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Implications of the Changing Nature of Conflict for the Submarine Force

John T. Hanley

E ARE IN A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE. Among naval forces, this change will most affect the U.S. attack submarine (SSN) force. Clausewitz counselled: "The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgement that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature" (*On War*, p. 88); further, "In war more than any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole" (p. 75). In this regard, we cannot address the role of U.S. SSNs in isolation from either the rest of the Navy or other military services. Nor is it very useful for the development of tactics and strategy or for force planning to address capabilities without an appreciation of the nature of future conflict.

Our vision of future conflict is not very clear. The relationships between world powers are changing rapidly. Concepts of polarity (uni-, bi-, or multi-) and balance of power do more to confuse than clarify the dynamics of international relations. For the foreseeable future, world politics will remain organized around nation-states. However, the absolute, unrestrained role of nation-states (sovereign political entities recognizing no authority beyond themselves) as the main actors on the world scene is waning. Developed nation-states find their power diffusing *up* to supernational organizations (the United Nations, Nato, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Community, the Western European Union, the "Group of Seven" nations, the International Monetary Fund, etc.); *out* to transnational economic concerns; and *down* to local and special interests. State sovereignty is under attack, both in effect and in principle. Growing interdependence and the accompanying inability of governments to control unilaterally the destinies of their peoples are eroding the effect of sovereignty. The rapid and vehement rise of ethnically motivated conflict in crumbling nations is raising concerns for human rights and signalling

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a change away from sovereignty as the principle dominating international behavior. Accompanying this weakening of states is a changing lexicon of war—from a continuation of politics (pursuit of state interests) to a continuation of justice with the admixture of other means. The combination of weak sovereignty and appeals to justice rather than state interests as the basis for conflict is a condition that the world has not experienced since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.[1]

The concerns of mature nations are shifting from war to order. Collectively we anticipate "A Long Peace."[2] The emerging vision is of an end to the era of total war ushered in by Napoleon, where developed nations mobilized all their energies to hurl military power at each other. This vision of peace does not preclude armed conflict. It does not preclude developing nations, principally in the Middle East, mustering all their energies to hurl their militaries at each other; nor does it preclude developed nations committing their militaries, for example, to Middle Eastern wars, Balkans peace enforcement, protection of Kurds, or counter-narcotics. Indeed, the outlook is one of an expanding zone of turmoil, within which conflict becomes more nasty. Widening gaps between those that have and do not have wealth, knowledge, and technology; the collapse of weak nations; population growth; endemic hatred; arms proliferation; and the globalization of economics, communications, and environmental effects constitute a security environment quite different from that which the developed world has confronted over the era of "Napoleonic" war.[3]

We are witnessing a breakdown in the structure of what we have recognized as war. Clausewitz captured the essence of the Napoleonic era of warfare in his "trinity" of actors in war: the *government*, the *army* and the *people*.[4] The salient features of war in his era included an established state employing military forces loyal to that state.[5] The state organized these forces to fight forces similarly constituted; civilians were not to engage in fighting. This concept created clear distinctions between combatants and noncombatants. Conventions for the treatment of civilians, property, and prisoners, and for the use of weapons, further set apart warfare from criminal activity. The use of force against uncivilized tribes involved a different set of conventions. Because territorial boundaries define states, the dominant object of war involved the control of territory.[6] War was the province solely of the state. Conflict outside the bounds of these conventions—uprisings, rebellion, terrorism—were not, properly, war.

In Clausewitz's construct, represented in the diagram, the role of the people is to provide the "primordial rage" needed to justify the effort and the horrors of war, and then to stay out of the fray. The role of the government is to set policy consistent with a calculus of the costs and benefits of fighting and to reason with the enemy government. The army is to deal with the uncertainty and friction inherent in war conducted by a large, complex organization against a calculating opponent.

As we learned in Vietnam, however, when features of the trinity are missing (such as hatred on the part of the American people or a distinction between the

Viet Cong and the peasants), trying to a match "trinitarian" organization to a non-trinitarian opponent has its risks. In such cases primordial rage is typically absent; in fact, the peoples of liberal democracies want combat to be quick and to shed little blood, particularly the blood of their own warriors and that of the civilian populace on the opposing side. Where one or more of the main actors in the conflict has no state, governmental structures with which to reason are weak or do not exist. Movements or ethnic groups may have no single head accepted by all factions as legitimate to represent them. The nature of their grievances are usually such that the problems are endemic and not subject to quick resolution. Non-state entities usually organize their forces into small

Clausewitz's Construct of Trinitarian War

J.R. NUNES, JR.

subgroups that use the populace for concealment. Therefore, hurting the fighters without inflicting collateral damage on innocents demands careful timing and discrimination. Because such forces are small, their command and control structures are usually primitive, like the nervous system of a shark—whose head can still bite after the body is chopped off. Also, where ethnic and religious hatred is endemic, catching one fish does little to change the behavior of the school. Loyalty to the cause is typically greater than belief in the virtue of established conventions of war.

A symptom of the weakening role of the state is that people no longer consider war the sole province of the state. The examples of the Kurds, former Yugoslavians, Moldavians, Ossetians, Abkhazians, and residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, in addition to the Irish Republican Army, the Palestine Liberation

Organization, and assorted terrorists all attest that mature states are not the main sources of conflict on the current scene. In many of these conflicts the stakes for losing are subjugation or extinction; the root of the matter here is more *thymotic* than economic.[7] The asymmetry between the economic calculus of mature states and the thymotic impulse of ethnic conflict makes peace-keeping or peace enforcement all the more difficult.

