilities that presumably had to be figured into the calculus of arms limitations. In the lead article, "Geopolitics, U.S. Interests, and Naval Arms Control," Barry Blechman has detailed the asymmetric roles of the U.S. Navy and that of the former Soviet Union. Without the Soviet Union there is only the (disquieting) existence of a residual naval nuclear arsenal in parts of that region, and potential naval nuclear

arsenals in Germany, Japan, and mainland China. However, the implications of these regional naval powers are largely ignored.

The principal value of this book is in the explanations it offers for the attempts at naval arms control just prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Verification contains more material on the post-Cold War world and a complete set of contributed papers that are arranged as follows: "Politics of Verification," "A Multilateral Perspective," "Issues of Compliance," and "The Chemical and Biological Conundrum."

A section of the paper by Mark M. Lowenthal, "The Politics of Verification: What's New, What's Not," calls attention to the potential of the verification issue to be politically disruptive for reasons wholly extraneous to arms control itself. Maria R. Alongi in her essay "Verification and Congress: What Role for Politics?" cites ideological polarization as well as the fragile nature of the trust underlying arrangements that are subject to willful or accidental violation.

The viewpoints held regarding verification are concisely summarized by Charles A. Appleby and John C. Baker in their informative article, "Verification and Mobile Missiles: Deterrence, Detection, or Assurance?" Although it is directly concerned with aspects of the nuclear threat, it seems that its observations are pertinent and applicable to the chemical and biological threats, or even the

rapidly proliferating mine warfare threat.

In case anyone is so naive as to think that on-site inspection for nuclear weapons activity (or anything else) is easy, George L. Rueckert's article, "Managing On-Site Inspections: Initial Experience and Future Challenges," will dispel the notion. Are his comments pertinent to the problem of inspection for chemical and biological weapons production? Possibly from a structural standpoint the U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons inspection protocols provide a model, but there the similarity ends. Policing chemical or biological arsenals will be more intrusive and more easily prevented, as Charles C. Flowerree points out in his article, "Verification of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Lessons Learned," which is located in the last section of the book.

On page 220, Joseph O. Burke outlines what he refers to as the final task for security specialists. He calls for the development of a deterrence theory that matches the political environment, multiple conflicts, and historical background of the Middle East. This challenge appears in his paper, "The Impact of the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles."

If the contents of the books reviewed here are an example of the state of knowledge on deterrence and arms control in these regional environments, then public and private institutions should address the challenge on an urgent basis. There is no dearth of opportunity for such work. The Balkans, the Indian subcontinent,

150 Naval War College Review

Indochina, northeast Asia, and Central Africa offer existing laboratories.

In conclusion, this reviewer wishes to ask editors and authors of this subject for relief from the barrage of acronyms and initials that seem to be worse in this field of study than in the purely military fields. In each book some of the articles, or parts thereof, are nearly unintelligible, difficult to read and comprehend because of the excess "alphabet soup."

Neither book is inexpensive. Neither speaks directly to the national security problems of the future, but both are quite informative about the arms control environment in the epoch that is just ending.

The professional who is interested in arms control and verification might want to note the titles and the names of the editors and authors. Some of them may well become involved in meeting the challenge uttered by Joseph G. Burke.

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Kaufman, Robert Gordon. *Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitation between the Two World Wars*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1990. 269pp. (No price given)

This excellent book gives us what we have needed: a clear analysis of the great effort and ultimate failure to control naval arms in the 1920s and 1930s. Each time, statesmen viewed

ships not as weapons for combat but as instruments of power to be bargained away. Ships were to be sunk at the table. Kaufman, who was a recent Secretary of the Navy Research Fellow at the Naval War College and is presently a professor at the University of Vermont, guides us through the meaning and paradoxes of this process.

The American view was that barring an arms race, no war was likely. That view was translated into various forms of naval arms limitation through policy judgments, strategic doctrines, and budgetary decisions, as well as formal agreements themselves.

The process was interactive. The treaties encouraged antinaval sentiment that placed additional limits on innovations in doctrine and technology and reinforced the reluctance by Congress toward a naval buildup, even to treaty limits. It is a wonder, as Thomas Hone has shown in a number of pioneering articles, that the U.S. Navy integrated as much as it did of aviation and new design. Within limits, which Kaufman shows to be broadly political, the professionals in charge of the "Treaty Navy"—their own efforts under tight constraints—did pretty well in preparedness, although for what they were never told.

The first lesson of making and breaking treaties is their contingent nature and the enduring primacy of politics. Arms control comes from self-restraint, not the other way around. Arms control failed when the will to maintain it disappeared.