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Soviet Strategic Interests in the North

William F. Hickman

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defense began. Huge amounts of money were made available to the SDI project. The best and the brightest of the physics community in the United States and some allied countries were mobilized and set to it.

As each critical X-ray laser test proved less promising, wrenching debates about the physics of SDI racked the laboratories. The titanic intellectual battles tore apart the physics community—careers, marriages, and friendships were destroyed. Even as the tests were failing, new and more elaborate promises were made by Teller and the true believers of SDI at the Livermore Laboratory.

Very little of this made its way into the public realm. The most demanding critiques of the X-ray laser came from within the nuclear weapons community. Eventually, the program failed, and funding was drastically reduced to barely enough to keep the project alive. The current thinking is that perhaps in fifty years we will see an X-ray laser.

However, Edward Teller survived the implosion of his vision. Indeed, the budget demands called for a reduced program to defend only a few critical sites from random, isolated attacks, not with X-ray lasers but with Smart Pebbles, yet another vision of Teller and the Livermore Laboratory.

Broad accuses Teller of deception, but is this the point? Rather, shouldn't we ask what is the proper role for optimistic high technology when making defense policy? Clearly the science is needed, and clearly there have

been cases, such as SDI and the bomber

before World War II, when the technology has not lived up to its promise.

Ultimately, the value of Broad's work lies not in the question of Teller's veracity or mendacity but in its study of the relationship between the promises of science and of high technology and the making of national security strategy and policy.

William Broad's work, like that of C.P. Snow, should be read by those who would engage in defense or public policy making based on the promises of exotic physics. Great scientists, like administrators and policy makers, are not without the potential for self-deception.

FRANK C. MAHNCKE
Norfolk, Virginia

Amundsen, Kirsten. *Soviet Strategic Interests in the North*. New York: St. Martin's, 1990. 153pp. \$45

Bland, Douglas L. *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy*. New York: Praeger, 1991. 288pp. \$47.95

Drew, S. Nelson et al. *The Future of NATO: Facing an Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain Environment*. New York: Praeger, 1991. 224pp. \$42.95

Skorve, Johnny. *The Kola Satellite Image Atlas: Perspectives on Arms Control and Environmental Protection*. Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1991. 130pp. \$29.50

Just as those who live in the far north listen carefully during the spring thaw for the first rumblings that portend the breakup of the winter ice, so too do Americans listen carefully in the

political thaw for the rumblings that might portend the breakup of the Nato Alliance.

One has only to scan the international press to feel the building pressure. Even as Nato shifts its strategic focus away from the old unidirectional threat to the more unfocused risks in an unstable world, Europeans are questioning Nato's role and relevance. Plans for a European-only defense have been discussed in the European Community, the Western European Union, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Although the heads of all European Nato nations have publicly pledged their support to the organization, the future of Nato is by no means certain. The public debate is noisy and its intensity will only increase in the coming months and years.

In such a climate the appearance of new books about Nato can have unusual influence. Each of those under review is a well written exposition of one aspect of the debate over the future of Nato. However, the influence each might have on the debate varies significantly.

Soviet Strategic Interests in the North and *The Kola Satellite Image Atlas* might have less influence than the others. These provide what can best be called the classic Norwegian view of the Russian threat. Conditioned by decades of Soviet hostility, the books are an expression of the continuing Norwegian concern with the threat from the East. *Soviet Strategic Interests* was written before the breakup of the Soviet Union and, thus, focuses on

military activity. Because of this, the casual American reader might be tempted to regard the book as an anachronism and ignore it. That would be a mistake. Despite the dated appearance of her material, Dr. Amundsen's effort reflects a wide body of current Norwegian public opinion. Recent Norwegian polls indicate that even though the Soviet Union no longer exists, a large majority still view Russia as potentially a major threat. Going distinctly against the grain of public opinion in other Western nations, over sixty percent of Norwegians believe their defense budget should remain the same or even be increased.