The emerging framework for international security is not one of poles. Rather it is one of collective action by mature, wealthy states to limit the level of violence in the zones of growing turmoil. This framework is, as yet, unstable. The transition to (or through) it will take decades. Collective action by the triad of Europe, America, and Japan could break down because of conflicting policies dictated by domestic political pressures, rising in turn from asymmetrical security and economic concerns. The likely result would be an arms race in Asia, more independent European military capabilities, and an international security regime based upon regional alliances that exclude America. Also, it will take decades to establish whether important states such as Russia and China become a part of collective action or set themselves apart from the community of mature nations.[8] They must first resolve their political economies and undergo generational leadership changes. To join the community of wealthy nations, they will demand treatment as great powers; in return, the West will demand behavior within international norms. In any of these circumstances, the prospect of a military peer to the U.S. that would engage in Clausewitzian, trinitarian war between great powers, should it ever occur, is towards the end of our thirty-to-fifty-year planning horizon.[9] The actions of the United States in shaping the military behavior of other great powers will be the greatest determinant of the success of collective action. Meanwhile, enforcing an acceptable level peace in the zone of turmoil will be the dominant form of armed conflict.

During the coming decades we can anticipate conflict involving both trinitarian and non-trinitarian organizations. The remaining standoffs between North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, hegemons of the Persian Gulf, Israel and the Arab states, and South American countries such as Ecuador and Peru present the prospect of nation-states hurling their forces against each other. The ethnic conflicts emerging from the rubble of the Cold War and the former Soviet Union demand immediate attention.

Security, War, and Defense

Security, war, and defense are not the same. Maintaining an improving quality of life dominates the concerns of most people in mature countries; many less-developed nations are not as free from the fear of armed attack, intimidation, or invasion. The prospect of a lengthy period with no acute threat to the survival and growth of mature nations, combined with the likelihood of collapse of states

with immature political economies, is fundamentally reshaping U.S. security concerns. Whether departments and ministries of defense should return to being ministries of war (with new conventions) or become ministries of security is a topic policymakers are beginning to address. We in the military services are being carried with the current into new roles and missions without clarifying the advantages and pitfalls of alternatives to current organizational structures.[10]

The security concerns of the U.S. are much broader than trinitarian war and have counterparts among all the great powers. Beyond trinitarian war are:

• non-trinitarian conflict (falling outside the conventions of what we generally accept as war, to include terrorism, tribal conflict, peace-enforcement and peace-keeping operations);

• things that flow across our national borders (including immigration, drugs, and even goods, services, and finance); and,

• internal security (including not only urban riots and crime but also structural issues such as a nation's infrastructure, educational system, and private and governmental debt).

Though the role of military force in addressing this panoply of issues is obscure, we have many examples of how people are trying to make it relevant. The Congress has already assigned to the military expanding roles in the detection and monitoring of drugs and in controlling immigration. This activity has progressed beyond the use of existing capabilities, to being the jurisdiction for funding new forces (e.g., maritime patrol aircraft). Not only were Marines and National Guard units part of the response to the riots in Los Angeles, but some have suggested that they should be retained explicitly for this purpose. Calls are growing for military engineers to clean up the environment and rebuild the nation's infrastructure, for military doctors to expand their role in city hospitals, and for military instructors to assume a role in educating children. Concerns are growing that by taking only the highest quality recruits the military will no longer serve its function of providing a path of upward mobility for disadvantaged segments of the population. Of course, all of this is happening at a time when Congress is looking to slash the defense budget to finance growing entitlements, the deficit, and non-defense discretionary spending. The time has come to distinguish the purpose of the military from its uses, before the military becomes not very useful in its essential roles.

But as we look to the future, what *are* the roles essential to the military? As nation-states erode the principle of sovereignty in the quest for international order, it will become more difficult to distinguish the role of the military in the enforcement of order from the pursuit of individual national aims. The collapse of the Soviet Union and of communist ideology has created a historic opportunity to establish a cooperative security regime among the great powers. Arguably, and as noted, the choice before Russia and China is to join this regime or to isolate themselves again from the world and fall from the great-power ranks.

The creation of such a cooperative security regime raises many issues. If the world is to live within a structure of the rule of law, what are the mechanisms for its creation? What are the mechanisms for adjudication and for establishing the authority for enforcement? What are the rules for deciding whether to intervene in a conflict? Under what conditions will states contribute forces? How will forces be organized, and how will the operating costs be allocated? The current answers to all of these questions are only partial and are based mostly on weak institutions and procedures left in the wake of the Cold War.

The institutions and procedures of the United Nations provide a framework, but not the whole answer. Even though the power of the nation-state is waning, it still dominates the weak collective will. The role of China in the UN Security Council illustrates the limits of a collective security regime that requires unanimity for action. Effective cooperative security will require a principle of subsidiarity, by which those most affected and willing can act according to their national interests. Such regimes would still limit unilateral action in the face of strong opposing collective will. As the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea demonstrates, even American freedom of action is circumscribed when the majority of nations ratifies new instruments. Increasingly the legitimacy conferred by the UN will circumscribe the use of military force.

Roles for the U.S. and Its Military

Because of its unique position in international security, the United States will play a key role in determining the success and the shape of future security regimes. Should American leadership falter, establishing a system of effective security around the globe will be problematic. A U.S. decision to restrict its engagement in international security accords, or neglect (engendered by pressing domestic concerns) of international affairs, or disagreement over fair allocation of costs, could limit the ability of the United States to lead. To develop a better appreciation of the requirements for U.S. leadership and the role of American military forces, it will help to look at some specific cases.

Developing the Structure of Security Relations. The *most demanding task* for the U.S. military in this time of rapid contraction will be to sustain the fabric of the international security structure. The U.S. is the only great power with a global web of security relations. It also is the only power capable of moving, coordinating, and sustaining sizable military forces across the globe. This combination of interests and capabilities is the fabric that holds the current system of international security in place, and it provides the basis for extension to a cooperative security regime. It also puts the United States in such a position that others look to it to lead whenever common interests may be threatened or the international order is violated. Absent the belief that the U.S. is a reliable security partner, the whole

structure of international security relations would change. New, regional security regimes based on something other than American commitment would contain no guarantees that U.S. interests would be considered or protected.

Whether Americans will choose to bear the costs of maintaining this position of leadership is uncertain. The cost of leadership at the Rio de Janeiro Environmental Summit of June 1992 was such that the administration chose at the time to "lead" in the role of a sea-anchor. If this choice indicates the calculus that will dominate U.S. behavior, we can expect the strands of the American security web both to weaken and be placed under great strain—with predictable result. Part of the fiscal 1993 Defense Authorization passed by the House of Representatives calls for $3.5 billion to be paid by Europeans, Japanese, and Koreans to maintain U.S. forces on their soil, for a forty-percent reduction by the end of 1995 of forces stationed overseas, for reducing American forces in Europe to 100,000, and for further reductions in Nato infrastructure funds.

The current rationale for the continued existence of Nato centers on the ideas that there is no other viable framework for addressing the security concerns of Europe and that without American presence the prospect of a return to interstate conflict within the European Community would cast a shadow over all other proceedings.[11] Pragmatically, without American air and sea lift, command systems, and intelligence, European forces can conduct only very limited combat operations even on the borders of their own areas, much less in the Persian Gulf. Experiencing cuts in military expenditures similar in proportion to those in the U.S., the Europeans have no room in current budgets to buy an independent capability. Continued American presence and commitment to pursuing a stable security regime in the region is essential in the view of European governments. Even the Russians prefer the continued existence of Nato to a European military structure independent of the Americans. Simply put, Nato cannot survive without energetic U.S. participation.

If prospects for any realignment of regional power relationships that would augur trinitarian war in Western Europe are distant and elusive, in Northeast Asia they are more immediate and tangible. The political economy of North Korea is not likely to survive the decade in its current form. The unification of the peninsula—whether peacefully or as the result of war—is likely in the coming years. On the peninsula are two of the world's largest armies; a unified Korea will alter regional power and security relationships between China, Japan, Korea, Russia, and the United States and will affect the security concerns of all Asian nations. Prospects for unification already have South Koreans looking at the specter of Japanese military expansionism as the rationale for their own force structure. China has never lost its vision of itself as the "Middle Kingdom," the region's dominant power. Both China and Russia are experiencing significant internal tensions between their respective centers and Pacific provinces. The effect of a unified Korea on these pressures is not clear. How the U.S. and Korean

governments will justify to their publics the continued presence of American forces following the collapse of the North is equally murky. However, none of the Asian nations is enthusiastic about using the current opportunity to talk with the Russians as a basis for establishing a "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia" in anticipation of turmoil in the future.

Concerned that a rapid withdrawal of the American military would upset the balance of power in Asia and the Pacific, even former leaders of the non-aligned movement Indonesia and Malaysia have joined Singapore, Brunei, and Thailand in offering the United States access to facilities that would paritally offset financial costs of maintaining U.S. forces in the area without Philippine bases. These nations view U.S. presence as a counterweight to China and a hedge against

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Japan's developing an independent military capability. "East Asian nations made 35 percent of all major weapons purchases in 1991."[12] Historical enmities and unstable regional powers and economies that can afford modern military equipment create a potentially dangerous brew.

The greatest security threat to the U.S. would be a great power that adopts a policy of addressing its security concerns unilaterally and develops an independent military capability. The main strategic task for the U.S. is to assure our traditional allies and new partners that their security interests and ours are largely congruent and that efficient use of resources calls for cooperation in safeguarding these interests.

These interests are various. All developed economies have a significant interest in unimpeded access to energy, principally oil. The main specific security concerns of the Europeans derive from ethnic conflict and economic backwardness in neighboring lands. The former could lead to the spread of violence to tense regions where fighting has not yet occurred. Both could lead to massive immigration pressures, slower European federation, and slower economic growth. As for Russia, its main aims are to stabilize its political situation through integration into the world's economy and to quell the ethnic strife on its borders. The strife in the other former Soviet republics threatens the well-being of twenty-five million ethnic Russians and presents the specter of an Islamic revolution on its frontiers (though many Russians believe that once ethnic hatred has passed, most former Soviet republics will naturally form cooperative political, economic, and security relations with Moscow). The Japanese, for their part, are mainly interested in free access to markets and in the political stability, foreign and domestic, that promotes economic growth.

In essence, all these security concerns center on peaceful economic development: containing and stifling ethnic conflict and preventing the gap between developed and adjacent developing areas from generating new sources of conflict both serves that interest and satisfies ethical sensibilities. Indeed, the lot of peoples in underdeveloped political economies can improve only as they can obtain a stable political environment. The U.S. military, as an instrument for enforcing international order and the rule of law, can play a large role in addressing all these congruent security interests.

The principal task for the U.S. military will be to reassure our traditional allies and new partners, including Russia and China, that we can reduce our forces stationed and deployed abroad without putting their security concerns at risk or generating a power vacuum. Creating this assurance requires more action than rhetoric. Only energetic work with other militaries and reliable, effective performance in assigned missions are likely to persuade these nations not to increase spending on armaments. If successful, we will "inhibit the rise of future military superpowers among our present allies."[13] If we fail, we will face a dilemma: it will be precisely because we reduce our military forces that we will need more of them. Because the domestic pressures motivating the current defense draw-down will remain, the outcome is more likely to be a redefinition of American security responsibilities than the reconstitution of forces.