Against this background Dr. Amundsen's analysis takes on new meaning. The key question she raises is, why, in the face of the clear change in Soviet policy toward the West, the Soviets (now Russians) still maintain and improve their formidable military posture vis-à-vis the small Scandinavian countries. Her detailed review of the strategic importance of the northern region and the difficult history of Soviet-Scandinavian relations gives the reader a better appreciation of why the Norwegians continue to view Russia with concern. By showing how the expanding (Russian) military presence on the Kola peninsula looks through Norwegian eyes, *Soviet Strategic Interests* provides a useful counterpoint to the more benign view of the Russians taken by the mainstream of European

Though non-Scandinavian readers might consider Dr. Amundsen's analysis myopic, they might do well to pick up *The Kola Satellite Atlas* next. Although not associated with Dr. Amundsen, the *Atlas* dramatically underscores her basic points. Using surprisingly detailed imagery available from commercial satellites (SPOT-P and LANDSAT-TM), the *Atlas* documents the increased number of military installations on the Kola Peninsula. With forty-three satellite images juxtaposed with explanatory maps and detailed analyses for each image, the reader is given a sobering view of the Russian military installations in this strategic bastion. For those without access to military satellite imagery or not familiar with the work of a photo interpreter, the *Atlas* is a fascinating glimpse into the field.

As with *Soviet Strategic Interests*, *The Future of NATO* appears dated when reviewing it in 1992. Written by senior U.S. military officers serving as National Security Fellows at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and based on research conducted in 1989-90, the book provides a thoughtful option for a revised Nato military strategy. Originally published in April 1992, during the period when Nato was developing its new strategy, *The Future of NATO* provided a distinct alternative to the alliance's military strategy of flexible response.

Starting from the premise that pressures for reduced defense spending would result in smaller forces available to meet the residual Soviet threat, the

conventional arms defensive strategy. Termed "resilient defense," the strategy was a carefully crafted attempt to replace large numbers of troops on the ground by capitalizing on existing mobilization capabilities.

Unfortunately, although both the strategy and the book are well thought out, events of the past several years have passed them by. The debate within Nato over a new strategy, which the book attempted to advance, took a completely different path. Nato's strategic review concluded that because future risks to alliance nations were multi-directional, multifaceted, and much less clearly defined than previously, it could open contacts with its former adversaries and make its operations more transparent to the opposition. The new strategy is now an unclassified, public document that focuses on crisis management and conflict prevention through a combination of political, economic, and military measures.

Despite this, *The Future of NATO* remains a book worth reading. Should the need arise, this book provides one possible military strategy by which the U.S. and Nato can increase their defensive posture on the ground in Europe while accommodating what are certain to be continued pressures for reduced defense spending.

In contrast to the above books, *The Military Committee* could have unusual significance. Focusing on the key, but surprisingly little-analyzed, committee of the chiefs of staff of most member nations, the book is both a thoroughly researched history of the organization and a thoughtful analysis

of the group's powerful role in the Nato policy process.

Writing from the perspective of one who has observed the organization at close quarters, Bland details the historical antecedents of the committee, how the present structure was developed, and how it has used its influence within the alliance. By itself, this historical analysis fills an important gap in literature about Nato. What gives the book its potential influence in the current debate, however, is the final chapter, in which Bland draws together the threads of structure and policy to postulate a seminal change in the structure of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Fully cognizant of and drawing upon the serious proposals that have been made within the debate over the relevance and future role of Nato in European defense, Bland concludes that a structure for European security cooperation is likely to be possible only within the Atlantic alliance. To avoid splitting the alliance along national or political lines, he suggests forming a regional military structure to support a reinforcement strategy. Allied Command Europe would be abolished and Nato's military forces organized into five major Nato commands: Atlantic Command, Northern European Command, Central European Command, Southern European Command, and Strategic Reserve Command. With appropriate nations grouped into relevant major Nato commands, the need for the post of SacEur (to this point always

an American) would dissolve and the post could be abolished. In such a radical realignment the Military Committee would assume a much more prominent role.

The Military Committee is an important book which deserves careful study by all who participate in the debate over the future of Nato. Although Nato is restructuring itself along less radical lines at the moment, unless the alliance is willing, as Bland points out, to look carefully at its basic structure, the essential political cohesion of the decades-old alliance could be in jeopardy.

WILLIAM F. HICKMAN
Captain, U.S. Navy
Northwood, United Kingdom

Hidden, John and Salmon, Patrick. *The Baltic Nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Longman, 1991. 224pp. (No price given)

During the profound transformation of political and economic relationships in Europe, a reexamination of the relative significance of peripheral and border areas is in order. At such times, the catalyst for dramatic developments has often appeared on the margins of the European state system. Given the conditions of uncertainty and erosion of long-standing security arrangements, even diminutive states and nonstate actors may momentarily play roles far out of proportion to their relative standing in the international community. Thus, the march of fundamental change