The United States may indeed drift into the realm of an ordinary power. In this circumstance, the role of the U.S. in international security will change significantly. The likely outcome would be a retrenchment of military missions to core American security (i.e., mostly in the Western Hemisphere), allowing Eurasia to develop security arrangements without U.S. involvement. In Asia this could lead to a nuclear-armed Japan and turmoil in the current international security regime. In the Mideast, it would leave Israel to its own devices and expose our oil supply to the vagaries of economic trading with a possible regional hegemon.

Trinitarian War. Compared to the importance of maintaining the structure of international security relations, the contingencies to be considered under this heading (short of an intercontinental nuclear attack on the United States) pale in significance. However, it is by effective leadership and military performance in such contingencies that the United States can sustain the web of global security.

Whether the U.S. will satisfy Clausewitz's criteria when waging war against another state is ambiguous. Of the candidates for trinitarian war previously mentioned, only a North Korean invasion of the South, an invasion of the Gulf Cooperation Council States by Iraq or Iran, or a concerted Arab attack on Israel would be likely to bring in the U.S. on the side of an ally. Whether the American people would provide the primordial hatred prerequisite to trinitarian war would

depend heavily on the circumstances. Even for Iraq, with a leader as odious as Hitler, criticism for inflicting too much damage upon the civilian infrastructure was widespread. We can expect demands for relatively bloodless victory to remain.

In the South Korean case, the role of American forces in response to an invasion is relatively well defined and rehearsed. The South Korean army would bear the brunt of an initial ground attack, while U.S. forces dominated the air. Both land and sea-based forces would contribute to strikes against command centers and forces lined up along restricted corridors. In this respect, the use of air power would be much as in Desert Storm; North Korean armored forces bear many resemblances to their Iraqi counterparts. The North Korean navy cannot effectively deny the U.S. the use of even the local seas, but it can inflict damage. Enemy submarines and mines would dominate the concerns of those tasked to protect the naval forces. Our naval forces would once again prepare for Inchon-like operations.

In a resumption of the Korean War (we operate today under an armistice, no peace treaty having ended the conflict), the concern with war termination is more over how to constrain South Korean ambitions than over North Korean victory. The U.S. does not contribute enough military force to control the actions of the South. Depriving the Chinese of reasons to become involved would condition the missions assigned to our forces.

Turning to the Persian Gulf, we have a paradox. Any invasion of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia over the next couple of decades would involve the same types of forces that have just proved so ineffective against U.S. air power. An Iranian invasion of Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, would require first the defeat of Iraqi forces at the head of the Gulf, then protection of Iranian lines of supply. Should such an invasion occur, we could expect it not to pause and dig in. However, our approach of gaining control of the air and then using air power to decimate relatively unprotected forces has a familiar ring. The role of our naval forces would be essentially as it was, with perhaps more reliance on the ability to land at unprepared facilities. Iranian submarines, mines, and coastal cruise missile batteries would complicate naval operations in the North Arabian Sea and Gulf. However, the chance of another invasion of the Arabian peninsula is remote as long as the U.S. retains the capability to redeploy to the region.

Should Iran or Iraq want to intimidate or control the smaller Arab states, a strategy of extortion involving elements such as (non-trinitarian) political subversion by support to indigenous militant movements or the threat of missile attacks would be more difficult to counter than outright invasion. Our strategy for countering intimidation or extortion in such cases rests upon classical concepts of presence and deterrence, though the latter would involve principally non-nuclear munitions. The prospect of the use of weapons of mass destruction would place a premium on our own missile defenses, including contributions

from Aegis-equipped ships. Though the world's response to direct attacks would involve counter-action, invasion of the offending state by coalition forces from the international community is a remote likelihood.

Israel is not a formal ally of the United States and has not encouraged the idea of U.S. forces operating in Israel. Faced with an Arab military attack, the Israelis would need mainly logistical support. They have sufficient forces to thwart an attack not involving all Arab forces in coordination. Israeli wars have tended to be short, because Israel cannot afford to lose territory or people and none of its antagonists have the logistics to sustain high-intensity combat. Therefore, support to Israel must be available nearby or transported by air. Should Israel need combat support, sea-based forces may be the only ones at hand.[14]

Common to all these scenarios is the need for naval forces to be on-scene quickly to provide air power. The Korea and Persian Gulf invasion scenarios also call for putting troops ashore, possibly by assault from the sea. To anticipate a fuller discussion of the point, we can observe here that American commanders-in-chief responsible for such projection of power in each of these scenarios would find SSNs useful—but not essential. In fact, their absence would not affect the general concepts of operations.

These examples of trinitarian conflict have a greater value for tactical and doctrinal development than for force planning. Perhaps over the next decade or two, Korea will unify itself peacefully; Saudi Arabia could in that time become more closely aligned with Iraq and Iran than with the West; and the militaries of the Arab nations may be in too great disrepair to launch a conventional armored attack against Israel. In any case, the costs of maintaining large conventional forces are increasing at such a rate that even developed nations will have difficulty purchasing new equipment in quantity. North Korea, Syria, Egypt, and Israel, with populations expanding faster than their economies, will be hard pressed to maintain current force levels. Iraq and Iran need sizable oil exports to support any military expansion. These trends portend that aggressors may turn to means other than the large conventional forces that proved so inadequate in Desert Storm.

Non-trinitarian Conflict. Intervention by the U.S. in wars between India and Pakistan, Peru and Ecuador, or between any of a number of other states properly fall in the realm of non-trinitarian conflict. Trilateral arrangements between the belligerent states and the international community would be invoked; the U.S., working with other countries, would seek to contain, limit, and quench such conflicts that affected the global economy, potentially affected security relations between the great powers, or violated humanitarian sensibilities. Yugoslavia and Somalia serve as useful models illustrating the role and limits of military force in non-trinitarian conflict.

As of this writing (early June 1993), Americans and Europeans are coming to the conclusion that even though it may not be possible to enforce peace in former Yugoslavia, doing nothing is untenable. The Balkans may be a model for future European conflict—in which case, if Nato is irrelevant there, it is irrelevant to the heart of regional security concerns. Though the absence of its leadership in planning operations has been unfortunate, American reluctance to get involved is sensible; memories of Beirut are vivid. Ground forces cannot hope to keep the warring factions apart and thereby keep the peace; they can serve mainly to demonstrate that the world will not tolerate certain levels and types of violence.

Peace-keeping forces have demonstrated success but also severe limits. They have remained in Cyprus since 1974; if they are removed, the conflict there is likely to resume. With the spread of ethnic violence, the demand for such forces is increasing even as force structures are being cut. The Canadians are leaving Europe but have three battalions stationed around the world as United Nations peace-keepers, including in Bosnia, where, as they recognize, they are in a precarious situation. Casualties or an indefinite commitment will strain the tolerance of Canadians for maintaining their current strategy.

That we cannot keep the peace does not mean that we can do nothing. Our principal difficulty occurs where we encounter irregular forces. Where the combatants employ modern combat aircraft, naval vessels, armored formations, artillery, or centralized command structures, we have significant capabilities to intervene. We could have prevented the naval bombardment of Dubrovnik and the aerial bombardments of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We can make the use of armored vehicles and artillery dangerous for their crews. Such options cannot stop the killing, and cannot go on simultaneously with humanitarian or peacekeeping efforts. They can, however, even the odds, demonstrate limits to the freedom of action of the Serbian leaders, and restrict the instruments of combat to things that peace-keeping forces and peace-making actions are better able to handle.[15]

The analogy for international action in Yugoslavia is the American action in Los Angeles. We cannot make peace among the gangs in East Los Angeles without changing their socioeconomic circumstances and social maturity. However, we can prevent them from murdering each other with tanks and fighter-bombers. National, as well as international, societies tolerate certain levels of violence but restrict the geographic scope and instruments within which the violence occurs.

In non-trinitarian conflict the desired end-state is a stable political regime and a growing economy, not merely military victory or intimidation. Somalia has demonstrated, as did "Just Cause" (the recent—as opposed to 1911—U.S. invasion of Panama), the pitfalls of the military planning operations independently from the civil agencies needed to create a viable social structure. In Somalia the absence of a government (or even a trusteeship), a judicial system,

effective police, and schools has prolonged the stay of American and other forces in the country. Integration of the appropriate agencies from the start is the only way to ensure a seamless transfer from military to civil action and thereby reduce the strain on U.S. force commitments.

International, or unilateral U.S., military intervention in an Indo-Pakistani war is difficult to conceive and would be dependent upon particular circumstances. Attempts to study the problems of military intervention there have produced no clearly good answers. The potential for the use of nuclear weapons would galvanize world attention. A failure of deterrence would be devastating for the combatants and could have major implications for nuclear proliferation if one side gained benefit from their use.

The role of organized forces in non-trinitarian war will be to drive the level of violence down to the point where it becomes properly a matter for policemen (or lightly armed peace-keeping forces). The examples of Yugoslavia and Somalia make evident the roles of naval forces in this type of conflict. Maritime interdiction forces will enforce the inevitable economic sanctions. Naval forces can deny use of the seas, provide command and intelligence facilities, deliver relief supplies, deliver and put troops ashore and sustain them, and strike hostile conventional forces and their support systems if necessary.

Cross-border Flows and Internal Security. Many in the United States want to exploit the competence of military forces in accomplishing whatever mission they are assigned by giving them tasks beyond those for which they have been intended. Some fear, however, that having national military forces act as policemen will simultaneously corrupt the conventions of war (such as distinctions between civilians and noncombatants) and blur distinctions between civil disturbance and war.[16] Though the American tradition restricting the use of military in civil disturbances is a strong one, just as gang wars in cities become harder to differentiate from international disorder, a particular effort will be required to keep in focus the distinction between the role of warrior and that of policeman. Expanding the activity of the military in immigration control and drug enforcement does nothing to reinforce this distinction. Unless the threat is tied clearly to state sponsorship, counter-terrorism more involves police work than the skills of a warrior. The policy of the current administration shows a strong predilection for using the Department of Defense and the military services to address the full panoply of American security concerns. As it implements this policy, it should not take for granted that the military can be used for other than its essential purpose without eroding combat skills. A study of the effects of such a policy should accompany its implementation, lest we get too far down the path toward an ineffective fighting force before we know there is a risk.[17]

Implications for the SSN Force

The fact that this discussion has seemingly wandered well away from the submarine force illustrates its major implication for that arm. The U.S. submarine force faces serious challenges in a security environment distinctly different from that of recent decades.

A nuclear submarine's competitive advantages lie in a combination of covertness, endurance, and the difficulty of attacking it, along with the ability to improve its own acoustic sensor performance by varying depth. This makes it particularly valuable when facing opponents that have:

- sizable navies capable of defending themselves from air attack;
- air forces (including coastal cruise missiles) capable of withstanding U.S. air power;
- fixed targets that can be destroyed by cruise missiles but are outside the range of surface-launched cruise missiles or bombers;
- critical coastal installations suitable for attack by special forces; or,
- dependence on operations or systems vulnerable to SSN monitoring.

Unfortunately, from the submarine force perspective, the match between unique SSN strengths and the situations and opponents that we now anticipate is spotty.

Nuclear-powered submarines cost on the order of a billion dollars to build, but only ten million dollars a year to own and operate. Because scarce defense dollars and the changing security environment are the twin "drivers" in addressing strategy, doctrine, and force structure, any discussion of the submarine force needs therefore to distinguish between existing SSNs and future designs.

Implications of Change for the Current Force. The principal issues for the current SSN force are what the president and the unified commanders-in-chief will want to do with them, and how fast to deactivate individual boats. We have a highly versatile attack submarine force, capable of contributing to a broad range of surveillance and combat missions.[18] These platforms will form a part of the Navy's contribution to the full scope of U.S. security concerns.

SSNs in Developing the Structure of Security Relations. Keeping our alliances intact and extending partnerships entails practices of working with other nations to sustain belief in the United States as a reliable security partner, policies of cooperative security, and capabilities to address effectively mutual security concerns.

As the U.S. reduces its navy, the remaining SSNs will find themselves deploying more frequently as part of naval and joint task forces. SSNs have few distinctions from other naval forces as symbolic representations of U.S. interest and commitment. However, the distinctions they do have are mostly adverse for submarines. Size, ease of access, and security concerns limit their use for ship visits during port calls. Only those militaries with submarines or sophisticated

antisubmarine forces have had an interest in working with the U.S. submarine force, and this interest is qualified by wanting not to be embarrassed. Our concern over divulging actual submarine noise characteristics restricts operations even with close allies. The submarine force will feel pressure to become more open in its practices in order to improve its effectiveness as an ambassador of American goodwill.

Perhaps predictably, U.S. policy for cooperative security with Russia is divided, particularly as it regards submarine forces. Though cooperation with the Russian Navy is increasing, Russia in its current state of instability remains the main candidate to be a nuclear threat to the West. Thus, we find American and Russian naval forces steaming in one kind of formation in places like the Persian Gulf but U.S. SSNs keeping quite a different formation with Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) on patrol.[19] If U.S. policy for establishing a cooperative security regime is successful, our treatment of the Russian SSBN force will be closer to the way we treat the French one—cooperation with little detailed information exchange.

The combat capability of SSNs as part of naval task forces and on independent operations will contribute to intimidating potential opponents and addressing mutual security concerns. More visibility for the submarine force will enhance that intimidation. However, there is little evidence to support a contention that SSNs distinctly add to the already overpowering ability of the U.S. military to intimidate.

In sum, SSNs frequently play at a disadvantage compared to other U.S. military capabilities with respect to developing a cooperative security structure.

SSNs in Trinitarian War. The recent Department of the Navy white paper " . . . From the Sea" addresses principally naval functions in regional trinitarian war such as Desert Storm. SSN missions in such conflicts include surveillance, sinking enemy ships and submarines, Tomahawk strikes, and special forces operations. These would be conducted in conjunction with joint task forces rather than as independent operations. These operations frequently call for operations in shallow water. An SSN's ability to monitor minelaying, both to allow other forces to avoid them and to support amphibious operations, are valuable in these scenarios. However, each contingency calls for only a handful of submarines to perform these missions. As noted above, SSNs are not essential to the area commander-in-chief's concept of operations—i.e., the absence of submarines would not substantially alter his plans.

The opponents we anticipate within the next two decades will have small navies with little ability to defend themselves against attack from the air. Their challenge to our control of the seas is minimal, coming mostly from diesel submarines and mines. With minor exceptions, naval combat will occur close to the territory of the opponent. In the presence of U.S. aircraft carriers and Aegis cruisers, these opponents have no air threat capable of defeating U.S.

surface naval forces. Their cruise missile targets that we may wish to strike fall well within the range of surface force operating areas.

Recently the U.S. submarine force has placed increased emphasis on anti-diesel submarine, strike, mining, and special warfare missions. Improving the ability to find diesel submarines is clearly a priority for all naval antisubmarine (ASW) forces. Where the submarine force has traditionally emphasized a capability to search and attack independently, current scenarios place a much greater emphasis on the ability to operate in rather small geographic areas occupied also by surface battle forces. Though it has been an article of faith that submarines are more effective than surface or air ASW forces against other submarines, whether that is true specifically against diesel submarines is an open question. In the Second World War, by mid-1943 the Allies, with only surface and air ASW forces, were sinking one U-boat for every Allied ship sunk. Against a capable ASW organization a diesel submarine has inadequate endurance to both attack and flee.[20] Adding friendly submarines to a task force complicates the ASW task; though improvements in navigation make coordination easier, making sure of attacking only enemy subs and not friends will clearly require much more work.[21]

The need for the submarine force to emphasize missions other than ASW and mine detection is less clear. As for strike, it can be performed by surface forces. As was true in the recent attack upon Iraqi nuclear facilities, in none of the anticipated scenarios is the detectability of the launch platform a factor. To be sure, one can expect that as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea takes effect, some nations will develop more capabilities to exercise sovereignty over their Exclusive Economic Zones. Their efforts may lead to better surveillance and targeting for their land and sea-based cruise missiles; accordingly, the risk to surface naval forces may increase over time. However, the sophisticated systems needed for timely targeting of mobile platforms are precisely those we have optimized our forces to disrupt and destroy. As with diesel submarines, the principal concern in a missile attack against surface forces is the first shot; after that, the enemies we envision would have difficulty precisely locating targets.

We can expect opponents to try, using devices like mines, to deny our navy access to coastal waters. Mines remain the achilles' heel of the Navy in general, and the submarine force in particular. Mines are a weapon for sea denial, of little use to those who can control the sea. They are difficult to sweep once deployed. Being relatively indiscriminate, they damage civilian vessels as readily as warships. Since we are so reliant on the use of the seas, legitimizing mining by doing it ourselves is not in our interest. For all these reasons, U.S. and allied policymakers are reluctant to use mines. In balance, the United States should devote far greater effort to countering mines than to developing capabilities to lay them.

Like the above missions, special warfare fills a particular niche in modern armed conflict. Congress created the Special Operations Command because the

services and the Department of Defense had slighted funding for capabilities that fill narrow niches as opposed to mainline missions. In the decade since the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command, however, units like the Delta Force and Seal Team Six have had little opportunity for combat. The main value of naval special forces has lain in training small navies for riverine operations and policing functions. Though a handy capability, the special force operations that require the use of submarines remain those least in demand.

SSNs in Non-trinitarian Conflict and Cross-Border Flows. In the current Bosnian conflict, American SSNs have been quietly contributing valuable support to the international effort. In Somalia they played no role. Superb combat machines, SSNs are limited in their ability to exert the graduated force most useful in this type of conflict.[22] Maritime interdiction to enforce economic sanctions is an almost universal part of such operations, and is one in which SSNs play little role. As currently equipped, a submarine can only threaten to damage or destroy a merchant ship that does not comply with its demands—in which it is no more effective, and less efficient, than a surface combatant. Damage to innocent shipping is completely unacceptable, limiting the submarine's role to cases of unambiguous guilt. In the actual exertion of force, SSNs provide here little that other forces cannot.

As for cross-border flows and internal security, SSNs will continue to be used in the detection and monitoring of drugs, but this is a high-cost, limited-effect use of naval combatants, particularly submarines.

The Case for Building New Attack Submarines. Based upon this survey, the case for building new SSNs is weak. The clearest argument for new submarines would be the prospect of an opponent with its own powerful nuclear submarine force. However, few nations have the resources to build a navy to challenge the United States on the broad seas. Those that have the resources have little interest today in doing so; if U.S. policy is successful, they will have no greater incentive in the future.[23] Also, it is insufficient to show that a submarine *can* perform a mission; it must be demonstrated that only a submarine can effectively perform it. To justify building attack submarines, their cost must be reduced substantially; otherwise it will be cheaper to build other platforms in quantity. The projected SSN force, of half to a third the current size, will cover the missions we can anticipate over the next twenty years.[24]

In the current budget environment, spending one billion of the five billion ship-construction dollars in a given year for one submarine is unlikely. The likelihood of a hiatus in submarine construction is significant. We need to explore the opportunities, as well as the pitfalls, of a period of no submarine construction. For instance, over eighty percent of the cost of a new SSN is for other than its combat system; this point raises questions. Can we, in a decade of technology development, produce an alternative to the pressurized-water fission

reactor that is less expensive and provides adequate endurance? Or can we develop, at less cost, technology that can perform SSN missions without submerging humans in a steel tube?

I n summary, the nature of future conflict suggests that the nation will increasingly rely on naval forces as an instrument of policy. However, submarines have dropped from the extraordinary position they had in war plans against the Soviets, to filling narrow niches.[25] Like the special forces, submarines will not enjoy the funding priority they once held. None of the contingencies that we anticipate provide a sound foundation for large submarine force levels. The principal justification for the submarine force lies not in adding up contingencies but in its contribution to the perception of American military strength. No other power should sense an opportunity to challenge U.S. naval supremacy. If our submarine forces decline to a point where the opportunity for a genuine challenge emerges, we will have made a fundamental mistake. The threshold of strength and circumstances at which allies and partners begin to feel our commitment or capabilities are too soft, or at which our enemies feel unintimidated, is hard to quantify. Surely, however, if we suspend nuclear submarine production we should actively create incentives for others (the French, Russians, and Chinese) not to export them. We have decades before we risk truly going out of the nuclear submarine business. However, we cannot be passive in the meantime about losing our undisputed capability to control the broad seas.

In biological evolution, species that can do more with less, better than their competitors can, thrive. They narrow the niche of other species competing for the same resources, sometimes to extinction. Evolution, also, is punctuated by sudden environmental changes. Species that cannot adapt quickly enough, perish.[26] The U.S. submarine force faces today a sudden change toward an environment in which the resources it needs for new growth are being consumed by competitors that are more efficient in satisfying national security concerns. Unless the submarine force can compete for construction resources more effectively, SSNs will go the way of the dreadnoughts.

Notes

1. Martin van Creveld develops this theme in his book *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991). The Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War. In doing so it established the dominance of "reason of state" over "reason of religion" as a basis for foreign policy, and also the principle that territorial rulers had the power to regulate taxation, defense, laws, and public affairs within their localities without Imperial intervention (See G. Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (New York: Military Heritage Press, 1987), pp. 217–218).

2. John Lewis Gaddis coined the phrase "A Long Peace" in "Toward the Post–Cold War World," *Foreign Affairs* 70, Spring 1991. The problem is that reconstitution following a long peace demands more than simply adding more forces. The fundamental reshaping of security perceptions and problems that occur during the

long peace requires another reshaping of forces and doctrine when it ends. The pace of technological change over the period of peace will also affect the choice of forces should a peer competitor emerge.

3. At the end of World War II, an estimated 2.2 billion people inhabited the planet. By the time the Berlin Wall came down, the number had grown to 5.3 billion. The number living in developed countries over this period went from a hit under to a bit over one billion. In the next forty-five years, the world population is projected to grow from nine to ten billion. Ninety-three percent of population growth is occurring in the developing and yet-to-begin-developing world. Today the "have" nations contain sixteen percent of the world's population and control seventy percent of the wealth. Should projections hold, over the next twenty years this gap will widen to fourteen percent of the population controlling seventy-five percent of the wealth (not accounting for disparities within developed nations). Many see the conditions created in the United States in the 1980s in which the richest one percent gleaned seventy percent of the nation's wealth as having contributed to such situations as the recent riots in Los Angeles. Concerns over have-nots wreaking havoc on the world scene are leading to calls for the rule of law and order on an international scale. Particularly in developed nations, distinctions between national interests and an international rule of law that applies to all are becoming less clear.

4. Van Creveld.

5. In his era, the concept of the state as an entity distinct from its ruler became more important, as a factor circumscribing the freedom of rulers to act in ways detrimental to their peoples.

6. Examples in the twentieth century of the U.S. fighting for interests not involving territory are rare. The difficulty that Nato has had with the concept of employing forces for other than territorial defense is a current illustration.

7. In his book *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), Frank Fukuyama harkens back to Socrates' description of the three parts of man's soul. First is the "desiring" part, that which recognizes thirst and wants to drink. Next is the "calculating" (or economic) part, where man recognizes that the liquid he has may be poison. But man also demands that others recognize his self-worth: this demand arises from the third part, the *thymos*. Some implicitly equate thymotic reasoning to irrationality. Technically, however, rationality calls only for consistent choices—i.e., that if frequently presented with similar alternatives the person consistently makes similar choices. Rationality then, can involve a combination of thymotic and economic considerations.

8. A great power is one that substantially affects the calculations and behavior of those other states that influence world events. A radical realignment of policy by a great power would affect directly the structure of global relations and the global security environment. Economic power by itself would qualify the United States, Germany, and Japan for this status. The geography and potential of Russia will keep her in the club. China qualifies by its size and role in the UN.

9. Thirty to fifty years covers the life of naval ships, with all but aircraft carriers having a planned thirty-year life span, and carriers, fifty.

10. The "Memorandum to the President-Elect: Harnessing Process to Purpose," by the Carnegie Endowment and Institute for International Economics Commission on Government Renewal, 1992, is one attempt to address the organization of the executive branch to cope with the emerging environment. The formation by the Clinton administration of an Economic Council similar to the National Security Council arose from the recommendations of this report.

11. Indeed this seems to be the dilemma that the French face. To have the Americans out of Europe, they must have some assurance that the Germans are irreversibly integrated into a European military structure.

12. Leslie H. Gelb, "Asian Arms Races" (editorial), *The New York Times*, 18 March 1993.

13. This quotation comes from a recent futures study (of 2025) conducted for the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

14. Airborne forces arriving without supplies may prove more of a burden than a contribution in this situation.

15. The terminology of peace-enforcement, peace-keeping, and peacemaking used here is that of UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in his June 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*. Peacemaking in this construct is the work of diplomats and aid agencies. Peace-enforcement requires heavily armed military forces.

16. Van Creveld makes this point strongly, citing the problems the Israeli forces are having with the Intifada.

17. Charles J. Dunlap's article "The Origins of the Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters*, Winter 1992–1993, suggests the most pernicious aspects of this policy.

18. Though one could argue that 637-class (*Sturgeon*) SSNs, being deactivated first, are a bit more versatile than their 688-class (*Los Angeles*) colleagues.

19. Witness collisions between the USS *Baton Rouge* and a Russian Sierra-class SSN, and between the USS *Grayling* and a Delta-type SSBN within the past year.

20. Though diesel submarine performance has increased, so has ASW sensor performance.

21. Another lesson from the outcry and litigation after Desert Storm is that people will not stand for their sons and brothers being killed by their own coalition's forces.

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22. See Jan Breemer's article "Where Are the Submarines?" U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, January 1993, pp. 37–42.

23. See (then) Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: Regional Defense Strategy*, January 1993. Though placing a greater emphasis on human rights and democratization, the new administration's policy lies within the bounds of major themes presented in that document.

24. This year we have eighty-eight SSNs. Without new construction, and assuming a thirty-year ship life, the American SSN force will drop at a rate of three to four ships a year beginning about 2010, reaching a level of thirty SSNs around 2015. Even if ship life is extended, maintaining force levels will require production of more than one ship per year if production is delayed.

25. Covert, local surveillance fits into the category of "niche" missions.

26. Michael Rothschild, *Bionomics: Economy as Ecosystem* (New York: Henry Holt, 1992) has excellent examples.

Ψ

Call for Papers

The World War II in the Pacific Conference will be held at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City, Arlington, Virginia, on 10–12 August 1994, sponsored by the American Society of Naval Engineers, the Marine Corps Historical Center and Marine Corps Historical Foundation, the Naval Historical Center, the Naval Historical Foundation, the Naval Order of the United States, and the U.S. Naval Institute.

This conference will examine the momentous Allied offensive campaign against the Empire of Japan from August 1942 to August 1945. The analysis of well known military and naval historians, the remembrances of veterans of the war, contemporary film, artifact displays, and book exhibits will focus on this dramatic clash of arms that so influenced the late twentieth century.

The World War II in the Pacific Conference Program Committee welcomes single papers or entire sessions on such aspects of the war as grand strategy and policy, Allied coalition politics, the South, Southwest, and Central Pacific campaigns, the battles of Leyte Gulf, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima, combat leadership, military medicine, intelligence and code-breaking, the evolution of naval air and amphibious warfare doctrines, combat art and photography, technological development of ships, aircraft, and weapons, Marine Raider and Navy UDT operations, and logistics.

Please send one-paragraph abstracts of paper or session proposals, curriculum vitae, and related correspondence to Dr. Edward J. Marolda, Chair, Program Committee, World War II in the Pacific Conference, Naval Historical Center, Bldg 57 WNY, Washington DC 20374-0571. Deadline for submission of proposals: 30 November 1993.